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We Almost Lost Detroit
Details the background, circumstances, and implications of the nearly disastrous October, 1966 accident at the Enrico Fermi nuclear reactor near Detroit and surveys other reactor accidents throughout the world
288 pages, Mass Market Paperback
First published September 12, 1976
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About the author
John G. Fuller
33 books36 followersJohn Grant Fuller, Jr. (1913 - 1990) was a New England-based American author of several non-fiction books and newspaper articles, mainly focusing on the theme of extra-terrestrials and the supernatural. For many years he wrote a regular column for the Saturday Review magazine, called "Trade Winds". His three most famous books were The Ghost of Flight 401, Incident at Exeter, and The Interrupted Journey.
The Ghost of Flight 401 was based on the tragic Eastern Air Lines airplane crash in December 1972, and the alleged supernatural events which followed; it was eventually turned into a popular 1978 made-for-television movie.
Incident at Exeter concerned a series of well-publicized UFO sightings in and around the town of Exeter, New Hampshire in the fall of 1965 (see the Exeter incident). Fuller personally investigated the sightings and interviewed many of the eyewitnesses, he also claimed to have seen a UFO himself during his investigation.
The Interrupted Journey tells the story of the Betty and Barney Hill abduction. The Hills were a married couple who claimed to have been abducted in 1961 by the occupants of a UFO in the White Mountains of New Hampshire while returning home from a vacation. The book was the first to seriously claim that competent, reliable witnesses were being abducted by UFOs for medical and scientific experiments. The book remains one of the most influential in UFO history; and has been hotly debated since its publication. Like The Ghost of Flight 401, The Interrupted Journey was also turned into a made-for-television movie in 1975.
Fuller wrote The Great Soul Trial (1969) about the disappearance of Arizona Miner James Kidd and the later trial regarding his will, which left his fortune to anyone who could prove the existence of the human soul. The book was published prior to the final resolution of the case in 1971.
John was also married to a NorthWest flight Attendant who was the researcher mentioned in his book "Ghost of Flight 401" His book We Almost Lost Detroit deals with a serious accident at the Fermi nuclear power plant near Detroit. The book title was later the title of a song by Gil Scott-Heron on the No Nukes live album recorded by the Musicians United for Safe Energy.
He wrote two plays -- The Pink Elephant, which opened in 1953, and Love Me Little, which opened in 1958, both on Broadway.
His most important book was the fictional novel We Almost Lost Detroit. There is a song by Gil Scott-Heron, same title.
Fuller died of lung cancer in 1990.
The Ghost of Flight 401 was based on the tragic Eastern Air Lines airplane crash in December 1972, and the alleged supernatural events which followed; it was eventually turned into a popular 1978 made-for-television movie.
Incident at Exeter concerned a series of well-publicized UFO sightings in and around the town of Exeter, New Hampshire in the fall of 1965 (see the Exeter incident). Fuller personally investigated the sightings and interviewed many of the eyewitnesses, he also claimed to have seen a UFO himself during his investigation.
The Interrupted Journey tells the story of the Betty and Barney Hill abduction. The Hills were a married couple who claimed to have been abducted in 1961 by the occupants of a UFO in the White Mountains of New Hampshire while returning home from a vacation. The book was the first to seriously claim that competent, reliable witnesses were being abducted by UFOs for medical and scientific experiments. The book remains one of the most influential in UFO history; and has been hotly debated since its publication. Like The Ghost of Flight 401, The Interrupted Journey was also turned into a made-for-television movie in 1975.
Fuller wrote The Great Soul Trial (1969) about the disappearance of Arizona Miner James Kidd and the later trial regarding his will, which left his fortune to anyone who could prove the existence of the human soul. The book was published prior to the final resolution of the case in 1971.
John was also married to a NorthWest flight Attendant who was the researcher mentioned in his book "Ghost of Flight 401" His book We Almost Lost Detroit deals with a serious accident at the Fermi nuclear power plant near Detroit. The book title was later the title of a song by Gil Scott-Heron on the No Nukes live album recorded by the Musicians United for Safe Energy.
He wrote two plays -- The Pink Elephant, which opened in 1953, and Love Me Little, which opened in 1958, both on Broadway.
His most important book was the fictional novel We Almost Lost Detroit. There is a song by Gil Scott-Heron, same title.
Fuller died of lung cancer in 1990.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
November 8, 2021
The reading of this to coincide with Cop26 in Glasgow was serendipitous as it shows that the great nations have been grappling with the question of clean, safe energy provision for nearly 70 years. Where would we be today if the advice of renowned scientists – James Watson of the double helix fame among them – had been followed back then and instead of investing billions pursuing a nuclear option (between 1950 and 1970 solar research received $100,000 pa compared to $500 million that was allocated to the breeder reactor program) we moved to their suggested ideas of solar, wind and hydro energy.
Fuller does an excellent job of explaining the complex science of nuclear energy in a way that is more or less understandable and I found that with increasing understanding came increasing incredulity that nuclear was ever (let alone still is) considered a viable option. Reading this book was truly terrifying. We are all expected to overlook Chernobyl as a catastrophe that couldn’t happen today (old Soviet technology after all) wilfully ignoring Fukushima and so I presume many will look at this written in 1975 as archaic. We have waste that won’t be safe for 400,000 years that we have entombed in concrete and keep our fingers crossed that the concrete will last that long. Even the most minor leaks have led to stretches of road being dug up and tonnes of soil from fields being buried as radioactive waste and yet we are sold a vision of it as a clean energy with the happy smiling faces of its users proving the adage ignorance is bliss after all unlike that pesky old fossil fuel that you could see polluting your lungs with its billows of black sooty smoke, this poisonous cloud you will be completely unaware of.
