Farewell: The Greatest Spy Story of the Twentieth Century

by Sergei Kostin, Eric Raynaud, Richard V. Allen (Foreword)

Farewell is the story of what Ronald Reagan called ?one of the biggest espionage cases of the century.? Farewell, became the code name of Vladimir Ippolitovitch Vetrov, a KGB spy turned double-agent when he accepted work for the DST, the French counter-insurgency agency. This is the story of his life as a spy, and the complex series of events that led him to murder.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Espionage, Biography, Russia, True Crime, Amazon

400 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2011

Reviews

[Rob · Rating 2 out of 5]

interesting story overwritten with too much detail and a clunky translation. abandoned probably 2/5 of the way through.

[Jacob · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book didn’t start off promising. It started in fact with a foreword written by Richard V. Allen. This name meant nothing to me, but when I approach books outside of my usual stalking grounds this tends to be the case. It turns out the man was Reagan’s National Security Advisor. Cool. He had first-hand experience to what occurred and seems logical enough given how he occupied the same strand of relevance that the book is set to handle. I don’t know Mr. Allen. I like to think, however, I know a little bit about forewords. It seems to me entirely off base to spend what should be engaging the text we are about to read rather than fellating your former employer.

We get it. You liked Reagan. I’m so very proud of you. What about the man on the cover? Maybe tell us how his work aided or affected you in specifically, or your reaction when you first heard? Oh, he allowed Reagan to single-handedly dismantle an oppressive Soviet Regime while coyly mocking those obnoxious détente loving liberals? How fascinating. The French helped too? Oh, but not really? So it was just us? No, sorry. No, I know I heard it. Caught it as I was saying it. Not us. Reagan. Got it.

Got. It.

I understand that politics indelibly inscribed in the legacy of a spy, but perhaps engage the proper topic and save the self-congratulations for the autobiography.

And so, that bitter pill under my tongue, the text proper began. I’m only slightly above wishing that pill was cyanide.

Less A Perfect Spy and more Weekend at Bernie’s. The book tells when it should show and shows when it should tell. Want examples of how stolen intelligence was used to bring down the entirety of the Soviet Union and find evidence for what the cover lauds is the greatest spy story of all time? Too bad. Want to know the color of the wallpaper inside Vetro’s childhood apartment? Congratulations, you have stumbled upon a chronicle of interior to let your heart rest satiated and fat.

It is dry, a strangely organized attempt to explore the life of man who apparently took a whole bunch of files and handed them to some French people because he felt slighted by the regime he has spent so much of his life trying to impress. Not a bad premise. With a better writer and a tighter focus on the man who made behind the leaks we’d have character study. But this book is something else It spends a great deal of talking about Vetrov, but in much the same way you would look at a log of minutes. 70% detail, 30% content. Which to say that only about a third of what they tell you matters in the slightest, is engaged with beyond the sentence in which it is mentioned, and actually moves the narrative forward.

There are parts that genuinely interested me; the interaction between man, wife, and mistress, the actions and panicked searchings of an organization incapable of properly suspecting itself, and a small collection of tighter, more subtle things that one could chew on between boredoms.

The failure of the book is impossible to ignore however. It is over-wrought. Unable to focus, unable to straddle the gap between player and space, he handles Vetrov with the sophomoric enthusiasm of someone who adores something they can’t quite express. Between the chapter dedicated to Vetrov’s prison letters and the feeble attempt at dismantling his psychology that followed, the book wreaks of an author trying to explore with a set of tools he does not have.

There is no master of espionage here. It is a cluster of amateurs whose sheer improbability gave them license to succeed.

If this is the great spy story ever told, I am desperately certain we need better a higher class of spy.

[wally · Rating 4 out of 5]

15 aug 16, 1st from kostin for me. read a number of 'spy' stories long ago, many of them based on true events, or tellings of true events, the man who never was, the house on garibaldi street, two that i remember though it has been 30+ years, maybe even 40. cue the soundtrack. golden years...gold-old-old, wa wa wa. onward and upward
18 aug 16, finished. great story! never heard of the man until this story. how much else? there also exists in this story an undercurrent untold...all those other nation spies revealed by the first...all those stories. and below that...all the stories of those who either willingly or unwittingly betrayed their country. in a sense, mind-boggling, in another, there is nothing new under the sun.
good read.

[Denise · Rating 4 out of 5]

More Cold War spy stuff, because I just can't resist. For once, here's a story of that sort not largely involving the British or American intelligence services or espionage shenanigans on either side of the Berlin Wall... which is probably why Vetrov's name is less well known than those of some of his erstwhile colleagues. While the book was occasionally somewhat too longwinded and given to offering up a little too much irrelevant detail, that didn't make the story itself any less intriguing.

[Mandy · Rating 1 out of 5]

It takes a special sort of skill to make a story about spies and espionage and secret agents and the KGB a dull and tedious trudge. But that’s exactly what the author has done here – in spite of his interesting subject matter and his painstaking and meticulous research (every last bit of which he includes in his narrative). I found this book really hard to wade through. I kept with it as Russia is my subject and I wanted to learn about this double agent but I could only manage it in small doses. Vladimir Vetrov was recruited early in his career by the KGB and after postings to France and Canada he returned to Moscow as an analyst. For reasons that are a little hard to understand, in spite of the author’s attempts to do so, he becomes a double agent working for the French intelligence service under the code name Farewell. The book is repetitive, concentrates too much and too often on extraneous detail, and the translation is shaky at best and clunky at worst. A thorough edit would have helped, and a more concise account would have retained some of the suspense and tension that must have been part of the original events. Even Vetrov’s execution felt strangely tepid. And I hated the frequent use of imagined conversations, feelings and motives, about which the author could not have known. Examples from near the end of the book. “Two strapping men, over 6 feet 6 inches tall….” interviewed Svetlana. Who had the tape measure? “Both men were imbued with a sense of the moment’s solemn intensity.” Were they? Did they say so? “Like a sleepwalker she left the office….she sat on a bench to …collect herself. The news sank in only later that evening.” Really? How does Kostin know? Making up stuff detracts from the overall credibility of the narrative. So all credit for the research, but little for the writing style.

