I am very interested in the work of Bletchley Park (BP), so I picked up this book. It is a collection of chapters by people who worked there. As such it gives interesting perspectives of the work there, and provokes a lot of thoughts – see below.
One thing I learned was of the volume of intercepts deciphered, in the thousands or tens of thousands. It seems that just about everything that the Nazis were broadcasting was captured. There was even at least one instance when Montgomery read a signal intended for Rommel before Rommel did.
Clearly this amount of intelligence was of almost immeasurable value. The Introduction to the book (rather poorly written, I’d say, by one of the editors, F H Hinsley) attempts to quantify the value, but not very convincingly. I believe Churchill (not in this book) estimated that the work at BP shortened the war by some two years. Yet what might have happened in those two years? If the war in Europe had lasted even a few months more, might the Allies have dropped an atom bomb on Europe? On the other hand, how much could the Nazis have developed their V-weapons and jet aircraft in two years?
It is interesting that the Germans never realized that their ciphers had been broken. There seem to have been a number of factors leading to this. One was that the work at BP was kept entirely secret.
Nearly every chapter in this book starts by the person describing how they had to agree to total secrecy before they could be told anything about the job they would be asked to do. Then, while working there, they discussed their work with no one. There were even wives and husbands who went to their graves not knowing the contribution that their husband/wife had made. As Alan Stripp says in Chapter 29 (p.289), 'Is it possible to believe that in six tense wartime years not one of the many thousands talked about the nature of the job to a wife, husband, lover, parent, or friend? Yet the secret never emerged. Presumably we were bright enough to see that it mattered.' If asked about their work they had to give some bland, mis-leading response, ‘Boring paperwork for the Foreign Office.’ It is also notable that the residents of the Bletchley area must have wondered what went on in the big house, but apparently did not spread any speculation.
Most of the BP workers assumed they would remain silent for the rest of their lives. So it was evidently a bit of a shock when in 1982 Gordon Welchman published the book 'The Hut Six Story', giving away a lot of the ‘secrets’. The contributors to this book evidently thought that Welchman had effectively given them licence to tell their stories.
And these are their individual stories. Each chapter comes from their particular viewpoint, showing their role. Given the ‘need to know’ principle these can be quite narrow.
Another reason that the Nazis did not guess that the codes were broken was that one of the jobs in BP was to come up with a story to cover how information gleaned from signals had been derived. For instance, if the position of a convoy was uncovered then a reconnaissance aircraft would be sent to that location, to ‘accidentally’ discover the convoy. In other cases fictional agents were created as supposed sources of information.
It would seem that another reason that the Nazis did not realize their ciphers had been broken was that they simply thought that was impossible, that they were entirely secure. In fact they could have been. Enigma was not just a machine, it was a system. This included standard operating procedures which, if followed, would have made the system entirely secure. However, the human element within this system was the weak point. It is all too easy to blame the people, and the designers of the overall system should have paid much more attention to the human factors.
For instance, there was a rule that repetition in messages must be avoided, but this was not always adhered to. For instance, most messages should start and finish with the identity of the intended recipient. However, the precise naming of the recipient should not be repeated. There were two problems with this, though. For a start, some imagination would be required to think of two ways of addressing the person. Secondly, if (for instance) a signal was headed for Field Marshall Rommel, might he not be insulted if the end of the message was addressed to Mr Rommel?
Then there was a problem if it was not clear whether a message had been received correctly the simplest thing to do was to send it again. This was against the rules; the message should have been re-worded before it was sent again. But again that would have been a lot of effort.
Once more one can see how an operator who had been told that the cipher they were using was extremely secure might think that there could be no harm in breaking the rules now and again: ‘Just this once, and there’s probably no one listening, anyway.’
Another problem that operators had was that in some instances they were required to input random sequences of letters. Humans are not very good at being random, and again the operators were probably unaware how important it was that these inputs were truly random. It was more fun to input a swear word, or their girlfriend’s name, or – even better, if known – the name of the receiving operator’s girlfriend. The sequence QAYWSX might look pretty random – unless you look at a German keyboard and see that those are the letters in the first two columns of keys.
Another technique to aid the breaking of a cipher that I had been unaware of was getting the enemy to generate predictable messages. Specifically the RAF would be told to sew mines at a specific location. (This was referred to as ‘Gardening’ – and my uncle, who was an air gunner talked about it. Of course, he thought he was just laying mines to sink enemy ships; he would not have known that he was helping to break German codes.) This would lead to signals warning of this new minefield – which would include the known coordinates.
This book is not a handbook on code breaking. It does include quite a lot of details of some of the ciphers and how to break them. For instance, Chapter 19 gives quite a detailed account of how to break the Fish cipher, but not in a way that I – at least – could implement. Many of the detailed descriptions are hard to follow because the authors seem to assume prior knowledge in the reader. Some of this is due to the use of jargon. (Now don’t get me started: Jargon is inevitable and a good thing – it is the mis-use of jargon that is reprehensible.) In fact I think it is interesting in itself how jargon, new words, were generated within the BP work. Some of these neologisms reflect British humour, and some of them show the Classics backgrounds of many of the BP workers. There is a glossary at the start of the book, which is helpful, but not exhaustive. It is also possible that some details have been deliberately omitted. One author holds back, unsure whether he might be straying into an area which is still officially secret.
If anyone has got this far in this review, then they probably should read the book.