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Afgantsy: The Russians In Afghanistan, 1979-1989
In a timely and eye-opening book Rodric Braithwaite examines the Russian experience in that most recent war in Afghanistan (after Alexander's conquests and the many British imperial wars and skirmishes). Largely basing his account on Russian sources and interviews he shows the war through the eyes of the Russians themselves - politicians, officers, soldiers, advisers, journalist, women. As former ambassador to Moscow, Rodric Braithwaite brings his unique insights to the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The story has been distorted not only by Cold War propaganda but also by the myths of the nineteenth century Great Game. It moves from the high politics of the Kremlin to the lonely Russian conscripts in isolated mountain outposts. The parallels with Afghanistan today speak for themselves. 'A superb achievement of narrative history, sensitive writing and exciting fresh research': so wrote Simon Sebag Montefiore about Rodric Braithwaite's bestseller Moscow 1941. But those words, and many others of praise that were given it, could equally apply to his new book.
417 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2011
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About the author
Rodric Braithwaite
16 books27 followersSir Rodric Quentin Braithwaite is a retired British diplomat and an author. From 1988 to 1992 Braithwaite was ambassador in Moscow, first of all under Margaret Thatcher to the Soviet Union and then under John Major to the Russian Federation. Subsequently, he was the Prime Minister's foreign policy adviser and chairman of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (1992–93), and was awarded the GCMG in 1994.
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March 28, 2011
“Don’t advance on Moscow”, is the first rule of warfare, according to the late Bernard Montgomery, a British Field Marshal and victory of the Battle of El Alamein. The second is don’t go fighting with your land army on the mainland of Asia. The time has come, I think, to reverse the order here: history has only two examples of failure before Moscow compared with the many examples of disaster in Asia; of disasters, in particular, in Afghanistan, the charnel house of empire.
I once wrote that it should be compulsory for ever new incumbent of the White House to read The Quiet American, the novel by Graham Greene set in Vietnam during the last days of the French occupation. Now another book has been published which should be compulsory reading for every western leader, every neo-con and every moral imperialist – Afgantsy: the Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989 by Rodric Braithwaite. Sadly it has come ten years too late. Actually I have a slight qualification here, a point I will come to a little later on.
There are few better qualified to tell the story of the tragic involvement of the old Soviet Union in Afghanistan than Sir Rodric Braithwaite, once British ambassador to Moscow. He begins with an intimate knowledge of Russia, the Russian people and the Russian sources. He also writes with understanding and sympathy for the veterans of this hopeless conflict, the Afgantsy of the title, who fought and suffered under the most appalling circumstances, often caught between the ruthlessness of the enemy and the negligent indifference of their own commanders. Put out of your mind the Red Army of 1943 to 1945. Think, rather, of the Imperial Army of 1914 to 1917.
Braithwaite’s has a tale to unfold whose lightest word harrows up the blood. It’s a story of suffering: the suffering of the ordinary Russian soldiers, mostly ill-educated conscripts, some 15,000 of whom lost their lives; the suffering of the ordinary people of Afghanistan, over a million of whom lost theirs, often in the most dreadful circumstances. It’s also a story of incompetence: the political incompetence of the Kremlin, sinking into geriatric senescence, and the military incompetence of the Russian central command.
The political and strategic incompetence goes wider, goes so far as Washington, to an administration so anxious to avenge the humiliation of Vietnam that it was willing to offer support to the most antediluvian and obscurantist forces, - the mujahideen that was to morph into al-Qaeda and the Taliban. As late as 1998, ten years after the conflict ended, Zbigniew Bzrezinski, former security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, continued to justify American support for the insurgents;
What is more important in the history of the world? The Taliban, or the collapse of the Soviet Empire? Some stirred up Muslims, or the liberation of central Europe and the end of the Cold War?
Here we have the same kind of blindness that led Francis Fukuyama to announce the ‘end of history’, just before history leapt up and bit him, and Bzrezinski, on the arse. It’s the blindness that caused Congressman Charles Wilson to describe Jalaluddin Haqqani, the mujahideen commander, as “goodness personified.” This incarnation of goodness is now number three on America’s most wanted list.
The Soviet road to hell was paved with good intentions. Although reluctant to intervene in the affairs of the country – contrary to Western perceptions at the time – they came hoping to make a difference, to bring this medieval society into the modern age. But the Afghans, in the main, have only ever wanted one thing: to be left alone. The British know this, or should know this, after some fairly disastrous interventions in the nineteenth century. In fact soon after the Soviet invasion the Foreign Office helpfully provided the deputy Soviet foreign minister with an account of past involvements, only to be told that this time it will be different.
But it wasn’t; it never could be. Afghanistan is easy to occupy but impossible to hold, a lesson that needs to be repeated time and again; the lesson that the Soviets ignored, the lesson that George Bush and Tony Blair also ignored. There might be some excuse for Bush, smarting in the aftermath of 9/11; there is none for Blair, given the Foreign Office warning, given our history. So, hence my qualification above: even in Afgantsy had been published years earlier it is doubtful if it would have made any difference to the strategic blindness of this stupid man.