[Ron Jones · Rating 4 out of 5]

It was quite ironic to finish this book on the metro in Kyiv, Ukraine. Reading about Vetrov while living in the former USSR brought an incredible dimension to the story.
Vetrov was a mole in the KGB, who began sharing intel with the French, when Reagan became President. Many believe he hastened the end of the Cold War, because of the incredible amount of secrets he revealed to the West.
The story was great, but quite exhaustive. At times a little too much... but I was easily able to skip ahead & not loose the flow of the story.
If you love the Cold War, spies & espionage, do yourself a favor and get this book!

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

I overall enjoyed this book, but had one principle frustration with it: the continuous foreshadowing.

Almost from the first chapter we are told (rather, significantly hinted at) that Vetrov will be caught and executed. As such, some of the storytelling factor of this true story is kind of moot ss already know it is going to happen.

Other books, such as The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB and Rawhide Down: The Near Assassination of Ronald Reagan don't "give away" what will happen (Even though in both cases, we know the general outcome of history). As such, they are much more thrilling and interesting narratives.

Where this book did excel and was most interesting was in two areas.

The first was in providing a fair and balanced look at the entire Vetrov saga. Given that Vetrov is dead, it is impossible to know many of the details of his life, such as his rationale for defection, or even exactly when it occurred. Other things, like his reasons for attempting to kill his mistress, are also presented from multiple angles and the alternatives explored.

The second is the authors' psychological analysis of Vetrov. The author makes several dissections of Vetrov's behavior, motives, and thoughts, and compares/contrasts these with various events and his interactions with others. What is best, and similar to the first point I make above, is that the author presents several alternative interpretations, but does not settle on one, leaving the reader to choose.

I would recommend this book for anyone interested in Cold War/Intelligence/CI. Outside of that, skip.

[Brian · Rating 2 out of 5]

It's surprising that a story this inherently thrilling can have so much of its reading pleasure so effectively expunged in this retelling. I respect the authors' scholarly approach to examining Vladimir Vetrov's life, actions, and motivations from every angle, as well as considering the veracity of every source. However, they should have also considered the reader's experience when creating this work. For examples of authors who can effectively balance intellectually rigorous subject matter with an enjoyable reading experience, I would suggest the works of Jon Krakauer or Richard Rhodes. As mentioned by others, the translation is serviceable, but noticeably inadequate in many places.

One portion of this book I found very interesting and challenging is the authors' reflection on Vetrov's impact on the conclusion of the cold war. The authors propose that President Ronald Reagan was emboldened by the intelligence provided from the Farewell operation to push forward with his SDI demands during negotiations with the Soviet Union. They suggest that Reagan knew that such actions would force the Soviets into increasingly unsustainable expenditures in technology research & development, while at the same time being crippled by a shortage of foreign agents supplying stolen knowledge from the West. I'm not sure if I accept that Reagan was such a master manipulator, but it's an interesting theory.

[Adam Shields · Rating 3 out of 5]

Short Review: Farewell was a Russian KGB agent that leaked thousands of pages of secret documents to the French. Arguably this leaked information (and its use by Reagan and his security team) did more to bring down the Soviet Union than any other single action. The documents opened up the full extent of USSR's espionage and technical secrets. This allow the US to feed the USSR false research leads and force them into an arms race that the USSR could not afford.

The book is very detailed and not incredibly well written. 1/2 is background on Farewell and those around him. The other half is discussion of what really went on and how it was all done. It was worth reading, but it could have been a better book. Shows that real spycraft is just as weird as some of the John le Carré novels. And at the same time very boring.

My full review is on my blog at http://bookwi.se/farewell/

[KF · Rating 5 out of 5]

this book was amazing!! the story itself is incredible . . . for any spy novel fans, you will be blown away by the ordinariness of this operation that was a key jenga piece in bringing down the soviet union. the book is written in a very interesting way . . . and the authors' continual questioning of the protagonist's motives and mental state adds an extra dimension you rarely see in biographies.

[Chris Debo · Rating 2 out of 5]

Sorry. Pretty much a yawner. I was hoping for some sense of the thrill of the thing, but the writing style ensured that wasn't going to happen. Read if you really, really like spy stories; otherwise , hit up Wikipedia and save yourself the trouble.

[Kate · Rating 2 out of 5]

Somehow a fascinating story made for a plodding and clunky book. What?!

[Zella Kate · Rating 2 out of 5]

2.5 stars. This book has all the makings of a fascinating espionage story--a KGB colonel who is bitter about his lot in life becomes a double agent for an obscure French intelligence service and manages to provide some of the best intel of the 1980s on the USSR's science/technology capabilities.

But it is translated from Russian and French, and the result is incredibly dry, tedious, and ponderous. In small doses, the style might be charming, but hundreds of pages of it is hard to get through. A typical chapter reads something along the line of "The KGB does things this way. Why would they do things this way? Let me explain it to you."

