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Madness: The Invention of an Idea
Michel Foucault’s first exploration of insanity as a social construct—and his debut work of criticism, published nearly a decade before Madness and Civilization—Madness offers an invaluable lens through which to observe the seminal social critic’s philosophical evolution. Previously published as Mental Illness and Psychology, this exciting and accessible new edition offers unique insight into both Foucault’s early engagement with the psychoanalytic tradition and his critical break from Freud, giving readers a crucial look at the thinking that prefigured The History of Sexuality, The Archeology of Knowledge, and more.
160 pages, Library Binding
First published January 1, 1954
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1904 people want to read
About the author
Michel Foucault
763 books6,482 followersPaul-Michel Foucault was a French philosopher, historian of ideas, writer, political activist, and literary critic. Foucault's theories primarily address the relationships between power and knowledge, and how they are used as a form of social control through societal institutions. Though often cited as a structuralist and postmodernist, Foucault rejected these labels. His thought has influenced academics, especially those working in communication studies, anthropology, psychology, sociology, criminology, cultural studies, literary theory, feminism, Marxism and critical theory.
Born in Poitiers, France, into an upper-middle-class family, Foucault was educated at the Lycée Henri-IV, at the École Normale Supérieure, where he developed an interest in philosophy and came under the influence of his tutors Jean Hyppolite and Louis Althusser, and at the University of Paris (Sorbonne), where he earned degrees in philosophy and psychology. After several years as a cultural diplomat abroad, he returned to France and published his first major book, The History of Madness (1961). After obtaining work between 1960 and 1966 at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, he produced The Birth of the Clinic (1963) and The Order of Things (1966), publications that displayed his increasing involvement with structuralism, from which he later distanced himself. These first three histories exemplified a historiographical technique Foucault was developing called "archaeology".
From 1966 to 1968, Foucault lectured at the University of Tunis before returning to France, where he became head of the philosophy department at the new experimental university of Paris VIII. Foucault subsequently published The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). In 1970, Foucault was admitted to the Collège de France, a membership he retained until his death. He also became active in several left-wing groups involved in campaigns against racism and human rights abuses and for penal reform. Foucault later published Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality (1976), in which he developed archaeological and genealogical methods that emphasized the role that power plays in society.
Foucault died in Paris from complications of HIV/AIDS; he became the first public figure in France to die from complications of the disease. His partner Daniel Defert founded the AIDES charity in his memory.
Born in Poitiers, France, into an upper-middle-class family, Foucault was educated at the Lycée Henri-IV, at the École Normale Supérieure, where he developed an interest in philosophy and came under the influence of his tutors Jean Hyppolite and Louis Althusser, and at the University of Paris (Sorbonne), where he earned degrees in philosophy and psychology. After several years as a cultural diplomat abroad, he returned to France and published his first major book, The History of Madness (1961). After obtaining work between 1960 and 1966 at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, he produced The Birth of the Clinic (1963) and The Order of Things (1966), publications that displayed his increasing involvement with structuralism, from which he later distanced himself. These first three histories exemplified a historiographical technique Foucault was developing called "archaeology".
From 1966 to 1968, Foucault lectured at the University of Tunis before returning to France, where he became head of the philosophy department at the new experimental university of Paris VIII. Foucault subsequently published The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). In 1970, Foucault was admitted to the Collège de France, a membership he retained until his death. He also became active in several left-wing groups involved in campaigns against racism and human rights abuses and for penal reform. Foucault later published Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality (1976), in which he developed archaeological and genealogical methods that emphasized the role that power plays in society.
Foucault died in Paris from complications of HIV/AIDS; he became the first public figure in France to die from complications of the disease. His partner Daniel Defert founded the AIDES charity in his memory.
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January 13, 2012
Reading Michel Foucault's Madness made me feel stupid. Then smart. Then stupid again. Then smart for a little. Then okay. Then stimulated. Then relived to finish.
I don't know much about Mr. Foucault but apparently he's written extensively about what contemporary Americans would call mental health issues but he calls (at least in translation) Madness. I'm not offended. Getting offended about his terminology would be stupid. A quick search indicates Foucault wrote at least one other book on the subject (Madness and Civilization or The History of Madness, depending on the edition, apparently). I'm not sure where this shorter work fits contextually but from what I can tell the first edition of Madness was a precursor to Madness and Civilization while the revised publication followed a year after the publication of Madness and Civilization. This book (uh, the one I'm reviewing) also was published previously as Mental Illness and Psychology. Got that straight? Good.
Anyway, I'm relieved answering essay questions on the first hundred pages of Madness was not required. Foucalt writes some LONG sentences, with many clauses, and I had to re-read a few pages over to create meaning beyond the skim level. And every now and then he'd say something like, “And those three points summarize the Freudian approach to physiological organic treatment.” And I'd be, like, “What the fuck? Three points? Let me go back. No, I see two. Wait, now I see four. Three? Which point do I drop?” I was quite proud when I could identify the correct three points. Were I studying Madness I wouldn't even bother reading before class. I'd wait until after the class's conversation to read. That's not to say the first hundred pages of Madness are not a worthwhile read. Wading through the text is a noble and stimulating struggle. I've not read a book in years that contained this many words I've never seen before. The first hundred pages focus primarily on the definition and origins of madness along with descriptions of both its treatment and societal context. I think. He argues against framing madness as a regression into childhood. I don't know anyone who would believe the assertion that madness is a regression into childhood. Remember, this book was last revised fifty years ago. So even someone with only a rudimentary understanding of psychology recognizes the dated nature of the analysis. I'd love to hear Foucault's take on psychiatric medication, etc, but he's dead, so I can't.
Foucault switches gears in the last forty pages to the point where I felt like I was reading a different, and much more interesting, book. He analyzes the way mad (and I should clarify that he seems to be usually talking about severe mental illness, not garden variety depression) people have been treated, included and excluded, etc. in European society over time. And he argues that only through the presence of madness can man identify the normal. I think.
“If carried back to its roots, the psychology of madness would appear to be not the mastery of mental illness and hence the possibility of its disappearance, but the destruction of psychology itself and the discovery of that essential, non-psychological because nonmoralizable relation that is the relation between Reason and Unreason.”
Yeah. What he said. There are no typos in that sentence. I double-checked. Pg. 124.
I don't regret reading Madness. The experience was a hell of a neurological workout. I wouldn't read more Foucalt, however, unless the book was more like the last 40 pages and less like the first 100. I feel guilty for not wanting to do the hard work associated with the first hundred pages, but I'd read the last 40 pages again. So Madness is a cool little book with a whole lot of intellectual energy packed into its thin profile. But if I had to read another Foucault book I'd buckle down and face the text as a grim task that would be good for me. Sometimes I like reading books that make me feel that way. Sometimes I don't. Madness seems like a short introduction to Foucault's work, and that was good enough for me, for now.
I don't know much about Mr. Foucault but apparently he's written extensively about what contemporary Americans would call mental health issues but he calls (at least in translation) Madness. I'm not offended. Getting offended about his terminology would be stupid. A quick search indicates Foucault wrote at least one other book on the subject (Madness and Civilization or The History of Madness, depending on the edition, apparently). I'm not sure where this shorter work fits contextually but from what I can tell the first edition of Madness was a precursor to Madness and Civilization while the revised publication followed a year after the publication of Madness and Civilization. This book (uh, the one I'm reviewing) also was published previously as Mental Illness and Psychology. Got that straight? Good.
Anyway, I'm relieved answering essay questions on the first hundred pages of Madness was not required. Foucalt writes some LONG sentences, with many clauses, and I had to re-read a few pages over to create meaning beyond the skim level. And every now and then he'd say something like, “And those three points summarize the Freudian approach to physiological organic treatment.” And I'd be, like, “What the fuck? Three points? Let me go back. No, I see two. Wait, now I see four. Three? Which point do I drop?” I was quite proud when I could identify the correct three points. Were I studying Madness I wouldn't even bother reading before class. I'd wait until after the class's conversation to read. That's not to say the first hundred pages of Madness are not a worthwhile read. Wading through the text is a noble and stimulating struggle. I've not read a book in years that contained this many words I've never seen before. The first hundred pages focus primarily on the definition and origins of madness along with descriptions of both its treatment and societal context. I think. He argues against framing madness as a regression into childhood. I don't know anyone who would believe the assertion that madness is a regression into childhood. Remember, this book was last revised fifty years ago. So even someone with only a rudimentary understanding of psychology recognizes the dated nature of the analysis. I'd love to hear Foucault's take on psychiatric medication, etc, but he's dead, so I can't.