This is an age old tale of ambition, vision and vanity that rules supreme and places the safety of the public, both now and in the future secondary. It is the tale of reports being revised and then whitewashed (the initial report into the potential casualties and contamination aftermath of an accident was deemed too alarmist by the committee building the station who commissioned a second report which proved even more catastrophic in its forecast and so a semantically revised original report was published) of repeated safety failures in the functional power plants in the USA, Canada and the UK, of a public who were not informed of these leaks and even if they had been had no true understanding of the destructive might that overshadowed their town. It’s a story of money – so much had been invested that regardless of the safety issues it could not be allowed to stand dormant becoming a white elephant (though the Detroit plant never did manage to run to anywhere near its full capacity and only ever generated enough power for 68 homes).
A well written book that once again shows the nature of man’s desire to try and play God by harnessing a power that he will not accept he cannot fully control and the question of whether just because something is possible it should be done. This book documents the time when scientists became the new gods.
Fuller does an excellent job of explaining the complex science of nuclear energy in a way that is more or less understandable and I found that with increasing understanding came increasing incredulity that nuclear was ever (let alone still is) considered a viable option. Reading this book was truly terrifying. We are all expected to overlook Chernobyl as a catastrophe that couldn’t happen today (old Soviet technology after all) wilfully ignoring Fukushima and so I presume many will look at this written in 1975 as archaic. We have waste that won’t be safe for 400,000 years that we have entombed in concrete and keep our fingers crossed that the concrete will last that long. Even the most minor leaks have led to stretches of road being dug up and tonnes of soil from fields being buried as radioactive waste and yet we are sold a vision of it as a clean energy with the happy smiling faces of its users proving the adage ignorance is bliss after all unlike that pesky old fossil fuel that you could see polluting your lungs with its billows of black sooty smoke, this poisonous cloud you will be completely unaware of.
This is an age old tale of ambition, vision and vanity that rules supreme and places the safety of the public, both now and in the future secondary. It is the tale of reports being revised and then whitewashed (the initial report into the potential casualties and contamination aftermath of an accident was deemed too alarmist by the committee building the station who commissioned a second report which proved even more catastrophic in its forecast and so a semantically revised original report was published) of repeated safety failures in the functional power plants in the USA, Canada and the UK, of a public who were not informed of these leaks and even if they had been had no true understanding of the destructive might that overshadowed their town. It’s a story of money – so much had been invested that regardless of the safety issues it could not be allowed to stand dormant becoming a white elephant (though the Detroit plant never did manage to run to anywhere near its full capacity and only ever generated enough power for 68 homes).
A well written book that once again shows the nature of man’s desire to try and play God by harnessing a power that he will not accept he cannot fully control and the question of whether just because something is possible it should be done. This book documents the time when scientists became the new gods.
May 30, 2019
I knew this story from Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents, mentioned it in a conversation with a coworker, and decided to read a book about it. Almost all of the hundreds of nuclear reactors throughout the world are either light water or heavy water reactors, with light water or heavy water flowing between the fuel rods. When a uranium or plutonium nucleus in the fuel rods fissions, it releases neutrons that bounce off the protons or deuterium nuclei in the water, like billiard balls off other billiard balls, and slow down; slow neutrons are more likely to cause new fissions than fast ones. Should a reactor core melt down and sink to the bottom of the reactor vessel, there won't be any water near the uranium or plutonium, so the chain reaction will stop (in theory; nobody really knows whether this happened at Fukushima). In a fast breeder reactor there is molten metal (mercury, sodium, lead, or their alloys) instead of water that does not slow down the neutrons, and the fuel is such that it fissions even with fast neutrons. However, should a fast breeder reactor core melt down, there is nothing to stop an uncontrolled chain reaction. In the 1950s and the 1960s there were apprehensions of a coming energy shortage, and a lot less uranium deposits had been discovered, so there was a great deal of active research into fast breeder reactors, which are inherently more economical than light water and heavy water reactors. One such reactor was built 30 miles away from Detroit, starting in 1957; it used liquid sodium as a coolant. In order to prevent the molten core from collecting in one pool, at the bottom of the reactor vessel there was a foot-high cone-shaped stainless steel pillar. Around it were sheets of zirconium that protected the vessel from molten uranium. At the last moment, the technical director of the project asked himself, why not also put zirconium on the cone? You cannot be too careful in preparing for the possibility of a reactor core meltdown, can you? Because of human oversight, the zirconium sheets covering the cone were not put on the blueprint.
On October 5, 1966 a reactor operator noticed higher temperatures in parts of the reactor, and a radiation alarm sounded. The reactor was successfully shut down. The sheriff of Monroe County, Michigan was called by a representative of Detroit Edison, the utility company operating the reactor, told that something is wrong with the reactor but asked that no public alarm be raised. The same call was placed with the Michigan State Police. In the meantime, the nuclear engineers were trying to figure out, what was wrong with the reactor and what was the likelihood of radiation escaping. Since sodium is not transparent, they could not simply look inside. When they connected a microphone to a control rod, they heard a clapping sound. By January 1967, the engineers determined that four subassemblies of fuel rods had been damaged, and two stuck together. Through 1967, they were draining radioactive sodium, and removing the damaged subassemblies. In September 1967, a 40-foot-long periscope with 15 lenses was lowered into the reactor, and it saw something that looked like a crushed beer can at the bottom. This piece of metal must have blocked the flow of sodium and caused the fuel assemblies to overheat. A nuclear engineer said that removing it was "like taking out an appendix through the nostrils." In April 1968, using ingenious tools, the piece of metal was removed from the reactor and examined. It was one of the zirconium sheets protecting the cone. It was forgotten about, and was not even on the blueprint.
