JFK and the CIA
It has become something of the article of faith in some circles that JFK was totally hostile towards the CIA and even dedicated to breaking it apart or smashing it. While it is true that JFK had been more than irritated with the agency following the disaster at the Bay of Pigs – and had expressed that verbally – it would be a disservice to President Kennedy to think that he would act that emotionally at the height of the Cold War. Especially so given the political ramifications – and the fact that in 1962 the CIA intelligence work had been showcased and made much of during the Cuban missile crisis.
In reality President Kennedy faced a number of intelligence challenges, beginning with the history of discord between SAC intelligence and the CIA in terms of Russian ICBM capabilities. The reliance on the Air Force for Soviet intelligence collections diminished significantly under JFK, with the U-2 program being run by the CIA and the new Defense Intelligence Agency beginning its role of consolidating intelligence from the services, primarily the Air Force and Navy. But as far as intelligence collections, analysis, and reporting was concerned JFK would continue to rely primarily on the CIA and its Director until the time of his death.
In contrast, the role of the CIA in covert military operations was something that JFK mistrusted and had begun to move under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. First in SE Asia, specifically in covert missions against North Vietnam, and by 1963 in regard to Cuba. By mid-1963 the Joint Chiefs had been directed to begin planning and preparations for covert military operations against Cuba and had begun that process.
However the transition was clearly going to somewhat chaotic with the CIA continuing both a covert operations role into 1964 and the new idea of a totally independent and deniable offshore effort against Cuba (AMWORLD) just coming into play.
It was a complex and chaotic time, with JFK trying to shift roles while not exposing the US to either another major intelligence failure or further embarrassment while trying to keep covert action efforts against both North Vietnam and Cuba in play.
Chuck Ochelli and I recently had the opportunity to chat about how pragmatically the President was trying to restructure both intelligence and covert action at the height of the Cold War. Those interested can find that conversation at this link:
