On Human Nature: Essays in Ethics and Politics

by Arthur Schopenhauer, Thomas Bailey Saunders (Compiler)

A devout believer in the supremacy of will over intellect, Arthur Schopenhauer developed a metaphysical theory that influenced such thinkers as Nietzsche, Wagner, Wittgenstein, and Freud. These six essays are drawn from the chapters entitled Zur Ethik and Zur Rechtslehre und Politik, which originated in the philosopher’s Parerga, as well as from his posthumously published writings.
More than any other work, On Human Nature offers an expression of Schopenhauer's views, including the depth of his interests, his biases, and his philosophy. Students of history and philosophy along with other readers will appreciate these lucid, accessible observations on government, free will and fatalism, character, moral instinct, and ethics.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Classics, Psychology, Essays, Politics

96 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1851

About the author

Arthur Schopenhauer was born in the city of Danzig (then part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth; present day Gdańsk, Poland) and was a German philosopher best known for his work The World as Will and Representation. Schopenhauer attempted to make his career as an academic by correcting and expanding Immanuel Kant's philosophy concerning the way in which we experience the world.

He was the son of author Johanna Schopenhauer and the older brother of Adele Schopenhauer.

Reviews

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reading this book makes it abundantly clear how Schopenhauer earned the nickname the great pessimist.

("We have been taking a look at the depravity of man , and it is a sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our sight on the misery of his existence; and then when we have done so and are horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity. We may then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall perceive the eternal justice of things; for we shall recognize that the world itself is the final judgement on it, and we shall begin to understand why it is that everything that lives must pay the penalty of its existence. First in living then in dying.And thus the evil of the penalty accords with the evil of the sin")

Like Hobbes he favors monarchy and the ideal of a platonic republics over democracy's leveling effects , he sees human beings as monsters of egoism who are more brutish then animals and openly detests the masses. Moreover he doesnt subscribe to any utopian ideas in change or progreess, and holds a deterministic view in regards to the question of free will. Towards things that irritate him he sacrifices philosophical rigor and any standard of objectivity by being unrelentingly and comically scathing in his rants , see his essay "On woman" for further proof. Though he should be given credit as stuborness is something he admits to and owns , as he dismisses competing ideas and asserts that " My standard is truth"

Life is central for Schopenhauer " i am no proffessor of philosophy" and his reflections and observations on it are both stylish and stimulating. as they tend to spark explosions of thoughts ala nietzsche. i will not comment so much on my itnerpreatations though the allusions and the influence is obvious as Schopenhauer expounds a theory that all things outwardly are the manifestation and objectification of an apriori will. Such a will is the thing in itself and the unconscious and primordial guiding force behind all our actions and explanations. Also one can't end talking about Schopenhauer without allotting him due credit for being one of the first western philosophers to navigate and integrate eastern hindu and buddhist ideas into his writings.

[ZaRi]

اراذل همیشه اجتماعی هستند و مهم ترین علامت نجابت یک فرد این است که خیلی کم از معاشرت با دیگران لذت میبرد.

[Mehmet · Rating 3 out of 5]

Orijinal dilinde okusam daha fazla anlardım herhalde. Çeviri başka ne kadar kötü olabilirdi acaba? Yarım bırakmak istemediğim için tamamladım ama kitaba yazık oldu.

[Danielle · Rating 5 out of 5]

The thread tying together all of the essays in this little volume is that the whole of humanity is contained in any one of its parts, so much so that if all men were killed but one, all of what constitutes humanity will survive so long as he does. This notion is the foundation on which his whole analysis rests and it is a lovely thought.

[Natasha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Schopenhauer details that there is a simple elegance of living in the present state but that anyone who does so is no more than a brute. Life comes from our suffering and that we recognise each other through this and as a result we should address each other as such; our fellow sufferers.

Time stretches out before us and yet everything passes away as soon as it has occurred so that all we can rely upon is an endless state of change, always becoming and never being.

Schopenhauer acknowledges that we place more significance on that we have lost than on that we already possess as the present has no value to us whilst we hold it in our hands. We are always reaching to our pasts or futures and sometimes ruin out futures for lack of valuing our present. In all of its cruelty, our suffering in life comes from regret of that we have lost and yet the hope that we will find it again and yet failing to realise its value in the present moment. It is a cruel irony that haunts all of our lives and actions. We give up on worthwhile pursuits for short-term pains and pleasures.

He also explains that difference between the suffering of people in two major forms. First there are those who are open of their suffering, wearing their weaknesses and errors as something duly paid that they often forget about them and become angry with others whom they recognize the same traits, as they are not the same. Secondly, there are those who are of good character and intellect but who instead hide their faults and suffering and hide from these further when their own weaknesses are revealed to them causing further gestation of suffering to their own person. Suffering can also be furthered between these two types as they fail to recognise each other, both hiding or blaming the other for their own suffering.

This book is useful in recognising these different modes of coping and also is a useful meditation on the nature of humanity, hopes, and fears.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, if only in the business of taming and restraining him which we call civilisation. Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his nature breaks out. Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law and order fall off and give place to anarchy, he shows himself for what he is. But it is unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain enlightenment on this subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way inferior to the tiger and the hyaena."

"No animal ever torments another for the mere purpose of tormenting, but man does it, and it is this that constitutes the diabolical feature in his character which is so much worse than the merely animal."

"We have been taking a look at the depravity of man, and it is a sight which may well fill us with horror. But now we must cast our eyes on the misery of his existence; and when we have done so, and are horrified by that too, we must look back again at his depravity. We shall then find that they hold the balance to each other. We shall perceive the eternal justice of things; for we shall recognise that the world is itself the Last Judgment on it, and we shall begin to understand why it is that everything that lives must pay the penalty of its existence, first in living and then in dying. Thus the evil of the penalty accords with the evil of the sin."