There must be a lesson in all this for engineers everywhere.
On October 5, 1966 a reactor operator noticed higher temperatures in parts of the reactor, and a radiation alarm sounded. The reactor was successfully shut down. The sheriff of Monroe County, Michigan was called by a representative of Detroit Edison, the utility company operating the reactor, told that something is wrong with the reactor but asked that no public alarm be raised. The same call was placed with the Michigan State Police. In the meantime, the nuclear engineers were trying to figure out, what was wrong with the reactor and what was the likelihood of radiation escaping. Since sodium is not transparent, they could not simply look inside. When they connected a microphone to a control rod, they heard a clapping sound. By January 1967, the engineers determined that four subassemblies of fuel rods had been damaged, and two stuck together. Through 1967, they were draining radioactive sodium, and removing the damaged subassemblies. In September 1967, a 40-foot-long periscope with 15 lenses was lowered into the reactor, and it saw something that looked like a crushed beer can at the bottom. This piece of metal must have blocked the flow of sodium and caused the fuel assemblies to overheat. A nuclear engineer said that removing it was "like taking out an appendix through the nostrils." In April 1968, using ingenious tools, the piece of metal was removed from the reactor and examined. It was one of the zirconium sheets protecting the cone. It was forgotten about, and was not even on the blueprint.
There must be a lesson in all this for engineers everywhere.
May 6, 2024
In October 1966, a nuclear breeder reactor 30 miles north of Toledo and 30 miles south of Detroit experienced a failure in its cooling system that endangered millions in the two metropolitan areas. It received almost no coverage in local media. Nine years later, Fuller wrote this book examining in detail what went wrong, what engineers knew at the time, and paints a pretty scary picture of what might have been. Many accused Fuller of scaremongering. After all, no radiation was leaked and the world is safe. But the fact is that this type of reactor, a particularly dangerous type, was no longer used after this incident because of safety fears. And it is also true that the accident occurred when the reactor was still in testing mode, operating at a small fraction of its full power. Had the plant made it through the testing phase safely and then experienced the cooling problem at full power, the story would likely be very different. Among the most interesting elements of the story is the period of the 1950s when the Atomic Energy Commission, the federal agency assigned to monitor nuclear power and weapons, seemed to be an employee of the nuclear power industry. they were in such a rush to make people stop thinking about bombs and start thinking of the wonderful benefits of nuclear power that they seemed willing to let almost anything pass inspection.
June 12, 2019
I was out the other night with two young people, well educated (both in graduate school), and HBO's new mini-series about Chernobyl was a topic of discussion. These were smart well informed young people, and primarily because of their age, they'd never heard of 3-Mile Island, and to my true surprise, didn't seem to be aware of the Monroe (Michigan) Nuclear power plant, known as Fermi. I mentioned this conversation on Facebook, and another friend there said, hey, read this book about the Fermi-1 plant. Fermi one was activated the year I was born, and "decommissioned" shortly thereafter. I'd always heard that fermi was "decommissioned," and was under the impression that it was so because of its age. Oops. Nope. It was decommissioned within weeks of being commissioned due to a melt down.
This book is extremely well documented, and, considering the level of technical writing, pretty well written. I did skim portions of it that were just more technical than I cared to know. I am stunned by the number of nuclear plants around the world that have had disasters of one level or another. I had no idea it was this bad.
My work place was less than 15 miles from the Fermi plants (yes, after one nearly melted down, they went ahead with 2) for 25 years. I like to tell the story of seeing the nuclear disaster preparedness booklet in a Monroe City office. It was a maybe 20 page paper pamphlet, with a lavender cover, adorned with butterflies and wildflowers. The irony was not lost on me. After reading this book, however, I'm aghast. I had no idea how close to disaster I was on a daily basis. Do I simply not know this because most of the worst of the bad stuff happened before I was 3?
Author Fuller is an oldtime journalist who did all his due diligence and wrote a thoroughly detailed and thoroughly documented book about an important topic. I miss journalism.
This book is extremely well documented, and, considering the level of technical writing, pretty well written. I did skim portions of it that were just more technical than I cared to know. I am stunned by the number of nuclear plants around the world that have had disasters of one level or another. I had no idea it was this bad.
My work place was less than 15 miles from the Fermi plants (yes, after one nearly melted down, they went ahead with 2) for 25 years. I like to tell the story of seeing the nuclear disaster preparedness booklet in a Monroe City office. It was a maybe 20 page paper pamphlet, with a lavender cover, adorned with butterflies and wildflowers. The irony was not lost on me. After reading this book, however, I'm aghast. I had no idea how close to disaster I was on a daily basis. Do I simply not know this because most of the worst of the bad stuff happened before I was 3?
Author Fuller is an oldtime journalist who did all his due diligence and wrote a thoroughly detailed and thoroughly documented book about an important topic. I miss journalism.
July 10, 2019
The book addresses not only the cockamamie idea of a fast breeder reactor, at Fermi-1. It also covers nuclear accidents at the SL1 reactor in Idaho, two accidents at Chalk River (upstream from Ottawa, 182 km northwest of Canada's capital), and the Windscale accidents in Britain.