I nearly gave up several times, which is a shame because it has a lot of interesting information in it I've not seen anywhere else. (Like that KGB officers are like everyone else and used to make up excuses to spend the last hour of work "celebrating" to get out of work early. Your kid passed university exams? Party time for the colleagues!)

I will say the last 100 or so pages about the protagonist's downfall and capture takes a bizarre turn that has nothing to do with successful counterespionage. Rather, adultery, blackmail, and murder quite unrelated to espionage are what did Vladimir Vetrov in and got the KGB to take a harder look at him.

That last 1/3 or so of the book is so batshit crazy and inherently compelling that it overcomes a lot of the book's style issues, but it's still a rather turgid read, considering the subject matter.

[Rajiv Chopra · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book by Sergei Kostin is fascinating. I also have to commend him for striking a balanced tone throughout.
The story of Vladimir Vetrov is a tragedy. It also highlights one person's impact on an organization and, in this case, geopolitics. It illustrates how personality, personal life stories, and career grudges affect a person.
Sergeo's story covers great ground: Vladimir's life, career, marital relations, and the political changes taking place in America. If Reagan had not become president, events may have panned out differently.
The book is fascinating. Stay with it until the end.

[Larry Roberts · Rating 3 out of 5]

Would have been much better at half the length.....

[Dr.J.G. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Early on, it's alarming to realise that one has - quite inadvertently - begun a book sponsored by someone who seems to not only think, but assert, that Reagan was not merely somehow elected, but an intelligent, even prescient, man, worthy of association, even bring served, as the guy introducing the book asserts publicly.

What's more, he seems to support and applaud Reagan labelling this spy, according to these guys responsible- single-handedly - for downfall of Soviet Union, as "the greatest spy ever".

This characterisation depends, of course, on issues and results involved; obviously family feuds between members of a clan don't qualify to compete for the title, however great the spies.

So obviously Reagan and his associates - including Richard Allen - label this man, vetrov, as the greatest day, because they hold their engineered crash of Soviet Union more important than, say, WWII.

Sane people must disagree. Especially those who know about nazis - its easy enough to read even just the epic work of William Shirer, but throw in a couple of frozen memoirs by holocaust survivors, and some films and documentaries about Battle of Britain, the London Blitz, and Dunkirk - and yes, for good measure, Nuremberg Trials, and one is there.

Greatest spies remain those who fought that war against navies, whether at Bletchley Park or with French Resistance, or as Virginia Hall, Bill Stephenson and others of his associates did, wherever it took. Ian Fleming was associated with them, as was his brother; therein the germ of 007.

What seems obvious is that neither Reagan nor Richard Allen think much of them, and hold this Russian mole above them all, due to either an ideological flaw of their own, or a complete ignorance, or at the very least, a complacent assurance that their lies will hold because - what? Uttered by men in power? Or is it more? Do they have total faith that public in general is stupid, Ignorant, and shall remain so?

One is reminded in the context of a more recent pronouncement by another president to the effect that US troops leaving Afghanistan was the greatest evacuation in history.

Had they forgotten Dunkirk?

Later his associates publicly clarified that he had meant to say that this was the greatest evacuation in history by air.

They were corrected immediately - that distinction, so far, is held by the airlift that was evacuation by India of citizens of India - and a few also from some other neighbouring countries - out of Kuwait, during the Gulf War, to the tune of close to 175,000 people, perhaps a little more.

That particular president had just shot his mouth off to cover the shameful flight by US, leaving Afghanistan to the nonexistent mercy of terrorists who promptly walked in across the Durand Line, took over and proceeded to execute males and issue orders to females yo limit themselves strictly to slave roles, available for asking; that US equipment worth billions of dollars, from tanks and helicopters to weapons and ammunition for them for taking, was a detail that was glossed over - with that comment about the greatest evacuation in history.

So what were Reagan and Richard Allen glossing over, in commenting about Vetrov bring the greatest spy?

Would it be the Iran-Contra affair, when weapons for a repressive regime were exchanged via US military transport (as per a publication available at US university libraries), for narcotics?
***

Strangely enough, authors waste a great deal of space on detailed descriptions and analysis of personal, private and even extramarital parts of the life of the man, whose seeming achievement - as asserted by these authors and their republican friends, anyway - seems to have been the downfall of Soviet Union.

Is that merely to pad the otherwise thin manuscript, or, as publishers seem these days to force on every author, a compromise halfway towards what's required of most authors, namely, unnecessary prurience of explicit and detailed nature? Unclear.

Unclear, that is, until the expected story about state secrets exposed by a spy, turns instead into an attempted murder thriller. At this point one has lost all hopes of a discussion of world politics and security details discussion, anyway, going by the trend of chapters until the murder and a half.

"The most negative remarks about Ludmila were collected in the corridors of the KGB. The Vetrov case sent two shattering jolts to the Soviet intelligence edifice. It was talked about over and over for years. It is surprising that in the male-dominated KGB there was so much reliance on gossip."

Are the authors serious? Did they grow up in a monastery either strict orders of silence?

Whats half this book about, at that, having started as story of a spy but indulging in private details, instead of the secrets the spy unveiled, and exactlyhow West benefits thereby?

What's, for that matter, the much tomtommed ritual of confession in their faith, enforced via constant reminder of guilt and hell?
***

Authors attempt to wangle an indictment of Russia and Soviet Union via a last, reportedly sixty page, document left by Vetrov, when he was asked, between the sentence and execution, to write a confession; he wrote, reportedly, scathing of the whole system, and in particular of KGB.