"When physical pleasures seduce a man from the right path, it is his sensual nature--the animal part of him--which is at fault. He is carried away by its attractions, and, overcome by the impression of the moment, he acts without thinking of the consequences. When, on the other hand, he is brought by age to bodily weakness to the condition in which the vices that he could never abandon end by abandoning him, and his capacity for physical pleasure dies--if he turns to Avarice, the intellectual desire survives the sensual. Money, which represents all the good things of this world, and is these good things in the abstract, now become the dry trunk overgrown with all the dead lusts of flesh, which are egoism in the abstract. They come to life again in the love of Mammon. The transient pleasure of the senses has become a deliberate and calculated lust of money, which, like that to which it is directed, is symbolical in its nature, and, like it, indestructible."

[Abolfazl Sheybani · Rating 3 out of 5]

كتاب نسبتا سخت جلو ميره با اينكه حجم كمى داره
هم اينكه خود كتاب يه مقدار سنگينه و هم اينكه به نظرم مترجم خيلى موفق عمل نكرده و ويراستار هم همينطور.

[Choukri AOUSSAR · Rating 4 out of 5]

a being whose will is so sinful, whose intellect is so limited, whose body is so weak and perishable as man's. How shall a man be proud, when his conception is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a necessity!

But it is superfluity that Avarice brings in its train, and when was superfluity ever unwelcome? That must be a good vice which has good consequences. Avarice proceeds upon the principle that all pleasure is only negative in its operation and that the happiness which consists of a series of pleasures is a chimaera; that, on the contrary, it is pains which are positive and extremely real. Accordingly, the avaricious man foregoes the former in order that he may be the better preserved from the latter, and thus it is that bear and forbear—sustine et abstine—is his maxim.

Avarice is the vice of age, just as extravagance is the vice of youth.

so many men of the better kind have four-footed friends: for, to be sure, how is a man to get relief from the endless dissimulation, falsity and malice of mankind, if there were no dogs into whose honest faces he can look without distrust?

there are general masks, without any particular character attaching to them like dominoes. They may be met with everywhere; and of this sort is the strict rectitude, the courtesy, the sincere sympathy, the smiling friendship, that people profess. The whole of these masks as a rule are merely, as I have said, a disguise for some industry, commerce, or speculation.

Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, if only in the business of taming and restraining him which we call civilisation. Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his nature breaks out. Wherever and whenever the locks and chains of law and order fall off and give place to anarchy, he shows himself for what he is. But it is unnecessary to wait for anarchy in order to gain enlightenment on this subject. A hundred records, old and new, produce the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelty man is in no way inferior to the tiger and the hyaena.

Gobineau in his work Les Races Humaines has called man l'animal méchant par excellence. People take this very ill, because they feel that it hits them; but he is quite right, for man is the only animal which causes pain to others without any further purpose than just to cause it. Other animals never do it except to satisfy their hunger, or in the rage of combat. If it is said against the tiger that he kills more than eats, he strangles his prey only for the purpose of eating it; and if he cannot eat it, the only explanation is, as the French phrase has it, that ses yeux sont plus grands que son estomac. No animal ever torments another for the mere purpose of tormenting, but man does it, and it is this that constitutes the diabolical feature in his character which is so much worse than the merely animal.

People may, if they please, call it the radical evil of human nature—a name which will at least serve those with whom a word stands for an explanation. I say, however, that it is the will to live, which, more and more embittered by the constant sufferings of existence, seeks to alleviate its own torment by causing torment in others.

But it is Schadenfreude, a mischievous delight in the misfortunes of others, which remains the worst trait in human nature. It is a feeling which is closely akin to cruelty, and differs from it, to say the truth, only as theory from practice. In general, it may be said of it that it takes the place which pity ought to take.

With a good action,—that, every action in which a man's own advantage is ostensibly subordinated to another's,—the motive is either (1) self-interest, kept in the background; or (2) superstition, in other words, self-interest in the form of reward in another life; or (3) sympathy; or (4) the desire to lend a helping hand, in other words, attachment to the maxim that we should assist one another in need, and the wish to maintain this maxim, in view of the presumption that some day we ourselves may find it serve our turn.

The man who has no conscience in small things will be a scoundrel in big things. If we neglect small traits of character, we have only ourselves to blame if we afterwards learn to our disadvantage what this character is in the great affairs of life. On the same principle, we ought to break with so-called friends even in matters of trifling moment, if they show a character that is malicious or bad or vulgar, so that we may avoid the bad turn which only waits for an opportunity of being done us. The same thing applies to servants. Let it always be our maxim: Better alone than amongst traitors.

No man becomes this or that by wishing to be it, however earnestly. His acts proceed from his innate and unalterable character, and they are more immediately and particularly determined by motives. A man's conduct, therefore, is the necessary product of both character and motive.

nul homme n’a qualité pour s’ériger en juge et en punisseur, au sens moral pur des mots, non plus que pour châtier, par des douleurs qu’il infligerait, les méfaits d’autrui, pour leur imposer en somme une pénitence.

Au contraire, l’esprit délivré du principe d’individuation, parvenu à cette notion plus profonde des choses, qui est le principe de toute vertu et de toute noblesse d’âme, cesse de proclamer la nécessité du châtiment.

LA MÉCHANCETÉ : ELLE IMPLIQUE UN DÉVELOPPEMENT EXCESSIF DE LA VOLONTÉ, ET PAR SUITE DES SOUFFRANCES EXCESSIVES.

nous appelons bon tout ce qui est tel que nous le voulons ; aussi telle chose peut être bonne pour l’un, qui est justement tout le contraire pour l’autre. Le genre bon se divise en deux espèces : il y a ce qui assure la satisfaction de notre volonté sur-le-champ, et il y a ce qui l’assure pour plus tard seulement ; en d’autres termes, l’agréable et l’utile. Quant à la qualité contraire, s’il s’agit d’êtres sans intelligence, on se sert du mot mauvais (Schlecht), plus rarement du mot plus abstrait de nuisible (Uebel), ce qui veut dire toujours une chose ne répondant pas à la tendance actuelle de la Volonté.

Tout bon est essentiellement relatif ; il n’existe en effet que par rapport à une Volonté qui a des désirs.

