Beem Weeks's Blog - Posts Tagged "politics"
SNL
I'm just amazed that Saturday Night Live is still on the air. It lost it's mojo a long time ago. I remember those glory days of the 1970s, when John Belushi, Dan Aykroyd, Gilda Radner, Jane Curtin, Garrett Morris, Chevy Chase, and Laraine Newman actually made viewers laugh. They were fresh and relevant.
Politics ran sharp and smart, fads were lampooned, and characters became cultural icons. Rosanne Rosannadanna, The Blues Brothers, Samurai Warrior, Mr. Bill, Father Guido Sarducci; those were the best.
Even into the eighties the humor remained. But this version that hobbles around from week to week these days just isn't funny. The characters lack creativity, and Seth Myers is just plain awful doing Weekend Update. It's like that drunken uncle who used to be funny and wild, somebody you sort of looked up to. You know, he's your parents' age yet hip and easy to relate to. But now he's just pathetic, always coughing, laughs at his own jokes because nobody else will, and is in need of hip replacement surgery.
The mojo went bye-bye when they let Adam Sandler and other no-talent morons take to the air. That's when the standards went. And yet here we are, another Saturday night, and this dreck is occupying my TV. I don't know why or how I continue to watch. Habit, I suppose. Or maybe it's hope that still draws me in. Hope that this week will be the week where somebody steps up and writes a really funny sketch, creates a memorable character, and makes the world laugh again. Or maybe not.
Politics ran sharp and smart, fads were lampooned, and characters became cultural icons. Rosanne Rosannadanna, The Blues Brothers, Samurai Warrior, Mr. Bill, Father Guido Sarducci; those were the best.
Even into the eighties the humor remained. But this version that hobbles around from week to week these days just isn't funny. The characters lack creativity, and Seth Myers is just plain awful doing Weekend Update. It's like that drunken uncle who used to be funny and wild, somebody you sort of looked up to. You know, he's your parents' age yet hip and easy to relate to. But now he's just pathetic, always coughing, laughs at his own jokes because nobody else will, and is in need of hip replacement surgery.
The mojo went bye-bye when they let Adam Sandler and other no-talent morons take to the air. That's when the standards went. And yet here we are, another Saturday night, and this dreck is occupying my TV. I don't know why or how I continue to watch. Habit, I suppose. Or maybe it's hope that still draws me in. Hope that this week will be the week where somebody steps up and writes a really funny sketch, creates a memorable character, and makes the world laugh again. Or maybe not.
Democracy or Republic?
We hear it all the time on those dime-a-dozen twenty-four hour cable news channels, with the talking heads informing the American citizenry of our troops’ efforts to keep the world safe for democracy. Even our elected officials, during an election year, proudly proclaim their intentions to fight for our democracy. But I challenge anybody reading this article to search the Constitution of the United States of America and point out where the word democracy appears even one time in that document.
Article four, section four of the U.S. Constitution informs those who care to study this amazing document that we are, in fact, a republic. Nowhere in all of the Constitution will you find the word democracy.
There are those, when challenged on this subject, who will pronounce a democracy is the same system as a republic. But I’ll point the reader to the Federalist Papers. Paper ten, to be exact. In this particular paper we find James Madison explaining the differences between a democracy and a republic. He even explains why the founding fathers chose a republican form of government over a democracy.
Here is a sample of Federalist Paper 10:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, — is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
We the people of these United States of America are not a democracy. We are a republic. The problem is we’ve allowed politicians and media pundits to continually tell us we are something we really are not, until what we truly are has been stolen away. This knowledge must again be taught in our school systems across this nation.
If you’ve never read the Federalist Papers, I encourage you to educate yourselves with a read. If you haven’t bothered with the U.S. Constitution, please take the time to study this document. Otherwise, how will you know when your rights have been taken?
Knowledge is power!
Share it now!
Article four, section four of the U.S. Constitution informs those who care to study this amazing document that we are, in fact, a republic. Nowhere in all of the Constitution will you find the word democracy.
There are those, when challenged on this subject, who will pronounce a democracy is the same system as a republic. But I’ll point the reader to the Federalist Papers. Paper ten, to be exact. In this particular paper we find James Madison explaining the differences between a democracy and a republic. He even explains why the founding fathers chose a republican form of government over a democracy.
Here is a sample of Federalist Paper 10:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, — is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
We the people of these United States of America are not a democracy. We are a republic. The problem is we’ve allowed politicians and media pundits to continually tell us we are something we really are not, until what we truly are has been stolen away. This knowledge must again be taught in our school systems across this nation.
If you’ve never read the Federalist Papers, I encourage you to educate yourselves with a read. If you haven’t bothered with the U.S. Constitution, please take the time to study this document. Otherwise, how will you know when your rights have been taken?
Knowledge is power!
Share it now!