While none of the facts are contested thereby, here's a contradiction evident all along - he not only knew of these flaws since the very beginning, but, over and above working in the very system and in KGB too, had returned more than once to Russia from postings in West, despite not only ample opportunities of escape, but at least one invitation thereof, from the very DST that he later turned to providing documents voluntarily, exposing the moles in West.

He wasn't doing this, moreover, out of fear of reprisals against family, when he returned to Moscow instead of escaping - his family had been with him in both France and Canada.

So the only explanation possible is that, despite the corruption hed seen, he'd still expected to rise in ranks if never returning West, and neither expectation being fulfilled, he then sought revenge.

While that profited US, it's hardly stuff of title of a last chapter of the book, questioning if he was hero or martyr. He's neither, especially if he sought to have an affair just so he could murder the woman in full public view, just so he could escape consequences of betraying his nation, and selected a suitable victim for the said murder to have an affair with, by going after her.

He was,in any discussion of virtue or importance, simply akin to the small screw that, having gone loose or missing at some point, had brought Columbia down in frames in 1986.

No more than that, whatever his personal attributes according to family or friends.
****

"First, the White House was to reassert its determination in the military and geostrategic area. This led to the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe, and to a stronger support of contra-revolutionary movements in Central America, in Angola, and in Afghanistan where the U.S. delivered ground-to-air Stinger missiles to the mujahideens."

Are they still celebrating that, after 2001? Or have they decided that being as myopic and damaged in upper floors as the then president they served is all that's necessary for life, and tomorrow need not be worried about?

"Then, the Americans decided, in close coordination with friendly oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf, to significantly increase the oil production in order to drive the price of the barrel down, thereby reducing the source of hard currencies the Soviet Union derived from oil. This oil policy would soon be reinforced by a very restrictive monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank, leading to a drop in the price of gold, another significant resource of the USSR."

Hence, Kuwait!
***

"Respectful of Marcel Chalet’s explicit request, American secret services observed the utmost prudence when using the information from the Farewell file. At this stage of the operation, Vetrov was still active, and nobody wanted to kill the goose that was laying the golden eggs. In fact, mole arrests and expulsions would start much later.

"Gus Weiss had a better idea about using the Farewell dossier in a much more devastating way. The VPK, the organization centralizing technology requests from the military-industrial complex, compiled in what was informally called the Red Book a detailed “shopping list” for each Soviet ministry.

"In January 1982, Weiss proposed to William Casey, director of the CIA and personal friend of Ronald Reagan, to put in place a vast plan for sabotaging the Soviet economy by transferring false information to the KGB Line X spies.8 Reagan approved the plan immediately and enthusiastically."
***

"A gas pipeline between Siberia and Western Europe had been in the design phase for many years.9 It was supposed to be commissioned soon. Implementing European technology, this gas pipeline was the source of tensions between the EEC countries and the United States. Europe’s need for energy independence through diversification was in direct conflict with the economic war the Americans had launched against the Soviet Union. Mitterrand and Reagan, just after their honeymoon over the Farewell case, had a serious confrontation on the topic.

"Weiss’s plan allowed everybody to agree. He arranged to have software delivered to Line X through a Canadian company. This software was meant to control gas pipeline valves and turbines, and it was delivered with viruses embedded in the code by one of the contractors. The viruses were designed to have a delayed effect; at first the software seemed to work as per the contract specifications.

"The sudden activation of the viruses in December 1983 led to a huge three-kiloton gas explosion in the Urengoi gas field, precisely in Siberia where, ironically, Vetrov had just started his jail time for a crime of passion. ... "

Was Chernobyl, too, an achievement of this regime?

" ... There was another extraordinary coincidence. The contract for the management software of the Urengoi-Uzhgorod pipeline pumping stations had been awarded to the French company Thomson-CSF, and the Thomson executive who had led the negotiations worked in collaboration with a certain Jacques Prévost."
***

"Observed from space by satellite, the explosion was allegedly so powerful that it alarmed NATO analysts, who later described it as the most powerful non-nuclear (man-made) explosion of all times. NORAD, responsible for the air defense of the U.S. territory, even thought that there had been a missile launch from an area where no base was known. Weiss had to reassure, one by one, his NSC colleagues, explaining that “all this was normal.”10

"The American administration thought the pipeline sabotage operation was a new blow for the Soviets. First, it disturbed natural gas exports and, consequently, earned revenue in hard currencies. Since the military-industrial complex was resting, for the most part, on technology stolen in the West, the American side was hoping that this “accident” would create a general climate of paranoia within the KGB regarding Soviet industrial equipment. It was also expected that the KGB would no longer trust its technology espionage, at a time when the Soviet Union needed it most.

"In March 1983, Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The famous “Star Wars” plan was expected to go through Congress and pass with a budget above thirty billion dollars. To use a metaphor, the poker player had just raised the stakes, knowing his adversary’s poor hand.
***

"The Americans did not stop there. Under the coordination of William Casey and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the plan of economic war against the Soviet Union became systematic in all federal organizations. Financially, the plan was to bar Soviet access to credit from Western banks. This effort was conducted by Roger Robinson, a New York banker familiar with the world of international finance. In the Defense Department, Fred Ikle and Richard Perle were in charge of coordinating with their allies to limit, and even prohibit, technology transfers to the Eastern Bloc. This was where the Farewell dossier had its greatest impact. When Richard Perle received the Farewell dossier from the hands of a CIA agent, he was absolutely astonished: “Of course everybody knew the Soviets were stealing whatever they could, but this was beyond everything we imagined. Each request for technology had the corresponding budget necessary to reach the stated objective. It was really like a catalogue de la Redoute [equivalent of the Sears catalog].”11 The Defense Department was also interested in using this catalog to determine exactly which advanced technologies should be off-limit to the Soviets.

