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272 pages, Hardcover
First published January 6, 2011
I had spent years watching, living in and writing about the countries along the curve of Atlantic coastline ranging from Nigeria in the north, through Gabon and down to Angola in the south. This region supplies almost a sixth of US oil imports and about the same share of China's, and beneath the veneer of great wealth lies terrible poverty, inequality and conflict. Journalists are supposed to start on the trail of a great story somewhere dramatic and dangerous; unexpectedly I found my story here, in a series of polite if unsettling meetings in Libreville, [Gabon]. p.1
Consider the banana.
Each bunch takes two routes into your fruit bowl. The first route involves a Honduran worker emploued by a multinational who picks the bananas, which are packaged and shipped to Britain. The multi-national seels the fruit to a big supermarket chain, which sells it to you.
The second route - the accountant's paper trail - is more round-about. When a Honduran banana is sold in Britain, where are the final profits generated, from a tax point of view? in Honduras? In the British supermarket? In the multinational's US head office? How much do management expertise, the brand name, or insurance contribute to profits and costs? Nobody can say for sure. So the accountants can, more or less, make it up. They might, for example, advise the banana company to run its purchasing network from the Cayman Islands anmd run its financial services out of Luxembourg. The multinational might locate the company brand in Ireland; its shipping arm in the Isle of man; "management expertise" in Jersey and its insurance subsidiary in Bermuda.
Say the Luxembourg financing subsidiary now lends money to the Honduras subsidiary and charges interest at $20 million per year. The Honduran subsidiary deducts this sum from its local profits, cutting or wiping them out (and its tax bill). The Luxembourg's subsidiary's $20 million in extra income, however, is only taxed at Luxembourg's ultra-low tax haven rate. With a wave of an accountant's wand, a hefty tax bill has disappeared, and capital has shifted offshore.
Big Banana has done a common offshore trick known as transfer pricing, or transfer mispricing.. By artificially adjusting the price for the internal transfer, multinationals can shift profits into a low-tax haven and costs into high-tax countries where they can be deducted against tax. p.11
Chase was the oil company's preferred bank, and [in the early 1960s] it had asked [young economist] Hudson to study the balance of payments of the petroleum industry, in order to show that the oil companies were "good for America" and help them lobby for special perks from the government. Hudson had been asked to find out where the oil companies made their profits. At the producing end? At the refineries? In the gas stations? David Rockefeller, Chase's president, arranged for Hudson to meet Jack Bennett, treasurer of Standard Oil of New Jersey, now part of the ExxonMobil empire. Bennett gave him his answer. "The profits are made right here in my office," the oil man said. "Wherever I decide."
He was talking about transfer pricing...Bennett showed Hudson exactly how large vertically integrated multinationals could shift profits around the globe, apparently without breaking the law. The company would sell its crude oil cheap to a shipping affiliate registered in zero-tax Panama or Liberia, which in turn sold it on at nearly retail price to its refineries and marketing outlets. In the high-tax countries where the oil is produced and consumed, the subsidiaries buy at a high price and sell cheap, so they are unprofitable. But in the middle, in zero-tax Panama or Liberia, the subsidiaries buy cheap and sell dear, making vast profits. But these havens levy no tax on those profits. To this day, accounting standards effectively hide this kind of trickery, letting companies shovel results from different countries into a single category (often called simple "international") which cannot be unpicked to work out who takes what profit where. "Only the immense political power of these extractive sectors," said Hudson, "could have induced their governments to remain so passive in the face of the fiscal drain."
In the 1960s this kind of offshore leakage was relatively restrained when compared to today. p.190
A lot of innovation - I'm talking about useful innovations to make better and cheaper goods and services, not the City of London's innovations that simply shift wealth upwards and shift risks downwards - happen in small and medium-sized enterprises. But the offshore system works directly against this.
It subsidises multinationals by helping them cut their taxes and grow faster, making it harder for the innovative minnows to compete. And when small innovative firms do emerge they become targets for predators who seek to "unlock value" from "synergies" created by bringing the small firm into the bigger, more diversified one. Some synergies may be useful - economies of scale, for instance - but too often the predator unlocks value simply by being better at obtaining abusive, unproductive offshore tax privileges. Some make their best profits by seeking out and harvesting small, genuinely innovative companies that haven't yet managed to unlock those abuses for themselves.
