کتاب بسیار موجز و دقیق که شامل امهات نظریات ویتگنشتاین در دو دوره فکری او میشود و تلاش میکند از نوعی انسجام درونی خصوصاً پیرامون مفهوم فلسفه در این دو دوره سخن به میان آورد.
Een vriend schonk mij een hele tijd geleden Wittgenstein en zijn wereld, zoals de vertaling van dit boek heet, een hapbare maar toch diepgaande inleiding tot de filosofie van Wittgenstein. Een goed uitgezocht cadeautje, want ik ben erg geïnteresseerd in taal en dan kan filosofie over taal alleen maar verrijken. Met de enkele noties over Wittgenstein die ik reeds had, verwachtte ik veel van dit boekje, en veel dat me zou bevallen.
Ik moet wel zeggen een beetje teleurgesteld te zijn. Ik ga hier waarschijnlijk een van de meest pretentieuze of naïeve uitspraken doen die ik kan doen—mij ontbreekt dan ook de contextuele kennis van de filosofie en taalkunde van Wittgensteins tijd om alles goed te begrijpen en te situeren—maar ik kreeg de indruk dat het de Duitser nogal aan kennis van semantiek, taalevolutie en grammatica ontbrak om tot de juiste conclusies te komen. Hoewel hij later zelf op zijn theorie terugkwam (Wittgenstein II, noemen we dat dan), lijkt het toch nog allemaal erg verdwaald. Vooral de ideeën uit Tractatus (Wittgenstein I dus) vond ik, hoewel ze fraai zijn, nogal absurd. Alsof hij vergeet dat er zoiets is als woordsoorten en bovendien niet weet dat grammatica in andere talen totaal anders werkt. Enfin, ik zal het wel weer niet helemaal begrepen hebben.
At the time this book was published in 1969, K.T. Fann taught Philosophy at York University, Ontario; he also wrote/edited books such as 'Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy,' 'Symposium on J. L. Austin,' 'Peirce's Theory of Abduction,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface, “Wittgenstein’s later CONCEPTION of the nature and tasks of philosophy can best be seen as a ‘development’ of his earlier views, while his later METHOD should be regarded as the ‘negation’ of his earlier method. This, I think, is the key to a clear understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a whole… This book is intended as a brief introduction to Wittgenstein’s works for students and the interested public. It is the result of my own struggle to understand Wittgenstein…”
He cautions in the first chapter, “Because of the difficulty of the subject matter and the cryptic style of presentation, the Tractatus is without doubt one of the hardest philosophic classics to master. Wittgenstein… told Frank Ramsey that his idea of the work was ‘not that anyone by reading it will understand his ideas but that some day someone will think they out again for himself and derive great pleasure from finding in his book their exact expression. According to Wittgenstein himself, it was misunderstood by Russell, Moore, and Frege---the three foremost philosophers of his time.” (Pg. 3-4)
He suggests, “the whole aim of his philosophizing in the Tractatus is to put an end to philosophizing. Wittgenstein will achieve this by setting a limit to thought, or rather to the expression of thoughts---i.e, language… Thus, the principal job of the Tractatus is to investigate the essence of language---its function and its structure.” (Pg. 5)
He explains, “Wittgenstein’s theory of language in the Tractatus has two components: the ‘picture theory’ and the ‘truth-function theory.’ These two theories are designed to answer the questions: ‘What is the function of language?’ and ‘What is the structure of language?’… the two questions above now take the following forms: ‘How are elementary propositions linked with the world?’ and ‘How are complex propositions related to elementary ones?’ His answers are: Elementary propositions are ‘logical pictures’ of atomic facts---the basic kind of facts which cannot be further analysed; and all complex propositions are ‘truth-functions’ of the elementary ones.” (Pg. 8)
He points out, “It is amazing that nowhere in all of Wittgenstein’s writings are we offered a single example of ‘names’ or ‘elementary propositions.’” (Pg. 12)
He states, “If an elementary proposition MATCHES the atomic fact it describes, then it is true; otherwise, it is false. But a proposition need not be compared with reality to be understood, because it is a picture of reality: I know the situation that it represents by merely looking at the picture. That is also the reason why we can understand a completely new proposition such as: ‘There are ten pink elephants flying over Hawaii.’ In all likelihood nobody has ever come across this statement before. Nevertheless, we all know what it means because it sketches out a picture which can be compared with the reality.” (Pg. 16)
He advises, “The failure to understand Wittgenstein’s distinctions results in misinterpreting the Tractatus as an anti-metaphysical treatise. That the earlier commentators and readers of the Tractatus did not appreciate Wittgenstein’s important distinction between ‘senseless’ (sinnlos) and ‘nonsensical’ (unsinnig) is evident from the first English edition of the book in which ‘unsinnig’ (nonsensical) is often translated as ‘senseless’---the same translation given to ‘sinnlos.’” (Pg. 25)
He notes, “From what is known about Wittgenstein’s life and character, there is no doubt that he actually believed that he had solved all important philosophical problems and quit philosophy accordingly. The doubts expressed in the ‘Notebooks’ were either suppressed of resolved at the time of the publication of the Tractatus. They apparently surfaced again in 1929 to haunt his tormented mind.” (Pg. 43)
He points out, “The years Wittgenstein spent in teaching elementary-school children may be considered the most decisive factor in the shaping of his later philosophy. The reality of teaching children how to read, write, calculate, etc., and the experience of compiling a dictionary for elementary schools must have contributed to Wittgenstein’s later pragmatic view of language. How else does one find out whether a child knows the meaning of a word or not except by observing how the child USES the word? And, doesn’t the explanation of the meaning of a word to children consist precisely in teaching them the USE of the word?” (Pg. 43)
He says of the later Wittgenstein, “Wittgenstein conceives his philosophical task to be helping those who are philosophically puzzled to see the nature of their puzzlement. It is true that he tends to emphasize the negative aspects of philosophy. But we might remember … that if we discover a proposition to be unverifiable, then that is an important piece of information about it.” (Pg. 95)
Although this book was written nearly fifty years ago, and before the publication of additional material of Wittgenstein’s that has come out in recent decades, this book remains a masterful analysis of this aspect of Wittgenstein’s thought, and will be of great value to anyone studying Wittgenstein’s philosophy and its development.
An absolutely superb introduction and in-depth examination of Wittgenstein’s method and the development of his thought. Fan expertly covers both the earlier and later periods with well-researched and thoughtful commentary. The book is filled with quotations and references that illuminate Wittgenstein’s dense writing, and give the reader a complete picture of both the author’s life and his groundbreaking philosophy.
Fann divides the book into 4 main areas: 1. Tractatus-era, 2. Transition-era 3. Investigations-era, and finally, 4. what can only be considered the best and most complete bibliography every compiled on Wittgenstein.
I found the diagrams on the early Tractatus ontology to be particularly helpful, and the final chapter “Understanding Wittgenstein” was an absolutely joy to read.
This book is a must-read for any fan, casual or otherwise, of Wittgenstein, and will serve as a gold-standard on his work for years to come.