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Lincoln and His Admirals
Abraham Lincoln began his presidency admitting that he knew "but little of ships," but he quickly came to preside over the largest national armada to that time, not eclipsed until World War I. Written by naval historian Craig L. Symonds, Lincoln and His Admirals unveils an aspect of Lincoln's presidency unexamined by historians until now, revealing how he managed the men who ran the naval side of the Civil War, and how the activities of the Union Navy ultimately affected the course of history.
Beginning with a gripping account of the attempt to re-supply Fort Sumter--a comedy of errors that shows all too clearly the fledgling president's inexperience--Symonds traces Lincoln's steady growth as a wartime commander-in-chief. Absent a Secretary of Defense, he would eventually become de facto commander of joint operations along the coast and on the rivers. That involved dealing with the men who ran the the loyal but often cranky Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, the quiet and reliable David G. Farragut, the flamboyant and unpredictable Charles Wilkes, the ambitious ordnance expert John Dahlgren, the well-connected Samuel Phillips Lee, and the self-promoting and gregarious David Dixon Porter. Lincoln was remarkably patient; he often postponed critical decisions until the momentum of events made the consequences of those decisions evident. But Symonds also shows that Lincoln could act decisively. Disappointed by the lethargy of his senior naval officers on the scene, he
stepped in and personally directed an amphibious assault on the Virginia coast, a successful operation that led to the capture of Norfolk. The man who knew "but little of ships" had transformed himself into one of the greatest naval strategists of his age.
Co-winner of the 2009 Lincoln Prize
Winner of the 2009
Barondess/Lincoln Prize by the Civil War Round Table of New York
John Lyman Award of the North American Society for Oceanic History
Daniel and Marilyn Laney Prize by the Austin Civil War Round Table
Nevins-Freeman Prize of the Civil War Round Table of Chicago
Beginning with a gripping account of the attempt to re-supply Fort Sumter--a comedy of errors that shows all too clearly the fledgling president's inexperience--Symonds traces Lincoln's steady growth as a wartime commander-in-chief. Absent a Secretary of Defense, he would eventually become de facto commander of joint operations along the coast and on the rivers. That involved dealing with the men who ran the the loyal but often cranky Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, the quiet and reliable David G. Farragut, the flamboyant and unpredictable Charles Wilkes, the ambitious ordnance expert John Dahlgren, the well-connected Samuel Phillips Lee, and the self-promoting and gregarious David Dixon Porter. Lincoln was remarkably patient; he often postponed critical decisions until the momentum of events made the consequences of those decisions evident. But Symonds also shows that Lincoln could act decisively. Disappointed by the lethargy of his senior naval officers on the scene, he
stepped in and personally directed an amphibious assault on the Virginia coast, a successful operation that led to the capture of Norfolk. The man who knew "but little of ships" had transformed himself into one of the greatest naval strategists of his age.
Co-winner of the 2009 Lincoln Prize
Winner of the 2009
Barondess/Lincoln Prize by the Civil War Round Table of New York
John Lyman Award of the North American Society for Oceanic History
Daniel and Marilyn Laney Prize by the Austin Civil War Round Table
Nevins-Freeman Prize of the Civil War Round Table of Chicago
430 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 2008
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734 people want to read
About the author
Craig L. Symonds
45 books241 followersCraig Lee Symonds is a retired professor and former chairman of the history department at the United States Naval Academy. He earned both his MA (1969) and Ph.D. (1976) from the University of Florida.
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August 15, 2022
The title of this book is a play on Lincoln and His Generals, since Lincoln’s well-known difficulties with the generals of the Union Army get most of the attention in Lincoln biographies and Civil War histories. But Lincoln also had plenty of challenges dealing with the Navy, whose admirals could often be just as prickly and exasperating - and whose efforts, while not necessarily equal in importance or prominence to those of the army, still played a noteworthy role in waging and winning the war.
I am not a Civil War expert, so much of what I know about the Navy’s role in the war is from narratives in which the Navy plays a background, supporting role in Army operations. Major naval engagements that I am aware of, like the Battle of the Monitor and Merrimack, are well described, while other aspects of the naval war about which I am more vaguely aware, like submarine warfare and the famed CSS Hunley, are not mentioned at all. That’s because this is not meant to be a history of the Civil War-era U.S. Navy, as Symonds explains that “operational history is included only when it helps explain the context for the problems and issues that made their way to Lincoln’s desk.”
So what this book does do, is bring Lincoln’s role as Naval commander to the forefront, putting the Army in the background for once. After all, the president’s title that’s usually shortened to “Commander in Chief” is really, more accurately, “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” Instead of Lincoln’s fraught relationships with many of his well-known generals, we learn of his fraught relationships with many of his lesser-known admirals. Instead of his close relationship with War Secretary Edwin Stanton, we learn of his relationship with Navy Secretary Gideon Welles. And instead of his frequent visits to the War Department’s telegraph office for news from the front, we learn of his frequent visits to the Washington Navy Yard - including on the very last day of his life (which is described in the book’s final pages, as Symonds brings his story to a poignant and portentous end).
As the war itself began with a naval operation, the book begins with an excellent recounting of Lincoln’s deliberations on how to resupply Forts Sumter and Pickens. While his inexperience and lack of strong management ability stood out in what became a comedy of errors in handling this first crisis, Symonds also shows how Lincoln sought advice, deliberated carefully, took responsibility for his actions, and ultimately succeeded in projecting strength while avoiding firing the first shot of the war.
Once the war began, Lincoln’s most prominent use of the Navy was in enforcing the blockade of the South. Symonds describes how Lincoln threaded the needle, declaring a blockade without acknowledging the enemy as a distinct country, and ultimately prevailing in the Prize Cases before the Supreme Court, which determined that "the United States was legally engaged in a war against an enemy that did not legally exist." Later, there’s a full and dramatic treatment of the Trent Affair, the naval engagement that resulted in a diplomatic spat and potential war with the UK. Symonds describes it as “Abraham Lincoln's Cuban Missile Crisis," as his delicate diplomacy ultimately resolved the matter peacefully.
Much of the rest of the narrative deals with combined operations, both along the Atlantic coast and on Western rivers, in which the Army and Navy worked together - and not always harmoniously. In contrast to today, when there’s a Department of Defense and a Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was left to Lincoln to referee disputes and rivalries between the coequal War Department and Navy Department, as "there was no individual below the president himself who had joint command of both services."