And for what? "By January, 1972, the Fermi plant [Fermi-1] had operated less than thirty days at its licensed capacity, for a total of 378 hours without producing meaningful electricity."
WE ALMOST LOST DETROIT, chapter 15, p.245
Does anyone have a $ figure (in 2016 dollars) as to how much the Fermi-1 boondoggle cost?
Full download (297 pp.) available as PDF online for free:
http://wsrl.org/pdfs/detroit.pdf
And for what? "By January, 1972, the Fermi plant [Fermi-1] had operated less than thirty days at its licensed capacity, for a total of 378 hours without producing meaningful electricity."
WE ALMOST LOST DETROIT, chapter 15, p.245
Does anyone have a $ figure (in 2016 dollars) as to how much the Fermi-1 boondoggle cost?
Full download (297 pp.) available as PDF online for free:
http://wsrl.org/pdfs/detroit.pdf
January 14, 2016
This one did not hold my interest all the way through. The author kept dipping deeply into the mechanics and physics of a nuclear reactor, all of which was way over my head. There would be sections that read like "then the universal joint in the flogobbulator gave out, and nobody expected it when that somehow caused the fanbelt to break in mid-oscillation, causing the safety badges to read 450 rads, which equals an atomic weight of coreopsis!" Then he would veer back into the in-your-face horrors of nuclear accidents. Overall this is worth it, but kind of a slog when you're trying to get to a section written in plain English.
December 19, 2008
John G. Fuller was an investigative reporter. He turned to authoring a number of books, some based on poisonings, some nuclear near-disasters, some alien stories, and all interesting. A very strange thing happened when I tried to get this book several (at least 25) years ago. All the libraries listed it but not a one of them had it when they went to look. I finally got a copy sent by interlibrary loan, and when I got halfway into the supreme court hearings, the pages had all been removed! Very strange indeed!
August 9, 2012
Interesting, but dry treatment describing the early years of the nuclear power program in the US. Interesting to read in light of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi - in which the "unthinkable" described in the book happened. Given a few recent visits to Hanford, I found this to be personally timely. In short, a lot of money was spent on a program that never quite delivered. The author pleads for funds to be given to develop other energy sources instead. Perhaps we are finally getting there.
October 30, 2016
Although dated (written in 1975) this is a good account of the early years of the Atomic Energy program and the subterfuge and shenanigans that went on with corporate interests getting approval for one of the first breeder reactors in Michigan in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
It is disturbing on many accounts, but mainly because of the secrecy concerning scientific studies and how their findings were suppressed so that the atomic program could continue. It is scary because it leaves you with the feeling that if there was this much secrecy and political influence in those days, how much more so now.
This book has whetted my appetite to find about more about the nuclear disaster in Fukushima and to try to find out how much information has been hidden to the public eye in that event.
John G Fuller writes science in a very accessible way.
It is disturbing on many accounts, but mainly because of the secrecy concerning scientific studies and how their findings were suppressed so that the atomic program could continue. It is scary because it leaves you with the feeling that if there was this much secrecy and political influence in those days, how much more so now.
This book has whetted my appetite to find about more about the nuclear disaster in Fukushima and to try to find out how much information has been hidden to the public eye in that event.
John G Fuller writes science in a very accessible way.
December 31, 2013
In read this sometime in the 1980s and it fascinated me because I'd lived in Michigan when it happened, I'd lived in Washtenaw county and many of the politicians, law enforcement names were are familiar. Just a pretty scary near disaster in Detroit much like Three Mile Island.
November 14, 2007
Enrico Fermi?
October 14, 2010
This was an eye opener to me as a teen as I grew up in Detroit area.
September 22, 2014
Idaho, mostly.
August 23, 2015
An important read for insights into the nascent commercial nuclear power, but it is as thrilling as reading a lawnmower repair manual at times.
January 19, 2016
Very outdated book but a good one. If nothing else it will get you out there and doing some of your own research.
Read
July 9, 2016I'd wanted to read this book forever since I live in metro Detroit. I found it Used on-line and let's just say it'll scare you and make you question nuclear energy.
February 12, 2017
Obviously biased, and without a clear understanding of the science involved. Entertaining, just don't take very much of it without it being heavily salted.
May 12, 2024
A SUPERB ACCOUNT OF NOT JUST THE FERMI PLANT, BUT NUCLEAR POWER IN GENERAL
John Grant Fuller, Jr. (1913-1990) was an American author of several nonfiction books and newspaper articles, and well as a former columnist for the Saturday Review magazine.
