The Peninsular War in Spain and Portugal was the most bitterly fought contest of nineteenth-century Europe. From 1808 to 1814, Spanish regulars and guerrillas, along with British forces led by Sir John Moore and the duke of Wellington, battled Napoleon's troops across the length and breadth of the Iberian Peninsula. Napoleon considered the war so insignificant that he rarely bothered to bring to it his military genius, relying instead on his marshals and simultaneously launching his disastrous Russian campaign of 1812. Yet the Peninsular War was to end with total defeat for the French, and in 1813 Wellington's army crossed the Pyrenees into mainland France. What Napoleon had called "the Spanish ulcer" ultimately helped bring down the French empire. Michael Howard of Oxford University hailed this book as "a major achievement . . . the first brief and balanced account of the war to have appeared within our generation." Illustrated with over a hundred maps and fifty contemporary drawings and paintings, this is a richly detailed history of a crucial period in history that resonates powerfully to this day -- and figures prominently in Bernard Cornwell's internationally acclaimed novels of the Napoleonic era.
If you only want to a have one book on the Peninsular War, this is it. This is a great account of the battles and campaigns fought in Spain & Portugal during the Napoleonic Wars. In over 550 pages of text the author, David Gates, offers the reader a detailed account of the fighting with a non-bias point of view. He offers assessments of the opposing Generals and their forces and covers the political and social background of the times.
The only fault I could find with this book would be the standard of the maps. They are sufficient in number and assist the reader in following the fighting but could have been of a better quality and detail. The author also provides a number of B&W photographs. Overall this is one of the best single volume accounts on this subject and well worth the time to read.
"Using French & Spanish as well as British material, he presents the first brief and balanced account of the war to have appeared within our generation. As the first work of a new young military historian it is a major achievement, and I hope that we shall see many more from his pen". - Michael Howard, Oxford University
Just for information the book was first published in 1986 and the author was a Lecturer at the Centre for Defence Studies at the University of Aberdeen.
The Peninsular War is a unique part of the broader Napoleonic Wars. The author, David Gates, research of this theater is impressive and meticulous. He writes in great detail, about every battle and skirmish of this war even going so far as inserting maps for the larger battles fought. I love the beginning chapters explaining briefly the background events leading to this outbreak of battle; the general makeup of the armies involved; as well as the primary reasons why Napoleon lost and Lord Wellington won. The writing style is aimed at an audience that is very familiar with war terminology. Many of the maps do not have legends and the vocabulary used, such as forced march, could be unfamiliar to casual readers. Gates also assumes that the reader is familiar with the names of the primary players. This book contains wonderful information, but is a bit dry for a general audience.
The Spanish Ulcer, by David Gates, is a wonderfully written narrative history of the Peninsular War. The book’s title is taken from a phrase Napoleon himself would use to describe the morass in which he found himself on the Iberian Peninsula. And an ulcer it would be. The Imperial campaigns in Spain and Portugal would consume a considerable percentage of the overall Imperial war machine, strain it’s economic and logistical support infrastructure terribly, and steadily wear down some of the finest units in the Imperial Army, let alone break down some of it’s finest Marshals. It would see the British come to the fore as a major continental force to be reckoned with, and their commander, Arthur Wellesley, is recognized as one of the finest generals in not just English military history, but military history in general. Gates’ book is nearly exclusively a military history, and analysis, of the Peninsular War. As such, the politics, and the social issues, of all sides, are only ever peripheral concerns for the main narrative. Gates does do a good job, however, of placing the military events in their broader context, but the meat of the book is a discussion on the operations and the battles. Because the Peninsular War was a such a long, sprawling conflict, and because Gates attempts to describe, at least in brief, every major, and many of the minor, encounters on the battlefield and the sieges of the conflict, each individual action gets at most a handful of pages. The larger battles such as Bailen, Talavera, Saragossa, Badajoz, Salamanca and Vittoria are well described, though the viewpoint is largely birds eye view, and there are few to none first person accounts. Even so, the writing is excellent, and the narrative pace is brisk. I found myself easily devouring fifty to sixty pages in a sitting. Because Gates focuses predominantly on the military operations, his introduction to the conflict is brief, and can leave one feeling a little bewildered. And as someone who has had a long standing interest in the Napoleonic era, but only recently has come into possession of a decent Napoleonic library, I admittedly wasn’t fully versed with the events myself, and so have to more reading myself to give a fuller opinion on the