There are helpful maps at appropriate places in the book, and the narrative succeeds in its goal of staying focused on Lincoln without getting bogged down in details of battles and tactics. Some broader context about what else was on Lincoln’s mind is also necessary at times, even though it strays from the book’s otherwise strict naval focus.
This is fine for the most part, but it’s also where the book shows some weaknesses, since Symonds is a naval and not a political historian. He asserts that Lincoln, who once advocated colonizing freed slaves overseas but ultimately dropped it as being unworkable, clung to the idea as late as 1864 - which is a hotly debated and inconclusively documented assertion, but Symonds simply states it as fact without citing any sources in the narrative or in his end notes. Earlier, he begins to tell the fascinating story of the 1861 naval victory at the Battle of Port Royal, which resulted in the formation of colonies of displaced slaves along the South Carolina coast, but abruptly drops it when Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase enters the picture, without ever explaining why he assumed control of the whole experiment. And a cringeworthy footnote confuses the White House’s second floor Oval Room with the not-yet-existent Oval Office, as Symonds earnestly explains that Lincoln "did not use the now-famous Oval Office during his years in the White House. That space was then the White House library."
On the whole, though, the book does an admirable job in highlighting a different side of the war and of Lincoln’s presidency, which don’t ordinarily get this level of attention. Personalities like Welles and Assistant Naval Secretary Gustavus Fox are given prominent attention, as are a host of admirals whose fame pales in comparison to the likes of Grant, Sherman and McClellan. Symonds is realistic in assessing the Navy’s overall importance in the war, acknowledging that "it had been mainly an army war, but the navy, too, had played its part." But the naval side of the story still deserves to be told, not only for its own sake, but for what it tells us about Lincoln as Commander in Chief. And Symonds has done it here, creating a worthy companion piece to the oft-told story of Lincoln and his Generals.
I am not a Civil War expert, so much of what I know about the Navy’s role in the war is from narratives in which the Navy plays a background, supporting role in Army operations. Major naval engagements that I am aware of, like the Battle of the Monitor and Merrimack, are well described, while other aspects of the naval war about which I am more vaguely aware, like submarine warfare and the famed CSS Hunley, are not mentioned at all. That’s because this is not meant to be a history of the Civil War-era U.S. Navy, as Symonds explains that “operational history is included only when it helps explain the context for the problems and issues that made their way to Lincoln’s desk.”
So what this book does do, is bring Lincoln’s role as Naval commander to the forefront, putting the Army in the background for once. After all, the president’s title that’s usually shortened to “Commander in Chief” is really, more accurately, “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” Instead of Lincoln’s fraught relationships with many of his well-known generals, we learn of his fraught relationships with many of his lesser-known admirals. Instead of his close relationship with War Secretary Edwin Stanton, we learn of his relationship with Navy Secretary Gideon Welles. And instead of his frequent visits to the War Department’s telegraph office for news from the front, we learn of his frequent visits to the Washington Navy Yard - including on the very last day of his life (which is described in the book’s final pages, as Symonds brings his story to a poignant and portentous end).
As the war itself began with a naval operation, the book begins with an excellent recounting of Lincoln’s deliberations on how to resupply Forts Sumter and Pickens. While his inexperience and lack of strong management ability stood out in what became a comedy of errors in handling this first crisis, Symonds also shows how Lincoln sought advice, deliberated carefully, took responsibility for his actions, and ultimately succeeded in projecting strength while avoiding firing the first shot of the war.
Once the war began, Lincoln’s most prominent use of the Navy was in enforcing the blockade of the South. Symonds describes how Lincoln threaded the needle, declaring a blockade without acknowledging the enemy as a distinct country, and ultimately prevailing in the Prize Cases before the Supreme Court, which determined that "the United States was legally engaged in a war against an enemy that did not legally exist." Later, there’s a full and dramatic treatment of the Trent Affair, the naval engagement that resulted in a diplomatic spat and potential war with the UK. Symonds describes it as “Abraham Lincoln's Cuban Missile Crisis," as his delicate diplomacy ultimately resolved the matter peacefully.
Much of the rest of the narrative deals with combined operations, both along the Atlantic coast and on Western rivers, in which the Army and Navy worked together - and not always harmoniously. In contrast to today, when there’s a Department of Defense and a Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was left to Lincoln to referee disputes and rivalries between the coequal War Department and Navy Department, as "there was no individual below the president himself who had joint command of both services."
There are helpful maps at appropriate places in the book, and the narrative succeeds in its goal of staying focused on Lincoln without getting bogged down in details of battles and tactics. Some broader context about what else was on Lincoln’s mind is also necessary at times, even though it strays from the book’s otherwise strict naval focus.
This is fine for the most part, but it’s also where the book shows some weaknesses, since Symonds is a naval and not a political historian. He asserts that Lincoln, who once advocated colonizing freed slaves overseas but ultimately dropped it as being unworkable, clung to the idea as late as 1864 - which is a hotly debated and inconclusively documented assertion, but Symonds simply states it as fact without citing any sources in the narrative or in his end notes. Earlier, he begins to tell the fascinating story of the 1861 naval victory at the Battle of Port Royal, which resulted in the formation of colonies of displaced slaves along the South Carolina coast, but abruptly drops it when Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase enters the picture, without ever explaining why he assumed control of the whole experiment. And a cringeworthy footnote confuses the White House’s second floor Oval Room with the not-yet-existent Oval Office, as Symonds earnestly explains that Lincoln "did not use the now-famous Oval Office during his years in the White House. That space was then the White House library."
On the whole, though, the book does an admirable job in highlighting a different side of the war and of Lincoln’s presidency, which don’t ordinarily get this level of attention. Personalities like Welles and Assistant Naval Secretary Gustavus Fox are given prominent attention, as are a host of admirals whose fame pales in comparison to the likes of Grant, Sherman and McClellan. Symonds is realistic in assessing the Navy’s overall importance in the war, acknowledging that "it had been mainly an army war, but the navy, too, had played its part." But the naval side of the story still deserves to be told, not only for its own sake, but for what it tells us about Lincoln as Commander in Chief. And Symonds has done it here, creating a worthy companion piece to the oft-told story of Lincoln and his Generals.