Il est aussi impossible à la Volonté de trouver une satisfaction qui l’arrête, qui l’empêche de vouloir encore et toujours, qu’il est impossible au Temps de commencer ou de finir ; un contentement durable, qui apaise son désir complètement et pour jamais, c’est là ce qu’elle ne goûtera point. Elle est le tonneau des Danaïdes ; pour elle pas de bien suprême, pas de bien absolu ; rien que des biens d’un instant.

la suppression spontanée et totale, la négation du vouloir, le néant véritable de toute volonté, bref cet état unique où tout désir s’arrête et se tait, où se trouve le seul contentement qui ne risque point de passer, cet état qui seul délivre de tout, et dont nous parlerons bientôt, pour conclure toutes ces études, –voilà ce que nous appelons le bien absolu, le summum bonum ; voilà où nous voyons le remède radical et unique à la maladie, tandis que tous les autres biens sont de purs palliatifs, de simples calmants.

Quand un homme, en toute occasion, dès que nulle puissance ne le retient, a un penchant à commettre l’injustice, nous disons qu’il est méchant. Rappelons-nous notre explication du mot « injustice » ; ce que nous voulons dire, c’est qu’il ne se contente pas d’affirmer la Volonté de vivre, telle qu’elle se manifeste dans son corps ; mais il pousse cette affirmation jusqu’à nier la Volonté en tant qu’elle apparaît dans d’autres individus ; et la preuve, c’est qu’il tente d’asservir leurs forces à sa propre volonté, et de supprimer leur existence dès qu’ils font obstacle aux prétentions de cette volonté. La source dernière de cette humeur, c’est l’égoïsme porté à un degré extrême,

De là ressortant deux vérités : d’abord celle-ci, que ce qui apparaît en un pareil homme, c’est une volonté de vivre extraordinairement violente et qui dépasse de beaucoup la simple affirmation de son propre corps ; et en second lieu, cette autre, que l’esprit de cet homme est soumis sans réserve au principe de causalité et comme prisonnier du principium individuationis ; d’où vient qu’il prend tout à fait au sérieux les distinctions absolues introduites par ce principe entre sa personne et tout le reste des êtres ; qu’il cherche son bien-être particulier, et cela seul, entièrement indifférent d’ailleurs à celui de tous les autres ; ceux-ci, pour mieux dire, lui sont tout à fait étrangers ; il les voit séparés de lui comme par un large abîme, et même il ne voit en eux que de purs fantômes sans nulle réalité. –Ces deux traits sont les deux éléments essentiels du caractère méchant.

La Volonté, dans cet état d’exaspération, est nécessairement et par nature une source intarissable de souffrances. La première raison en est que toute volonté a pour essence même de naître d’un besoin, et par conséquent d’une souffrance.

un des éléments premiers de la jouissance que nous procure le beau, c’est ce silence momentané de la Volonté, qui s’établit à l’instant où nous nous abandonnons à la contemplation esthétique, où nous nous réduisons, dans cet acte de connaissance, au rôle de sujet pur et sans volonté,

grâce à la causalité qui enchaîne les choses, le plus grand nombre des désirs sont destinés à ne point rencontrer leur satisfaction ; la Volonté sera donc bien plus souvent contrariée que contentée ; et plus une Volonté sera violente et multipliera ses élans, plus seront violentes et multiples les souffrances qu’elle traînera à sa suite. Qu’est-ce, en effet, qu’une souffrance ? Simplement une volonté qui n’est pas contentée, et qui est contrariée ;

C’est encore pour cette raison, c’est en vertu de cette liaison indissoluble qui amène à la suite d’une volonté forte et fréquente un cortège de douleurs fortes et fréquentes, que tout homme très méchant porte sur son visage les marques d’une souffrance intime ; eût-il obtenu en partage tous les biens extérieurs, toujours il aura l’air malheureux, et cela sans autre répit que les instants où il sera possédé soit par la jouissance présente, soit par l’image de cette jouissance.

Cette souffrance intérieure, qui fait partie inséparable de l’essence même des gens de cette sorte, est la source véritable de cette joie, qu’on aurait tort de rapporter au simple égoïsme, car elle est désintéressée, et qu’ils tirent de la douleur d’autrui, joie qui est le fonds propre de la méchanceté, et qui, à un degré supérieur, est la cruauté même. Ici, la douleur d’autrui n’est plus un simple moyen, destiné à conduire vers un but différent la volonté du sujet ; elle est elle-même le but.

Comme l’homme n’est que le phénomène de la Volonté, mais qu’elle est en lui éclairée à un degré supérieur par la connaissance, il ne cesse, pour mesurer la satisfaction réelle que la Volonté obtient en lui, de la comparer à la satisfaction possible, telle que la lui représente l’intelligence. De là l’envie ; toute privation s’exagère par comparaison avec la jouissance d’autrui, et s’adoucit à la seule pensée que les autres sont privés comme nous.

Les maux qui sont communs à tous les hommes et inséparables de leur existence nous troublent peu ; de même encore ceux qui frappent notre pays tout entier, ainsi les intempéries du climat. Le seul souvenir d’un malheur pire que le nôtre, allège notre chagrin ; la vue des douleurs d’autrui apaise notre douleur.

supposons un homme en qui la volonté est animée d’une passion extraordinairement ardente ; en vain, dans la fureur du désir, il ramasserait tout ce qui existe pour l’offrir à sa passion et la calmer ; nécessairement il éprouvera bientôt que tout contentement est de pure apparence, que l’objet possédé ne tient jamais les promesses de l’objet désiré, car il ne nous donne pas l’assouvissement final de notre fureur, de notre volonté ; que le désir satisfait change seulement de figure et prend une forme nouvelle pour nous torturer encore ; qu’enfin, les formes possibles fussent-elles toutes épuisées, le besoin de vouloir, sans motif connu, subsisterait et se révélerait sous l’aspect d’un sentiment de vide, d’ennui affreux ; torture atroce !

Dans un état de faible développement de la Volonté, tous ces effets ne se font que faiblement ressentir et ne produisent en nous que la dose commune d’humeur noire ; mais chez celui en qui la volonté se manifeste jusqu’au degré où elle est la méchanceté bien déterminée, il naît de là nécessairement une douleur extrême, un trouble inapaisable, une incurable souffrance ; aussi, incapable de se soulager directement, il recherche le soulagement par une voie indirecte ; il se soulage à contempler le mal d’autrui, et à penser que ce mal est un effet de sa puissance à lui.