He wrote in the Introduction to the 1984 edition of this 1976 book, “When I wrote [this book], I was hoping that it would not be a prelude to an accident like Three Mile Island---or any other accident in a nuclear power plant that could bring such a potential danger to the very threshold of a core meltdown. But in researching the material for the book… I couldn’t help feeling it was inevitable… Even more alarming were the internal memos and minutes of meetings of the experts … released through the Freedom of Information Act. They were shocking. They added up to this: The public was being told outright lies about the safety of nuclear power… Outright propaganda was being disseminated.” (Pg. xii)
He explains, “When nuclear fuel, usually uranium, melts like a candle into a waxy, drippy mass, it can become unpredictable. It might melt down through the bottom of the reactor vessel in what engineers call the ‘China Syndrome’---the molten mass of uranium heading down through the earth toward China.” (Pg. 22) At a discussion meeting of the proposed reactor, “The major question before these leading physicists and engineers was never quite answered at the meeting. Was it safe to place a developmental breeder reactor halfway between Detroit and Toledo, within thirty miles of each city, in the heart of an area embracing a population of over four million?... There was still no realistic estimate as to how exactly how many people would be killed, maimed, or come down with leukemia if an ‘energy release’ hit a populated area… And what worried the insurers most were the plans for … the creation of several hundred thousand POUNDS of plutonium by the end of the century, all of it possessing a hazardous life span of a minimum of 480,000 years.” (Pg. 24-25)
He records, “in spite of their concerns about a breeder [reactor] so near Detroit, Senator Clinton Anderson and Congressman Melvin Price were pushing hard to get through … the Price-Anderson Act, providing government insurance for nuclear power plants up to $500 million… An interesting feature of the Price-Anderson Act---loudly protested by the critics fighting fission power---was that none of the utilities or manufacturers of the reactors would be responsible for any of the damage to the public beyond that ceiling… Not only were the utilities protected from financial loss that might result from their own negligence, but the taxpayers would be paying for their insurance … Those who supported the atomic energy program argued that without this government-subsidized insurance, not a single reactor would be built by private industry. The counter-argument was that if the reactor builders and operators didn’t have enough confidence in the safety of the atomic plants to assume responsibility for the risks, they shouldn’t be building them at all.” (Pg. 60-61)
After scientists made assessments of potential damage from an accident, “their computations showed… It would take about an hour for half the core to melt; a day for all of it to melt. If a city was involved the results would be catastrophic, and there would be deaths as far as seventy-five miles away… If the wind moved out, it would reach further out to kill… In other words, the death figures for the new reactors---with their larger fuel loads and higher power---had risen to eight times the original toll… The burning question was, and would continue to be: What would happen to the entire atomic power plant industry if these figures were released to the public?” (Pg. 136-137)
He points out, “At the beginning of 1965, the Planning Research Corporation sent [out] its first working paper … the results of the study turned out to be horrendous. The report showed: ‘We are 95 percent confident… that the probability of occurrence of a catastrophic accident during a reactor year is less than 1 in 500…’ This figure would mean that in 1985, when 500 reactors were spread across the country with at least one in every state, there would be the possibility of one major catastrophic accident EVERY YEAR. And when the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] reached its goal of 1,000 atomic power plants, the possibility would rise to one major holocaust EVERY SIX MONTHS. Furthermore, the figures considered only a meltdown accident. They did not take into account an accident that could be triggered by an earthquake, or an aircraft of a missile or even a meteor hitting the reactor facility. Earthquakes were a very real factor in California…” (Pg. 149-150)
He observes, “Pacific Gas and Electric had been pointing out in lavish advertisements for years how its nuclear power plants ‘good, clean and sage neighbors.’ One of their newspaper advertisements read: ‘The safety record of commercial nuclear power plants is unmatched in industrial history… There have been no nuclear-caused deaths. Not even a significant injury.’ The same advertisement goes on to say that the reason homeowner policies have a nuclear exclusion is because the Price-Anderson government insurance… is paid by the public and would only cover a fraction of the potential damages from a major accident.” (Pg. 170)
He recounts, “It seemed… that, if the estimated destruction figures had been brighter… the insurance companies and the utilities would have had confidence to take on the insurance burden. But all the utilities that testified … stated flatly that they would stop building any atomic power plant under construction and never plan another one unless the government took on the mammoth responsibility pf protecting the public, and relieving them of any damage suits. It was the government indemnity supplied by the taxpayer---or else. In spite of the appalling damage figures, still hidden from the public, the Price-Anderson insurance act was extended by Congress without protest.” (Pg. 172-173)
He states that Sheldon Novick of Washington University noted, “‘In view of the many unfavorable aspects of nuclear energy… and the inherent pollution and explosion hazards, it is puzzling that the efforts of scientists and the resources of the United States have not been directed toward developing a less hazardous energy source… After all, we have a century or so to find a replacement for fossil fuels.’ The last sentence was important. With many centuries of coal available, why the rush into a catastrophe and disaster that was entirely possible, if not probable?” (Pg. 190)
He notes, “Regardless of how well trained and prepared the Fermi crew was to meet emergencies… This sort of problem left the operating crew between the devil and a runaway meltdown. Yet how could any engineer or reactor operator be cool enough to handle the complexities in a crisis situation? Even if a technician memorized every factor… laid down in the industry’s Bible, how could they be correlated in the seconds---or minutes, if they were lucky---that were allowed in a nuclear accident crisis?” (Pg. 196, 199)
He states, “Speculation about a peacetime nuclear accident had been kept in such a low profile by the AEC that hardly anyone would be likely to think about it. A coal mine disaster, a chlorine explosion, an ammunition ship blowing up---all were tragic sorts of things that could happen. But none of them threatened to contaminate a whole state or to kill in such potentially massive quantities. None would threaten the soil, the vegetation, the water tables, the air for thousands and thousands of years.” (Ph. 202-203)
After the accident at the Fermi reactor, “an engineer at the Fermi project analyzed the accident: ‘Let’s face it, we almost lost Detroit.’ His statement was circulated widely and it was hardly a reassuring thought. The fact remained, however, that they did not lose Detroit. Working with a reactor more complex than the SL-1 model … McCarthy and his team were able to avoid what could have been an incredible disaster, by their planning, their expertise, their ingenuity, the low power level---and some luck.” (Pg. 231)
He acknowledges, “As I was working on the book, the $3 million Rasmussen study emerged. Suddenly, the public was being reassured. They were told that the chance of 1,000 people being killed by a reactor accident was about one in a million. This was the opposite of what my reporting had uncovered. There were other factors about the Rasmussen study that disturbed me. Sabotage was not even considered… Breeder reactors---the most deadly of all---were ignored. Psychotic behavior and human error on the part of operators received no attention… The dangers of fuel transportation, storage, and burial of radioactive wastes were skipped over. And while the report assumed complete evacuation in the area of damaged plants, no allowance was made for the futility of this operation.” (Pg. 238-239)
He states in the ‘Author’s Epilogue,’ “Of all my experiences in preparing the lengthy research for this book there is one scene that stands out vividly… I was going through the remains of the Fermi No. 1 plant with Eldon Alexanderson. He escorted me into the gaunt buildings that once had housed the huge breeder reactor in which so much hope had been placed for the peaceful use of the atom. There was an eerie hollowness to the buildings. Only a skeleton crew remained… welders were sealing the last seams to close the empty core forever. A handful of engineers worked glumly in the control room… Nearby, in a darkened storage area, were rows of fifty-gallon drums of radioactive sodium… This was the dangerous residue that nobody wanted…” (Pg. 235-236)
He concludes, “There must be more public debate about the subject than there has been in years past. It is obvious that the government must create a more rational energy program than it has done to date. The tide of public opinion toward nuclear energy is shifting. If an enlightened public can now help a rechanneling of the billions of dollars spent for fission power toward the funding of research programs for alternative sources of power, there could be real hope for both easing the energy crisis and keeping our planet safe and clean.” (Pg. 245-246)
This book will be absolute “must reading” for anyone concerned with the safety of nuclear power plants.