June 9, 2023
Little About Ships
In May, 1861, two months after assuming the presidency, Abraham Lincoln told his Secretary of the Navy, the crusty Gideon Welles, that "I know but little about ships". Over the next four years, Lincoln learned a great deal about ships, and about much more besides. In his highly acclaimed book, "Lincoln and his Admirals" (2008) Craig Symonds tells the little-known story of Lincoln's relationship to the Navy. Symonds is professor emeritus of history at Annapolis, and this book was the co-winner of the prestigious Lincoln Prize. Symonds has written extensively about both naval history and Civil War history, including works about Gettysburg, biographies of Confederate Generals Joseph Johnston and Patrick Cleburne, and a biography of Confederate Admiral Franklin Buchanan. But "Lincoln and his Admirals" may prove to be Symonds's most enduring work. It is a true accomplishment which manages the rare feat of saying something fresh and valuable about Lincoln and the Civil War.
Symonds's book is not a military history of the engagements of the Navy. Thus, some of the most famous naval actions of the Civil War, such as Farragut's victory at Mobile Bay, (and his capture of New Orleans for that matter), or the Navy warship "Kerseage's" capture of the CSA's raider "Alabama" are not described in detail. Even the on-the-seas description of the Union blockade is sparse. In general, Symonds describes naval engagements only to the extent they cast light on Lincoln's relationship to the Navy and of the Navy's political history during the war. The focus of the book is thus on Lincoln, on Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Gustavus Fox, and on their political relationship with the rest of Lincoln's cabinet, especially Secretary of State Seward, Secretary of War Stanton, and Secretary of the Treasury Chase. The command relationship, or lack of it, between the Army and the Navy is discussed throughout. Symonds gives close attention as well to the command structure of the Navy. At the outset of the Civil War, there were no Admirals in the service. The service developed as Lincoln and Welles searched for leaders in a way that had many parallels to Lincoln's painful search for able leaders of the Army.
With all the attention to the political growth of the Navy, Symonds's primary focus is on Lincoln's own growth as a leader. Symonds's portrait weaves together Lincoln's growing mastery of the Navy with broader political issues, especially those involving slavery and Emancipation. The book examines Lincoln's leadership in the sensitive areas of foreign affairs raised by the Civil War. Symonds has insights to offer into Lincoln's personal life, particularly with the death of his young son Willie early in his administration. Without sentimentalizing the matter, Symonds shows how Lincoln used his gift for storytelling and his sense of humor to break tension and to advance his political goals.
The book is organized by chapters covering each of the years 1861 - 1864, with a brief epilogue for 1865 and an important Introduction. The discussion early in the book of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's tentativeness at this point of his presidency is one of the most detailed and important of the book. Symonds also gives a thorough account of the early "Trent" affair, which threatened a war with Britain that the United States could ill afford, and of the political and legal issues involving the origins of the blockade. Much of the book describes the poor coordination and rivalry between the Army and the Navy and of how Lincoln had to work to pull the services together. Lincoln became a hands-on commander in order to implement the necessary coordination and to satisfy his own curiosity and interest in technology and in the instruments of war, especially as they involved river warfare and the development of ironclads. Symonds offers a full discussion of the Navy's role at Forts Henry and Donelson and at Vicksburg. He shows the importance of the Navy's coastal activities to the question of dealing with escaped slaves or "contrabands" and how this ultimately contributed to the Emancipation Proclamation.
Throughout the book, Symonds emphasizes how Lincoln grew into greatness. Lincoln emerges in Symonds's account as a somewhat passive, and reflective leader who tried to allow events to unfold in order to make an informed, balanced decision. Symonds accepts Lincoln's own characterization of his presidency: "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me." (Introduction, at xi) Lincoln also, for Symonds, was a principled but pragmatic leader. Lincoln allowed situations to develop and then made what he felt was the best decision under the circumstances without necessarily becoming "hamstrung by established doctrine." (Introduction, at xi.) Symonds also praises Lincoln's creativity and ingenuity with mechanical things (Lincoln was the only president to hold a patent), a factor sometimes overlooked in his leadership. In Symonds's account, Lincoln grows from an inexperienced, vacillating leader, to a president who gradually learns to master events and subordinates. Ultimately, when he finds Army and Navy leadership with which he is satisfied, Lincoln becomes willing to delegate and have professionals take control of the military aspects of the war.
This is a dense, difficult book. It covers some matters covered in most histories of the Civil War but treats them in a new way. It also addresses some matters that people knowledgeable about the conflict will find unfamiliar. The book is a study of the political role of the Navy during the war. But even more, it is a meditation on the evolving character of Lincoln's leadership.
Robin Friedman
In May, 1861, two months after assuming the presidency, Abraham Lincoln told his Secretary of the Navy, the crusty Gideon Welles, that "I know but little about ships". Over the next four years, Lincoln learned a great deal about ships, and about much more besides. In his highly acclaimed book, "Lincoln and his Admirals" (2008) Craig Symonds tells the little-known story of Lincoln's relationship to the Navy. Symonds is professor emeritus of history at Annapolis, and this book was the co-winner of the prestigious Lincoln Prize. Symonds has written extensively about both naval history and Civil War history, including works about Gettysburg, biographies of Confederate Generals Joseph Johnston and Patrick Cleburne, and a biography of Confederate Admiral Franklin Buchanan. But "Lincoln and his Admirals" may prove to be Symonds's most enduring work. It is a true accomplishment which manages the rare feat of saying something fresh and valuable about Lincoln and the Civil War.
Symonds's book is not a military history of the engagements of the Navy. Thus, some of the most famous naval actions of the Civil War, such as Farragut's victory at Mobile Bay, (and his capture of New Orleans for that matter), or the Navy warship "Kerseage's" capture of the CSA's raider "Alabama" are not described in detail. Even the on-the-seas description of the Union blockade is sparse. In general, Symonds describes naval engagements only to the extent they cast light on Lincoln's relationship to the Navy and of the Navy's political history during the war. The focus of the book is thus on Lincoln, on Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Gustavus Fox, and on their political relationship with the rest of Lincoln's cabinet, especially Secretary of State Seward, Secretary of War Stanton, and Secretary of the Treasury Chase. The command relationship, or lack of it, between the Army and the Navy is discussed throughout. Symonds gives close attention as well to the command structure of the Navy. At the outset of the Civil War, there were no Admirals in the service. The service developed as Lincoln and Welles searched for leaders in a way that had many parallels to Lincoln's painful search for able leaders of the Army.
With all the attention to the political growth of the Navy, Symonds's primary focus is on Lincoln's own growth as a leader. Symonds's portrait weaves together Lincoln's growing mastery of the Navy with broader political issues, especially those involving slavery and Emancipation. The book examines Lincoln's leadership in the sensitive areas of foreign affairs raised by the Civil War. Symonds has insights to offer into Lincoln's personal life, particularly with the death of his young son Willie early in his administration. Without sentimentalizing the matter, Symonds shows how Lincoln used his gift for storytelling and his sense of humor to break tension and to advance his political goals.