Foucault switches gears in the last forty pages to the point where I felt like I was reading a different, and much more interesting, book. He analyzes the way mad (and I should clarify that he seems to be usually talking about severe mental illness, not garden variety depression) people have been treated, included and excluded, etc. in European society over time. And he argues that only through the presence of madness can man identify the normal. I think.
“If carried back to its roots, the psychology of madness would appear to be not the mastery of mental illness and hence the possibility of its disappearance, but the destruction of psychology itself and the discovery of that essential, non-psychological because nonmoralizable relation that is the relation between Reason and Unreason.”
Yeah. What he said. There are no typos in that sentence. I double-checked. Pg. 124.
I don't regret reading Madness. The experience was a hell of a neurological workout. I wouldn't read more Foucalt, however, unless the book was more like the last 40 pages and less like the first 100. I feel guilty for not wanting to do the hard work associated with the first hundred pages, but I'd read the last 40 pages again. So Madness is a cool little book with a whole lot of intellectual energy packed into its thin profile. But if I had to read another Foucault book I'd buckle down and face the text as a grim task that would be good for me. Sometimes I like reading books that make me feel that way. Sometimes I don't. Madness seems like a short introduction to Foucault's work, and that was good enough for me, for now.
June 3, 2017
One of the learned professor’s earliest known writings, and very obviously a graduate student’s work.
The introduction is actually the best part, wherein the editor explains how the first draft (which is precisely not this text) was a more or less straightforward Marxist account of the issues at stake, and that the second draft substituted in heideggerian terminology for the Marxist arguments. Throughout, “the phrases are conveniently ambiguous. They could refer to his early Marxist analysis or to his later Heideggerian cultural account” (xxiv). Foucault revised it because of the “unstable relation of philosophical anthropology and social history” (xxvii), but after revision he “was not happy with the second version”—“and for good reasons,” as it became “an unstable synthesis [!] of early Heidegger’s existential account of Dasein as motivated by the attempt to cover up its nothingness and later Heidegger’s historical interpretation of our culture as constituted by its lack of understanding of the role of the clearing in both making possible and limited a rational account of reality” (id.).
Text proper states its purpose as “to show that mental pathology requires methods of analysis different from those of organic pathology and that it is only by an artifice of language that the same meaning can be attributed to ‘illnesses of the body’ and ‘illnesses of the mind.’ A unitary pathology using the same methods and concepts in the psychological and physiological domains is now purely mythical” (10). One kickass way this plays out is that “if this subjectivity of the insane is both a call to an abandonment of the world, is it not of the world itself that we should ask the secret of its enigmatic status?” (56).
Nice summary of Freudian theory follows, with the notion that there is a myth of a psychological substance, such as Freud’s libido or some other cat’s psychic force (24).
It has been said that the final chapters (64 ff) are essentially capsules of his later writings in Madness & Civilization and elsewhere; it is quite correct that these brief final chapters anticipate the later developments.
Probably not the best place to start with Foucault; maybe best left for Foucault maniacs.
The introduction is actually the best part, wherein the editor explains how the first draft (which is precisely not this text) was a more or less straightforward Marxist account of the issues at stake, and that the second draft substituted in heideggerian terminology for the Marxist arguments. Throughout, “the phrases are conveniently ambiguous. They could refer to his early Marxist analysis or to his later Heideggerian cultural account” (xxiv). Foucault revised it because of the “unstable relation of philosophical anthropology and social history” (xxvii), but after revision he “was not happy with the second version”—“and for good reasons,” as it became “an unstable synthesis [!] of early Heidegger’s existential account of Dasein as motivated by the attempt to cover up its nothingness and later Heidegger’s historical interpretation of our culture as constituted by its lack of understanding of the role of the clearing in both making possible and limited a rational account of reality” (id.).
Text proper states its purpose as “to show that mental pathology requires methods of analysis different from those of organic pathology and that it is only by an artifice of language that the same meaning can be attributed to ‘illnesses of the body’ and ‘illnesses of the mind.’ A unitary pathology using the same methods and concepts in the psychological and physiological domains is now purely mythical” (10). One kickass way this plays out is that “if this subjectivity of the insane is both a call to an abandonment of the world, is it not of the world itself that we should ask the secret of its enigmatic status?” (56).
Nice summary of Freudian theory follows, with the notion that there is a myth of a psychological substance, such as Freud’s libido or some other cat’s psychic force (24).
It has been said that the final chapters (64 ff) are essentially capsules of his later writings in Madness & Civilization and elsewhere; it is quite correct that these brief final chapters anticipate the later developments.
Probably not the best place to start with Foucault; maybe best left for Foucault maniacs.
March 11, 2015
Provavelmente o livro mais acessível de Foucault, gostaria de ter lido a versão de 1954 para comparar com a reescrita em 62 já com toda a pesquisa do História da Loucura. O que importa é que ele parou de endossar as bobagens do Freud.
December 3, 2025
كتاب يقدم من خلاله فوكو فهمه للمرض العقلي من خلال مقاربات تجمع بين التحليل النفسي و الطب النفسي .
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May 29, 2017Diğer psikoloji kitaplarından farklı olarak Foucault deliliğin-akıl hastalıklarının toplumsal boyutu hakkında düşünmek için bi kapı açmış kitabını okuyanlara. Ben de kendimce o kapıdan içeri buyur edeyim sizi;
...
-Çalış! İstediğin şeylere (ki onları gerçekten istiyor musun?) sahip olabilmek için, en basitinden karnını doyurmak için çalış.
-Yoruldum, bıktım. Hem ne kadar çalışsam da hiçbir zaman hayalimdeki cennetimsi eve sahip olmayacağım. Yorgun argın eve gelip aynaya baktığımda, kendinden emin ve ne istediğini bilen ifadem yüzüme oturmayacak, düşecek yavaşça. Kıyafetlere, makyaj malzemelerine, arabalara, telefonlara ne kadar para harcasam da o ideal kadına-erkeğe dönüşemeyeceğim. Yediğim dondurma hiçbir zaman reklamlardaki gibi kıtırdamayacak. Yılda 20 gün tatil, yeterli mi bir insana? İnsan her sabah saat 6-7-8'de kalkmaya ne kadar dayanabilir ki? 10 yıl? 20 yıl? 30? 40? Yok hayır yapamayacağım. Para harcamak da kazanmak da istemiyorum. Gelmiyor içimden. Ama mecburum. Mecbur muyum?
-Evet mecbursun.
-Haklısın mecburum.... Hayır değilim!
-Mecbursun.
-Değilim. Para kazanmadan da harcamadan da yaşayabilirim. Bi süre hiçbir şey yapmadan yaşamak istiyorum.
-Sen delirmişsin tatlım. :) Al şu antideprasanı dooooğru işe, haydi bakalım.
...
-Çalış! İstediğin şeylere (ki onları gerçekten istiyor musun?) sahip olabilmek için, en basitinden karnını doyurmak için çalış.
-Yoruldum, bıktım. Hem ne kadar çalışsam da hiçbir zaman hayalimdeki cennetimsi eve sahip olmayacağım. Yorgun argın eve gelip aynaya baktığımda, kendinden emin ve ne istediğini bilen ifadem yüzüme oturmayacak, düşecek yavaşça. Kıyafetlere, makyaj malzemelerine, arabalara, telefonlara ne kadar para harcasam da o ideal kadına-erkeğe dönüşemeyeceğim. Yediğim dondurma hiçbir zaman reklamlardaki gibi kıtırdamayacak. Yılda 20 gün tatil, yeterli mi bir insana? İnsan her sabah saat 6-7-8'de kalkmaya ne kadar dayanabilir ki? 10 yıl? 20 yıl? 30? 40? Yok hayır yapamayacağım. Para harcamak da kazanmak da istemiyorum. Gelmiyor içimden. Ama mecburum. Mecbur muyum?