John Grant Fuller, Jr. (1913-1990) was an American author of several nonfiction books and newspaper articles, and well as a former columnist for the Saturday Review magazine.
He wrote in the Introduction to the 1984 edition of this 1976 book, “When I wrote [this book], I was hoping that it would not be a prelude to an accident like Three Mile Island---or any other accident in a nuclear power plant that could bring such a potential danger to the very threshold of a core meltdown. But in researching the material for the book… I couldn’t help feeling it was inevitable… Even more alarming were the internal memos and minutes of meetings of the experts … released through the Freedom of Information Act. They were shocking. They added up to this: The public was being told outright lies about the safety of nuclear power… Outright propaganda was being disseminated.” (Pg. xii)
He explains, “When nuclear fuel, usually uranium, melts like a candle into a waxy, drippy mass, it can become unpredictable. It might melt down through the bottom of the reactor vessel in what engineers call the ‘China Syndrome’---the molten mass of uranium heading down through the earth toward China.” (Pg. 22) At a discussion meeting of the proposed reactor, “The major question before these leading physicists and engineers was never quite answered at the meeting. Was it safe to place a developmental breeder reactor halfway between Detroit and Toledo, within thirty miles of each city, in the heart of an area embracing a population of over four million?... There was still no realistic estimate as to how exactly how many people would be killed, maimed, or come down with leukemia if an ‘energy release’ hit a populated area… And what worried the insurers most were the plans for … the creation of several hundred thousand POUNDS of plutonium by the end of the century, all of it possessing a hazardous life span of a minimum of 480,000 years.” (Pg. 24-25)
He records, “in spite of their concerns about a breeder [reactor] so near Detroit, Senator Clinton Anderson and Congressman Melvin Price were pushing hard to get through … the Price-Anderson Act, providing government insurance for nuclear power plants up to $500 million… An interesting feature of the Price-Anderson Act---loudly protested by the critics fighting fission power---was that none of the utilities or manufacturers of the reactors would be responsible for any of the damage to the public beyond that ceiling… Not only were the utilities protected from financial loss that might result from their own negligence, but the taxpayers would be paying for their insurance … Those who supported the atomic energy program argued that without this government-subsidized insurance, not a single reactor would be built by private industry. The counter-argument was that if the reactor builders and operators didn’t have enough confidence in the safety of the atomic plants to assume responsibility for the risks, they shouldn’t be building them at all.” (Pg. 60-61)
After scientists made assessments of potential damage from an accident, “their computations showed… It would take about an hour for half the core to melt; a day for all of it to melt. If a city was involved the results would be catastrophic, and there would be deaths as far as seventy-five miles away… If the wind moved out, it would reach further out to kill… In other words, the death figures for the new reactors---with their larger fuel loads and higher power---had risen to eight times the original toll… The burning question was, and would continue to be: What would happen to the entire atomic power plant industry if these figures were released to the public?” (Pg. 136-137)
He points out, “At the beginning of 1965, the Planning Research Corporation sent [out] its first working paper … the results of the study turned out to be horrendous. The report showed: ‘We are 95 percent confident… that the probability of occurrence of a catastrophic accident during a reactor year is less than 1 in 500…’ This figure would mean that in 1985, when 500 reactors were spread across the country with at least one in every state, there would be the possibility of one major catastrophic accident EVERY YEAR. And when the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] reached its goal of 1,000 atomic power plants, the possibility would rise to one major holocaust EVERY SIX MONTHS. Furthermore, the figures considered only a meltdown accident. They did not take into account an accident that could be triggered by an earthquake, or an aircraft of a missile or even a meteor hitting the reactor facility. Earthquakes were a very real factor in California…” (Pg. 149-150)
He observes, “Pacific Gas and Electric had been pointing out in lavish advertisements for years how its nuclear power plants ‘good, clean and sage neighbors.’ One of their newspaper advertisements read: ‘The safety record of commercial nuclear power plants is unmatched in industrial history… There have been no nuclear-caused deaths. Not even a significant injury.’ The same advertisement goes on to say that the reason homeowner policies have a nuclear exclusion is because the Price-Anderson government insurance… is paid by the public and would only cover a fraction of the potential damages from a major accident.” (Pg. 170)
He recounts, “It seemed… that, if the estimated destruction figures had been brighter… the insurance companies and the utilities would have had confidence to take on the insurance burden. But all the utilities that testified … stated flatly that they would stop building any atomic power plant under construction and never plan another one unless the government took on the mammoth responsibility pf protecting the public, and relieving them of any damage suits. It was the government indemnity supplied by the taxpayer---or else. In spite of the appalling damage figures, still hidden from the public, the Price-Anderson insurance act was extended by Congress without protest.” (Pg. 172-173)