The book is organized by chapters covering each of the years 1861 - 1864, with a brief epilogue for 1865 and an important Introduction. The discussion early in the book of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's tentativeness at this point of his presidency is one of the most detailed and important of the book. Symonds also gives a thorough account of the early "Trent" affair, which threatened a war with Britain that the United States could ill afford, and of the political and legal issues involving the origins of the blockade. Much of the book describes the poor coordination and rivalry between the Army and the Navy and of how Lincoln had to work to pull the services together. Lincoln became a hands-on commander in order to implement the necessary coordination and to satisfy his own curiosity and interest in technology and in the instruments of war, especially as they involved river warfare and the development of ironclads. Symonds offers a full discussion of the Navy's role at Forts Henry and Donelson and at Vicksburg. He shows the importance of the Navy's coastal activities to the question of dealing with escaped slaves or "contrabands" and how this ultimately contributed to the Emancipation Proclamation.
Throughout the book, Symonds emphasizes how Lincoln grew into greatness. Lincoln emerges in Symonds's account as a somewhat passive, and reflective leader who tried to allow events to unfold in order to make an informed, balanced decision. Symonds accepts Lincoln's own characterization of his presidency: "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me." (Introduction, at xi) Lincoln also, for Symonds, was a principled but pragmatic leader. Lincoln allowed situations to develop and then made what he felt was the best decision under the circumstances without necessarily becoming "hamstrung by established doctrine." (Introduction, at xi.) Symonds also praises Lincoln's creativity and ingenuity with mechanical things (Lincoln was the only president to hold a patent), a factor sometimes overlooked in his leadership. In Symonds's account, Lincoln grows from an inexperienced, vacillating leader, to a president who gradually learns to master events and subordinates. Ultimately, when he finds Army and Navy leadership with which he is satisfied, Lincoln becomes willing to delegate and have professionals take control of the military aspects of the war.
This is a dense, difficult book. It covers some matters covered in most histories of the Civil War but treats them in a new way. It also addresses some matters that people knowledgeable about the conflict will find unfamiliar. The book is a study of the political role of the Navy during the war. But even more, it is a meditation on the evolving character of Lincoln's leadership.
Robin Friedman
August 13, 2013
An excellent, well-organized, and coherent work about Lincoln, his involvement in the war’s naval campaigns, and decision-making in the naval establishment of the time. Symonds does a great job setting the context: the politics, the strategies, the land and naval campaigns, foreign relations, economics and the state of the nation as a whole.
Through the management of the naval establishment, Symonds develops as a theme the three key leadership skills that Lincoln employed to success, which were patience, pragmatism, and acceptance of new ideas. According to Symonds, Lincoln was a reactive leader, not a proactive one as demonstrated by no set program of reform. “His genius derived more from what might be labeled inspired patience than from insistent direction” (p. xi). When action was required, sometimes forcibly, the administration was required to deal with exponentially growing problems. Lincoln was pragmatic and innovative in looking for solutions. He frequently advocated the development and use of new technologies to fight the Civil War. He often participated in the testing of new weapons and was a frequent presence at the Washington Navy Yard, as much as he is reported to appear at the telegraph office or War Department.
Also, most of the portraits that Symonds paints of the navy leaders aren’t very flattering. Charles Wilkes, for example, “entered the war with a well-earned reputation for cupidity and obstinacy, and lived up to it during the war.” David Dixon Porter was “brash, self-promoting, and not always truthful.” Lincoln came to think of Samuel Francis DuPont as “a nautical George McClellan.” Lincoln’s favorite admiral, John A. Dahlgren, was judged to have gone insane. (In all fairness, it was also thought from time to time that General William T. Sherman had gone insane.) The reluctance of some of the naval officers to fight “compelled [Lincoln] to become involved in the planning and execution of particular campaigns, even directing an amphibious landing on the Virginia coast to capture Norfolk.”
Lincoln improved upon his performance in naval issues by taking some those issues into his own hands. In the west, he championed a river campaign utilizing combined army and naval forces that could strike simultaneously at multiple targets and force the rebels to divide its military resources. While not as directly involved, he was similarly heartened by the success of Admiral David Farragut's taking of New Orleans and run up the Mississippi. These combined operations succeeded in giving the North a toehold on both ends of the Mississippi as it ran through the South.
The other significant part of this Anaconda plan was the blockade of southern ports. Here, Lincoln first had to navigate admiralty law while his fleet was built or acquired. Thanks to "King Cotton," European nations had a vested interest in maintaining trade with the South. They would not submit to a "paper blockade": the North would have to have a real force in place. Yet, the logistics of putting a blockade in place seemed to worry Lincoln less than the legal gymnastics required to legitimize a blockade against the South, which Lincoln had contended was not an entity in and of itself. Symond's explains this well.
In all, a must-read for anyone interested in the war’s naval campaigns.
Through the management of the naval establishment, Symonds develops as a theme the three key leadership skills that Lincoln employed to success, which were patience, pragmatism, and acceptance of new ideas. According to Symonds, Lincoln was a reactive leader, not a proactive one as demonstrated by no set program of reform. “His genius derived more from what might be labeled inspired patience than from insistent direction” (p. xi). When action was required, sometimes forcibly, the administration was required to deal with exponentially growing problems. Lincoln was pragmatic and innovative in looking for solutions. He frequently advocated the development and use of new technologies to fight the Civil War. He often participated in the testing of new weapons and was a frequent presence at the Washington Navy Yard, as much as he is reported to appear at the telegraph office or War Department.
Also, most of the portraits that Symonds paints of the navy leaders aren’t very flattering. Charles Wilkes, for example, “entered the war with a well-earned reputation for cupidity and obstinacy, and lived up to it during the war.” David Dixon Porter was “brash, self-promoting, and not always truthful.” Lincoln came to think of Samuel Francis DuPont as “a nautical George McClellan.” Lincoln’s favorite admiral, John A. Dahlgren, was judged to have gone insane. (In all fairness, it was also thought from time to time that General William T. Sherman had gone insane.) The reluctance of some of the naval officers to fight “compelled [Lincoln] to become involved in the planning and execution of particular campaigns, even directing an amphibious landing on the Virginia coast to capture Norfolk.”
Lincoln improved upon his performance in naval issues by taking some those issues into his own hands. In the west, he championed a river campaign utilizing combined army and naval forces that could strike simultaneously at multiple targets and force the rebels to divide its military resources. While not as directly involved, he was similarly heartened by the success of Admiral David Farragut's taking of New Orleans and run up the Mississippi. These combined operations succeeded in giving the North a toehold on both ends of the Mississippi as it ran through the South.