-Evet mecbursun.
-Haklısın mecburum.... Hayır değilim!
-Mecbursun.
-Değilim. Para kazanmadan da harcamadan da yaşayabilirim. Bi süre hiçbir şey yapmadan yaşamak istiyorum.
-Sen delirmişsin tatlım. :) Al şu antideprasanı dooooğru işe, haydi bakalım.
October 22, 2019
kitabın başlarında birçok kavram geçtiği için biraz yoğunlaşmam gerekti fakat bu ilk kısmın ardından üslup da kavramlar da sarih bi hâl aldı ve akıcı bir okuma oldu. akıl hastalığı ve psikoloji tartışması üzerinden başlayan foucault deliliğin -yüzeysel olmak kaydıyla- tarihçesine uzanmış. delilik üzerine düşünürken sözde insani değerlerin savunuculuğunu yapanların özgürlüğü nasıl da delilerden esirgediğine değinmesi yürek burkmadı değil.
kitapta geçmese de şunu söylemek istiyorum; delilik, hastalık ya da sapıklık dediğimiz tüm o şeyler akıllı(!) olanın daha doğrusu "normal" olanın tahakkümünden başka bir şey değil.
kitapta geçmese de şunu söylemek istiyorum; delilik, hastalık ya da sapıklık dediğimiz tüm o şeyler akıllı(!) olanın daha doğrusu "normal" olanın tahakkümünden başka bir şey değil.
June 28, 2015
Kitap iki bolumden olusmakta ve bu bolumlere gecmeden once psikolojik bazi terimlerin birbirine karismamasi icin gerekli aciklamalar yapilmis, ornekler verilmis.
Ozellikle psikolojiyle ilgilenmeye yeni baslayan bireyler icin de uygun bir kaynak olmus.
Kitabin birinci kisminda hastaligin psikolojik boyutlari ele alinmis ve hastaliklari yasayan insanlarin icinde bulunduklari durumlar aciklanmis.
Ikinci kisimda ise delilik ve kultur adi altinda tarihsel olarak toplumun delilige bakisi incelenmis.
Orneklendirmeler biraz daha fazla olabilirmis ancak yine de aciklayici ve guzel bir eser.
Ozellikle psikolojiyle ilgilenmeye yeni baslayan bireyler icin de uygun bir kaynak olmus.
Kitabin birinci kisminda hastaligin psikolojik boyutlari ele alinmis ve hastaliklari yasayan insanlarin icinde bulunduklari durumlar aciklanmis.
Ikinci kisimda ise delilik ve kultur adi altinda tarihsel olarak toplumun delilige bakisi incelenmis.
Orneklendirmeler biraz daha fazla olabilirmis ancak yine de aciklayici ve guzel bir eser.
May 30, 2023
i don’t study psychology and i never have, but i hope to every possible god out there that study of psychology has significantly progressed since the release of this book
January 30, 2023
"Madness is the greatest freedom." der Alein Kentigerna.
As this is a great promise, there are very few promises in history that have been proven and approved as many times as this promise.
Thinkers swimming in the deep points of philosophy, on the other hand, necessarily dealt with the phenomenon of insanity and, while leaning on it, made a drastic transition to the discipline of Psychology. Foucault is one of the leading names of these names. In this book, he also evaluated mental illness both philosophically and pathologically. First, he approached the subject in a philosophical sense with an existential inquiry and attempted to explain the nature of insanity. In the continuation of the book, he questions the phenomenon of insanity, which he considers to be the most realistic state of freedom, by saying that psychology can only be possible by controlling insanity, and what is normal in today's residential mental hospitals? what are they? who is normal, who is crazy? he asks his questions one after the other and sees insanity not as a crime but as a point that every person can reach at any moment and says that it can be understood by acceptance rather than a situation of Decimation and isolation.
On the other hand, the medical terms and concepts that you will often come across may tire you out a little. However, he has blended it into such a beautiful narrative that Foucault does not lose the sense of curiosity to solve what he wants to be told. It was quite nice in that sense too.
It is both a philosophical and a technical book. Therefore, I will wish pleasant readings to the "interested" again.
As this is a great promise, there are very few promises in history that have been proven and approved as many times as this promise.
Thinkers swimming in the deep points of philosophy, on the other hand, necessarily dealt with the phenomenon of insanity and, while leaning on it, made a drastic transition to the discipline of Psychology. Foucault is one of the leading names of these names. In this book, he also evaluated mental illness both philosophically and pathologically. First, he approached the subject in a philosophical sense with an existential inquiry and attempted to explain the nature of insanity. In the continuation of the book, he questions the phenomenon of insanity, which he considers to be the most realistic state of freedom, by saying that psychology can only be possible by controlling insanity, and what is normal in today's residential mental hospitals? what are they? who is normal, who is crazy? he asks his questions one after the other and sees insanity not as a crime but as a point that every person can reach at any moment and says that it can be understood by acceptance rather than a situation of Decimation and isolation.
On the other hand, the medical terms and concepts that you will often come across may tire you out a little. However, he has blended it into such a beautiful narrative that Foucault does not lose the sense of curiosity to solve what he wants to be told. It was quite nice in that sense too.
It is both a philosophical and a technical book. Therefore, I will wish pleasant readings to the "interested" again.
December 11, 2016
Foucault did not like this book, at least, according to the Forward in the California Edition. He “left a note categorically refusing all reprint rights of the first version and “tried unsuccessfully to prevent the translation of the radically revised 1962 version” which I read. Foreword, pg. viii. Foucault felt unsatisfied with the work for two reasons: “its theoretical weakness in elaborating the notion of experience, and its ambiguous link with a psychiatric practice which it simultaneously ignored and took for granted.” Foreword, pg viii, citing The Use of Pleasure. Subsequently, it’s difficult to read this and not be influenced by Foucault’s own criticisms. However, there are some decent insights.
In the last few chapters, we see the Foucault who emerges in his later works. We see a skepticism rooted in a broad view, historical vantage point. His historical view of mental illness questions the “illness” of it all.
Not being a psychologist or a psychiatrist, it’s difficult to critically evaluate Foucault’s assessments. However, his sense of historical perspective provides an understandable and noteworthy basis to appreciate his criticisms.
In the last few chapters, we see the Foucault who emerges in his later works. We see a skepticism rooted in a broad view, historical vantage point. His historical view of mental illness questions the “illness” of it all.
Generally speaking, madness was allowed free reign; it circulated throughout society, it formed part of the background and language of everyday life, it was for everyone an everyday experience that one sought neither to exalt nor to control […] Up to about 1650, Western culture was strangely hospitable to these forms of experience. About the middle of the seventeenth century, a sudden change took place: the world of madness was to become the world of exclusion.” Pg. 67.The advent of experts and dedicate professionals changed our views as to the role of madness in our society. The “ill” patient was expected to submit to the knowledge of health practitioners so one could be “cured”. But Foucault takes issue with a traditional doctor-patient relationship in dealing with psychological issues:
The consciousness that the patient has of his illness is, strictly speaking, original. Nothing could be more false than the myth of madness as illness that is unaware of itself as such; the distance between the consciousness of the doctor and the consciousness of the patient is not commensurate with that between the knowledge and ignorance of the illness. The doctor is not on the side of health, possessing all the knowledge about the illness; and the patient is not on the side of illness, ignorant of everything about it, including its very existence. The patient recognizes his anomaly and it gives him, at least, the sense of an irreducible difference separating him from the world and the consciousness of others. But, however lucid the patient may be, he does not view his illness in the same way the doctor does: he never adopts that speculative distance that would enable him to grasp the illness as an objective process unfolding within him, without his participation; his consciousness of the illness arises from within the illness; it is anchored in it, and at the moment the consciousness perceives the illness, it expresses it. pg. 47Thus, the understanding of a patient’s madness is a dynamic process requiring the insights of those experiencing it. He ultimately concludes that current shift in societal attitudes toward mental health has lead to a lower threshold of sensitivity to madness evidenced by psychoanalysis “in that it is an effect as well as a cause of it.” Pg. 78.