Ainsi le mal des autres devient proprement son but ; c’est un spectacle qui le berce ; et voilà comment naît ce phénomène, si fréquent dans l’histoire, de la cruauté au sens exact du mot, de la soif du sang, telle qu’on la voit chez les Néron, les Domitien, les Deys barbaresques, chez un Robespierre, etc.

Il y a des rapports entre la méchanceté et l’esprit de vengeance, qui rend le mal pour le mal, non pas avec une préoccupation de l’avenir, –ce qui est la caractéristique du sentiment, –mais simplement en songeant à ce qui est arrivé, au passé, cela sans intérêt, en voyant dans le mal qu’il inflige non un moyen, mais un but, et en cherchant dans la souffrance de l’offenseur un apaisement de la nôtre.

Le méchant, par l’énergie qu’il met à affirmer la vie, et qui se manifeste à lui dans les souffrances qu’il inflige à autrui, mesure la distance où il est de l’abdication, de la négation de sa volonté, c’est-à-dire la distance où il est du seul moyen qui délivre de la vie et de ses douleurs. Il voit combien il y tient, et par quels liens solides ; la souffrance d’autrui, simplement connue, n’a pu l’émouvoir ; le voilà qui tombe en proie à la vie et à la souffrance, cette fois ressentie. Reste à savoir si ce sera assez pour briser l’élan de sa volonté, et pour en venir à bout.

il est aussi impossible de faire un homme de bien avec de simples considérations morales ou par la pure prédication, qu’il l’a été aux auteurs de Poétiques, depuis Aristote, de faire un seul poète.

Il est, par exemple, tout à fait indifférent, pour la valeur morale de l’homme, qu’il fasse des dons considérables aux pauvres, avec la ferme conviction d’en recevoir le décuple dans une vie future, ou bien qu’il dépense la même somme à améliorer un bien-fonds qui lui rendra plus tard, mais d’autant plus sûrement, de riches récoltes ; –si le bandit qui tue pour une récompense est un assassin, le vrai croyant qui livre aux flammes l’hérétique ne l’est pas moins ; et de même aussi, à ne considérer que l’état intérieur des âmes, le croisé qui va égorger des Turcs en Terre sainte ; l’un et l’autre agissent au fond avec la pensée de gagner une place dans le paradis. Ainsi donc, ils ne songent qu’à eux-mêmes, à leur propre égoïsme, comme le bandit ; s’il y a entre eux et lui une différence, elle tient à l’absurdité du moyen qu’ils prennent. –Nous l’avons dit déjà, pour atteindre du dehors la volonté, il faut employer des motifs ; or, les motifs changent la façon dont la volonté se manifeste, non la volonté même. « Velle non discitur. »

Quand il s’agit d’une bonne action dont l’auteur s’est inspiré de certains dogmes, il faut toujours distinguer si ces dogmes en ont été le motif réel, ou s’ils ne seraient pas, comme nous le disions plus haut, l’explication illusoire dont on se sert pour contenter sa raison au sujet d’un acte sorti d’une tout autre source ; on a fait l’action parce qu’on est bon ; on est incapable de l’expliquer correctement, parce qu’on n’est pas philosophe ; et pourtant on a besoin de s’en donner une explication. Seulement la distinction est difficile à faire ; il faut pénétrer jusqu’au fond des intentions.

C’est pourquoi nous ne pouvons presque jamais juger exactement, au point de vue moral, les actes d’autrui ; et les nôtres même, rarement. –Les actions et la manière de se conduire, soit d’un individu, soit d’un peuple, peuvent être grandement modifiées par leurs croyances, par l’exemple, par l’habitude.

bonté sincère, la vertu désintéressée, la noblesse vraie, n’ont pas leur source dans la connaissance abstraite ; elles l’ont pourtant dans la connaissance ; mais celle-là est immédiate, intuitive, le raisonnement n’a rien à faire avec elle, ni pour ni contre ; comme elle n’est pas abstraite, elle ne se transmet pas, il faut que chacun la trouve lui-même ; par suite, ce n’est pas dans les paroles qu’elle obtient son expression adéquate, mais seulement dans les faits, dans les actes, dans la conduite d’une vie d’homme.

Maintenant, avant de parler de la bonté proprement dite, pour l’opposer à la méchanceté que nous avons déjà analysée, il est utile de considérer un degré intermédiaire, qui est la négation de la méchanceté ; c’est à savoir la justice. Nous avons exposé déjà, et tout au long, ce que c’est que le droit et l’injuste ; disons donc en peu de mots qu’on nomme juste quiconque reconnaît spontanément les limites tracées par la morale seule entre le droit et l’injuste et qui les respecte, même en l’absence de l’État, ou de toute autre puissance capable de les garder ; qui, par suite, pour revenir à notre doctrine, ne va jamais, dans l’affirmation de sa propre Volonté, jusqu’à la négation de la même Volonté chez un autre individu. Il n’ira donc jamais, pour accroître son propre bien-être, infliger des souffrances à autrui ; en d’autres termes, il ne commettra aucune transgression, il respectera les droits et les biens de chacun.

On le voit, aux yeux de ce juste, le principe d’individuation n’est plus ce qu’il était pour le méchant, un voile impénétrable ; il ne se borne plus, comme ce dernier, à affirmer le phénomène de la volonté en lui, tout en le niant chez autrui ; les autres hommes ne sont plus pour lui des fantômes vains, et d’ailleurs absolument distincts de lui par leur essence ; non, il le déclare par sa conduite même ; il reconnaît ce qui fait son être propre, la chose en soi qui est la Volonté de vivre, il la reconnaît dans le phénomène d’autrui, qui lui est donné à simple titre de représentation ; il se reconnaît donc chez l’autre, jusqu’à un certain point, assez en somme pour n’être pas injuste, pour ne pas lui porter tort. Dans la même mesure, son regard perce le principe d’individuation, le voile de Maya ; il pose l’être extérieur sur le pied d’égalité avec le sien ; il ne lui fait pas tort.