The other significant part of this Anaconda plan was the blockade of southern ports. Here, Lincoln first had to navigate admiralty law while his fleet was built or acquired. Thanks to "King Cotton," European nations had a vested interest in maintaining trade with the South. They would not submit to a "paper blockade": the North would have to have a real force in place. Yet, the logistics of putting a blockade in place seemed to worry Lincoln less than the legal gymnastics required to legitimize a blockade against the South, which Lincoln had contended was not an entity in and of itself. Symond's explains this well.
In all, a must-read for anyone interested in the war’s naval campaigns.
June 25, 2022
Earlier this year I read Symonds book The Battle of Midway, and after reading Lincoln and His Admirals, Symonds has become one of my favorite authors. His style of writing causes the words to flow across the page and create the desire to read more, making it hard to put the book down.
I enjoyed Symonds method of describing the various admirals and their relationship with Lincoln. Symonds also does a fantastic job of detailing the petty bickering between the Army and Navy that many times had less than desirable outcomes.
Most importantly, there are many leadership lessons to be gleaned from the book including personal relationships, the importance of issuing clear and direct orders, not promoting people due to political favoritism, and the necessity of cooperation.
Symonds also does a great job explaining Lincoln's position when he first came into office when he had to deal with slow moving military officers who were either incompetent or reluctant to act. Until reading Symonds book, I have always held the opinion that Lincoln meddled entirely too much in military affairs. I now have a different outlook thanks to Lincoln and His Admirals, and I understand that Lincoln was reluctant to engage in military matters but was forced into acting because of the officers he dealt with until later in the war when more competent individuals were in command.
This is a great read!
I enjoyed Symonds method of describing the various admirals and their relationship with Lincoln. Symonds also does a fantastic job of detailing the petty bickering between the Army and Navy that many times had less than desirable outcomes.
Most importantly, there are many leadership lessons to be gleaned from the book including personal relationships, the importance of issuing clear and direct orders, not promoting people due to political favoritism, and the necessity of cooperation.
Symonds also does a great job explaining Lincoln's position when he first came into office when he had to deal with slow moving military officers who were either incompetent or reluctant to act. Until reading Symonds book, I have always held the opinion that Lincoln meddled entirely too much in military affairs. I now have a different outlook thanks to Lincoln and His Admirals, and I understand that Lincoln was reluctant to engage in military matters but was forced into acting because of the officers he dealt with until later in the war when more competent individuals were in command.
This is a great read!
December 9, 2011
This is an interesting volume, exploring Abraham Lincoln's admirals, his role in naval decision making, and the effectiveness of strategic and tactical decisions using the navy. In the process, we learn about some of the more important naval leaders. We learn of the team: Lincoln and his top naval advisors Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and his Assistant Secretary Gustavus Fox. The author notes (Page xiii): "One of the themes of this book is to demonstrate not only how Lincoln managed the navy, and particularly its admirals, during its great national drama, but also how--and how much--he grew in the job during his metamorphosis into greatness."
Admirals such as DuPont, Farragut, Foote, Porter, Goldsborough, Lee, and so on. The book does a nice job of discussing the naval commanders who did not "cut the mustard" and those who did. We learn of those admirals who could work with others and those who did a poor job of collaboration. The book does not necessarily spend a great deal of time on specific battles--such as the taking of New Orleans by David Farragut. But one learns how such events fit into the larger picture.
The book does a good job of describing the politics of naval decisions and how decisions came about.
If interested in the relationship between the Lincoln Administration and the navy, this would prove a fine addition to one's library.
Admirals such as DuPont, Farragut, Foote, Porter, Goldsborough, Lee, and so on. The book does a nice job of discussing the naval commanders who did not "cut the mustard" and those who did. We learn of those admirals who could work with others and those who did a poor job of collaboration. The book does not necessarily spend a great deal of time on specific battles--such as the taking of New Orleans by David Farragut. But one learns how such events fit into the larger picture.
The book does a good job of describing the politics of naval decisions and how decisions came about.
If interested in the relationship between the Lincoln Administration and the navy, this would prove a fine addition to one's library.
December 17, 2022
Lincoln & his Admirals
Craig L. Symonds
There are many books about President Lincoln’s relationship with Civil War generals such as McClellan and Grant.
With his usual flair and skill, Mr. Symonds tells the story of the Civil War US Navy, it’s importance and relationship with the President. He also tells several rarely publicized stories involving mid-rank officers which were key to victory and international affairs.
Such as the story of Cmdr Napoleon Collins and his capture of the CSS Florida in a Brazillian port. He ignored international Naval customs to do so, even though he had been reprimanded by the President himself previously for his part in an international incident. But he knew this elusive raider had to be stopped, so he acted anyway. The Brazillians protested with a wink, the US government blamed it on the junior officer with a wink.
This book was interesting and documents many interesting incidents and Lincoln’s remarkable leadership skills.
Craig L. Symonds
There are many books about President Lincoln’s relationship with Civil War generals such as McClellan and Grant.
With his usual flair and skill, Mr. Symonds tells the story of the Civil War US Navy, it’s importance and relationship with the President. He also tells several rarely publicized stories involving mid-rank officers which were key to victory and international affairs.
Such as the story of Cmdr Napoleon Collins and his capture of the CSS Florida in a Brazillian port. He ignored international Naval customs to do so, even though he had been reprimanded by the President himself previously for his part in an international incident. But he knew this elusive raider had to be stopped, so he acted anyway. The Brazillians protested with a wink, the US government blamed it on the junior officer with a wink.
This book was interesting and documents many interesting incidents and Lincoln’s remarkable leadership skills.
September 2, 2023
Military buffs would probably be disappointed but those looking for a more specific or alternate view of the American Civil War might enjoy this book. The book deals with the military, political, diplomatic and economic actions involving the Union Navy during the American Civil War as well as the relationship between Lincoln, his admirals, and the inter-service rivalry between the army and navy. Although the ACW was mainly a land war, nevertheless the navy played an important part of the conflict through the blockade of southern ports, assisting the army in the western campaign and hunting down commerce raiders on the seas. As important, the book also details the diplomatic struggles suffered by the Union as a result of neutral trading with the Confederacy and the harbouring of Confederate privateers. In short, the book offers a new perspective not often seen, and I enjoyed it throughout.