We are now where we are, where the Soviets once were: the wolf is being held by the ears…just. How to let go, that’s the problem. The Russians wanted out years before their final exit. The problem was always to do so while retaining a degree of credibility, the nightmare bequeathed to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. Obama and Cameron would do well to pay heed to this brilliant and superbly researched account of a multi-faceted tragedy. In the end Afghanistan will be left to its own devices at a waste of so many lives and so much effort. History speaks; it’s such a pity that we fail to listen.
I once wrote that it should be compulsory for ever new incumbent of the White House to read The Quiet American, the novel by Graham Greene set in Vietnam during the last days of the French occupation. Now another book has been published which should be compulsory reading for every western leader, every neo-con and every moral imperialist – Afgantsy: the Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-1989 by Rodric Braithwaite. Sadly it has come ten years too late. Actually I have a slight qualification here, a point I will come to a little later on.
There are few better qualified to tell the story of the tragic involvement of the old Soviet Union in Afghanistan than Sir Rodric Braithwaite, once British ambassador to Moscow. He begins with an intimate knowledge of Russia, the Russian people and the Russian sources. He also writes with understanding and sympathy for the veterans of this hopeless conflict, the Afgantsy of the title, who fought and suffered under the most appalling circumstances, often caught between the ruthlessness of the enemy and the negligent indifference of their own commanders. Put out of your mind the Red Army of 1943 to 1945. Think, rather, of the Imperial Army of 1914 to 1917.
Braithwaite’s has a tale to unfold whose lightest word harrows up the blood. It’s a story of suffering: the suffering of the ordinary Russian soldiers, mostly ill-educated conscripts, some 15,000 of whom lost their lives; the suffering of the ordinary people of Afghanistan, over a million of whom lost theirs, often in the most dreadful circumstances. It’s also a story of incompetence: the political incompetence of the Kremlin, sinking into geriatric senescence, and the military incompetence of the Russian central command.
The political and strategic incompetence goes wider, goes so far as Washington, to an administration so anxious to avenge the humiliation of Vietnam that it was willing to offer support to the most antediluvian and obscurantist forces, - the mujahideen that was to morph into al-Qaeda and the Taliban. As late as 1998, ten years after the conflict ended, Zbigniew Bzrezinski, former security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, continued to justify American support for the insurgents;
What is more important in the history of the world? The Taliban, or the collapse of the Soviet Empire? Some stirred up Muslims, or the liberation of central Europe and the end of the Cold War?
Here we have the same kind of blindness that led Francis Fukuyama to announce the ‘end of history’, just before history leapt up and bit him, and Bzrezinski, on the arse. It’s the blindness that caused Congressman Charles Wilson to describe Jalaluddin Haqqani, the mujahideen commander, as “goodness personified.” This incarnation of goodness is now number three on America’s most wanted list.
The Soviet road to hell was paved with good intentions. Although reluctant to intervene in the affairs of the country – contrary to Western perceptions at the time – they came hoping to make a difference, to bring this medieval society into the modern age. But the Afghans, in the main, have only ever wanted one thing: to be left alone. The British know this, or should know this, after some fairly disastrous interventions in the nineteenth century. In fact soon after the Soviet invasion the Foreign Office helpfully provided the deputy Soviet foreign minister with an account of past involvements, only to be told that this time it will be different.
But it wasn’t; it never could be. Afghanistan is easy to occupy but impossible to hold, a lesson that needs to be repeated time and again; the lesson that the Soviets ignored, the lesson that George Bush and Tony Blair also ignored. There might be some excuse for Bush, smarting in the aftermath of 9/11; there is none for Blair, given the Foreign Office warning, given our history. So, hence my qualification above: even in Afgantsy had been published years earlier it is doubtful if it would have made any difference to the strategic blindness of this stupid man.
We are now where we are, where the Soviets once were: the wolf is being held by the ears…just. How to let go, that’s the problem. The Russians wanted out years before their final exit. The problem was always to do so while retaining a degree of credibility, the nightmare bequeathed to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. Obama and Cameron would do well to pay heed to this brilliant and superbly researched account of a multi-faceted tragedy. In the end Afghanistan will be left to its own devices at a waste of so many lives and so much effort. History speaks; it’s such a pity that we fail to listen.
February 8, 2017
Afgantsy
بدا هذا الكتاب خياراً مناسباً بعد رواية خالد حسيني (عداء الطائرة الورقية) والتي دارت بعض أحداثها في أفغانستان ما قبل الغزو السوفييتي، ذلك الحدث الفاصل والذي نتجت عنه أحداث غيرت شكل العالم الإسلامي، فالغزو السوفييتي أعطى دفعة كبيرة للحركات الإسلامية، الجهادية منها خاصة، أعطاها أرضاً للاجتماع والتدرب والقتال، دعماً دولياً وأسلحة متقدمة، أنتج الغزو السوفييتي فيما أنتج الأفغان العرب والقاعدة وطالبان، ومن هذا كله خرجت حقبة 11 سبتمبر والحرب على الإرهاب وما وصلنا إليه الآن من أوضاع سياسية واقتصادية واجتماعية متأزمة.