why. It is in the ‘what’ and ‘how’ that this book shines. Napoleon’s brazen attempt to restructure the Spanish monarchy, a bid to oust the, admittedly highly incompetent, Bourbon’s in contorl of Spain, and to replace them with his brother Joseph triggered a general Spanish uprising. An uprising that began fully in Madrid, and then spread to the countryside, the rest of the Peninsula, and saw the Spanish Army side with the rebels. The French, already having tens of thousands of troops in the peninsula to support a joint Franco-Spanish invasion of Portugal (to enforce the Continental System), began seizing key towns and cities in an attempt to rapidly exert Imperial authority over the Spanish. Joseph Bonaparte, despite going out of his way to be a fair and just monarch, was never accepted by the Spanish people, least of all because he represented a revolutionary ideology that was distinctly anti Christian, anti Church, and worst of all, foreign. (Despite Napoleon being a rather right wing counterrevolution in his own right, and one not hostile to religion, or Christianity, he was still fundamentally an Enlightenment Idealist, and himself, not Christian, and a foreigner, so therefore easily despised by the mass of the Spanish and Portuguese people. Napoleon was not helped by too many of his subordinates, and Imperial agents, showcasing open hostility to Christianity, further provoking the spread of a people’s war...something Napoleon was trying to curb with his Imperial, Roman like, system). Upon orders from Paris, (Napoleon routinely undermined his brother’s authority by simply going around him), the French Imperial forces attempted to restore order through force, and initially did quite well. However, in the southern part of Spain, at Bailen, an entire Corps was entrapped and forced to surrender by a highly competent Spanish force. Napoleon was duly infuriated. The French in general looked down upon the Spanish in the same manner that the Germans would look down upon the Austro-Hungarians and the Italians in two World Wars. The two had been allies for quite some time, but relations had been tense, and the French were not afraid to laud their successes over who they saw as backwards, incompetent, and idiotic Spaniards. Bailen shattered this French/Imperial myth of invincibility, and so Napoleon determined to take charge himself. I found the chapters dealing with Napoleon’s personal intervention to be very brief, in fact this book, in my opinion, does better looking at the Allied (British, Spanish, Portuguese) side of the tale than it does the French. And even though some of the battles, such as Somossiera, are notably iconic in the Napoleonic Wars, I was slightly let down to see them get such little page space here. Then again, this is a roughly 500 page work, chronicling an entire war lasting several years, so it’s excusable. Clearly the most depth in the book is given to the British side of the story, even though Gates does try to be fair and just to all concerned. First the tale of Sir John Moore, and then the tale of Wellesley get much attention. And this is a very important tale, as it showcases how the British managed to perform so magnificently with a much smaller overall force, against a mostly better equipped, and supplied, opponent. Wellesley, better known as the Duke of Wellington, utilized his army as a rapid, mobile strike force, preferring to be aggressive whenever possible, though often Imperial operational and tactical aggression forced him to take a defensive stance tactically. The terrain of Spain rarely allowed for the French and their Imperial formations (Imperial as in units from Germany, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, and elsewhere made up the Napoleonic forces in the region, not just French) to deploy in line, to mass their batteries, and to deploy their cavalry for effective outflanking maneuvers. Most often, the French were forced to assault in column, against British and Portuguese forces aligned on the back slopes of hills and high ground, and utterly mown down by concentrated, highly disciplined volleys of musketry. Victory after victory, albeit often won at high cost, gradually shifted the impetus of determining the war to the British, and by 1813, the French and Imperial forces were so worn out, and demoralized by routine defeats, that the British managed to sweep them from the Peninsula and enter France itself by early 1814. Locked in titanic contests first in 1809 against the Austrians, then in 1812-1814 against the Coalition forces of Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Austria, the French were incapable of leveraging decisive amounts of extra manpower reserves at key points due to the Spanish Ulcer. Napoleon’s gamble in Spain paid a terrible dividend for his Empire, and his vision of European and eventually, global, world order outside of the dominance of the English speaking world. The constant bleeding of men, supplies, fortune, and morale that The Peninsular War wrought on the Napoleonic Empire, in part, ensured its downfall. Although light on the political context, as well as the social and economic, though not totally ignored, this is an excellent single volume work on The Peninsular War. Fast paced, brilliantly written, the only real downside, that I could really mention, is an overemphasis on the Allied side of the equation in terms of decision making. Not to say that the French are ignored, but their sections aren’t as in depth as the British/Portuguese, or the Spanish. Still, that’s a minor complaint, and doesn’t detract from a brilliant work, Highly recommended.