"The Farewell dossier was progressively being exploited in Europe as well. The Americans had directly transmitted elements of the dossier to their NATO allies. These pieces of information would, therefore, eventually reach the French secret services, who were very “honored” to be trusted with such “confidential” information…which had actually originated from their services.

"At the DST, on Rue des Saussaies, the new boss, Yves Bonnet, was managing how the Farewell information was to be used. After a briefing in Langley by the CIA on how to use the Farewell dossier (the CIA agents knowing nothing of the French origin of the sources), Bonnet regained control of the situation and personally organized the process of informing his peers in the other fifteen countries concerned by Line X activities. The heads of British and German services came to Paris, in turn, to be briefed by the DST.
***

"The French also took part in a deception operation launched by the CIA. This was a particularly vicious campaign, giving a more precise idea of the manipulation techniques used in the world of espionage. The operation, as recounted by one of its masterminds, General Guyaux, had to do with the assumed properties of osmium-187 metal for use in weaponry implementing laser technology. With the launching of the SDI project by Ronald Reagan, this technology had become one of the priorities for Soviet intelligence. Here is what General Guyaux had to say about it: “By the end of the seventies, there was a lot of talk going on about the ‘graser,’ a kind of laser using high energy gamma rays from radioactive elements instead of using optical radiation ranging from infrared to ultraviolet. Even though, in France, Professor Jaéglé had obtained a weak laser effect with X-rays, it was out of the question to rush headlong into the domain of gamma rays. This technology was far from being developed, although it would have been a formidable weapon since gamma rays are highly penetrating.”12

"The Farewell dossier, as a matter of fact, included a document from a Soviet research lab wherein scientists were protesting the decision of Directorate T not to launch any research program devoted to osmium. The letter went on to accuse scientists opposed to the project of betrayal. Convinced that the Soviets had a serious interest in that particular isotope, secret services of the Western alliance decided to encourage, in a subtle way, the Russians to err further.

"The American journal Physical Review and the British magazine Nature published a few articles signed by renowned physicists detailing the number and the diversity of osmium-187 energy levels. Then, technical papers on the subject stopped. When this happens in technical and scientific areas, it signals to all intelligence services that this is of strategic importance. Directorate T immediately ordered its operatives to follow that trail, and more specifically in France, where the KGB had attempted to recruit quite a few scientists. At scientific conventions, where intelligence officers spent a lot of time, renowned researchers from all over the world started discussing with credibility osmium properties, describing the metal as a good candidate for use in a possible “graser.” A few labs went as far as publishing posters claiming successful experiments conducted in highly protected research centers. And last, American labs conspicuously bought significant quantities of natural osmium from the Soviet Union, major provider of this metal on world markets.

"“For a long time, we did not know the results of this maneuver,” explains General Guyaux. “So we thought the Soviets had not risen to the bait. Then came the coup attempt in 1991. The KGB was dissolved. The entire Soviet Union imploded. To our amazement, all of a sudden large quantities of osmium-187 showed up on the Russian market of rare materials, along with the too famous red mercury! It was as if the Russians did not know what to do with osmium anymore! This was the sign that, at the time, they had fallen into the trap.”

"The major DST operation, however, was meant to address the DST’s main concern about the disproportionate presence of the KGB in Paris. This operation resulted in the spectacular expulsion of Soviet “diplomats” identified by Farewell as KGB agents. It was launched soon after Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars speech, causing a rift in French-Soviet relations, thus sealing the fate of Vladimir Vetrov, whose departure for prison camp 272/3, near Irkutsk, was already scheduled."
***

"It is also possible that Vetrov thought the French were not likely to let him get out of the game that easily. He himself knew very well how to use the spiral into which he attracted his foreign agents, starting with seemingly innocuous actions. Now he would be the one to experience it. The French had too much proof of his treason and, therefore, too many means of pressure.

"It may have become urgent for Vetrov to find a way to make the DST lose all interest in him. There were not that many possibilities. He had to leave the KGB, which was easier said than done. As with all secret services, the KGB had a lot of entries, but very few exits.

"Vetrov could, in theory, pretend he was sick and needed a prolonged treatment that would prevent him from working. In practice, it was much trickier. The very idea of leaving the KGB on his own initiative was dubious, especially three years from retirement, and taking into account that he would lose 75 percent of his future pension. This is why the candidate for resignation was hospitalized for a period that could last several months, during which time the patient could undergo all the necessary tests. It was impossible to simulate a disease, except for the immeasurable side effects of a head injury, for instance. The general conclusion, however, was that the whole thing was a pretext; the second phase of the hospitalization ....

[Prathamesh Deshpande · Rating 4 out of 5]

Book Review - Farewell - The Greatest Spy Story of Twentieth Century

I chose to read this book due to a childhood fascination about spy stories, espionage thrillers which was fed aptly by stellar authors like Forsyth, Ludlum and the likes. I felt ‘would it not be fun to read a real spy story for a change’ considering that all those authors had at some point drawn inspiration from true stories.

But I was in for a rude shock !

The underlying theme for the biggest espionage operation in history can be described as Flaw.