June 27, 2025
It's well written, but it's not an area of history that is my usual bailiwick. It's well written, and Civil War buffs will have a field day with this, but I tend to pick and choose what I like in here, particularly a new view of the Trent Affair. Not my personal cup of tea, but an excellent research tool.
February 21, 2015
A command study of Lincoln & his navy. I recommend this book for anyone who wants to better understand the navy's role in the Civil War.
When he became President, Lincoln didn't know anything about the navy. When he had commanders he could rely on, he was happy to let Gideon Welles (his Secretary of the Navy) & his commanders run things. But he could & did take charge when he had to, for example by ordering the navy to transport troops to capture Norfolk & to speed up the production of mortars used to bombard Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi.
Lincoln preferred to let events unfold until his course of action became clear. That didn't serve him well during the Fort Sumter crisis. It served him better during diplomatic crises with England & Brazil caused by overzealous Union naval captains who violated neutrality laws. 2 of these overzealous captains were later courtmartialed.
The army & navy didn't cooperate well early in the war. There was no unified command structure like the present day Joint Chiefs of Staff so Lincoln had to make the two services cooperate. In addition, Lincoln's cabinet members Welles, Stanton, Seward & Chase often squabbled over things like who got ownership of captured Confederate cotton (a quite lucrative prize), who had control over transport & naval ships on the ocean & on rivers & how to respond to diplomatic incidents.
There are interesting chapters that describe how politics & luck played key roles in who got promoted. Samuel Lee, who was politically well connected, was a competent commander but he didn't get promoted to full Rear Admiral (he was an acting Rear Admiral during the war) in part because he didn't win a key victory that got voted the Thanks of Congress. Porter, who Lincoln & Welles considered to be somewhat rash & self promoting, won key victories and thus moved up the ranks. DuPont captured Port Royal early in the war but was replaced by Dahlgren after DuPont failed in an attack on Fort Sumter.
When he became President, Lincoln didn't know anything about the navy. When he had commanders he could rely on, he was happy to let Gideon Welles (his Secretary of the Navy) & his commanders run things. But he could & did take charge when he had to, for example by ordering the navy to transport troops to capture Norfolk & to speed up the production of mortars used to bombard Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi.
Lincoln preferred to let events unfold until his course of action became clear. That didn't serve him well during the Fort Sumter crisis. It served him better during diplomatic crises with England & Brazil caused by overzealous Union naval captains who violated neutrality laws. 2 of these overzealous captains were later courtmartialed.
The army & navy didn't cooperate well early in the war. There was no unified command structure like the present day Joint Chiefs of Staff so Lincoln had to make the two services cooperate. In addition, Lincoln's cabinet members Welles, Stanton, Seward & Chase often squabbled over things like who got ownership of captured Confederate cotton (a quite lucrative prize), who had control over transport & naval ships on the ocean & on rivers & how to respond to diplomatic incidents.
There are interesting chapters that describe how politics & luck played key roles in who got promoted. Samuel Lee, who was politically well connected, was a competent commander but he didn't get promoted to full Rear Admiral (he was an acting Rear Admiral during the war) in part because he didn't win a key victory that got voted the Thanks of Congress. Porter, who Lincoln & Welles considered to be somewhat rash & self promoting, won key victories and thus moved up the ranks. DuPont captured Port Royal early in the war but was replaced by Dahlgren after DuPont failed in an attack on Fort Sumter.
December 22, 2013
Wow, if you think Lincoln had his hands full with some numbskull generals (e.g. McClellan), it was the same for most of his admirals. With the exception of Porter, many of his admirals, like the generals, were afraid to fight, afraid to lose their ships. Lincoln had to continually prod them to hunt out the confederate navy ships, regardless of where they were, and engage them in battle. Symonds also does a great job explaining the maritime strategy, of the Union and Lincoln, along with its goals and objectives. We read much about the land battles (Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Manassas), but not much about what was happening at sea, Symonds closes that loop. Great read.
February 24, 2023
The gold standard of books on the navy during the Civil War and in particular Lincoln's relationship with naval personnel. Should be on everyone's Civil War and Abraham Lincoln reading list.
David J. Kent
Author of Lincoln: The Fire of Genius
President, Lincoln Group of DC
David J. Kent
Author of Lincoln: The Fire of Genius
President, Lincoln Group of DC
November 21, 2008
tells about Welles, his SECNAV, and Fox, the ASN, as well as the admirals. Everyone involoved has surprisingly direct access to Lincoln.
July 24, 2017
Although the naval history of the civil war is not something that is completely neglected by historians [1], it has definitely not received the same amount of attention as Lincoln's relationship with his generals. Part of this is due to the fact that the squeaky wheel gets the grease--Lincoln's generals were a fairly obstreperous lot, many of them with political connections who wanted to throw around their weight. This is not to say that the political element was missing from the navy during the Civil War, as this book demonstrates, but rather that there were far fewer political admirals and so Lincoln's focus was usually focused on those people who were making the most noise and whose behavior was the most pivotal when it came to votes. This book, though, is an admirable one in explaining the complicated involvement of Lincoln in naval affairs, and the author does a good job in setting a context in which his involvement was often necessary to smooth over conflicts, and in which Union victory came about through complicated means, in which the navy played a supporting but important role.
With over 300 pages of content, none of it filler, this book fills an admirable void in discussing Lincoln's relationship with his admirals. As is the case in general, the tale shown is of increasing confidence and competence among Lincoln in his role as commander and chief along, as well as a high degree of rivalry between Seward and Welles over matters that involved both of them, which proved to be quite a few. Organized in a chronological fashion, the author shows how Lincoln's initial understanding of the navy and the relationship between the navy and army and the navy and foreign affairs was not always strong. Lincoln is consistently shown as being a moderating influence on the extremes pushed by others, seeking to guide a path between radical and conservative, and usually successful at engaging in the difficult balancing act. Likewise, the importance of the navy is shown in combined operation, blockade running, attempting to deal with commerce raiding, and interacting with foreign citizens and the agents of foreign governments. The result is a book that contains some information that people might not be aware of, such as the patronage politics of the navy and the struggle for officers in promotion as well as to gain the naval victories that would give one a high reputation. As was the case with his generals, Lincoln preferred those who didn't continually demand reinforcements.