Not being a psychologist or a psychiatrist, it’s difficult to critically evaluate Foucault’s assessments. However, his sense of historical perspective provides an understandable and noteworthy basis to appreciate his criticisms.
January 15, 2024
In his very early work, Foucault set out on a mission: to investigate the nature of mental illness. According to Foucault, the part "illness" in the phrase "mental illness" deserves a close-up investigation. The act of terming and thus, considering and perceiving, the mental pathology (depression, paranoid, mania,..) as "illness" had 2 consequences. Firstly, it made the study of psychological life the same domain as the study of organic life when it came to general pathology. This means that the pathological approach to a mental illness will be carried out in the same conceptual structure as that to an organic illness: by isolating and assembling the symptoms into groups and defining large morbid entities. This, consequently, made mental illness a "natural essence manifested by specific symptoms" . However, there is no real unity between the two forms of pathology, but only "abstract parallelism", such an attempt to fuse psychological pathology with organic pathology is inept. Therefore, mental pathology required methods of analysis different from those of organic pathology. The second consequence is that it separates the ill person from the normal person, the pathological and the normal, of which the former can be "cured", or it has the potentiality to be cured. So, Foucault wanted to shake off the postulation of a "metapathology" that put the emphasis on the "illness" of the mental illness, and to argue that, mental illness cannot be reduced to any illness, in 2 steps: to investigate the psychological dimensions of the mental illness, to see if what we call "mental illness" really an "illness" in its psychological sense, and then to see the mental illness as a social and cultural phenomenon, that is, understanding what made a behaviour an "illness" in each culture, and consequently, seeing how our current usage of the term "illness" has evolved and transformed. This latter approach (which was actually written quite later compared to the first part) marked the change in Foucault's thinking that moved toward the postmodern deconstruction that was essential in his later work.
Leaving his in-depth investigation in each part for anyone who is interested in Foucault to explore by him/her/themselves, but I have to say I had much fun reading this one. This book is incredibly readable and enjoyable. Foucault's writing is eloquent as usual, and he presented his ideas systematically and logically. Although the sudden switch of focus in 2 parts can be a little off, Foucault's 1st part had some of the best Freud's interpretations I've ever read, and every is for every Freud and Foucault maniac
Leaving his in-depth investigation in each part for anyone who is interested in Foucault to explore by him/her/themselves, but I have to say I had much fun reading this one. This book is incredibly readable and enjoyable. Foucault's writing is eloquent as usual, and he presented his ideas systematically and logically. Although the sudden switch of focus in 2 parts can be a little off, Foucault's 1st part had some of the best Freud's interpretations I've ever read, and every is for every Freud and Foucault maniac
September 13, 2016
Akıl hastalığının yapısı, bireyselliği, var oluşu, kültürel etkileri üzerine klasik psikoanaliz örnekleri de sunan kolay okunur bir metin..
June 29, 2021
Büyük bir heyecanla başladığım Faucault serüvenime belki çevirideki eksiklik belki de benim anlama kapasitemdeki yetersizlik yüzünden hayal kırıklığıyla devam etmek zorunda kalıyorum. Bitirdikten sonra bu şekilde arkadaşıma da yakınınca aldığım cevap Foucault un zor anlaşılan biri olduğu yönündeydi. Anladım kadarıyla da okuması zevkli güzel bir kitaptı.
July 3, 2025
Leitura interessantíssima para uma contextualização da relação Doença Mental e a invenção da psicologia. Não dou nota mais alta por ser um bocadinho freudiana demais. Mas recomendo vivamente!
January 28, 2008
One of my favortie thinkers.
September 15, 2022
Étude intéressante (et importante) autour de la dé-naturalisation des psychopathologie.
Mais maintenant, j'ai très envie de lire une relecture contemporaine de cette analyse 🤔
Beaucoup de choses ont dû changer en 70 ans.
Mais maintenant, j'ai très envie de lire une relecture contemporaine de cette analyse 🤔
Beaucoup de choses ont dû changer en 70 ans.
March 2, 2025
I disagree with most of the first 100 pages. Mental illness ARE organic (I can’t think of a single one that isn’t), although I think that illness can be a spectrum from the known to the unknown to the ambiguous and maybe-on-a-spectrum to maybe-just-maladaptive to the normal. These pages are hard to read and difficult and to understand. A lot of the psychological illnesses with no organic cause have been shown to have an organic cause or aren’t actually illnesses as defined by the APA (hi Freud, hi hysteria).
I do like the historical context of mental illness. That half was interesting to read. Context is key!!!
As a neuroscientist, I don’t agree with the author’s premises and a lot of his conclusions.
I do like the historical context of mental illness. That half was interesting to read. Context is key!!!
As a neuroscientist, I don’t agree with the author’s premises and a lot of his conclusions.
January 12, 2018
Zor bir kitaptı. Ruhsal hastalıkları ikiye ayırmış nevroz ve psikoz diye. Ve ruhsal hastalıkların tam olarak anlaşılamayacağını öne sürmüş.
January 18, 2020
Je ne vois pas comment l'ensemble du livre supporte la thèse. J'avoue que par ennui j'ai fini par bâcler.
November 16, 2022
as ive long suspected mental illness isnt real
May 22, 2024
Ce livre est dynamite❤️
June 15, 2021
This was originally published in 1954 in French as Maladie Mentale et Personalite. It was revised and re-published as Maladie Mentalite et Psychologie in 1962. It was translated in 1976. I have no idea if this is his final and mature thoughts on the matter.
He begins by asking two questions. Under what conditions can one speak of illness in the psychological domain? What relations can one define between the facts of mental pathology and those of organic pathology? He then says “I would like to show that the root of mental pathology must be sought not in some kind of “meta-pathology,“ but in a certain relation, historically situated, of men to the madman and to the true man.“ So you can see a kind of legacy of structuralism here.
Chapter 1 begins with a long list of various psychological ailments that were known or labeled at his time. He then says “the first postulate is that illness is an essence, a specific entity that can be mapped by the symptoms that manifest it…“ He says this is an essentialist prejudice. The second postulate he points out is that there has been a naturalist postulate that saw illness in terms of botanical species…”
After a quick discussion about the difference between psychosis and neurosis he says “the personality that becomes the element in which the illness develops in the criterion by which it can be judged; it is both the reality and the measure of the illness.“
“My aim, on the contrary, is to show that mental pathology requires methods of analysis different from those of organic pathology and that it is only by an artifice of language that the same meaning can be attributed to “illnesses of the body“ and “illnesses of the mind.““
The second part of this book is called Madness and Culture. It begins with an introduction that discusses the fact that there are widely different opinions on what is madness in different cultures.
Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of the fact that in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance madness was treated differently than it is now in the 20th century.
He says that it was around the middle of the 17th century that a sudden change took place “the world of madness was to become the world of exclusion.”
He says it was around this time that internment houses were created which housed not simply the mad but a whole series of individuals who are very different from the norm, the poor and disabled, the elderly poor, beggars, the Werk shop, those with venereal diseases, libertines of all kinds, people whose families or the royal power wish to spare public punishment, spendthrift fathers, defrocked priest…“ “In short all those who in relation to the order of reason, morality, and society, showed signs of derangement.“
“These houses had no medical vocation; one was not admitted in order to receive treatment; one was taken in because one could no longer cope with life or because one was no longer fit to belong to society.“
Foucault has this annoying habit of speaking for a paragraph or two in extraordinary detail and then shifting gears and talking in rather abstract language. I have no idea why he does this. Perhaps it is to appear wise and as a sage. But once it is noticed it is just an irritant.