Flaws in human nature, organisations, perceptions all lead to one of the greatest spy stories which played a huge role in the downfall of KGB and resultantly the USSR.

The Plot:
The book starts off on an expected note ( at that point I was still in my larger than life spy mode) painting Vladimir Vetrov ( the spy) as a too good to be perfect individual. Handsome,athlete, an ideal son, outperforming cadet and KGB employee and a charming lover.

The book traces his journey with his wife to France and Canada where they are the toast of the town amongst the Soviet diplomats and the most loved couple amongst their own citizens and the French friends they make.

The story takes a wild turn when Vetrov and his family are asked to come back to Russia. Subsequently, Vetrov is moved to a dead end job from where he knows he cannot scale up the ladder and reach the pinnacle of his ambitions within the KGB. This sets into motion a series of flaws which lead to an astonishing read:

Flaw 1 - The basic of human traits, greed. Having had a taste of the world outside the USSR, in France and Canada, the Vetrovs long for a life they enjoyed in Western Europe. Vetrov’s resentment towards his organisation, KGB, begins when he is brought back to Russia without clear reasons.

Flaw 2 - Vetrov is ignored once he is in Russia and is put in a dead end job. His various attempts at proving his worth by way of research papers is ignored which adds to the growing discontent and resentment he has towards his superiors and in turn the organisation

Flaw 3 - This resentment makes him vengeful and he decides to avenge his treatment by teaching his superiors a lesson and the best way to hurt the most secretive organisation there ever was is by barings its secrets open to the world

Flaw 4 - To achieve this aim he contacts the French DST. Now this is a flaw because firstly France at that moment was moving towards a Left leaning Government i.e. a pro communist regime. Secondly he contacted DST which is French organisation for tracking a catching spies and not the espionage organsiation which is trained at cultivating and running a spy. Thirdly, the KGB, considering their relations with a pro communist France does not feel the need to intercept any communication between a KGB officer and French diplomats and in turn they drive the first nail into the USSR coffin. And last, the DST, considering its inexperience in handling spies sends the most unsuspecting and under trained personnel to handle Vetrov who do the job with aplomb. All these flaws add to an explosive spy story unlike anything you may have ever read.

Flaw 5 - The biggest twist in the story is the extra marital affair of Vetrov and the crime it pushes him to committ which sets into motion the wheels of his downfall. But it is too late for the Soviets because by the time things unfold they are totally exposed in front of the western world and all they can do is damage control.

Its an amazing read and keeps you hooked on.

Writing Style :
Considering that the book is a collaborative effort of two documentary film makers (Russian and French) the flow is lacking in the book. The book requires real concentration to get through because both the authors have done their best to conduct a psychological profile of Vetrov and have laid down their views , conflicting or not, and left it on the readers’ judgement as to which view they consider correct

There are many open ended views in this book especially when interviews are given by parties on the opposing sides with conflicting information.

One thing you cannot fault is the effort and research that has gone in the making of this book. I would say its close to brilliant and courageous. I would never have thought that erstwhile KGB personnel would come out so openly on this topic with the authors considering it was a sore point for them.

For purely the effort gone in this book by the authors I would give it 4 stars.

Reference:

One thing which kept coming in my mind while reading this book is how apt was George Orwell in his definition of a closed form of government in his classic ‘1984’ and to consider this story is based around 1982-84 period is just a freakish coincidence.

Finally, its an interesting but a slow read and needs a lot of concentration to understand the implications of actions of the various characters in the book.

Happy reading !!

[Hank Pharis · Rating 2 out of 5]

(NOTE: I'm stingy with stars. For me 2 stars means a good book or a B. 3 stars means a very good book or a B+. 4 stars means an outstanding book or an A {only about 5% of the books I read merit 4 stars}. 5 stars means an all time favorite or an A+ {Only one of 400 or 500 books rates this!).

This was a very intriguing story. And it gives a lot insight into what spying was like during the Cold War and how this spy contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union. President Reagan described this as “the most significant spy story of the last century.”

Here are some quotes:

On July 20–21, 1981 at Chateau Montebello in Quebec, Mitterrand and Reagan met for the first time. … Mitterrand revealed that France had a private sector company, Thomson-CSF, working on contracts in Moscow, and through it French intelligence had achieved a very deep penetration of the KGB. It had in place a key Soviet source who was voluntarily providing astonishing national security information about Soviet technology acquisition from the West, including massive theft of technological secrets. Thus was revealed the famous “Line X” KGB espionage network by one of the most precious and extraordinary “moles” the West ever had. The “Farewell” case was born.

This spy opened the eyes of the West to the scope, structure, and operations of technological espionage as practiced by the USSR, primarily in the military-industrial complex. The free world suddenly realized the vulnerability of those very defense systems vital to its survival. Furthermore, it became clear that it was impossible to have the upper hand in the arms race against the East because, through the efforts of Soviet intelligence, it did not take long for the West to “share” its most efficient weapons and devices with this formidable adversary. Finally, the scale of this systematic stealing revealed a key strategic weakness of the socialist bloc in the domain of high technology. A window of opportunity to bankrupt the Soviet economy was open for the new American administration, who did not expect the Cold War to remain frozen forever. Under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, who had been informed of the Farewell operation less than five months after it all began, the NATO countries significantly toughened their attitude toward the USSR and its satellites. Many remember the anxiety the world was experiencing during the first five years of the 1980s. After a short-lived détente, the Cold War was back in full swing, heating up to the point that it could less and less be described as “cold.” Fear of an apocalypse resurfaced after cascading events, including the downing of a South Korean aircraft, the Euromissile crisis, and Reagan’s joke during a mic check that he had signed legislation outlawing the Soviet Union, and bombing would begin in five minutes.