This is a book that makes a fine companion volume to Lincoln and His Generals, a book the author himself makes reference to in the introduction to this book. For those who have an interest in the naval history of the Civil War, and enjoy reading about the ways that naval affairs can influence matters of diplomacy as well as military strategy, this is a worthwhile book. The way that the author is able to grasp Lincoln's political skill and the way he made people feel like he was on their side even when he was somewhat skeptical about them, as was the case with Porter, is itself worth the read. Where else can one expect to know so thoroughly the rivalries between various naval officials and the way that Lincoln and Seward struggled with being back channels, especially early in Lincoln's presidency, concerning naval affairs? The end result is that this particular volume gives a fascinating and detailed look, well backed up by the evidence, into an area of history that is often ignored. To be sure, there are many more books about Abraham Lincoln than one could read during a lifetime, but this is certainly a worthy one.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2013...
With over 300 pages of content, none of it filler, this book fills an admirable void in discussing Lincoln's relationship with his admirals. As is the case in general, the tale shown is of increasing confidence and competence among Lincoln in his role as commander and chief along, as well as a high degree of rivalry between Seward and Welles over matters that involved both of them, which proved to be quite a few. Organized in a chronological fashion, the author shows how Lincoln's initial understanding of the navy and the relationship between the navy and army and the navy and foreign affairs was not always strong. Lincoln is consistently shown as being a moderating influence on the extremes pushed by others, seeking to guide a path between radical and conservative, and usually successful at engaging in the difficult balancing act. Likewise, the importance of the navy is shown in combined operation, blockade running, attempting to deal with commerce raiding, and interacting with foreign citizens and the agents of foreign governments. The result is a book that contains some information that people might not be aware of, such as the patronage politics of the navy and the struggle for officers in promotion as well as to gain the naval victories that would give one a high reputation. As was the case with his generals, Lincoln preferred those who didn't continually demand reinforcements.
This is a book that makes a fine companion volume to Lincoln and His Generals, a book the author himself makes reference to in the introduction to this book. For those who have an interest in the naval history of the Civil War, and enjoy reading about the ways that naval affairs can influence matters of diplomacy as well as military strategy, this is a worthwhile book. The way that the author is able to grasp Lincoln's political skill and the way he made people feel like he was on their side even when he was somewhat skeptical about them, as was the case with Porter, is itself worth the read. Where else can one expect to know so thoroughly the rivalries between various naval officials and the way that Lincoln and Seward struggled with being back channels, especially early in Lincoln's presidency, concerning naval affairs? The end result is that this particular volume gives a fascinating and detailed look, well backed up by the evidence, into an area of history that is often ignored. To be sure, there are many more books about Abraham Lincoln than one could read during a lifetime, but this is certainly a worthy one.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2013...
April 22, 2024
As a history major at the US Naval Academy, Dr. Symonds' Civil War class was one of the best I took there. He also gave two excellent talks at a Civil War symposium I attended earlier this year in Monterey. He is a dynamic speaker and writer. I first learned about this volume when I saw it on a spiral stack of books about Abraham Lincoln during a 2010 visit to Ford's Theater. I'm glad to have finally read it. The naval campaigns of the Civil War required of Lincoln the full measure of the strategic and political genius so richly documented in Doris Kearn Goodwin's Team of Rivals. It was interesting to learn about his frequent visits to the Washington Navy Yard and cruises down Chesapeake Bay to see his Navy in action. I also learned his about his patent, the only one received by a US president. Nautically related, if was for an invention to buoy and lift boats over shoals and obstructions in rivers. Highly recommended for those seeking further insights into Lincoln through the prism of a less explored aspect of the Civil War. I'm donating this book to the USS Midway Museum Library.
"With Lee's surrender, Lincoln knew that the end of the was was at hand. His entire presidency had been dominated by that war, and now it was over, or very nearly over. It had been mainly an army war, but the navy, too, had played its part. Lincoln had begun knowing 'but little about ships,' as he had confessed to Welles at the time, and throughout its course he had been a reluctant commander who preferred to let others manage the conflict. Nevertheless, circumstances had compelled his involvement in the naval war. The blockade, the Trent affair, the French invasion of Mexico, and the overeagerness of several of his navy captains had forced him to intervene diplomatically. The uncertain and confusing command relationship between the army and the navy had forced him to play an active role on the western rivers, where he coordinated the manufacture and distribution of mortar schooners. The reluctance of some of his officers to seize the moment, such as Goldsborough in Hampton Roads and Du Pont at Charleston, had compelled him to become involved in the planning and execution of particular campaigns, even directing an amphibious landing on the Virginia coast to capture Norfolk. His distrust of some of those officers and his admiration for others had led him to make suggestions about the promotion of particular individuals. Farragut, Porter, and especially Dahlgren had all benefited from those suggestions; Du Pont, Samuel Phillips Lee, and Charles Wilkes had not. For the most part, however, Lincoln remained a reluctant commander in chief, and once he had a command team in place that he trusted, he backed away." p364
"With Lee's surrender, Lincoln knew that the end of the was was at hand. His entire presidency had been dominated by that war, and now it was over, or very nearly over. It had been mainly an army war, but the navy, too, had played its part. Lincoln had begun knowing 'but little about ships,' as he had confessed to Welles at the time, and throughout its course he had been a reluctant commander who preferred to let others manage the conflict. Nevertheless, circumstances had compelled his involvement in the naval war. The blockade, the Trent affair, the French invasion of Mexico, and the overeagerness of several of his navy captains had forced him to intervene diplomatically. The uncertain and confusing command relationship between the army and the navy had forced him to play an active role on the western rivers, where he coordinated the manufacture and distribution of mortar schooners. The reluctance of some of his officers to seize the moment, such as Goldsborough in Hampton Roads and Du Pont at Charleston, had compelled him to become involved in the planning and execution of particular campaigns, even directing an amphibious landing on the Virginia coast to capture Norfolk. His distrust of some of those officers and his admiration for others had led him to make suggestions about the promotion of particular individuals. Farragut, Porter, and especially Dahlgren had all benefited from those suggestions; Du Pont, Samuel Phillips Lee, and Charles Wilkes had not. For the most part, however, Lincoln remained a reluctant commander in chief, and once he had a command team in place that he trusted, he backed away." p364
October 1, 2017
This is another classic book by Craig Symonds. It is also another masterpiece he has written. The book is about the Anaconda Plan and finding the men to carry it out during the Civil War. The same problem the Union had with the Army also existed in the Navy. To much deadwood and political appointments. Another problem was the officers who were out for themselves once they reached command.
Craig also talks about the problem of the cotton trade between the Union and the Confederacy. This trade was what extended the war for several months. Once, the officers realized Cotton was a prize that could be seized and sold for profit many officers went after it instead of fighting or doing their job.