Regardons au fond de la justice ; nous y trouverons déjà le ferme propos de ne pas aller, dans l’affirmation de notre propre Volonté, jusqu’au point de nier les phénomènes qui manifestent hors de nous la Volonté, en nous les asservissant.

À son degré le plus haut, la justice, la droiture d’âme, ne se sépare déjà pas de la bonté proprement dite, laquelle n’a pas un caractère purement négatif ; elle va alors jusqu’au point de nous faire mettre en doute nos droits sur un bien qui nous vient par héritage ; jusqu’à nous inspirer de subvenir aux besoins de notre corps par nos propres forces, physiques ou intellectuelles ; de refuser, comme n’y ayant pas droit, les services d’autrui, le luxe sous toutes ses formes, et enfin de nous vouer à une pauvreté volontaire.

Nous en avons un exemple dans Pascal ; quand il se rangea à la vie ascétique, il refusa de se laisser servir, bien qu’il eût assez de gens à ses ordres ; malgré son état toujours maladif, il faisait son lit lui-même ; il allait quérir son repas à la cuisine,

[Teresa · Rating 5 out of 5]

While I don't necessarily agree with all of Schopenhauer's ideas (though with most of them, I do), his capacity to dissect human motives and character is astounding. I have to give it 5 stars for the "food-for-thought" factor alone.

[Shayan Nasihati · Rating 4 out of 5]

کسانی که بجای زندگی فضیلت‌مندانه، آرزوی زندگی شاد و عالی و طولانی را در سر دارند، مانند بازیگران احمقی هستند که می‌خواهند همواره نقش‌های بزرگ داشته باشند، نقش‌هایی که وجه ممیزشان شکوه و ظفرمندی است. این‌ها نمی‌توانند بفهمند که مهم چه و چقدر بازی کردن نیست، بلکه چطور بازی کردن است.

[Yasemin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Derin bir konu ama yazik ki vasat bir ceviri.

[1010 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Meh know someone way more pessimistic (ngl was lit read)

[GurmeOkur · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kötü çeviri

[Samira · Rating 3 out of 5]

قبل از این کتاب به نظرم حتما باید کتاب دو مسئله بنیادین اخلاق شوپنهاور رو خوند چون خیلی جاها رفرنس میده به اون کتاب و با خوندن اون کتاب فهم این خیلی راحت‌تر میشه یه جورایی بعضی جاها خلاصه شده ی نکات کتاب دو مسئله ی بنیادین اخلاق هست

این کتاب ۶ بخش داره و درمورد ۶ موضوع صحبت میکنه به جز دو بخش اخر که باهاش ارتباط نگرفتم کلا نظرات جالب توجه ایی میگه که البته بازم میگم کتاب جمع و جور و خلاصه اییه.

1.طبیعت بشری
"دنیای متمدن ما صرفا بالماسکه ایی بزرگ است ...اینها آنچه وانمود میکنند نیستند؛ صرفا نقاب اند و علی القاعده پشت این نقاب ها به مشتی کاسب کار برمی‌خوریم.."

"پس واقعیت این است که در دل هر انسا دیدی وحشی خفته است که فقط در انتظار فرصتی ست تا بغرد و حمله کند...این سرچشمه ی شهوت مبارزه و جنگ است و عقل مامور مراقبت از این شهوت"

2.حکومت
" اگر در جهان حق حکم فرما بود انسان خودش خانه اش را میساخت و به جز حق داشتن آن خانه به حفاظت دیگری نیاز نداشت اما از آنجا که ظلم حاکم است لازم است شخصی که خانه اش را ساخته از آن محافظت کند" پس حکومتی باید تشکیل بشه جلوی اون حاکمیت ظلم که تو ذات انسان هست رو بگیره

3. اراده ی ازاد و تقدیرباوری
"آن چیزی رخ میدهد که باید رخ دهد."

4. شخصیت
" شخصیت تا جایی که ما طبیعتش رو میفهمیم فوق و ورای زمان است نمیتواند تحت تاثیر زندگی دستخوش تغییر شود اما برای آشکار کردن خود و نشان دادن مناظر متنوع نیاز به گذشت زمان دارد"

5.غریزه ی اخلاقی
6. تاملات اخلاقی

[Troy · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you have a significant other that's into Philosophy, and you're thinking of charming them with your interest in their love of philosophy by picking up this book and reading it... don't. This was a rather dense read. I can't say I agree with all of Schopenhauer's ideas, but I do like what he has to say about human character and how he phrases his ideas. The 5th essay in this book isn't an essay, but a series of quotes, which are pretty funny if you're in the right mood.
...
For those of you who read philosophy, this is a good thought provoking book. He brings up some interesting ideas on free will and character protruding through our actions, and tells stories to illustrate his examples. This book is nothing like Plato, which I had just finished reading prior to, so it was a bit of a shock adjusting to the format of Schopenhauer's writing.

[Hossein · Rating 5 out of 5]

این کتاب به عنوان اولین کتاب فلسفی که چه از شوپنهاور و چه عموماً خوندم با وجود یک سری مفاهیم فلسفی (پدیدار و شیء فی نفسه) برایم جذاب بود. شوپنهاور در این کتاب انسان رو شرور جانوری تمام عیار معرفی کرده، جمهوری رو به کلی زیر سوال برده و تنها نظام حکومتی ایده‌آل رو پادشاهی موروثی با چاشنی استبداد معرفی می‌کند. تقدیرباوری و جبرگرایی را از لحاظ نتیجه یکسان دانسته و می‌گوید آن چیزی رخ می‌دهد که باید رخ دهد.

از متن کتاب:

آنچه در ملأ عام انکار می‌شود، در خلوت مهر تأیید می‌خورد. (در باب انکار اراده حیات در دوران معاصر)

هدف دولت ایجاد بهشت احمقان است و این با هدف واقعی زندگی یعنی رسیدن به شناختی از اینکه اراده در طبیعت هولناکش واقعاً چیست تضاد مستقیم دارد.