I can heartily recommend Gates’s book to anyone interested in the Napoleonic Wars – or in the theory and practice of military intervention in general. I found it by accident wandering among the shelves of my local library in search of background reading for my own writing and ended up with a whole new outlook on current affairs, too…
Many reviews here mention the maps, and indeed they're not great, but reproducing good maps in book format is probably quite difficult? Anyway, I just kept an atlas open next to me, not least to avoid having to flip back and forth, in the book, between the description and the map all the time.
A fantastic book in terms of depth and detail regarding the Peninsular War. Gates has mastered the ability to communicate extensive research in an accessible and readable manner. Having only a rudimentary overview of the Peninsular War which I had gained from previous reading number of books on the Napoleonic Wars, I found Gates's book surprisingly easy to follow with some extremely helpful maps on the battles but also the strategic positioning of armies at different times during the war. I very much enjoyed this book, despite feeling a little apprehensive that I would get dogged down (which I did not, in fact I could not get enough of it).
Gates's argument throughout (it is in the title) was that the Peninsular War was an "ulcer"(specifically the campaigns in Spain) that drained Napoleonic France of time, men and resources through the actions of the numerous Spanish armies that continued to be resurrected, a number of costly sieges, the activities of irregular forces and of the British army and navy. Gates gives due credit to the role of the Spanish armies and irregular for their role in conflict. For example Gates demonstrates how a number of Napoleon's famous generals had their reputations tarnished by the inability to overcome the Spanish armies and insurrections.
This is principally a military history which follows the campaigns of the war in great detail, making it suitable for those with an interest in the military and strategic element of the war and an underlying awareness of the political background (the broader conflict outside of Spain, the importance of Portugal and Spain to both Britain and Napoleonic France etc.) Those without an overview should probably acquire one before taking on this work.
Nevertheless, a key work that anyone with an interest in the Napoleonic wars (including amateurs like myself) should read!
I was disappointed by this book, expecting to learn more than 'this battle happened here and then this one here'. Where is the essential analysis (or even outline) of the political, economic and cultural elements of the conflict, without which the book cannot lay claim to being 'A History of the Peninsular War' as the title suggests. I understand that an analysis of even the Spanish regions and National Junta's inability to form a coherent strategy could fill volumes in its own right, but the author simply glosses over these aspects which are essential to any understanding of the conflict. These 'undercurrents' as the author describes them, take up les than 7 pages of a 500 plus page narrative. There are better reads on the subject if you're interested more in the whole conflict and less in who was where and whom did they fight. The battle maps (drawings?) are also of low quality, adding little to a text that fails to give colour to the numerous engagements. Not a bad book, but definitely not what it purports to be in its title.
Entertaining and informative look at the Peninsular War of 1808-1814. The author discusses all the major battles in detail using hand-drawn maps. Having already read quite a bit about this 'war to the knife' on the part of Spain and France made it easier to understand what they, as well as Portuguese and British forces went through.
Although it was not the main theatre of war for Napoleon, the Peninsula played a major part in Napoleon's downfall since it deprived him of much needed manpower and acted as a continual drain on finances, especially in the wake of the Russian disaster.