Craig also talks about the problem of the cotton trade between the Union and the Confederacy. This trade was what extended the war for several months. Once, the officers realized Cotton was a prize that could be seized and sold for profit many officers went after it instead of fighting or doing their job.
November 3, 2018
Magnificent
It is often the fate of those who study the Civil War to repeat the same stories as infinitum. How many times shall Grant take command or Meade haltingly pursue the bleeding Army of Northern Virginia as it lumps away from Gettysburg? In “Lincoln and His Admirals”, Craig Symonds breaks fresh ground in focusing on the naval war and, specifically, the Union Navy’s high command, who have an unjustly-neglected place in the war’s pantheon. Their work, less-glamorous and without the pitched battles of the war on land, was nonetheless essential to the North’s victory and, in telling their story and that of Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, Symonds does an important service. I highly recommend this book.
It is often the fate of those who study the Civil War to repeat the same stories as infinitum. How many times shall Grant take command or Meade haltingly pursue the bleeding Army of Northern Virginia as it lumps away from Gettysburg? In “Lincoln and His Admirals”, Craig Symonds breaks fresh ground in focusing on the naval war and, specifically, the Union Navy’s high command, who have an unjustly-neglected place in the war’s pantheon. Their work, less-glamorous and without the pitched battles of the war on land, was nonetheless essential to the North’s victory and, in telling their story and that of Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, Symonds does an important service. I highly recommend this book.
March 27, 2024
I definitely little to none regarding the Union Navy nor the heavy hand that Lincoln had with war time decisions in the Civil War but this book does an excellent presentation regarding what the Union Navy evolved into just at the onset of Civil War and beyond. Lincoln had many issues to deal with with Admirals in service and behind the desk, naval strategies, good and poor performing personal and so on. The book will keep you at bay in your easy chair has putting this book down will be difficult. Enjoy a well written book so full of good information and well researched facts.
August 10, 2020
Many books have been written over the years about "Lincoln and his Generals." Craig Symonds sheds long-awaited light upon the other service: the United States Navy in the American Civil War. Well written, exquisitely researched, and compellingly telling the stories of a string of admirals that Lincoln cycled through just as he did general officers. A fascinating read revealing a seldom-scrutinized side of the Civil War.
January 12, 2023
Firstly, a very interesting read. The naval aspect of the civil war is largely overlooked, so most of the information in the book was completely new to me. However, the timeline of the war was a bit confusing at times. I understand why the author jumped back and forth between dates like that, but i had to go back and reread several passages because of the jumps. Otherwise, a very engaging read! Recommend!
September 13, 2023
This is one of the best books I’ve read in a while. The way it is written is entertaining and not boring like some historical novels. It is also very insightful as to how Lincoln handled the civil war. The book has a focus on Lincoln and the Navy, but also covers topics like his relationship to the Army, emancipation, and other things. I really enjoyed this book and I hope others appreciate it when they read it
July 14, 2025
NOT a general naval history of the American Civil War, but a character study of Lincoln as commander-in-chief of the Navy: how Lincoln managed personalities, weighed strategy, and grasped new technologies like ironclads and riverine warfare.
Some understanding of Civil War history would be useful for context, but, having that, readers will find yet another facet of Lincoln’s leadership and political acumen.
Some understanding of Civil War history would be useful for context, but, having that, readers will find yet another facet of Lincoln’s leadership and political acumen.
March 2, 2021
Great Book. It is more about Lincoln than just Lincoln and his admirals. It touches on everything he did in the war. You understand how he worked with people, how they earned his trust, how he would interact with them in different situations.
A must for anyone that reads extensively about Lincoln.
A must for anyone that reads extensively about Lincoln.
January 19, 2018
A nice book. A different perspective on some Civil War subjects and information about unknown ones. It is not the best narrative flow, but it is reasonable, although some descriptions report events that are scrambled in time without explicitly stating the order that the events occurred.
October 16, 2018
Dense reading at times but this is a fine addition to a somewhat overlooked area of war nerd studies, the naval aspect of the American Civil War, and Lincoln's increasingly hands-off approach to managing it.
May 29, 2023
3.5/5
This was an interesting look at Naval command during the Civil War. I am not as interested in the Navy side of things as I am of army operations during the Civil War, but it was nonetheless an interesting and informative book.
This was an interesting look at Naval command during the Civil War. I am not as interested in the Navy side of things as I am of army operations during the Civil War, but it was nonetheless an interesting and informative book.
May 6, 2020
A nice overview of the Union's main naval leaders during the American Civil War, as well as the leadership exerted over them by Abraham Lincoln and his Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles.
December 29, 2020
Very good read for anyone interested in Lincoln, the U.S. Civil War, naval history, or all the above. A different perspective from the usual viewpoint of most books on the war that deal exclusively (or nearly exclusively) with the armies and their land battles/campaigns.
December 16, 2023
Macro level Civil War through the eyes of AL with a strong emphasis on the attention he paid to the Federal naval arm. Very interesting read.
Read
August 5, 2011Interesting examination of the personalities and issues involving the Navy during the Civil War. This is not a battle account - battles are mentioned more in passing than in detail. And since the Civil War was predominantly a land war, the Navy gets relatively little historical attention - the author spends almost as much time on several of Lincoln's generals as he does on Lincoln's admirals, and the major strategies and land campaigns are explained as well as the relatively fewer naval campaigns. It is an interesting study in personalities and the issues/strategies affecting the naval aspects of the war - it is not a particularly deep examination of Lincoln's interactions with his admirals. Good read - but definitely supplemental to more comprehensive histories of the war and of the land and sea strategies and campaigns. There are some delightful anecdotes regarding Lincoln and the Navy, and some good explanations of technical aspects of naval warfare as it was in that time.
October 4, 2016
This is a very good and important book on the American Civil War. The naval aspect of the war is greatly overlooked in the great majority of books and this book addresses many aspects of the war on the ocean, the seas and American rivers. It presents qualities of Lincoln I was not aware of and multiple facts and anecdotes of many of the key figures involved in the war.
By no means do I consider myself an expert on the war but I've probably read about 10 titles thus far and I consider this title an important and indispensable part of my book collection. While the author writes well, his style isn't as engaging as some other civil war writers. Also, and this may not be the author's fault, the book comes with 5 maps but they are not indexed anywhere.
By no means do I consider myself an expert on the war but I've probably read about 10 titles thus far and I consider this title an important and indispensable part of my book collection. While the author writes well, his style isn't as engaging as some other civil war writers. Also, and this may not be the author's fault, the book comes with 5 maps but they are not indexed anywhere.
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