He states that Sheldon Novick of Washington University noted, “‘In view of the many unfavorable aspects of nuclear energy… and the inherent pollution and explosion hazards, it is puzzling that the efforts of scientists and the resources of the United States have not been directed toward developing a less hazardous energy source… After all, we have a century or so to find a replacement for fossil fuels.’ The last sentence was important. With many centuries of coal available, why the rush into a catastrophe and disaster that was entirely possible, if not probable?” (Pg. 190)
He notes, “Regardless of how well trained and prepared the Fermi crew was to meet emergencies… This sort of problem left the operating crew between the devil and a runaway meltdown. Yet how could any engineer or reactor operator be cool enough to handle the complexities in a crisis situation? Even if a technician memorized every factor… laid down in the industry’s Bible, how could they be correlated in the seconds---or minutes, if they were lucky---that were allowed in a nuclear accident crisis?” (Pg. 196, 199)
He states, “Speculation about a peacetime nuclear accident had been kept in such a low profile by the AEC that hardly anyone would be likely to think about it. A coal mine disaster, a chlorine explosion, an ammunition ship blowing up---all were tragic sorts of things that could happen. But none of them threatened to contaminate a whole state or to kill in such potentially massive quantities. None would threaten the soil, the vegetation, the water tables, the air for thousands and thousands of years.” (Ph. 202-203)
After the accident at the Fermi reactor, “an engineer at the Fermi project analyzed the accident: ‘Let’s face it, we almost lost Detroit.’ His statement was circulated widely and it was hardly a reassuring thought. The fact remained, however, that they did not lose Detroit. Working with a reactor more complex than the SL-1 model … McCarthy and his team were able to avoid what could have been an incredible disaster, by their planning, their expertise, their ingenuity, the low power level---and some luck.” (Pg. 231)
He acknowledges, “As I was working on the book, the $3 million Rasmussen study emerged. Suddenly, the public was being reassured. They were told that the chance of 1,000 people being killed by a reactor accident was about one in a million. This was the opposite of what my reporting had uncovered. There were other factors about the Rasmussen study that disturbed me. Sabotage was not even considered… Breeder reactors---the most deadly of all---were ignored. Psychotic behavior and human error on the part of operators received no attention… The dangers of fuel transportation, storage, and burial of radioactive wastes were skipped over. And while the report assumed complete evacuation in the area of damaged plants, no allowance was made for the futility of this operation.” (Pg. 238-239)
He states in the ‘Author’s Epilogue,’ “Of all my experiences in preparing the lengthy research for this book there is one scene that stands out vividly… I was going through the remains of the Fermi No. 1 plant with Eldon Alexanderson. He escorted me into the gaunt buildings that once had housed the huge breeder reactor in which so much hope had been placed for the peaceful use of the atom. There was an eerie hollowness to the buildings. Only a skeleton crew remained… welders were sealing the last seams to close the empty core forever. A handful of engineers worked glumly in the control room… Nearby, in a darkened storage area, were rows of fifty-gallon drums of radioactive sodium… This was the dangerous residue that nobody wanted…” (Pg. 235-236)
He concludes, “There must be more public debate about the subject than there has been in years past. It is obvious that the government must create a more rational energy program than it has done to date. The tide of public opinion toward nuclear energy is shifting. If an enlightened public can now help a rechanneling of the billions of dollars spent for fission power toward the funding of research programs for alternative sources of power, there could be real hope for both easing the energy crisis and keeping our planet safe and clean.” (Pg. 245-246)
This book will be absolute “must reading” for anyone concerned with the safety of nuclear power plants.
Read
June 1, 2023In one incident the high-pressure emergency-corecooling system failed to operate when called upon because several diodes had burned out. In that same incident a fourfoot-long piece of pipe that had been inadvertently left in the reactor during construction jammed in a valve and prevented it from closing. In another, and one of the most serious accidents to occur in a large commercial power plant, a fire in an electrical cable duct knocked out numerous electrical circuits, many of them redundant circuits. The emergencycore-cooling-system was incapacitated. If it had been needed it would not have been available.
claiming that it was the greatest motivator on earth aside from God
It was what is known as a heavy-water reactor. Heavy water is a water molecule containing a hydrogen isotope with a mass number greater than 1. It is present in natural water about 1 part in 6,500 and is extremely expensive to isolate but a highly effective moderator. The heavy-water reactors are generally considered safer than the light-water reactors (which use plain, natural water as a coolant) on the drawing boards in the United States.
What he did not know, nor did anyone else at the time, was that in some inexplicable way the rods had jammed, and had dropped down just far enough to turn off the warning lights, but not far enough to choke off the reactivity which was rising rapidly.