Certainly, THE SPANISH ULCER, is an excellent reference for anyone who wants to learn about this bloody, costly, and memorable aspect of Napoleon's reign. It illustrates once again the folly of a two-front war, obsession, and the danger that can overwhelm even the greatest of soldiers.
Imminently readable account of the Peninsular War, balanced in presentation. One of the better modern histories of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. One thing that sets it apart from many other histories is the unusual number of maps - it has many. Even relatively minor events have maps depicting locations of troops and significant battlefield features. Unfortunately the maps are also my greatest criticism - one never knows which way is north when first scanning them Sometimes it is at the top of the page. other times to the left, or even diagonally across the page. It took some getting used to and was a bit of a distraction to those of us who are used to north being towards the top of the page.
This is a very good read. Going by memory, it's not as well written as Wellington in the Peninsula by Jac Weller. By this I mean the beginning of Spanish Ulcer is very choppy with little continuity. It'll briefly describe a battle or event and then move on to the next battle of event. This gave me little idea of the overall picture. About 25% into the book, the pace slows down and the overall narrative begins to come into focus. In many respects this title is superior to the Weller book, in particular with Wellington's failings. With the Weller book, in retrospect, it seems he took an excessively pro-British stance and wasn't as objective.
This is a tremendous book for an overview of the Peninsular War against Napoleon. The sheer plodding and suffering of the armies and citizens of Spain and Portugal are covered as the armies maneuver for advantage and are brought to battle. His research is impeccable, his detail in delineating the armies is astonishing, and his writing style is readable and moving. This is a must have for someone interested in wargaming for the appendices alone. I hope this provides a good introduction for the Oman series.
A big, daunting book. Hard to finish at times due to its complexities. If you want to learn about every military and political move that happened in the napoleonic wars in the peninsula, this is the book for you. Otherwise, it might be a bit too hard for a curious beginner to learn about the time period. For historians 8/10. For anybody 5/10.
I was, unfortunately, a bit disappointed by this book. I was hoping for an analysis of the 1808-1814 Peninsular War (or Guerra Independencia) which provided a more even handed coverage of the war than is common from English-language authors who have tended to concentrate almost wholly on the British involvement. I was looking for a more sympathetic treatment of the Spanish war effort, whose contribution to the French defeat is too often all but ignored.
For a single volume, the scope of this book is very broad - sweeping across all the various campaigns waged in those 6 years across both Spain and Portugal. In that sense it does achieve it's aim. This does mean the major campaigns of the Spanish army are indeed covered. But there is simply too much content to fit into even a fairly large single volume. The level of detail is too light to provide much more than a cursory touch on much of the action.
There isn't any significant analysis of the impact of both regular and irregular Spanish forces. Gates also gives a very simplistic analysis of the tactical differences between French and British forces, repeating Oman's views about line vs column without much by way of explanation for why the French used the tactics they did - even though they failed regularly and were the same as those used in other theatres.
In other words, this is a light touch book which covers all the main campaigns at a high level and without much deeper analysis of tactics or strategy. And the maps although frequent are truly terrible.
In short, despite it's age and the expense of buying hard copies, it still doesn't match the seven volumes of CWC Oman's masterpiece "A History of the Peninsular War".
Actually, I did not finish this book. It was way too full of names and numbers to adequately follow. Also, I got entirely frustrated with the author's treatment of the timelines. I would finally finish a chapter which ended, let's say in 1811, then the next chapter covered some other part of Spain starting in 1809. It was hard to stay focused on the overall story, and feel that I made any progress. In any event, I made it to page 287, but consider my future time too valuable to waste any more of it on this book. It's probably a 2 star book, but I'm giving 3 stars because a lot of effort obviously went into putting the book together.
I'd give it a five if it weren't for the maps, though I am glad it had them unlike other histories on campaigns that either do not have them at all or are barely functional. Got me into the Peninsular War in a large way that I prefer to indulge this subject more than any other Napoleonic related subject.
Struggling through this book, not because it is not any good but because I have been distracted by other things. This is for the serious reader of Military history and is not a light read.