This harvesting removes nimble, competitive and innovative firms from the marketplace and relocates them inside large corporate bureaucracies, curbing competition and potentially raising prices. Debt rises, and ordinary people pay more tax or see their schools and hospitals fall into disrepair. And if the predators leave their earnings offshore they can defer tax on them indefinitely. Deferred taxation is, as I have mentioned, effectively an interest-free loan from the government, with no repayment date. In other words, more debt. p.190
British private equity tycoon Guy Hands revealed that after moving to the British crown dependency of Guernsey to legally avoid tax, he had "never visited" his school-age children or his parents in England since he left, in order to preserve his non-resident tax status. Konrad Hummler, a vocal senior Swiss banker, calls Germany, France and Italy "illegitimate states" because their taxes are too high. Tax evasion, or what he calls "Swiss-style saving outside the system", is, he says, a legitimate defence by citizens attempting to "partially escape the current grasp of the administrators of a disastrous social welfare state and its fiscal policies."
Offshore attitudes are characterised by amazing similiarities of argument, of approach and of method, and some striking psycological affinities in a geographically diverse but like-minded global cultural community. A peculiar mixture of characters populates this world: castle-owning members of ancient continental European aristocracies, fanatical supporters of American libertarian writer Ayn Rand, members of the world's intelligence services, global criminals, British public schoolboys, assorted lords and ladies and bankers galore. Its bugbears are government, laws and taxes, and its slogan is freedom. p.231
the concept of domicile was originally developed to help colonials identify themselves wherever in the empire they lived. And English colonial administrator in India would be resident in India, but domiciled in England. England was their "natural" home, and they would remain domiciled in India, and never fully British. In 1914 the tax rules were twisted to let those resident but not domiciled in England escape tax on their worldwide income - they would only be taxed on what was actually earned in Britain. A rule originally created to discriminate against foreigners now discriminated against ordinary British residents. And that is essentially the situation today. A "non-dom" hedge fund owner can make sure all his income is booked outside Britain and escape tax on it.
About 60,000 non-doms live in the UK now, including Greek shipping magnates, Russian oligarch foot club owners, Saudi princesses and the Indian steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal, many of whom pay very low taxes. Just to add another layer of absurdity to the system, many resident non-domiciles were born in this country, including Lord Ashcroft. Born in Sussex and member of the House of Lords, his heart belongs to Belize, at least for tax purposes.
...The celebrity entrepreneur Sir Richard Branson - who owns his business empire through a maze of offshore trusts and companies, said in 2002 that his company would be half its size if he hadn't legally avoided tax via offshore structures. The British media treats Branson with awe. p. 251
The House of Lords was originally bsed on the City's Court of Aldermen; the House of Commons was based on the City's Court of Common Council. The prime minister's office was strongly modelled on the office of the lord mayor, elected by the Court of Common Council, which refers to itself as the Grandmother of Parliaments....
[Maurice] Glasman describes four pillars of the ancient constitution: the King at its head, the Church at its soul, the parliament as the country and the City as the money - not so much subordinate to the Crown or parliament but intertwined with them in complex political relationships. When William the Conqueror invaded England in 1066 and the rest of the country gave up its rights, the City kept its freehold property, ancient liberties, and its own self-organizing militias - even the King had to disarm when entering the City. When William commissioned the Domesday Book - a survery of the kingdom's assets and revenues that determined taxation - the City of London was excluded.
At the Protestant Reformation 500 years later, the English Church became subject to the Crown, and in the centuries that followed, the power of the monarch declined, parliament steadily lost its aristocratic character and broadened the suffrage to include almost all adults. But the City remained apart. It was, a nineteenth century reformer said, "like some prehistoric monster which had mysteriously survived into the modern world". Monarchs, firebrands and demagogues who tried to roll back the City's special rights and privileges had occasional success, but most came to a sticky end, and the City vigorously reasserted its rights afterwards. ...King Henry VIII's powerful advisor Cardinal Wolsey enraged the City by introducing progressive taxation and forcing the nobility to cough up large "benevolences," even taking all the armour and plate of the City's livery companies. The City helped engineer Wolsey's demise in 1529 with accusations such as "he having the French pox presumed to come and breath on the king." The City never forgot that and in 1571 instituted the post of city remembrancer to remind the King of his debt. The remembrancer, the world's oldest institutional lobbyist, remains a potent force in the British state today... the only non-parliamentary person allowed into the Commons chamber, he sits unobtrusively behind the speaker p. 256