هر کمال بشری متناظر نقصی است که با خطر مشتبه شدن با آن روبه‌رو است (مقتصد خسیس به نظر می‌رسد و گستاخ، خاکی و بی‌ریا)

[Nwaf · Rating 3 out of 5]

كتاب آرثر شوبنهاور عن الطبيعة البشرية وإن كان سوداويا .

فهو يذكر، على سبيل المثال :أن الوجود لا قيمة حقيقية له في حد ذاته، وأننا لا نشعر بالبهجة في وجودنا إلا عندما نسعى جاهدين لتحقيق هدف ما وإلا فإننا نعاني من شعور بالألم والملل والفراغ.

ويؤكد شوبنهاور أيضًا أن الإنسان يعيش في خياله يمارس أدواراً مسرحية مختلفة مفروضة إجتماعياً عليه لا في اللحظة الحاضرة، وأن الحاضر هو ما يجب أن يُعتز به لا أن ننتظر المستقبل.

ويرى أن على الإنسان يجب عليه أن ينبذ الدنيا، وأن إنكاره لإرادته الحره هو سبيل خلاصه الحقيقيّ .

[Mischa Daanen · Rating 4.25 out of 5]

Compilation of essays on: Human Nature, Government, Free-Will and Fatalism, Character, Moral Instinct, and Ethical Reflections

Character

‘Men who aspire to a happy, a brilliant and a long life, instead of to a virtuous one, are like foolish actors who want to be always having the great parts, -the parts that are marked by splendour and triumph. They fail to see that the important thing is not what or how much, but how they act.

Since a man does not alter, and his moral character remains absolutely the same all through his life; since he must play out the part which he has received, without the least deviation from the character; since neither experience, nor philosophy, nor religion can effect any improvement in him, the question arises, What is the meaning of life at all? To what purpose is it played, this farce in which everything that is essential is irrevocably fixed and determined?

It is played that a man may come to understand himself, that he may see what it is that he seeks and has sought to be; what he wants, and what, therefore, he is. This is a knowledge which must be imparted to him from without. Life is to man, in other words, to will, what chemical re-agents are to the body: it is only by life that a man reveals what he is, and it is only in so far as he reveals himself that he exists at all. Life is the manifestation of character, of the something that we understand by that word; and it is not in life, but outside of it, and outside time, that character undergoes alteration, as a result of the self-knowledge which life gives. Life is only the mirror into which a man gazes not in order that he may get a reflection of himself, but that he may come to understand himself by that reflection; that he may see what it is that the mirror shows. Life is the proof sheet, in which the compositors' errors are brought to light. How they become visible, and whether the type is large or small, are matters of no consequence. Neither in the externals of life nor in the course of history is there any significance; for as it is all one whether an error occurs in the large type or in the small, so it is all one, as regards the essence of the matter, whether an evil disposition is mirrored as a conqueror of the world or a common swindler or ill-natured egoist. In one case he is seen of all men; in the other, perhaps only of himself; but that he should see himself is what signifies.

Therefore if egoism has a firm hold of a man and masters him, whether it be in the form of joy, or triumph, or lust, or hope, or frantic grief, or annoyance, or anger, or fear, or suspicion, or passion of any kind-he is in the devil's clutches and how he got into them does not matter. What is needful is that he should make haste to get out of them; and here, again, it does not matter how.

I have described character as theoretically an act of will lying beyond time, of which life in time, or character in action, is the development. For matters of practical life we all possess the one as well as the other; for we are constituted of them both. Character modifies our life more than we think, and it is to a certain extent true that every man is the architect of his own fortune. No doubt it seems as if our lot were assigned to us almost entirely from without, and imparted to us in something of the same way in which a melody outside us reaches the ear. But on looking back over our past, we see at once that our life consists of mere variations on one and the same theme, namely, our character, and that the same fundamental bass sounds through it all. This is an experience which a man can and must make in and by himself.’

Ethical Reflections

‘Napoleon was not really worse than many, not to say most, men. He was possessed of the very ordinary egoism that seeks its welfare at the expense of others. What distinguished him was merely the greater power he had of satisfying his will, and greater intelligence, reason and courage; added to which, chance gave him a favourable scope for his operations. By means of all this he did for his egoism what a thousand other men would like to do for theirs, but cannot. Every feeble lad who by little acts of villainy gains a small advantage for himself by putting others to some disadvantage, although it may be equally small, is just as bad as Napoleon.

Those who fancy that retribution comes after death would demand that Napoleon should by unutterable torments pay the penalty for all the numberless calamities that he caused. But he is no more culpable than all those who possess the same will, unaccompanied by the same power.

The circumstance that in his case this extraordinary power was added allowed him to reveal the whole wickedness of the human will; and the sufferings of his age, as the necessary obverse of the medal, reveal the misery which is inextricably bound up with this bad will. It is the general manipulation of this will that constitutes the world. But it is precisely that it should be understood how inextricably the will to live is bound up with, and is really one and the same as, this unspeakable misery, that is the world's aim and purpose; and it is an aim and purpose which the appearance of Napoleon did much to assist. Not to be an unmeaning fools' paradise but a tragedy, in which the will to live understands itself and yields – that is the object for which the world exists. Napoleon is only an enormous mirror of the will to live.

The difference between the man who causes suffering and the man who suffers it, is only phenomenal. It is all a will to live, identical with great suffering; and it is only by understanding this that the will can mend and end.’

[arg/machine · Rating 4 out of 5]

Classic Schopenhauer. In the public domain, with a free electronic copy here.

[Philip Cartwright · Rating 2 out of 5]

OK, I didn't actually finish this one. Gave up half-way through the opening essay on morality. Frankly, it all seemed a bit smug and commonplace. I dare say there's more to Schopenhaur than this. I certainly hope so.

[Negar Rajaby · Rating 5 out of 5]

«این پرسش که آیا اخلاق چیزی واقعی است یا خیر معادل این پرسش است که آیا واقعا یک اصل مخالف استوار برای خودخواهی وجود دارد یا خیر. چون خودخواهی اندیشه سعادت را به یک فرد واحد، به بهای سعادت دیگران، محدود می‌کند، اصل مخالف باید آن را به همه‌ی افراد دیگر نیز بسط دهد.»