بعد الفراغ من الكتاب تبدو مشاعري حوله متناقضة، هو جيد من جوانب ولكنه أغفل جوانب أخرى، العنوان أفغانتسي يعني حرفياً (الجندي السوفييتي الذي قاتل في أفغانستان)، المقابل الروسي لمصطلح الأفغان العرب، يمكننا أن نقول استناداً إلى هذا العنوان أن الكتاب يركز على الجانب السوفييتي للحرب ويهمل الجانب الأفغاني، ستجد في الكتاب تفصيلات عن حياة الجنود السوفييت فترة الحرب وأوضاعهم بعد الحرب، فلذا من الأسلم أن نقول أن الكتاب هو عن التجربة السوفييتية في أفغانستان أكثر مما هو تأريخ للحرب والأطراف المشاركة والمعارك الرئيسية، يبدأ الكتاب من الانقلاب الأفغاني واستلام الشيوعيين للسلطة، الصراع ما بين الرفاق نور الدين تراقي وحفيظ الله أمين والذي انتهى بقتل تراقي واستلام أمين للسلطة، وهو ما لم يعجب موسكو، فتدخلت عسكرياً وهاجمت القصر الرئاسي الأفغاني وتم قتل أمين وتنصيب بابراك كارمال مكانه، يخبرنا الكتاب أن الروس رغبوا بتدخل قصير الأمد، يتم فيه تثبيت كارمال ومن ثم الانسحاب بلا تكاليف زائدة، ولكن سيطرة الرفاق على البلد كانت مهزوزة أصلاً، والحركات الجهادية الأفغانية كانت تعمل قبل الدخول السوفييتي، هكذا تمددت المغامرة الروسية لتسعة أعوام وكلفت الروس 15 ألف قتيل وبلايين الروبلات، التكلفة على الجانب الأفغاني لا يمكن قياسها، فلازال الأفغان يعانون من تداعيات تلك المغامرة الملعونة ويدفعون ثمنها.
بدا هذا الكتاب خياراً مناسباً بعد رواية خالد حسيني (عداء الطائرة الورقية) والتي دارت بعض أحداثها في أفغانستان ما قبل الغزو السوفييتي، ذلك الحدث الفاصل والذي نتجت عنه أحداث غيرت شكل العالم الإسلامي، فالغزو السوفييتي أعطى دفعة كبيرة للحركات الإسلامية، الجهادية منها خاصة، أعطاها أرضاً للاجتماع والتدرب والقتال، دعماً دولياً وأسلحة متقدمة، أنتج الغزو السوفييتي فيما أنتج الأفغان العرب والقاعدة وطالبان، ومن هذا كله خرجت حقبة 11 سبتمبر والحرب على الإرهاب وما وصلنا إليه الآن من أوضاع سياسية واقتصادية واجتماعية متأزمة.
بعد الفراغ من الكتاب تبدو مشاعري حوله متناقضة، هو جيد من جوانب ولكنه أغفل جوانب أخرى، العنوان أفغانتسي يعني حرفياً (الجندي السوفييتي الذي قاتل في أفغانستان)، المقابل الروسي لمصطلح الأفغان العرب، يمكننا أن نقول استناداً إلى هذا العنوان أن الكتاب يركز على الجانب السوفييتي للحرب ويهمل الجانب الأفغاني، ستجد في الكتاب تفصيلات عن حياة الجنود السوفييت فترة الحرب وأوضاعهم بعد الحرب، فلذا من الأسلم أن نقول أن الكتاب هو عن التجربة السوفييتية في أفغانستان أكثر مما هو تأريخ للحرب والأطراف المشاركة والمعارك الرئيسية، يبدأ الكتاب من الانقلاب الأفغاني واستلام الشيوعيين للسلطة، الصراع ما بين الرفاق نور الدين تراقي وحفيظ الله أمين والذي انتهى بقتل تراقي واستلام أمين للسلطة، وهو ما لم يعجب موسكو، فتدخلت عسكرياً وهاجمت القصر الرئاسي الأفغاني وتم قتل أمين وتنصيب بابراك كارمال مكانه، يخبرنا الكتاب أن الروس رغبوا بتدخل قصير الأمد، يتم فيه تثبيت كارمال ومن ثم الانسحاب بلا تكاليف زائدة، ولكن سيطرة الرفاق على البلد كانت مهزوزة أصلاً، والحركات الجهادية الأفغانية كانت تعمل قبل الدخول السوفييتي، هكذا تمددت المغامرة الروسية لتسعة أعوام وكلفت الروس 15 ألف قتيل وبلايين الروبلات، التكلفة على الجانب الأفغاني لا يمكن قياسها، فلازال الأفغان يعانون من تداعيات تلك المغامرة الملعونة ويدفعون ثمنها.