After Andropov’s death, the degradation of the international climate brought Mikhail Gorbachev to power. Being a flexible politician, Gorbachev eventually cooperated with the West to find a solution allowing the world to survive. The rest is history.
Therefore, it is tempting to think that without Farewell’s solitary action—whose motivations were miles away from reshaping the world—perestroika and the end of the Cold War could very well have occurred ten, fifteen, or even twenty years later, assuming that world peace could wait that long.
Undeniably, the factors leading to the collapse of European communism as a system are more numerous and complex, but only in the world of espionage can small acts have such great effects. The actions of a single person with access to the secrets of a major power have the potential to modify the course of history. Thus, among the “subjective factors,” to use Marxist terminology, the Farewell case certainly is in a class of its own. It was one of those stones that, as they crumble, cause the wall to collapse. The Farewell file is also the most disturbing case there ever was, with so many improbabilities and paradoxes that many people will even doubt that it really happened. Judge for yourself.
A KGB officer, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Ippolitovich Vetrov, decided to betray the system. However, instead of contacting contacting the Americans, he chose to contact the French secret services.

It is also difficult to imagine that a man acting alone, at great personal risk, could have stolen so many state secrets from the Soviet regime, managing to shake the whole edifice.

Vetrov never accepted the fact that people born with a silver spoon in their mouth, or who benefited from the right connections, were promoted to a better life, while brilliant individuals without connections, like himself, were not. (10)

For Vetrov, however, it was more a question of getting emotionally even with the KGB than an elaborate plan to fight the Soviet system. His investigation file clearly shows, in conversations with other Gulag inmates, or in letters to Svetlana, his criticism of Soviet life’s downsides, with nepotism, corruption, shortages, and so forth. (365)

To explain the unprecedented success of the Farewell operation, the DST put forward its deliberate intention to act contrary to all rules, but this is only partially true. Two circumstances made this anomaly possible.
The first one was the belief, put to the test through a long period of checks, that French services had given up agent manipulation. “With an American or a British handler, Vetrov would have been caught red-handed within a month,” claims Igor Prelin.
The second one is the fact that all the contact terms and conditions were devised by Vetrov in person. “Myself, when I was dealing with a competent foreign agent, I would trust him,” recalls Igor Prelin. “It would have been stupid to impose any elaborate scheme, in Moscow, on an individual operating on his own turf. (367)

The main question was how this unbelievable operation could have taken place in the heart of Communist Moscow. (368)

We obtained more accurate figures regarding the number of uncovered agents from the Soviet side. Vetrov admitted to giving the names of 422 former colleagues. He communicated basic information to Ferrant—identity, rank, personal address, and private phone number—for 250 Soviet technology intelligence officers operating abroad, 222 of them under diplomatic cover. Vetrov had access to Directorate T files, as well as those for the Third Department, dealing with technology intelligence inside the Soviet Union. Another 170 officers were identified from other KGB divisions; Vetrov knew a lot of them personally. … his betrayal forced out, in one sweep, a number of operatives still on duty, those who were the best trained and the most productive. …
The damage was just as disastrous for foreigners selling secrets they had access to at work to the KGB. …
Vetrov alone helped expose fifty-seven foreign agents! (381-382)

Vetrov revealed to the West the existence, in the Soviet Union and its satellites, of an entire network of State organizations in charge of accomplishing this mission. Besides the KGB and the GRU (military intelligence), there were seemingly innocuous organizations in this network, such as the GKNT (State Committee for Science & Technology), the MVT (Ministry of Foreign Trade), and the GKES (State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations). Even the Academy of Sciences was involved in the systematic theft operation initiated by special services and coordinated by the VPK (Military Industrial Commission). (383)

The technology theft practiced in the West gave the USSR the ability to improve its ongoing programs (66 percent), accelerate their development (27 percent), launch new projects (5 percent), or cancel research programs leading nowhere (2 percent). The savings in time and money achieved by stealing scientific and technical secrets could largely finance the huge network of intelligence gathering. Caspar Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, had summarized the situation in unambiguous terms: “The United States and other Western nations are thus subsidizing the Soviet military buildup.” The Farewell dossier laid bare the fragility of Western societies and the weaknesses in their defense and secrecy protection systems. Thus the Pentagon learned that it was not the only one who knew about the anti-missile defense system supposed to protect the U.S. territory; Congress learned that their budget documents were very informative on highly sensitive matters, and the White House that its electronic security system was no secret to the KGB. The Americans now knew that it was possible to get information on their space shuttle in Bombay, or that their stolen satellite pictures were closely examined by the Soviets (who, for instance, could thus detect oil fields in Ethiopia). (385)

The Star Wars initiative was launched in March 1983, and it was developed within the NSC and the DOD by Admiral James Watkins and Robert MacFarlane, who later described it as “the greatest sting operation in history.” Was he suggesting this was a monumental bluff in the economic poker game the president had started with the USSR immediately after he took office in the White House? One is tempted to believe so, in retrospect. (386)

“Monsieur Farewell,” as he was known by the American administration, was closely associated with the elaboration of a plan that led to the end of the Cold War. (388)

[Candace · Rating 5 out of 5]

Riveting account of a Russian whose spying for the West actually helped bring down the Soviet Union, and that was exactly what he methodically intended to do.

[Ajitabh Pandey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A spy is a spy and there is always something which forces one to betray one’s own country.