These repurposed internment houses were often also work houses. They manufacture little doodads in order to help the hospital pay its way. Foucault points out that this paralleled the modern notion that sloth was the greatest sin and not pride or greed as were the case in the Middle Ages.
By being housed madness disappeared.
“Madness is much more historical and then is usually believed, and much younger too.
Reading Foucault is very often the same from book to book. There is the obscure language and descriptions used in highly abstract writing. Then there are pithy and wise observations that are worthy of thought. Then he ignores a fact or dismisses a more benevolent interpretation of events and declares the case of radical relativism.
He claims that all of the treatments that were developed in the 17th and 18th centuries were therapeutic given the knowledge of the time. He then says that all of these treatments were used punitively in the 19th century.
And, of course, there is little comment made about the actual danger such labeled people posed to their families, to themselves and to the general public. But that is what you would do if you wanted to discredit an entire institution, avoid even a glance at the reason for the institution in the first place.
“… Man became a “psychologizable” species only when his relation to madness made a psychology possible, that is to say, when his relation to madness was defined by the external dimension of exclusion and punishment and by the internal dimension of moral assignation and guilt.“
““Psychology“ is merely a thin skin on the surface of the ethical world in which modern man seeks his truth – and loses it.“ “Psychology can never tell the truth about madness because it is madness that holds the truth of psychology.“ “And yet a psychology of madness cannot fail to move towards the essential, since it is obscurely directed toward the point at which its possibilities are created… “
“If carried back to its roots, the psychology of madness would appear to be not the mastery of mental illness and hence the possibility of its disappearance, but the destruction of psychology itself and the discovery of that essential, non-psychological because non-more allies a bowl relation that is the relation between reason and unreason.” Foucault does not say how the psychology of madness could have been done properly but then he is not here to build up but only to discredit or destroy.
Chapter 6 begins “the very notion of “mental illness” is the expression of an attempt doomed from the outset. What is called “mental illness” is simply alienated madness, alienated in the psychology that it has itself made possible.”
It is not just doctors who judged people to be mad. In fact, everyone must look upon their fellow citizens with an eye to whether they are benign or dangerous, no matter how swiftly this judgment is made. And if dangerous, it might be useful to distinguish between the criminal and the mad. Passing judgment is unavoidable. It should not be regrettable.
“A great deal has been said about contemporary madness and its connection with the world of the machine and the disappearance of direct effective relations between men. This connection is, no doubt, a true one, and it is no accident that today in the morbid world takes on the appearance of a world in which mechanistic rationality exclude the continuous spontaneity of the effect of life.“ I have heard comments of this sort many many times in my life but I do not buy them. If you know anything about product design you know that it is people who designed the products, people who are more or less identical to the people who will buy the products. So that connection can be found in the design itself.
“To sum up, it might be said that the psychological dimensions of mental illness cannot, without recourse to sophistry, be regarded as autonomous.“
Foucault arrives at his destination. However, he is wrong. He has focused on the practice of therapy and psychiatry and all of their various forebears and all of the accumulated mistakes and errors, but ignored the fundamental issue: are our actions suitable for the world we live in? Essentialism is correct. We live in a world with features and properties. We ourselves have various features and properties. We cannot be happy to any degree if our behavior is not matched to the world in a suitable way.
He begins by asking two questions. Under what conditions can one speak of illness in the psychological domain? What relations can one define between the facts of mental pathology and those of organic pathology? He then says “I would like to show that the root of mental pathology must be sought not in some kind of “meta-pathology,“ but in a certain relation, historically situated, of men to the madman and to the true man.“ So you can see a kind of legacy of structuralism here.
Chapter 1 begins with a long list of various psychological ailments that were known or labeled at his time. He then says “the first postulate is that illness is an essence, a specific entity that can be mapped by the symptoms that manifest it…“ He says this is an essentialist prejudice. The second postulate he points out is that there has been a naturalist postulate that saw illness in terms of botanical species…”
After a quick discussion about the difference between psychosis and neurosis he says “the personality that becomes the element in which the illness develops in the criterion by which it can be judged; it is both the reality and the measure of the illness.“
“My aim, on the contrary, is to show that mental pathology requires methods of analysis different from those of organic pathology and that it is only by an artifice of language that the same meaning can be attributed to “illnesses of the body“ and “illnesses of the mind.““
The second part of this book is called Madness and Culture. It begins with an introduction that discusses the fact that there are widely different opinions on what is madness in different cultures.
Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of the fact that in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance madness was treated differently than it is now in the 20th century.
He says that it was around the middle of the 17th century that a sudden change took place “the world of madness was to become the world of exclusion.”
He says it was around this time that internment houses were created which housed not simply the mad but a whole series of individuals who are very different from the norm, the poor and disabled, the elderly poor, beggars, the Werk shop, those with venereal diseases, libertines of all kinds, people whose families or the royal power wish to spare public punishment, spendthrift fathers, defrocked priest…“ “In short all those who in relation to the order of reason, morality, and society, showed signs of derangement.“
“These houses had no medical vocation; one was not admitted in order to receive treatment; one was taken in because one could no longer cope with life or because one was no longer fit to belong to society.“
Foucault has this annoying habit of speaking for a paragraph or two in extraordinary detail and then shifting gears and talking in rather abstract language. I have no idea why he does this. Perhaps it is to appear wise and as a sage. But once it is noticed it is just an irritant.
These repurposed internment houses were often also work houses. They manufacture little doodads in order to help the hospital pay its way. Foucault points out that this paralleled the modern notion that sloth was the greatest sin and not pride or greed as were the case in the Middle Ages.
By being housed madness disappeared.
“Madness is much more historical and then is usually believed, and much younger too.
Reading Foucault is very often the same from book to book. There is the obscure language and descriptions used in highly abstract writing. Then there are pithy and wise observations that are worthy of thought. Then he ignores a fact or dismisses a more benevolent interpretation of events and declares the case of radical relativism.
He claims that all of the treatments that were developed in the 17th and 18th centuries were therapeutic given the knowledge of the time. He then says that all of these treatments were used punitively in the 19th century.
And, of course, there is little comment made about the actual danger such labeled people posed to their families, to themselves and to the general public. But that is what you would do if you wanted to discredit an entire institution, avoid even a glance at the reason for the institution in the first place.
“… Man became a “psychologizable” species only when his relation to madness made a psychology possible, that is to say, when his relation to madness was defined by the external dimension of exclusion and punishment and by the internal dimension of moral assignation and guilt.“
““Psychology“ is merely a thin skin on the surface of the ethical world in which modern man seeks his truth – and loses it.“ “Psychology can never tell the truth about madness because it is madness that holds the truth of psychology.“ “And yet a psychology of madness cannot fail to move towards the essential, since it is obscurely directed toward the point at which its possibilities are created… “
“If carried back to its roots, the psychology of madness would appear to be not the mastery of mental illness and hence the possibility of its disappearance, but the destruction of psychology itself and the discovery of that essential, non-psychological because non-more allies a bowl relation that is the relation between reason and unreason.” Foucault does not say how the psychology of madness could have been done properly but then he is not here to build up but only to discredit or destroy.
Chapter 6 begins “the very notion of “mental illness” is the expression of an attempt doomed from the outset. What is called “mental illness” is simply alienated madness, alienated in the psychology that it has itself made possible.”
It is not just doctors who judged people to be mad. In fact, everyone must look upon their fellow citizens with an eye to whether they are benign or dangerous, no matter how swiftly this judgment is made. And if dangerous, it might be useful to distinguish between the criminal and the mad. Passing judgment is unavoidable. It should not be regrettable.
“A great deal has been said about contemporary madness and its connection with the world of the machine and the disappearance of direct effective relations between men. This connection is, no doubt, a true one, and it is no accident that today in the morbid world takes on the appearance of a world in which mechanistic rationality exclude the continuous spontaneity of the effect of life.“ I have heard comments of this sort many many times in my life but I do not buy them. If you know anything about product design you know that it is people who designed the products, people who are more or less identical to the people who will buy the products. So that connection can be found in the design itself.