January 8, 2014
The gist of this history occurs when Ambassador Braithwaite closes Chapter Nine by summarizing the Soviet military effort in Afghanistan: “And so the Russians discovered, as other armies have discovered in Afghanistan before and since, that once you have taken the ground you need troops to hold it. They might dominate the towns and the villages by day. But the mujahedin would rule them by night. They never broke the rebels’ grip on the countryside or closed the frontier through which the rebels received their supplies… Their best efforts, military and political, went for nothing. They eventually had no choice but to disentangle themselves as best they could.” The book chronicles the Soviets’ internal and external efforts to extricate their forces from Afghanistan—efforts which started just about immediately, by the way—and the devolving morale of a Soviet public that wasn’t supposed to ask detailed questions about it. I think the author has done a fine job of describing what Special Operations Forces and Intelligence units the Soviets sent in (this is the best description I’ve seen) and what the war was like for Afghans—both civilians and the muj. I think the entire book—from the description of the 1979 Presidential Palace Coup to the inclusion of Igor Morozov’s 1988 poem that tees up Part III—includes a wealth of material unfamiliar to the Western audience and all of it deserves a look, given what’s happening today in Afghanistan.
January 21, 2018
Authoritative book on the Russian Afghan intervention from the Russian perspective. The author compares this war with French-Algerian, American-Vietnamese, French-Vietnamese interventions. The Russians tried to implement their well tried developmental model in Afghanistan with a lot of determination and I think they might have been successful if they had been given enough time by the Americans. But the Americans wanted to get their revenge for their Vietnam humiliation, so they armed and trained the Islamist mujaheddin knowing full well that once the Russians had left, the Islamists would take over. What did didn’t realise was that once they had managed to defeat Soviet Union, they would be confronted by the very same enemy.
I found this aspect of this story a lot more believing than the Westernised version of all invading Russian infidel army destroying hell bent on destroying every Afghan at random.
I found this aspect of this story a lot more believing than the Westernised version of all invading Russian infidel army destroying hell bent on destroying every Afghan at random.
April 22, 2020
Nuanced and sophisticated; this is such a wholesome and very well-researched book on the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, following the next nine years of occupation. Almost all the books I've read before on red army in Afghanistan describes the narrative of Mujaheddin and Pakistan, America and CIA's combined help to bring down the soviets. This is a unique book of it's own kind, narrating the Russian's side of the story, the timeline of events is effectively put together; the author chose to divide the book into topical sections; each section encompasses the entire war; starting from Afghanistan's military coup of 1978, the gradual rise of disturbance between Tarakai and Amin, the Russian decision to intervene, the beginning of tragedy, 40th Army going to war, soldering, fighting, devastation, disillusion, the decision to go back; in a nutshell, each and every aspect of the USSR in Afghanistan is covered with good research with a mix of interviews with the survivors.
"Afgantsy" is in fact Afghanistan through Russian eyes, it shows a genuine depth of feelings for the incredible mix of tribal, ethnic, and religious identities of Afghanistan and of the USSR.
A good read for soviet and Asian history buffs.
"Afgantsy" is in fact Afghanistan through Russian eyes, it shows a genuine depth of feelings for the incredible mix of tribal, ethnic, and religious identities of Afghanistan and of the USSR.
A good read for soviet and Asian history buffs.
March 6, 2012
An outstanding and highly readable account of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Written by someone familiar with the USSR and Russia this book does not have the feel of many which touch the subject as having a particular partisan agenda to pursue. In his treatment and analysis of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan Braithwaite is fair and unsensational. Importantly he looks at the time leading up to the arrival of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the concerns among the CPSU about the conditions not being right for a revolutionary party such as the PDPA to attempt to sieze power. If the PDPA had heeded the advice of Moscow in the first place things might have developed differently. As Braithwaite shows the USSR was in a damned if it did and damned if it didn't situation. In the end I beleive the USSR had little choice but to do what it did against its better judgement and with misgivings which all turned out to be pretty much correct.
Braithwaite spends a lit of time examining who the Soviet citizens in Afghanistan were. Especially interesting are some of the stories of those who were motivated to carry out Internationalist duty assisting the progressive movement in Afghanistan in developing the countries economic and educational infrastructure. Many Afghans, especially women, had opportunities which without Soviet support never would have been possible.
The fighting of the war is covered in detail and reveals all the usual muggle and horror of any military at war together with the inability to learn from the mistakes of those who went before and the costly need to learn from scratch. Braithwaite shows clearly the phases through which the war passed before the eventual withdrawl having reached a stalemate that the Soviet Union could no longer commit to and with the USSR itself collapsing as a result of years of moribund leadership, its own internal contradictions and as a result of Gorbachevs attempted reforms.
While not a theme or a subject really tackled in this book it is pretty clear that (as the subsequent US/UK intervention has found)Pakistan is a large part of the problem, within which the ISI feature large behind which stands Saudi money and fundamentalism. The lack of resources available to the Soviet 40th Army to secure the Pakistan/Afghan border seriously undermined their efforts elsewhere. As is clear from the text while the 40th Army was anything but militarily defeated the force was too small to hold territory which was taken often at great cost to the Soviet military.
Especially instructive is the way the book investigates the way in which the war and Afghan situation was revealed, or not, to the citizens of the USSR and how returning troops were treated, and subsequently how vetrans have been treated, by the public and state. It took the rise of Vladimir Putin before the sacrifice and suffering of the Soviet vetrans was acknowledged by the state and some effort was made to improve their lot.
WHile Braithwaite does not touch on the US invasion of Afghanistan he does not need to. Anyone reading the book will be aware of paralels and differences and will draw their own conclusions.
Probably the best book in English on the overall Soviet experience available. Very highly recommended!
