Neither war nor preparations for war were the cause or effect of state formation in East Asia. Instead, emulation of China―the hegemon with a civilizational influence―drove the rapid formation of centralized, bureaucratically administered, territorial governments in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Furthermore, these countries engaged in state-building not to engage in conflict or to suppress revolt. In fact, war was relatively rare and there was no balance of power system with regular existential threats―the longevity of the East Asian dynasties is evidence of both the peacefulness of their neighborhood and their internal stability. We challenge the assumption that the European experience with war and state-making was universal. More importantly, we broaden the scope of state formation in East Asia beyond the study of China itself and show how countries in the region interacted and learned from each other and China to develop strong capacities and stable borders.
Let me start off by saying this is a must-read for those who are interested in the topic of state formation. I completely buy the authors' thesis that emulation was and still is a significant force for the development of states. Huang and Kang are good at drawing together the numerous institutional borrowings and patterns of government which were common to the region. They do well to check common misperceptions, like the relationship between Vietnamese and Chinese rulers.
I believe their concept of emulation has a wider application than the area explored in the book. Recent work by Anna Gryzmala-Busse showed the role of the medieval Church in promoting standard political and social institutions across Europe. In the same context, one could also point to certain large states, the Holy Roman Empire in particular, as being models for smaller kingdoms like Denmark and Poland. The dissemination of the so-called mandala model in Southeast Asia as well as forms of Islamic polity across different parts of Africa and Asia by merchants and scholars might be other cases of historical emulation which have not been so thoroughly explored by political scientists as of yet.
Huang and Kang also rightly move beyond the scope of mere institutions by bringing people and personalities back into the picture. The remarkable case of two scholar-bureaucrats, one Korean and one Vietnamese, who conversed fluently through the conventions of their time stood out in this respect. This region was not just bound by borrowed laws and administrative systems, but by people who were similarly educated and socialized and who had similar worldviews. This is no doubt a powerful channel for emulation.
As for my criticisms, I have three. First, at times the writing gets somewhat repetitive and the authors occasionally quote generalities rather than useful supporting information. Second, ecological and agricultural factors are neglected and downplayed too much. In the case of explaining nomadic conflict, North China was never really akin to Mongolia and the environment always supported more populous, and more sedentary, communities. North China even hosted species which were used for early crop domestication. There was no steppe analogue to this. Another force that spread the East Asian state might have been rice agriculture, as similarly structured villages multiplied across south China, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Japan. Third, war and emulation likely co-exist, rather than conflict as Huang and Kang frequently have it, as modes of state formation. This is more true globally when taking the cases of emulation I outlined earlier into account. But within the countries covered, wars certainly expanded the Vietnamese state southwards and the early Japanese state northwards, and coincided with political, military, and administrative reforms. The Manchu conquest of China ultimately led to the further extension of Chinese institutions into Manchuria via emulation.
Overall, a very useful work and one which must be taken seriously even if its maximalist arguments are often overstretched.