“To sum up, it might be said that the psychological dimensions of mental illness cannot, without recourse to sophistry, be regarded as autonomous.“
Foucault arrives at his destination. However, he is wrong. He has focused on the practice of therapy and psychiatry and all of their various forebears and all of the accumulated mistakes and errors, but ignored the fundamental issue: are our actions suitable for the world we live in? Essentialism is correct. We live in a world with features and properties. We ourselves have various features and properties. We cannot be happy to any degree if our behavior is not matched to the world in a suitable way.
October 12, 2024
Foucault încearcă aici o istorie a nebuniei, parțială, și a statutului de nebun. la sfârșit vorbește despre relația dintre mediu și nebun, chestionând cât din nebunie este nebunie și cât din ea e percepția grupului/cât din ea e construită sau lăsată să se dezvolte de context. mi-a plăcut ce a zis despre schizofrenie, parafrazez, reformulez un pic, că numai o lume ca și cea modernă, care lasă loc de alienare și permite subiectului să se simtă străin în propriul univers [exterior], numai o astfel de lume poate poate să o conțină, să dea șansa dezvoltării schizofreniei.
are câteva puncte importante, dar traducerea, sau poate textul în sine e pur și simplu imposibil de urmărit. și să ne înțelegem, o zic doar ca să știm unde ne situăm, am suficientă experiență cu „cărțile grele”, ori cu exprimare arhaică, ori complicată, ori cu frazeologie desprinsă dintr-un psihic absolut dezorganizat, și chiar îmi plac, mai mult decât o scriitură „plată” sau „simplă”, dar asta mi-a întrecut orice așteptare. am dovedit-o, pentru facultate, și pentru că voiam de mult timp s-o citesc, dar mi-a pus creierii în mașina de tocat carne. din cauza asta, fiindcă e în principiu incoerentă din cauza termenilor neaduși la zi în traducerea citită de mine și a frazeologiei dezlânate, dar și pentru că a spus mai PUȚINE decât mă așteptam și pentru că nu simt că a făcut o analiză puternică, greu de contrazis, o să-i dau 2 stele, care se datorează celor puncte importante pe care le atinge și perspectivei asupra schizofreniei.
are câteva puncte importante, dar traducerea, sau poate textul în sine e pur și simplu imposibil de urmărit. și să ne înțelegem, o zic doar ca să știm unde ne situăm, am suficientă experiență cu „cărțile grele”, ori cu exprimare arhaică, ori complicată, ori cu frazeologie desprinsă dintr-un psihic absolut dezorganizat, și chiar îmi plac, mai mult decât o scriitură „plată” sau „simplă”, dar asta mi-a întrecut orice așteptare. am dovedit-o, pentru facultate, și pentru că voiam de mult timp s-o citesc, dar mi-a pus creierii în mașina de tocat carne. din cauza asta, fiindcă e în principiu incoerentă din cauza termenilor neaduși la zi în traducerea citită de mine și a frazeologiei dezlânate, dar și pentru că a spus mai PUȚINE decât mă așteptam și pentru că nu simt că a făcut o analiză puternică, greu de contrazis, o să-i dau 2 stele, care se datorează celor puncte importante pe care le atinge și perspectivei asupra schizofreniei.
July 10, 2013
It was interesting to read this book, divided as it is into two sections. The first, larger section, was published in 1954 and was Foucault's first stand-alone book. It's essentially a textbook treatment of the progression of psychological definitions of mental illness and concomitant approaches to treating the person. It has a good description of Anna Freud's categorizations of the defense mechanisms. The text shows Foucault operating in something of a Heideggerean mode of anthropology. This was written at the same time as Foucault was working on his other early publication, the essay to accompany Binswanger's Reve et Existence (the french translation of Traum und Existenz) the founding work of Daseinanalysis. Interesting stuff.
The second section of the book is from 1962 and takes on a different register of analysis, more in line with Foucault's archaeological / historical critique of the social regulation of "madness" as he worked on in his History of Madness.
This book then is a quick guide to see where Foucault started in his career and where he began moving in that formative decade.
The second section of the book is from 1962 and takes on a different register of analysis, more in line with Foucault's archaeological / historical critique of the social regulation of "madness" as he worked on in his History of Madness.
This book then is a quick guide to see where Foucault started in his career and where he began moving in that formative decade.
November 1, 2025
كتاب متقدّم ومتخصّص لأهل فوكو وفرويد ومحبي نقد فلسفة علم النفس
يحاول فيه فوكو تفكيك فكرة المرض النفسي بمناظير علوم الأمراض والتاريخ
وأقتبس منه هذه الصفحات التي أود العودة إليها بضع مرات لاحقًا
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يلغي المرض الذهني الوظائف المركبة غير الثابتة والإرادية، ويُفاقم الوظائف البسيطة الثابتة والآلية. يتضاعف هذا الاختلاف القائم على المستوى البنيوي، وهذه السلوكات التي تسم بأسلوبها الخاص ردود أفعال الطفل مثل: غياب سلوك الحوار، وهيمنة مونولوجات بلا محاورين، وتكرار جدلية الأسئلة والأجوبة بلا فهم؛ وتعدد التنسيقات المكانية الزمانية، وهو ما يفسح المجال أمام تصرفات انطوائية تظل فيها الأمكنة متشظية واللحظات مستقلة. وتشير هذه الظواهر المشتركة بين البنيات الباتولوجية والفترات العتيقة من التطور إلى سيرورة رجعية داخل المرض. وعليه، يُظهر المرض في ملمح واحد علامات إيجابية وأخرى سلبية
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في نهاية القرن التاسع عشر، أسهم، بلا شك، كل من الحجز والوصاية اللذين فرضا على الأحمق منذ نهاية القرن الثامن عشر، وتبعيته الكلية للقرار الطبي في ابتكار الشخصية الهستيرية. وعندما أسقطت عن المريض حقوقه من طرف الوصي ومجلس العائلة، وأنزل منزلة أقلية قانونية وأخلاقية، وحرمته قوة الطبيب الكلية من حريته، تحوّل إلى عقدة تنعقد فيها كل التعقدات الاجتماعية
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في قبائل الزولو، وحين يقارب أحدهم على أن يصير متألها، ينقلب إلى منبع هائل للاضطرابات، من الخطأ القول بأن السلوكات المميزة للشامان كما توصف -لدى الأوروبيين- بالوسواس القهري أو الهيستيريا. فالوعي بالمرض، عند الزولو، لا يُقصي من الدور الاجتماعي فحسب، بل أيضًا يستدعي هذا الدور. إنَّ المرض الذي يُعترف به بصفته مرضًا يسند إليه وضع وتفرد له منزلة من طرف الجماعة التي تدينه. ونجد أيضا أمثلة عن ذلك في الدور الذي لعبه منذ زمن غير بعيد في مجتمعاتنا، أحمق القرية وأولئك الذين يقعون في الصرع