Braithwaite spends a lit of time examining who the Soviet citizens in Afghanistan were. Especially interesting are some of the stories of those who were motivated to carry out Internationalist duty assisting the progressive movement in Afghanistan in developing the countries economic and educational infrastructure. Many Afghans, especially women, had opportunities which without Soviet support never would have been possible.
The fighting of the war is covered in detail and reveals all the usual muggle and horror of any military at war together with the inability to learn from the mistakes of those who went before and the costly need to learn from scratch. Braithwaite shows clearly the phases through which the war passed before the eventual withdrawl having reached a stalemate that the Soviet Union could no longer commit to and with the USSR itself collapsing as a result of years of moribund leadership, its own internal contradictions and as a result of Gorbachevs attempted reforms.
While not a theme or a subject really tackled in this book it is pretty clear that (as the subsequent US/UK intervention has found)Pakistan is a large part of the problem, within which the ISI feature large behind which stands Saudi money and fundamentalism. The lack of resources available to the Soviet 40th Army to secure the Pakistan/Afghan border seriously undermined their efforts elsewhere. As is clear from the text while the 40th Army was anything but militarily defeated the force was too small to hold territory which was taken often at great cost to the Soviet military.
Especially instructive is the way the book investigates the way in which the war and Afghan situation was revealed, or not, to the citizens of the USSR and how returning troops were treated, and subsequently how vetrans have been treated, by the public and state. It took the rise of Vladimir Putin before the sacrifice and suffering of the Soviet vetrans was acknowledged by the state and some effort was made to improve their lot.
WHile Braithwaite does not touch on the US invasion of Afghanistan he does not need to. Anyone reading the book will be aware of paralels and differences and will draw their own conclusions.
Probably the best book in English on the overall Soviet experience available. Very highly recommended!
November 17, 2021
Afganistano karo kontekstas, priežastys, apie pasekmes žymiai mažiau teksto, bet bent išryškinta, iš kur atsirado talibai. Visapusiška knyga, nuo Afganistano istorijos ir priėjimo prie pačio karo iki žmonių prisiminimų.
Autorius kiek linksta palaikyti rusus, kad neva jie elgėsi geriau nei amerikiečiai. Kas čia žino.
Autorius kiek linksta palaikyti rusus, kad neva jie elgėsi geriau nei amerikiečiai. Kas čia žino.
April 30, 2018
The author of this book was the British ambassador to the USSR and then the Russian Federation but I highly appreciate his objective approach throughout the book which is about the causes of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan right up till the withdrawal of the troops and its aftermath from the Russian point of view. One reason why I found this book interesting was that the author has quoted first-hand experiences of those who were part of the battlefield.
In initial chapters, the author establishes his case on how Afghanistan became a bone of contention between the British and Tsarist Russia. Gradually, author takes reader to the 1970’s when People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) coups against President Daud and how the infighting between the Khalq and Parcham factions of PDPA led to a bloody power struggle which eventually coerce the Soviet Politburo to drag USSR into this pointless war which refutes the rampant propaganda at that time that USSR wanted an access to the Indian Ocean.
Although, Soviets occupied Afghanistan history again repeated itself when it turned out to be an impossible land where the rulers had to negotiate to reach an arrangement to rule with the local groups who held sway in the region. However, the PDPA regime did not understand this and cajoled the local populace by imposing communism, for which Afghanistan was not ripe. Eventually, this far from reality maneuver brewed resentment in the people against the PDPA regime.
Later, the Politburo of Soviet Union made a grave mistake to end this political issue by means of military and to attain peace and stability in Afghanistan because of insecurity that PDPA regime may fall into the hands of Americans and the Southern region would become unstable. Little did they know that they had got into a quagmire, by creating and deploying an ill-equipped army (40th Army) which was not familiar with the local tribal customs and the mountainous terrain of the region and their enemy i.e. the mujahideen primarily supported by countries like Pakistan, USA, and Saudi Arabia were well-familiarized with the terrain and the people which made them elusive and proficient in guerrilla tactics. Moreover, the 40th Army faced another enemy which was intangible in nature was a massive health problem (both physical and mental), particularly against the infectious diseases. Sometimes, the mental health issues eventually lead to suicide because the 40th Army had no psychiatrists till the mid-80’s and for some, it exacerbated when the traumatized veterans were turned down in the USSR and also no efforts were made on their psychological rehabilitation.
There might be an element of biasedness in me but I found this book to be an authoritative account of this futile war. However, I believe that this book would have been great had the author covered the involvement of America and Pakistan in more detail how arming the mujahideen was given more priority over the non-proliferation of Pakistan. Also, I felt lost at some places because of not being familiar with the Politburo of USSR and its role along with that of KGB.
After reading this book, I felt sorry for both the Afghans and as well as the Soviet Army.
P.S. I would like to share some excerpts from this book below which I found interesting.
But the soldiers’ attitude towards the professional singers was ambivalent. However eloquently these people sang, they had not seen battle themselves. Their music was artificial, constructed for effect, and over it, some thought, hung an atmosphere of commercial exploitation. For the real thing the soldiers made their own music on the guitars they had taken with them to the war. Or they listened to the songs of the soldier-bards, the people who had shared their trials, songs which became very popular, to the consternation of the authorities. The songs were banned by the political censorship, and the customs officers on the frontier cracked down heavily on attempts to bring taped versions into the Soviet Union. None of this stopped the songs from circulating throughout the 40th Army.