Most single errors might be controlled. It is the errors compounding the errors that no computer can foresee.
the splitting of atoms in the uranium core to produce heat, which in turn would produce steam to turn the generators.
the high pressures necessary for the light-water reactor made it subject to critical failures. For example, the effect of long-term radiation on the metals of the fuel rods was unpredictable. Or under accident conditions, the molten core could fall into the water. The 5,000°F core could then cause a violent steam explosion and breach the containment, spewing radioactivity. There was also the possibility of earthquake, sabotage, or human error.
As the most toxic substance known to man, it has been estimated that even 1/30,000,000th of an ounce of plutonium could bring on cancer if inhaled.
The thinnest chip of radium is deadly. It must be kept in a thick lead container and handled by remote control.
Another subtle characteristic that could spell the difference between safety and disaster was what was termed the "Doppler effect." If this was negative, it was desirable, because it slowed down the fissioning. If it was positive, it was dangerous, because it could increase an already risky power surge.
claiming that it was the greatest motivator on earth aside from God
It was what is known as a heavy-water reactor. Heavy water is a water molecule containing a hydrogen isotope with a mass number greater than 1. It is present in natural water about 1 part in 6,500 and is extremely expensive to isolate but a highly effective moderator. The heavy-water reactors are generally considered safer than the light-water reactors (which use plain, natural water as a coolant) on the drawing boards in the United States.
What he did not know, nor did anyone else at the time, was that in some inexplicable way the rods had jammed, and had dropped down just far enough to turn off the warning lights, but not far enough to choke off the reactivity which was rising rapidly.
Most single errors might be controlled. It is the errors compounding the errors that no computer can foresee.
the splitting of atoms in the uranium core to produce heat, which in turn would produce steam to turn the generators.
the high pressures necessary for the light-water reactor made it subject to critical failures. For example, the effect of long-term radiation on the metals of the fuel rods was unpredictable. Or under accident conditions, the molten core could fall into the water. The 5,000°F core could then cause a violent steam explosion and breach the containment, spewing radioactivity. There was also the possibility of earthquake, sabotage, or human error.
As the most toxic substance known to man, it has been estimated that even 1/30,000,000th of an ounce of plutonium could bring on cancer if inhaled.
The thinnest chip of radium is deadly. It must be kept in a thick lead container and handled by remote control.
Another subtle characteristic that could spell the difference between safety and disaster was what was termed the "Doppler effect." If this was negative, it was desirable, because it slowed down the fissioning. If it was positive, it was dangerous, because it could increase an already risky power surge.
September 3, 2025
“We Almost Lost Detroit: And I Almost Lost Interest”
JYou’d think a book about a nuclear reactor nearly melting down outside a major American city would be pulse-pounding, terrifying, and unforgettable. Instead, this felt like Fuller was trying to tuck me in for a nice, long nap before the apocalypse.
The scariest part wasn’t the possibility of Detroit glowing like Chernobyl’s younger cousin — it was realizing I had 200 more pages of repetitive detail to slog through. Honestly, if the reactor had gone off, at least we wouldn’t have had to finish the book.
Fuller manages to turn nuclear near-doom into something flatter than day-old Vernors. The stakes should feel life-and-death, but the writing makes it feel more like filing an OSHA report.
Two stars for the historical importance. Zero stars for making a potential nuclear disaster feel like the least explosive thing I read this year.
JYou’d think a book about a nuclear reactor nearly melting down outside a major American city would be pulse-pounding, terrifying, and unforgettable. Instead, this felt like Fuller was trying to tuck me in for a nice, long nap before the apocalypse.
The scariest part wasn’t the possibility of Detroit glowing like Chernobyl’s younger cousin — it was realizing I had 200 more pages of repetitive detail to slog through. Honestly, if the reactor had gone off, at least we wouldn’t have had to finish the book.
Fuller manages to turn nuclear near-doom into something flatter than day-old Vernors. The stakes should feel life-and-death, but the writing makes it feel more like filing an OSHA report.
Two stars for the historical importance. Zero stars for making a potential nuclear disaster feel like the least explosive thing I read this year.
November 24, 2025
Well written and informative. We’ve known since the onset (1950 or so) of the nuclear era that nuclear power plants are unsafe, exorbitantly expensive, and there is no way to safely dispose of their radioactive byproducts or the contaminated equipment produced during their operation. Instead of investing in solar, wind, geothermal, hydro, or even “cleaner” coal, untold trillions have been spent on a chimera that has enriched many corporations but has not produced the safe, cheap, reliable electricity that was promised.
February 28, 2020
Although the Fermi 1 incident is covered in only 2 chapters of the 15, the previous that unpeels previous incidents at other reactors along with the de-evolution of the AEC and the other trains on the track, such as the Price-Anderson Act make the whole come together.
The final 2 chapters show the shakey ground on which Fermi 2 was built. Living within its 50mile fallout zone and likely poisoned as a child during the Fermi 1 incident makes this current affairs for me.
The final 2 chapters show the shakey ground on which Fermi 2 was built. Living within its 50mile fallout zone and likely poisoned as a child during the Fermi 1 incident makes this current affairs for me.
November 29, 2020
Concise and mostly understandable account of a narrowly averted nuclear accident outside Detroit in the '60's.
August 11, 2023
Clearly written with anti-nuclear bias, but a nice insight into the early days of civil nuclear engineering.
November 8, 2023
Fun read. Some “facts” seem embellished and the use of scare tactics by CONSTANTLY repeating how dangerous nuclear is got a little old. But I wouldn’t avoid reading because of those things.
June 15, 2016
Sensational hack job. Short on facts and long on terror.
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