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إذا كان دوركايم وعلماء النفس الأمريكيون قد جعلوا من الانحراف عن المتوسط طبيعةً محدّدة للمرض، فذلك يُعزى، بلا شك، إلى وهم ثقافي يتلبس بهما معا هو أن مجتمعنا لا يريد التعرف إلى نفسه في هذا المرض الذي يُطرد أو يُحتجز؛ ففي اللحظة التي يُشخّص فيها المرض، فإنَّه يُقصي المريض. وعليه، فالتحليلات التي يقدمها علماء النفس عندنا والسوسيولوجيون، والتي تنظر إلى المريض بوصفه منحرفًا، إنّما هي، قبل كل شيء، انعكاس الموضوعات ثقافية. وفي الحقيقة، يعبر مجتمع عن نفسه إيجابيا في الأمراض الذهنية التي تظهر على أعضائه، وهذا هو واقع الحال مهما كانت المنزلة التي يمنحها لأشكاله المرضية
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لم يمنح الغرب الجنون منزلة المرض الذهنى إلا في زمن متأخر نسبيا. لقد قيل كثيرًا بأن المجنون قد عُدَّ ممسُوسًا، وذلك إلى لحظة قيام الطبّ الوضعى. وقد أرادت كل تواريخ الطب النفسى إلى حدود اليوم إظهار مجنون العصر الوسيط وعصر النهضة بوصفه مريضًا بتجاهل، ومحاصرا داخل شبكة مسورة بالدلالات الدينية والسحرية. وكان من اللازم انتظار ولادة نظرة طبية مطمئنة، صارت علمية في الفترة الأخيرة، لكي تكتشف تقهقرًا يطال مواضع لم نكن نرى فيها إلَّا فُسُوقات ما فوق طبيعية، وهذا تأويل يقوم على خطأ من حيث الواقع يكمن في اعتبار المجانين ممسوسين؛ وعلى حكم مسبق غير صائب مفاده أنَّ الناس الذين يُحدَّدون بوصفهم ممسوسين كانوا مرضى ذهنيين؛ وهو في الأخير تأويل يقوم على خطأ من حيث الاستدلال، فإذا كان الممسوسون في الحقيقة مجانين، فإنَّنا نستنتج من ذلك أن المجانين كانوا يُعاملون فعليا بوصفهم ممسوسين. وفي الواقع، لا يرتبط المشكل المركب للمس مباشرة بتاريخ الجنون، بل بتاريخ الأفكار الدينية
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المأوى المثالي الذي أنشأه توك قرب يورك أراد منه أن يعيد بناء شبه عائلة حول المريض، وجب أن يشعر في كنفها وكأنه في بيته؛ غير أنه في الواقع كان خاضعا لمراقبة اجتماعية وأخلاقية مستمرة؛ بحيث إن إشفاءه يعني أن تستنبت فيه من جديد، أحاسيس الانتماء والتواضع والشعور بالذنب والاعتراف، التي تمثل كلها عدة أخلاقية للحياة الأسرية. ولتحقيق ذلك، ستستعمل وسائل مثل التهديدات والعقوبات، والحرمان من الطعام، والإهانات؛ وباختصار، كل ما من شأنه أن يجعل المجنون يشعر بالذنب ويحس وكأنه طفل. وقد استعمل بينيل في مستشفى بيسيتر تقنيات شبيهة بتلك، بعد أن فك وثاق المكبلين الذين كانوا هناك إلى غاية سنة 1793 . من الأكيد أنه أسقط بعض الأغلال المادية التي أعاقت المرضى فيزيائيا، غير أنه وضع حولهم من جديد وثاقًا أخلاقيا حول المأوى إلى سلطة ثابتة لإصدار الحكم بحيث: وجب أن يراقب المجنون في حركاته، وأن يُحبط في ادعاءاته، وأن يُعترض على هذيانه، وأن يُستهزأ بأخطائه، كما وجب أن يأتي الجزاء مباشرةً بعد كل حيادٍ عن السلوك السوي. ويحدث هذا الأمر بتدبير من طبيب ليس مُكلفا بالعلاج بقدر ما هو مكلف بمراقبة إيتيقية، لأنه يُعدّ في هذا المأوى صانع الوص الوصفات الأخلاقية
.
سعت نصوص القرنين السابع عشر والثامن عشر الطبية إلى تحديد التقنيات المناسبة لإشفاء المجانين، خصوصًا مع تنامي الاضطرابات المزاجية والأمراض العصبية. ولم تكن هذه العلاجات لا سيكولوجية ولا فيزيائية، بل كانتهما معًا - إذ لم يؤثر بعد التمييز الديكارتي بين الامتداد والفكر على وحدة الممارسات الطبية؛ وقد كان المريض يُعرض لحمام ملائم لإنعاش أفكاره وأعصابه، ويُحقن بدم طري لتجديد دورته الدموية المضطربة؛ لقد كان المسعى هو أن تثار فيه انطباعات حيوية لتغيير مجرى مخيلته، وظف بينيل وخلفاؤه، في سياق قمعي وأخلاقي خالصين تلك التقنيات. فما عاد الحمام الذي يتعرّض له المجنون يُنعش، بل صار يعاقب، ولا يُعرض له المريض عندما يُصاب بالحمّى، وإنما عندما يرتكب خطأ؛ وقد كان لوري في القرن التاسع عشر يضع رؤوس مرضاه تحت ماء متجمد ويشرع أثناء ذلك في محاورتهم، مجبرا إياهم على الاعتراف بأن معتقدهم ليس إلا هذيانًا . واخترعت في القرن الثامن عشر آلة دوارة يوضع المريض عليها لكي تتمكّن أفكاره، التي تجمد على فكرة عبثية، من الحركة فتستعيد مداراتها الطبيعية. وبلغ القرن التاسع عشر بهذا النظام درجة عالية من الدقة، وأضفى عليه طابعًا عقابيًا خالصًا: فكلما أبان المريض عن مظهر هذياني، تعرّض للدوران حتى يُغمى عليه ما لم يثب. وتم كذلك تطوير قفص متحرّك يدور حول نفسه في محور أفقي، وتكون حركته شدیدةً بحسب شدة حركة المريض الذي يُسجن داخله. كانت هذه الحيل الطبية كلّها نسخًا عن الممارسات القديمة المؤسسة على فيزيولوجية هجرت منذ زمن بعيد والأساسي في الأمر هو أن المأوى الذي تأسس في عصر بينيل بغرض الاحتجاز لم يمثل أبدا عملًا يُضفي طابعا طبيا على مكان اجتماعي مخصص للإقصاء، وإنما عمل يخلط، داخل نظام أخلاقي واحد تقنيات لها طابع وقاية اجتماعية، بأخرى تحمل طابعا استراتيجيا طبيا
يحاول فيه فوكو تفكيك فكرة المرض النفسي بمناظير علوم الأمراض والتاريخ
وأقتبس منه هذه الصفحات التي أود العودة إليها بضع مرات لاحقًا
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يلغي المرض الذهني الوظائف المركبة غير الثابتة والإرادية، ويُفاقم الوظائف البسيطة الثابتة والآلية. يتضاعف هذا الاختلاف القائم على المستوى البنيوي، وهذه السلوكات التي تسم بأسلوبها الخاص ردود أفعال الطفل مثل: غياب سلوك الحوار، وهيمنة مونولوجات بلا محاورين، وتكرار جدلية الأسئلة والأجوبة بلا فهم؛ وتعدد التنسيقات المكانية الزمانية، وهو ما يفسح المجال أمام تصرفات انطوائية تظل فيها الأمكنة متشظية واللحظات مستقلة. وتشير هذه الظواهر المشتركة بين البنيات الباتولوجية والفترات العتيقة من التطور إلى سيرورة رجعية داخل المرض. وعليه، يُظهر المرض في ملمح واحد علامات إيجابية وأخرى سلبية
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في نهاية القرن التاسع عشر، أسهم، بلا شك، كل من الحجز والوصاية اللذين فرضا على الأحمق منذ نهاية القرن الثامن عشر، وتبعيته الكلية للقرار الطبي في ابتكار الشخصية الهستيرية. وعندما أسقطت عن المريض حقوقه من طرف الوصي ومجلس العائلة، وأنزل منزلة أقلية قانونية وأخلاقية، وحرمته قوة الطبيب الكلية من حريته، تحوّل إلى عقدة تنعقد فيها كل التعقدات الاجتماعية
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في قبائل الزولو، وحين يقارب أحدهم على أن يصير متألها، ينقلب إلى منبع هائل للاضطرابات، من الخطأ القول بأن السلوكات المميزة للشامان كما توصف -لدى الأوروبيين- بالوسواس القهري أو الهيستيريا. فالوعي بالمرض، عند الزولو، لا يُقصي من الدور الاجتماعي فحسب، بل أيضًا يستدعي هذا الدور. إنَّ المرض الذي يُعترف به بصفته مرضًا يسند إليه وضع وتفرد له منزلة من طرف الجماعة التي تدينه. ونجد أيضا أمثلة عن ذلك في الدور الذي لعبه منذ زمن غير بعيد في مجتمعاتنا، أحمق القرية وأولئك الذين يقعون في الصرع
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إذا كان دوركايم وعلماء النفس الأمريكيون قد جعلوا من الانحراف عن المتوسط طبيعةً محدّدة للمرض، فذلك يُعزى، بلا شك، إلى وهم ثقافي يتلبس بهما معا هو أن مجتمعنا لا يريد التعرف إلى نفسه في هذا المرض الذي يُطرد أو يُحتجز؛ ففي اللحظة التي يُشخّص فيها المرض، فإنَّه يُقصي المريض. وعليه، فالتحليلات التي يقدمها علماء النفس عندنا والسوسيولوجيون، والتي تنظر إلى المريض بوصفه منحرفًا، إنّما هي، قبل كل شيء، انعكاس الموضوعات ثقافية. وفي الحقيقة، يعبر مجتمع عن نفسه إيجابيا في الأمراض الذهنية التي تظهر على أعضائه، وهذا هو واقع الحال مهما كانت المنزلة التي يمنحها لأشكاله المرضية
.