This book is a very detailed account of one of the greatest spy stories on twentieth century. It gives a very detailed biographical account on the life of Vladimir Vetrov, a high ranking KGB official.

Excellent amount of research done by authors.

[Jordan Shapiro · Rating 4 out of 5]

A "must read" for any self respecting espionage junkie

My path to this book was quite backwards.

I first fell in love with the score to the film "l'affaire Farewell" due to my interest in composer Clint Mansell. Although I've always loved spy related entertainment both real life and fictional, I'd not heard of farewell until seeing that film. I thought the film was done really well and after hearing a podcast that brought up the Farewell affair I searched other forms of it and found not only my favorite tv show ("The Americans") but this book as well!

I won't say much about it, I'll leave the story to itself and the reader. It is a truly significant part of the Cold War and a great espionage story unlike any other you've probably already read or are familiar with.

My only criticism is that the book drags a bit due to the overwhelming amount of technical specifics contained in it. Trying to keep up with the trajectory of some aspects of the story becomes becomes almost possible and impossible at the same time. Without the information the story would be incomplete, but it is a lot to keep up with. There will be re-reading involved if you choose to start this book, but you'll be rewarded with a truly original and impressive story of a man, and how his actions and reactions to life within the KGB effected not only his friends, family and himself, but governments, presidents and the Cold War itself.

If you start the book and it lags for you, I highly suggest watching the film to get your appetite up for digesting more of the written version. It worked for me.

[Lew · Rating 2 out of 5]

Short story made long by delving into the teenie, tiny cracks of the story, telling the same fact over and over as if you hadn't read the previous chapters, and just the non-flow of a bad translation job. The sentence structure reads like an English literate, but unpracticed, Russian would speak.

There was no sensationalism, or dramatizing of the story; straight forward reporting with turns into cul-de-sacs of not-so-important supporting facts.

I made it to about chapter 25, then just skim read the rest. I don't feel like I missed anything.

[Larry · Rating 1 out of 5]

Couldn't finish this one. Painfully written / translated. The reading cadence took all the pleasure out of what was likely a good story. Read like a case file, with painful, uninteresting details.

[Kursad Albayraktaroglu · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Farewell" is probably the definitive study of the Vladimir Vetrov spying affair; one of the very few major Cold War espionage stories that did not have the USA or CIA at its center (even though USA gained the most from the information provided by Vetrov). It is a well-written book, with some dull sections that probably suffered during translation.

The coverage of how Vetrov began spying, details of tradecraft during the operation, and how the whole thing unraveled are very thorough and interesting. I am not sure if the Vetrov affair rates as "the greatest spy story" of the last century, though ; since there were far more important spies: certainly Aldrich Ames caused far more damage to the US intelligence apparatus, and Adolf Tolkachev singlehandedly delivered the crown jewels of Soviet technology to the US. But Vetrov's story is worth reading, if only to gain some insight into how the banality and injustice of the communist Soviet system drove an ambitious man into betraying his country.

[Tony · Rating 3 out of 5]

Vladimir Vetrov, a high-ranking KGB spy in Moscow during the Cold War, was assigned the code name 'Farewell' by the French intelligence service that recruited him. This is the true story of Vetrov, presented with balance and objectivity, and the Farewell dossier handed to U.S. President Reagan during the Ottawa G7 Summit by Francois Mitterrand, the newly elected president of France. A 2009 French film was inspired by the 1997 French book, while an updated account was translated into English in 2011, a quarter-century after Vetrov’s death.

"Farewell: The Greatest Spy Story of the Twentieth Century" is an otherwise pacy thriller that occasionally falls victim to its own verbosity. Yet, the writers succeed in painting a vivid picture of Vetrov from the accounts of his family, acquaintances and handlers. Does the KGB discover the mole? No spoilers here, go read the book.

[Sterling Hardaway · Rating 3 out of 5]

While it has an incredibly slow start, it finally picks up momentum and begins to live up to its name as " The Greatest Spy Story" , documenting Vetrov's ascend and fall within the KGB and his impact on stealth impact on foreign policy and the Cold War through the 70s and 80s. Though I think it could have been a bit shorter, I did like the very interpersonal touch that documented Vetrov's entire life from birth, not just his spy life, which is unique in this genre. Still, I really wouldn't recommend unless you are a huge international security or Cold War nerd, because the writing itself isn't particularly captivating otherwise.

[Vhobart · Rating 1 out of 5]

Horrible translation.

The use of anachronistic metaphors and exclamation points are distracting. At one point it says the book from a certain point on is not necessarily fact but now in "quicksand." That is a paraphrase. I stopped reading it when I got to the quicksand. This book is supposed to be nonfiction. It is an interesting subject and I would love to see it revisited by another translation or another author.

[Jennifer · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book was a disappointment. Despite the sensational title, it was actually quite boring and was very poorly written. The book spent a lot of time giving an overly thorough back story and spent very little time focusing on the actual spying or contents of the dossier. I wanted to quit reading so many times but forced myself to finish the book and really feel that I wasted two weeks of my life on it.

[Johnny · Rating 4 out of 5]

Struggled to get to the end where it talked about Farewell's influence in the cold war over the leaked documents but was interesting reading towards then. I feel that maybe it teetered out in the end because it was difficult to get a first hand account of events from the protagonist.

[Morris-Ken Hines · Rating 3 out of 5]

Informative

I really enjoyed this book and learning a lot from it as well. I enjoyed learning what was really going on during those years. I liked how this book gave different views.