In initial chapters, the author establishes his case on how Afghanistan became a bone of contention between the British and Tsarist Russia. Gradually, author takes reader to the 1970’s when People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) coups against President Daud and how the infighting between the Khalq and Parcham factions of PDPA led to a bloody power struggle which eventually coerce the Soviet Politburo to drag USSR into this pointless war which refutes the rampant propaganda at that time that USSR wanted an access to the Indian Ocean.
Although, Soviets occupied Afghanistan history again repeated itself when it turned out to be an impossible land where the rulers had to negotiate to reach an arrangement to rule with the local groups who held sway in the region. However, the PDPA regime did not understand this and cajoled the local populace by imposing communism, for which Afghanistan was not ripe. Eventually, this far from reality maneuver brewed resentment in the people against the PDPA regime.
Later, the Politburo of Soviet Union made a grave mistake to end this political issue by means of military and to attain peace and stability in Afghanistan because of insecurity that PDPA regime may fall into the hands of Americans and the Southern region would become unstable. Little did they know that they had got into a quagmire, by creating and deploying an ill-equipped army (40th Army) which was not familiar with the local tribal customs and the mountainous terrain of the region and their enemy i.e. the mujahideen primarily supported by countries like Pakistan, USA, and Saudi Arabia were well-familiarized with the terrain and the people which made them elusive and proficient in guerrilla tactics. Moreover, the 40th Army faced another enemy which was intangible in nature was a massive health problem (both physical and mental), particularly against the infectious diseases. Sometimes, the mental health issues eventually lead to suicide because the 40th Army had no psychiatrists till the mid-80’s and for some, it exacerbated when the traumatized veterans were turned down in the USSR and also no efforts were made on their psychological rehabilitation.
There might be an element of biasedness in me but I found this book to be an authoritative account of this futile war. However, I believe that this book would have been great had the author covered the involvement of America and Pakistan in more detail how arming the mujahideen was given more priority over the non-proliferation of Pakistan. Also, I felt lost at some places because of not being familiar with the Politburo of USSR and its role along with that of KGB.
After reading this book, I felt sorry for both the Afghans and as well as the Soviet Army.
P.S. I would like to share some excerpts from this book below which I found interesting.
But the soldiers’ attitude towards the professional singers was ambivalent. However eloquently these people sang, they had not seen battle themselves. Their music was artificial, constructed for effect, and over it, some thought, hung an atmosphere of commercial exploitation. For the real thing the soldiers made their own music on the guitars they had taken with them to the war. Or they listened to the songs of the soldier-bards, the people who had shared their trials, songs which became very popular, to the consternation of the authorities. The songs were banned by the political censorship, and the customs officers on the frontier cracked down heavily on attempts to bring taped versions into the Soviet Union. None of this stopped the songs from circulating throughout the 40th Army.
July 30, 2020
A fascinating and educational read.
July 11, 2019
I was a senior in high school when the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan in December, 1979. Shortly thereafter the U.S. boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow and President Jimmy Carter reinstated Selective Service registration. My mother wrote a letter of protest and actually received a reply from the White House. Three years later, when I was a junior in college (majoring in journalism) the Soviets were bogged down in Afghanistan and it was among the hottest stories that we studied. My favorite professor told us that, in his opinion, anything that occurred in the last 25 years was current events. Anything older was history.
Now, the Soviet war in Afghanistan qualifies as history according to him. Afgansty: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-1989 fills in all of the blanks that the Western news media couldn't when the war raged. Rodric Braithwaite was the British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. during that period, so if any one is qualified to write a book about the Soviet War in Afghanistan he is. Braithwaite writes like a journalist, not a government official. His writing is crisp and vivid. He sorts out messy situations such as the power struggle between factions in the Afghan Communist Party and among the mujahideen. He doesn't get mired in alphabet soup when writing about the various Soviet military units. This is a fast moving, exciting book. His sources include official Soviet records and personal interviews with Red Army soldiers, civilian volunteers and mujahideen.
Braithwaite dispels all of the misconceptions perpetuated by the Western news media throughout the 1980s. The Soviets had not learned from the U.S. mistakes in Vietnam. They repeated them in Afghanistan. The mujahideen did not incessantly savage the Soviets with Stinger missiles. They were often happy to negotiate ceasefires to position themselves better against their adversaries -fellow mujahideen! The Soviets did commit atrocities, but were rank amateurs compared to the mujahideen. The Soviets did commit atrocities, but they also tried very hard to win the hearts and minds of the Afghans and were respectful of Islam. And the biggest misconception of all: The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to seize a warm water port. Where? Afghanistan is land locked! According to Braithwaite, they were working on a withdrawal plan from the moment they went in.
Of course, the Western media did the best it could trying to report on a war waged by a closed society inside of another closed society. However, I vividly recall in 1980 a pervasive feeling that the Soviets were invincible. Little did we know they were just as vulnerable as anybody all along.
This is a superb book.
