This is an extended review of this quality work of diplomatic history.
The capitulation of Paris to the allied armies of Great Britain, Prussia, and the Russian and Austrian empires on March 31, 1814, and the abdication of Napoleon eleven days later, ended more than two decades of general European war. Although not all these four European powers had engaged France continually since 1792, each had been major players in the drama. By April of 1814, they wanted an end to the carnage, destruction, and financial drain of war, as well as the creation of a system of relations within Europe that would prevent the rise of a second Napoleon. Following the victory of their combined arms, the Allies met in Vienna to seek answers to these questions of how to ensure peace and stability.
The Congress of Vienna, by Harold Nicolson, is the saga of the diplomatic maneuverings at Vienna that produced their final settlement, the Second Peace of Paris, in November 1815. The ultimate diplomatic solution was the Quadruple Alliance of November 20, 1815 in which the victorious Allies agreed to continue their coalition against France, meet yearly to discuss issues of ongoing importance, and aid each other in repressing classical liberal political movements across the continent. In the process, the Allies doused the last flickering embers of the bonfire of continental political liberalism ignited by the French Revolution over twenty years earlier. In its place, a heavy fog of conservatism and political repression came to rest over the continent. Although there were occasional breaks in this fog over the next generation, it was not until the revolutions of 1848 that it showed any signs of lifting over significant portions of Europe.
This begs the question of what happened at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-5 that allowed conservative politicians to clamp down on the opposition and maintain their grip on political power into the second half of the nineteenth century. It also requires an explanation of why they were successful in their efforts. Nicolson provides us with many of the answers in his book.
One of Nicolson’s goals is to identify and describe the important events surrounding the negotiations in Vienna. As a result, The Congress of Vienna reads, at times, like a chronicle. More often, however, Nicolson offers the reader the salient points of the larger story and his interpretation of how these events influenced the diplomacy of the four Allies and the diplomacy of France as well. The overriding theme that set the tone for the entire Congress was, understandably given the length of the Napoleonic Wars, that of war weariness. According to Nicolson, by 1814, “What the Allies desired above everything was security and repose.” (100)
Contrary to popular belief, the Russian Campaign of 1812 was not the end for Napoleon and his battle-hardened soldiers. Though casualties were severe, he managed to collect enough men and supplies back in France to continue fighting for another year and a half, winning several battles along the way. Nicolson describes the subsequent campaigns of Napoleon, and the response of his opponents, in brief but sufficient detail. One of the most important consequences of the continued fighting was that events on the battlefield led France’s opponents to sign the Treaty of Chaumont on March 9, 1814. This was the culmination of Viscount Castlereagh’s efforts to bring all of Napoleon’s enemies into an official alliance and prevent any of the four from signing a separate peace with the French Emperor. By April of 1814, Napoleon was beaten. On April 11, he abdicated the throne of France, although only temporarily as it turned out.
Believing that force had finally solved their greatest problem, allied diplomats sat down to forge an agreement that would eliminate the specters of revolution and general war through a stable system that would balance the major powers of Europe. Working within his main theme of the need to provide for peace and security, Nicolson explains the major issues decided at Vienna and the interests, often conflicting, of each major participant. For example, Lord Castlereagh, as the lead British negotiator, desired to see Prussia and Austria strengthened by territorial acquisitions in the German lands and Italy, respectively. This would serve as a counterbalance to Russia’s growing land strength, on the one hand, and renewed French aggression, on the other, and create a balance of power that would help insure stability for all. Britain’s primary compensation would be some, but not all, of the colonial possessions acquired during its ongoing battles with France.
Russia and Tsar Alexander I, on the other hand, desired the recreation of an independent Polish state. Due to Alexander’s personality, which Nicolson describes as colloquially schizophrenic, at times the purpose of a rejuvenated Polish state would be to push Russian influence to the banks of the Oder River; at others, the new Poland would enjoy its ancient liberties and full independence. All of this was anathema to Austria and its representative, Count Metternich, however, because of its linkage to the question of what to do with Saxony. A restored Poland would require the cession of some of the lands acquired by Austria and Prussia in the three Polish partitions of the previous century. If necessary, Austria could claim provinces in northern Italy and Illyria as compensation. Prussia, on the other hand, maintained that in this case, it had no other option but the complete annexation of Saxony. This Austria would not allow because it would augment Prussian power within the German lands at Austria’s expense.
The eventual solution to this quandary came from, of all people, the French minister to the conference, Talleyrand. The ultimate political survivor, Talleyrand maneuvered through the byzantine complexities of revolutionary politics in France and emerged at Vienna with the solution to the joint Polish-Saxon question. His greatest concern was that Prussia not gain a dominant position in Germany. He foresaw (correctly, as it turned out) that Prussia, if it gained the ascendance in Germany, would have the economic strength and manpower to threaten the security of all Europe. Therefore, he joined French interests in opposing this outcome with those of Britain and Austria in what Nicolson calls “one of the most useful achievements in all of diplomatic history.” (154) Their treaty of alliance, signed January 3, 1815, called the bluff of Prussia and Russia on the territorial question, and resulted in a nominally independent Polish state and Prussia’s acquisition of 40% of Saxony, while Austria gained the Tyrol, Salzburg, future Italian concessions, and Illyrian territory on the Adriatic coast.