[Ali zand · Rating 4 out of 5]

وقتی که به اواخر کتاب رسیدم به نظرم باید به این کتاب امتیاز ۳.۵ تا ۴ رو میدادم. چون به نظرم دو فصل اول متعادل بودن و فصل سوم یعنی شخصیت عالی بود اما با فصلی های بعد زیاد ارتباط نگرفتم. فصل آخر و حتی شاید صفحه آخر این نقص رو جبران کرد.
میشه به این کتاب امتیاز ۴ تا ۴.۵ داد.

[Mark · Rating 2 out of 5]

Always entertaining, but really a sour bull-shit artist. A dog-lover though.

[Onyango Makagutu · Rating 4 out of 5]

Loved the book!

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Schopenhauer's super smart and all, but man, what a grump.

[Sait · Rating 2 out of 5]

Çok kötü bir çeviri.

[Patrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

I like his essays more.

[Joseph Knecht · Rating 3 out of 5]

Plenty of insights on human nature. According to the author, man is the only animal who inflicts pain on other animals by his own choice, for other animals don't have such tendencies. A human character is born out of eternal essence which goes through life to understand life and that said essence.

His morality is constructed, as well as his government in an attempt to subdue the selfish human tendencies and construct a more pleasant environment for life itself.



How shall a man be proud, when his conception is a crime, his birth a penalty, his life a labour, and death a necessity! —

. On the other hand, by going down into the depths of his own nature, a man may become conscious that he is all in all; that, in fact, he is the only real being; and that, in addition, this real being perceives itself again in others, who present themselves from without, as though they formed a mirror of himself.

You take my life When you do take the means whereby I live.

Instead of building cottages for themselves, thousands of men build mansions for a few. Instead of weaving coarse materials for themselves and their families, they make fine cloths, silk, or even lace, for the rich, and in general manufacture a thousand objects of luxury for their pleasure. A great part of the urban population consists of workmen who make these articles of luxury; and for them and those who give them work the peasants have to plough and sow and look after the flocks as well as for themselves, and thus have more labour than Nature originally imposed upon them

Everywhere one man is king, and for the most part his dignity is hereditary. He is, as it were, the personification, the monogram, of the whole people, which attains an individuality in him.

The English show their great intelligence, amongst other ways, by clinging to their ancient institutions, customs and usages, and by holding them sacred, even at the risk of carrying this tenacity too far, and making it ridiculous. They hold them sacred for the simple reason that those institutions and customs are not the invention of an idle head, but have grown up gradually by the force of circumstance and the wisdom of life itself, and are therefore suited to them as a nation.

The only freedom that exists is of a metaphysical character. In the physical world freedom is an impossibility.

It amounts to this, that by what we do we know what we are, and by what we suffer we know what we deserve.

Under the opposite supposition all responsibility, as I have shown, would be at an end, and the moral like the physical world would be a mere machine, set in motion for the amusement of its manufacturer placed somewhere outside of it. So it is that truths hang together, and mutually advance and complete one another; whereas error gets jostled at every corner.

The whole influence of example — and it is very strong — rests on the fact that a man has, as a rule, too little judgment of his own, and often too little knowledge, o explore his own way for himself, and that he is glad, therefore, to tread in the footsteps of some one else. Accordingly, the more deficient he is in either of these qualities, the more is he open to the influence of example; and we find, in fact, that most men’s guiding star is the example of others; that their whole course of life, in great things and in small, comes in the end to be mere imitation; and that not even in the pettiest matters do they act according to their own judgment.

he will is above and beyond time, and eternal; and character is innate; that is to say, it is sprung from the same eternity, and therefore it does not admit of any but a transcendental explanation.

The State and the Kingdom of God, or the Moral Law, are so entirely different in their character that the former is a parody of the latter, a bitter mockery at the absence of it. Compared with the Moral Law the State is a crutch instead of a limb, an automaton instead of a man.

The theoretical philosopher enriches the domain of reason by adding to it; the practical philosopher draws upon it, and makes it serve him.

The aim of the State is to produce a fool’s paradise, and this is in direct conflict with the true aim of life, namely, to attain a knowledge of what the will, in its horrible nature, really is.

[Tarık]

Kitap, başlığından da anlaşılacağı gibi geniş bir konu yelpazesine sahip. Alt başlıklar şeklinde belirtilmemiş de olsa kitapta ötenazi hakkından idamın içtimai düzen için zorunlu oluşuna, suçluların bir daha asla ıslah edilemeyecek ahlak ziyanları olduğundan kadınlara vasi atanması gerektiğine kadar yazarın birçok enteresan düşüncesi bir metinde harmanlanmış. Metnin ahlak üzerine olan kısmını biraz üstünkörü, fakat hukuk ve siyaset kısmını dikkatle okudum. Hukuk ve siyasete dair fikirlerini şöyle özetlemek mümkün: Schopenhauer yönetim biçiminde monarşiyi, cezalandırma amacında caydırıcılığı, içtimai meselelerde erkek lehine ayırımcılığı ve gerçek anlamda bilim ve sanatın kolektif ruhu besleyen en büyük gıda olduğunu yılmaz biçimde savunuyor. Bireycilik ve nihilizm pek tabii ki eser boyunca hat safhada. Ayrıca egoizm de “şu ödüllü makalemde de belirttiğim gibi” şeklindeki sık sık yapılan hatırlatmalarla kitap boyunca uygulamalı bir şekilde anlatılmış.

Kitabın kadınlarla alakalı kısımları özellikle dikkatimi çekti. Kadınların mirasçı olmaması, kendi çabalarıyla kazandıklarının haricindeki malvarlıklarına vasi atanması ve kadının şahitliğinin erkeğin şahitliğinden daha az muteber olması gerektiği gibi enteresan önerilerde de bulunuyor yazar. Kadınların duygusal ve nankör olduklarını defaatle vurguluyor. Açıkçası kadınlarla alakalı meselelere yaklaşım tarzının bu kadar sert olmasının çocukluğuyla doğrudan alakalı olduğunu daha ilk satırlarda anlamıştım. Tüm bu fikirlerin azmettiricisi -tahmin etmesi güç değil- bir de kara sevdalısı olduğu bir kadın iştirak etmiştir belki. Bu fikirler dışarıdan cinsiyetçi bir filozofun incileri gibi görünse de aslında hoyrat bir oğlan çocuğunun bilinçaltının dışavurumuydu. Zaten bu kadar makul bir adama böyle uçarı şeyleri ancak ve ancak kıskançlık gibi lanet bir duygu söyletebilir. Ancak bu konudaki fikirleri tamamen safsatadan ibaret değil, bazı hususlarda -ne yazık ki- yazar haklı.