Now, the Soviet war in Afghanistan qualifies as history according to him. Afgansty: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-1989 fills in all of the blanks that the Western news media couldn't when the war raged. Rodric Braithwaite was the British Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. during that period, so if any one is qualified to write a book about the Soviet War in Afghanistan he is. Braithwaite writes like a journalist, not a government official. His writing is crisp and vivid. He sorts out messy situations such as the power struggle between factions in the Afghan Communist Party and among the mujahideen. He doesn't get mired in alphabet soup when writing about the various Soviet military units. This is a fast moving, exciting book. His sources include official Soviet records and personal interviews with Red Army soldiers, civilian volunteers and mujahideen.
Braithwaite dispels all of the misconceptions perpetuated by the Western news media throughout the 1980s. The Soviets had not learned from the U.S. mistakes in Vietnam. They repeated them in Afghanistan. The mujahideen did not incessantly savage the Soviets with Stinger missiles. They were often happy to negotiate ceasefires to position themselves better against their adversaries -fellow mujahideen! The Soviets did commit atrocities, but were rank amateurs compared to the mujahideen. The Soviets did commit atrocities, but they also tried very hard to win the hearts and minds of the Afghans and were respectful of Islam. And the biggest misconception of all: The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to seize a warm water port. Where? Afghanistan is land locked! According to Braithwaite, they were working on a withdrawal plan from the moment they went in.
Of course, the Western media did the best it could trying to report on a war waged by a closed society inside of another closed society. However, I vividly recall in 1980 a pervasive feeling that the Soviets were invincible. Little did we know they were just as vulnerable as anybody all along.
This is a superb book.
August 29, 2022
5/5 I really enjoyed it and would highly recommend it. Little prior knowledge of the war or time period needed imo. Part 1 (103 pages) covers the background and the decision making process of the soviet leadership to explain why the USSR invaded/intervened when they knew it would likely go badly. Or to quote the book "Step by step, with great reluctance, strongly suspecting that it would be a mistake, the Russians slithered towards a military intervention because they could not think of a better alternative". Part 2 (140 pages) is more thematic and covers the various aspects of the war itself, the condition of the Soviet 40th Army, the experiences of soldiers on-duty and off-duty, the experiences of the Soviet advisors and the few Soviet women in Afghanistan, as well as the demoralisation at home and in the soldiers alongside the atrocities. There isn't really much of an operational or strategic narrative but with a counter insurgency war based around guard posts and cutting supply lines that would be difficult to do in a way interesting to most readers. Part 3 (80 pages) is about the withdrawal process and the (mostly bad) treatment of Afghanistan veterans on their return home. Some stuff on their experience post-USSR as well (up to late 2000s)
On the topic of American aid (bringing it up because that is well associated with the war) the author argues that the stinger anti-aircraft weapons provided didn't matter that much as the Soviets quickly adapted and Gorbachev's decision to withdraw was made before the first stinger arrived. The author also sometimes compares and contrasts to the American experience in the Vietnam War.
On the topic of American aid (bringing it up because that is well associated with the war) the author argues that the stinger anti-aircraft weapons provided didn't matter that much as the Soviets quickly adapted and Gorbachev's decision to withdraw was made before the first stinger arrived. The author also sometimes compares and contrasts to the American experience in the Vietnam War.
October 4, 2025
Afghansty by Rodric Braithwaite is a very useful book. I had little idea about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and this was an excellent introduction to the conflict. The book uses primary sources well - interviews and testimony from Soviet soldiers who were fighting, involved in advisory roles, intelligence etc. Braithwaite also utilises testimony from Soviet civilians who came as, for example, nurses to treat wounded soldiers or who were diplomatic staff.
The conflict itself is fairly confusing in some ways, essentially the communist party of Afghanistan was ultra Stalinist and had little presence in the countryside. It had a lot of support in the military, which was how it was able to pull off a coup that deposed the Soviet friendly government. It was split into two bloodthirsty, irrational factions who were more concerned with knocking each other off pedestals than governing in any efficient way. If disquiet occurred in the countryside there was little room for compromise, the government was pretty prepared to use full force to attack its own population.
Braithwaite portrays the Soviet decision to intervene as something they were reluctant about. This is not to take away from the brutality of the occupation, but tracks - the British state was fairly reluctant to intervene in northern Ireland ten years before, for example. It was interesting to read about the bureaucratic chaos that was the invasion, and the inter-service rivalries that often plague authoritarian regimes (in this case it was between the army intelligence and KGB).
The Soviets and their Afghan allies could often hold territory in the day, but at night they could not. If they left an area it went back to the muhajideen. The muhajideen themselves were divided and at each other’s throats as soon as the Soviets abandoned their doomed intervention. Masud is a particularly compelling and interesting figure. The book gives the reader some idea about the scale of Pakistani meddling in Afghanistan, and its anatomy - Masud was not well regarded by the Pakistanis because of his Tajik ethnicity and the fact he was reluctant to submit to Pashtuns (another fascinating detail of this conflict is the relationship between, say, Soviet and Afghan Tajiks, indeed, this factor made some aspects of the Soviet intervention smoother than the American one decades later).