Just as things seemed to be falling into place, however, Napoleon made his escape from Elba and disrupted the entire scene. Though defeated, for good this time, by Wellington (with assistance from Prussia late in the day) at Waterloo, what would become of France now? The Second Peace of Paris imposed modest indemnities and an army of occupation, as well as small territorial concessions. Great Britain, as the primary power responsible for Napoleon’s second defeat, could have dictated a peace that enhanced its continental power appreciably, yet chose not to. The reason, according to Nicolson, lay in Britain’s desire for a balance in continental Europe, certainly, but also in the personality of Castlereagh.
This attention to personality is one of the important pieces of The Congress of Vienna that helps to explain the outcome of the Congress. Personality is especially critical in diplomatic history, and doubly so when autocratic monarchs such as Alexander I are involved in the deliberations. Nicolson accents the contrast between the diplomatic opportunity to shape the peace presented to Alexander I in 1814, which he squandered, and what Castlereagh achieved given a chance the following year.
The denouement, for France, was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy under Louis XVIII.
Elsewhere, as part of the security framework established at Vienna and perpetuated at subsequent conferences from 1816-22, the European powers attempted to maintain order on the continent through intervention in any situation where revolutionary forces appeared to threaten the establishment. In this manner, the forces of reaction and conservatism maintained their superior position against the republican ideologies unleashed first in the United States overseas and in France on the continent. In a way, this set the stage for what would happen in the revolutionary year of 1848. By bowing the knee at the alter of political repression in the name of peace and order, men such as Metternich did little to alleviate the issues such as serfdom and economic inequality that were integral causes of the 1848 revolutions.
One strength of The Congress of Vienna lies in Nicolson’s ability to elucidate the motives of each major participant in the Congress. Granted, this is what diplomatic histories do, but he does so effectively. The major European land powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, desired territorial compensation for their exertions against Napoleon. Great Britain, however, chose modest colonial possessions as its reward for over two decades of resistance, allowing it to steer clear of acquisitions that seemed tempting but would only draw it into future conflicts with a potentially revenge-minded France. The author’s approval of this course shows especially in Nicolson’s praise of Castlereagh for seeking a moderate treaty with France, even in the Second Peace of Paris, that would give France no reason for any lingering animosity. Nicolson, writing in 1946, probably had in mind what the Treaty of Versailles did in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. Nicolson could see how Versailles contributed to the rise of Nazism in Europe; to him, any statesmanship that succeeded in avoiding this in the past appeared exceptionally far-sighted. While this conclusion may be a product of the value of its time, it’s not necessarily dated or irrelevant.
There is also the fact that, as a diplomat himself, Nicolson is well qualified to discuss matters of diplomacy through the lens of his extensive personal experience. As a member of the diplomatic community, he displays an exceptional understanding of the important role of individual personality. This shows in the high regard in which he holds Talleyrand’s performance at Vienna, compared to the thinly concealed contempt he heaps on Alexander I (and, by extension, Woodrow Wilson at Versailles for showing many similar traits). Not only does the reader encounter the author’s opinion of the various participants’ diplomatic abilities, Nicolson also provides the opinions of the diplomats at Vienna about each other in several cases, further illuminating the story behind their decisions.
There are, however, certain flaws in this work. Again reflecting the book’s year of publication, Nicolson has an unfortunate tendency to stereotype certain nationalities. For example, the British people “are not by nature punitive” (236) and “only become conscious of foreign policy when in immanent danger from external aggression.” (243) In addition, he occasionally refers to the British using words such as “we” and “our” that tend to compromise scholarly impartiality to a modest extent. Furthermore, considering the significant number of cities and German states that he mentions from time to time, Nicolson could have aided the reader by including the occasional map for clarification.
Despite these small flaws, The Congress of Vienna is extremely readable and clear. The nuance displayed is a welcome improvement on the shorter explanations offered up by general European histories. For example, some authors write that after Vienna, Austria turned its back on the West, but Austria’s membership in the Quadruple Alliance, its participation in the Allied occupation of France, and interventions on the Italian peninsula indicate otherwise. Likewise, others imply that it was only after the return of Napoleon that the negotiators in Vienna really determined on a reactionary course. Nicolson, on the other hand, demonstrates that this was the intention all along, given the personalities of men such as Metternich and Alexander. One text attributes Russia’s diplomatic performance at Vienna as indication of Alexander I’s restraint, while Nicolson demonstrates in chapter seven that in actuality, inept diplomacy on the tsar’s part produced the eventual outcomes.
Despite its age, this remains a quality book for those seeking greater understanding of the men and personalities present at the Congress of Vienna. Newer works perhaps offer additional insights not present here, but Nicolson’s book ranks among those that more modern historians build from, which is no small achievement for something now over 70 years old.