لم يمنح الغرب الجنون منزلة المرض الذهنى إلا في زمن متأخر نسبيا. لقد قيل كثيرًا بأن المجنون قد عُدَّ ممسُوسًا، وذلك إلى لحظة قيام الطبّ الوضعى. وقد أرادت كل تواريخ الطب النفسى إلى حدود اليوم إظهار مجنون العصر الوسيط وعصر النهضة بوصفه مريضًا بتجاهل، ومحاصرا داخل شبكة مسورة بالدلالات الدينية والسحرية. وكان من اللازم انتظار ولادة نظرة طبية مطمئنة، صارت علمية في الفترة الأخيرة، لكي تكتشف تقهقرًا يطال مواضع لم نكن نرى فيها إلَّا فُسُوقات ما فوق طبيعية، وهذا تأويل يقوم على خطأ من حيث الواقع يكمن في اعتبار المجانين ممسوسين؛ وعلى حكم مسبق غير صائب مفاده أنَّ الناس الذين يُحدَّدون بوصفهم ممسوسين كانوا مرضى ذهنيين؛ وهو في الأخير تأويل يقوم على خطأ من حيث الاستدلال، فإذا كان الممسوسون في الحقيقة مجانين، فإنَّنا نستنتج من ذلك أن المجانين كانوا يُعاملون فعليا بوصفهم ممسوسين. وفي الواقع، لا يرتبط المشكل المركب للمس مباشرة بتاريخ الجنون، بل بتاريخ الأفكار الدينية
.
المأوى المثالي الذي أنشأه توك قرب يورك أراد منه أن يعيد بناء شبه عائلة حول المريض، وجب أن يشعر في كنفها وكأنه في بيته؛ غير أنه في الواقع كان خاضعا لمراقبة اجتماعية وأخلاقية مستمرة؛ بحيث إن إشفاءه يعني أن تستنبت فيه من جديد، أحاسيس الانتماء والتواضع والشعور بالذنب والاعتراف، التي تمثل كلها عدة أخلاقية للحياة الأسرية. ولتحقيق ذلك، ستستعمل وسائل مثل التهديدات والعقوبات، والحرمان من الطعام، والإهانات؛ وباختصار، كل ما من شأنه أن يجعل المجنون يشعر بالذنب ويحس وكأنه طفل. وقد استعمل بينيل في مستشفى بيسيتر تقنيات شبيهة بتلك، بعد أن فك وثاق المكبلين الذين كانوا هناك إلى غاية سنة 1793 . من الأكيد أنه أسقط بعض الأغلال المادية التي أعاقت المرضى فيزيائيا، غير أنه وضع حولهم من جديد وثاقًا أخلاقيا حول المأوى إلى سلطة ثابتة لإصدار الحكم بحيث: وجب أن يراقب المجنون في حركاته، وأن يُحبط في ادعاءاته، وأن يُعترض على هذيانه، وأن يُستهزأ بأخطائه، كما وجب أن يأتي الجزاء مباشرةً بعد كل حيادٍ عن السلوك السوي. ويحدث هذا الأمر بتدبير من طبيب ليس مُكلفا بالعلاج بقدر ما هو مكلف بمراقبة إيتيقية، لأنه يُعدّ في هذا المأوى صانع الوص الوصفات الأخلاقية
.
سعت نصوص القرنين السابع عشر والثامن عشر الطبية إلى تحديد التقنيات المناسبة لإشفاء المجانين، خصوصًا مع تنامي الاضطرابات المزاجية والأمراض العصبية. ولم تكن هذه العلاجات لا سيكولوجية ولا فيزيائية، بل كانتهما معًا - إذ لم يؤثر بعد التمييز الديكارتي بين الامتداد والفكر على وحدة الممارسات الطبية؛ وقد كان المريض يُعرض لحمام ملائم لإنعاش أفكاره وأعصابه، ويُحقن بدم طري لتجديد دورته الدموية المضطربة؛ لقد كان المسعى هو أن تثار فيه انطباعات حيوية لتغيير مجرى مخيلته، وظف بينيل وخلفاؤه، في سياق قمعي وأخلاقي خالصين تلك التقنيات. فما عاد الحمام الذي يتعرّض له المجنون يُنعش، بل صار يعاقب، ولا يُعرض له المريض عندما يُصاب بالحمّى، وإنما عندما يرتكب خطأ؛ وقد كان لوري في القرن التاسع عشر يضع رؤوس مرضاه تحت ماء متجمد ويشرع أثناء ذلك في محاورتهم، مجبرا إياهم على الاعتراف بأن معتقدهم ليس إلا هذيانًا . واخترعت في القرن الثامن عشر آلة دوارة يوضع المريض عليها لكي تتمكّن أفكاره، التي تجمد على فكرة عبثية، من الحركة فتستعيد مداراتها الطبيعية. وبلغ القرن التاسع عشر بهذا النظام درجة عالية من الدقة، وأضفى عليه طابعًا عقابيًا خالصًا: فكلما أبان المريض عن مظهر هذياني، تعرّض للدوران حتى يُغمى عليه ما لم يثب. وتم كذلك تطوير قفص متحرّك يدور حول نفسه في محور أفقي، وتكون حركته شدیدةً بحسب شدة حركة المريض الذي يُسجن داخله. كانت هذه الحيل الطبية كلّها نسخًا عن الممارسات القديمة المؤسسة على فيزيولوجية هجرت منذ زمن بعيد والأساسي في الأمر هو أن المأوى الذي تأسس في عصر بينيل بغرض الاحتجاز لم يمثل أبدا عملًا يُضفي طابعا طبيا على مكان اجتماعي مخصص للإقصاء، وإنما عمل يخلط، داخل نظام أخلاقي واحد تقنيات لها طابع وقاية اجتماعية، بأخرى تحمل طابعا استراتيجيا طبيا
June 1, 2019
"...(T)he Phenomenology of Mental Illness..." (page 77)
This was my most difficult read so far this year by far. That is most likely because, for me anyway, it was too technical about a subject in which I have little interest. I found it in the philosophy section of Barnes and Noble but feel it would have been better placed in the psychology section.
That said, it was actually a very interesting read and I can't say I regret having read it.
This was my most difficult read so far this year by far. That is most likely because, for me anyway, it was too technical about a subject in which I have little interest. I found it in the philosophy section of Barnes and Noble but feel it would have been better placed in the psychology section.
That said, it was actually a very interesting read and I can't say I regret having read it.
August 13, 2016
The skeptic in me is only willing to take the ideas presented in the book, with a generous grain of salt. However, the brilliant way these ideas were unpacked was as enjoyable as the delicious language that was used in the process. A refreshing departure into a style of writing that is invigorating and full of pleasant surprises for the reader's brain.
July 4, 2015
Fascinating- the first section may require the reader to look up more than a handful of terms, but the implications that both sections have to say about the concept of insanity in regards to history, its treatment, and its manifestations are well worth it.
August 22, 2012
This is, actually, his doctorate dissertation.
October 6, 2015
''Đuro je Martić poludio.''
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