Schopenhauer, Alman olmanın bütün avantaj ve dezavantajlarını bünyesinde barındıran gerçek bir entelektüel. Özellikle ceza hukukuyla alakalı konuları daha dikkatli bir biçimde okudum, altyapısı gerçekten çok sağlam olan yazar bugün temel ilke olarak kabul ettiğimiz birçok hususa doğrudan değinmiş, birçoğunda açık yahut örtülü biçimde Beccaria’ya referans vererek tabii. İdam cezasının yurttaşların can güvenliği için mutlak olarak gerekli olduğu fikrine malum sebeplerden dolayı katılmıyorum. Hücre cezasının neden caydırıcı olmadığını kısa ve mantıklı bir argümanla açıklaması da oldukça hoşuma gitti.

Buraya kadar kimse okumaz muhtemelen, buraya sıkıştırabilirim. Doğrudan ya da dolaylı, felsefenin sadece ucundan kıyısından geçilen eserleri bile okurken epey zorlanıyorum artık. Adını ben unutacak olsam kırk farklı memleketin kırk farklı filozofu illa bir paragrafın orta yerinde hatırlatıyor. Pek iyi bir durum değil bu, hiç değil. Gerekirse dili biraz daha geliştirip İngilizce baskılardan okumak gerek. Bir kitaba kaç paket sigara gidiyor artık belli değil.

Bilim ve sanata dair altını çizdiğim şu pasajla incelemeyi noktalayayım. Çok derinlere inen, insanı yorucu düşüncelere sevk eden bir pasaj olmasa da Tanrı’nın insandaki izdüşümü olan yaratıcı zihinlerin ancak müreffeh bir memlekette berrak kalıp değer üreteceğini, değer ürettikçe de ona uygun ortamı sağlayanların emeklerini ölümsüzleştireceğini vurguluyor olması altını çizmem için kâfi geldi: “Bilim ve sanat bizzat lüksün çocuklarıdır ve ona olan borçlarını mutlaka öderler.”

[هومن · Rating 5 out of 5]

🔵 هنگامی که با انسانی مواجه میشوی - فرقی نمیکند چه کسی باشد - سعی نکن بر اساس ارزش و کرامتش ارزیابیِ عینی از او به عمل آوری. به بدطینتی، یا کوته‌بینی و افکار منحرفش نگاه نکن؛ زیرا آن یک به آسانی میتواند تو را به سوی تنفر از وی بکشاند و این یک به سوی تحقیر وی.

🟢 در عوض، توجه‌ات را فقط معطوفِ رنج‌ها و نیازها و نگرانی‌ها و دردهایش کن. آنگاه همواره با وی احساس نزدیکی میکنی، با او همدرد میشوی؛ و به جای تنفر یا تحقیر، شفقت را تجربه میکنی. راه فروخوردن نفرت و تحقیر به‌هیچ‌وجه جَستَن به اصطلاح ″کرامتِ انسان″ نیست بلکه برعکس، نگریستن به او همچون موجودی در خور دلسوزی‌ست.

🟡 بوداییان از معاصی کبیره آغاز میکنند نه از فضایل عالیه؛ زیرا فضایل صرفاً به صورت ضد یا نفیِ معاصی نمود می‌یابند. [...] نظر من با نظر صوفیان همخوانی دارد که برآنند ۴ گناهِ کبیره وجود دارد، و اینها را به طرز گیرایی جفت میکنند، به نحوی که شهوت در کنار خِسَّت قرار میگیرد و خشم در کنار غرور. ۴ فضیلتِ عالیه‌یِ مخالفِ این معاصی نیز عبارتند از نجابت و بخشندگی و مهربانی و فروتنی.

🟠 وقتی که این ایده‌های اخلاقی ژرف را با فضایل عالیه افلاطون - عدالت، شجاعت، اعتدال، و حکمت - مقایسه میکنیم، فضایل افلاطونی مبتنی بر اندیشه‌ای روشن و راهبر نیستند، بلکه به دلایلی انتخاب شده‌اند که سطحی، و بعضاً، به وضوح غلط‌اند.

🔴 فضایل باید کیفیات اراده باشند، اما حکمت عمدتاً صفت عقل است. اعتدال واژه‌ای بسیار ناروشن و مبهم است، و لذا مصادیق مختلفی پیدا میکند: یعنی میتواند به معنای حزم، یا خودداری، یا خونسردی باشد. شجاعت هم اصلاً فضیلت نیست، گرچه گاهی لازمه یا ابزار فضیلت است، اما میتواند ابزار بزرگترین جنایت‌ها نیز باشد...

🟤 [مع‌هذا این] اصل اخلاقی کانت است که در دانشگاه‌ها حکمفرماست. از میان صور گوناگون این اصل، صورتی که اکنون بیش از همه معروف است کرامتِ انسانی است. اگر پرسیده شود این به اصطلاح کرامتِ انسان بر چه چیز مبتنی‌ست، بی‌درنگ پاسخ می‌آید که بر اخلاق او مبتنی‌ست. به دیگر سخن، اخلاق انسان بر کرامت او مبتنی‌ست و کرامت او بر اخلاقش. اما جدای از این استدلال دوری، به نظر میرسد که برای موجودی چون انسان که اراده‌اش معصیت‌آمیز است و عقلش محدود و جسمش بس‌ضعیف و استهلاک‌پذیر، مفهوم کرامت را فقط به معنای کنایی میتوان استعمال کرد. چه افتخاری‌ست انسان را که انعقاد نطفه‌اش معصیت است و تولدش کیفر، و زندگی‌اش رنج و مرگش ضرورت؟

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