The Rommel Papers is the rough drafts and letters left by German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel at the time of his death, and then edited and added to by General Fritz Bayerlin, a general who was under Rommel’s command, and B.H. Liddle Hart, best known as a theorist of tank warfare. It is therefore as close to a memoir of his role in WWII as Rommel, who was forced to commit suicide in 1944, can provide. The book covers commanding a panzer division in the 1940 invasion of France, the Afrika Korps from 1941-43, the German occupation of Italy, and the Atlantic Wall and defence against the western allies in D-Day and its immediate aftermath.
The very nature of this work, being uncompleted at the time of Rommel’s death, and written in a period where he would have little time to put together a polished text, means it is rather uneven. Some bits have a pacy narrative, others a bit technical, while at points it is a bit sparse in content on the campaign itself. The invasion of France is quite one dimensional - we have Rommel dashing around without any real overview. The best bit is in the middle with the campaign in Africa where Rommel has a higher level role to provide the strategic and operational overview while still being a man on the spot so able to give good personal reflections on the conditions at the front. The final section on the D-Day invasion of Normandy is handicapped in terms of it being a “Rommel paper” by being really by Bayerlin with limited input by Rommel on account of the principal's untimely forced suicide. For me the use of letters did not add very much, and could break the narrative. But it should not be forgotten that the flipside is that we have something closer to Rommel’s true views during the war than the memoirs of many generals that have been edited in the context of defeat and time to reflect (and sometimes lay blame or coverup!)
The book gives, though often implicitly, a good idea of Rommel’s method of war. Manoeuvre, fast paced, leading from the front. Rommel might therefore be considered fortunate to have been leading an army group in Africa where there was only a narrow front on which to do this - it is a method that would have been next to impossible in a front of hundreds of miles with poor communications along it as in Russia.
It has been a good few years since I last read a history of the desert campaign making it difficult to tell where this suffers from being one sided. Liddle-Hart adds notes to point out any egregious errors but this can't be said to create any balance. Rommel does provide sections looking back at what went wrong but it is difficult while still in the war to be truly objective so these are not always as critical as they could be. For example Rommel suggests that if supply lines across the med had been secured not only could Egypt have been overrun (plausible, but debatable) but they could have “thrust forward into Persia and Irak” and “create a base for an attack on southern Russia” (p514). While strategically not a bad idea this is simply swapping one long vulnerable supply chain for another! And he is sometimes inconsistent. So this is probably best read in the context of having read other materials on these campaigns to provide that balance.
Ultimately as a primary source from one of the main participants this is valuable in giving an idea of Rommel’s views at the time. It is less effective if you are looking for a straight book on the campaign so I would recommend for If you already have a bit of knowledge of the campaigns, particularly the desert war, or want to read other books on it at the same time.