The book ends with some interesting discussion of the later American led invasion and Russian involvement (mainly as helicopter pilots). The Soviet invasion was looked at, by some, with a degree of almost nostalgia compared to the American led one. This book was of course written a time before the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the botched withdrawal by the US and its allies. Reading this book makes a lot of that less surprising (in retrospect).
This conflict pales in terms of scale and Russian casualties compared to the current war in Ukraine. It is interesting how much more cautious the Soviet leaders seemed to be then than Putin is now. Of course the type of war being fought is quite different, and Putin’s more aggressive style in the second chechen war was perhaps more successful because it was less cautious than than his predecessors in Chechnya but also Afghanistan. I suppose I was somewhat surprised to realise that the scale of Russian casualties was so different in these two wars.
This is a recommendation. If you can stomach the slightly Whiggish military historian irritations it is quite a good primer for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The conflict itself is fairly confusing in some ways, essentially the communist party of Afghanistan was ultra Stalinist and had little presence in the countryside. It had a lot of support in the military, which was how it was able to pull off a coup that deposed the Soviet friendly government. It was split into two bloodthirsty, irrational factions who were more concerned with knocking each other off pedestals than governing in any efficient way. If disquiet occurred in the countryside there was little room for compromise, the government was pretty prepared to use full force to attack its own population.
Braithwaite portrays the Soviet decision to intervene as something they were reluctant about. This is not to take away from the brutality of the occupation, but tracks - the British state was fairly reluctant to intervene in northern Ireland ten years before, for example. It was interesting to read about the bureaucratic chaos that was the invasion, and the inter-service rivalries that often plague authoritarian regimes (in this case it was between the army intelligence and KGB).
The Soviets and their Afghan allies could often hold territory in the day, but at night they could not. If they left an area it went back to the muhajideen. The muhajideen themselves were divided and at each other’s throats as soon as the Soviets abandoned their doomed intervention. Masud is a particularly compelling and interesting figure. The book gives the reader some idea about the scale of Pakistani meddling in Afghanistan, and its anatomy - Masud was not well regarded by the Pakistanis because of his Tajik ethnicity and the fact he was reluctant to submit to Pashtuns (another fascinating detail of this conflict is the relationship between, say, Soviet and Afghan Tajiks, indeed, this factor made some aspects of the Soviet intervention smoother than the American one decades later).
The book ends with some interesting discussion of the later American led invasion and Russian involvement (mainly as helicopter pilots). The Soviet invasion was looked at, by some, with a degree of almost nostalgia compared to the American led one. This book was of course written a time before the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and the botched withdrawal by the US and its allies. Reading this book makes a lot of that less surprising (in retrospect).
This conflict pales in terms of scale and Russian casualties compared to the current war in Ukraine. It is interesting how much more cautious the Soviet leaders seemed to be then than Putin is now. Of course the type of war being fought is quite different, and Putin’s more aggressive style in the second chechen war was perhaps more successful because it was less cautious than than his predecessors in Chechnya but also Afghanistan. I suppose I was somewhat surprised to realise that the scale of Russian casualties was so different in these two wars.
This is a recommendation. If you can stomach the slightly Whiggish military historian irritations it is quite a good primer for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
July 31, 2018
Spoiler alert: The Soviet Politburo was not keen to get directly involved with Afghanistan's political turmoil other than supporting the pro-communist government who took over the country. But got involved they did and Afghanistan became yet another piece in the Cold War chessboard. Afgantsy is about the Russian soldier, engineer, translator, nurse who served in that conflict and the legacy they left behind (rise of the Taliban, yet another occupation this time by the United States). Will that country ever find peace?
January 2, 2023
Can't believe we invaded Afghanistan after this.
April 6, 2012
The book is full of details, names, and shocking stories about rape, torture, and so on during war and traumas after war that unfortunately happen in every war.
I don’t think Soviet Union had democratic and free government. How a kind of dictatorship regime can blame another country for crackdown its own people and suppress of freedom? According to history both Russia and Britain had historical interest in Afghanistan so, how a country like Soviet Union claim that unwanted invade to Afghanistan? I believe unwillingness in politic is meaningless. This is a kind of propaganda in favor of Soviet Union.
Soviet Union had 2 purposes for invasion: 1- Protect its border as writer mentions 2- Expanding communism as they had done in Eastern Europe. So, this claim that Russia decided to establish stable regime in Afghanistan just for afghan sake is wrong.
On the other hand, I think this war was between Soviet Union and USA. USA supported Mujahedin during 10 years war as, Soviet Union supported Afghan Government.
War is the ugliest form of conversation. Powerful countries invade or participate in war for their own sake but who pays? People, just people as Afghanistan people paid, pay and will pay until when? Just God knows.
February 15, 2017
Вполне толковая книга от бывшего посла GB в России и СССР. Написанная, как ни странно, с искренней симпатией к советским солдатам-афганцам и на основе их собственных воспоминаний. Ничего особенно нового в ней нет, однако читать интересно за счет того, что Сэр Родрик надергал отовсюду необычных, или наоборот типичных, но жутковатых фактов о нашей войне с моджахедами и все это вместе производит сильное впечатление.
February 22, 2017
An authoritative account of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan
June 9, 2018
In spite of the subtitle, I think the main title itself is more accurate in describing what this book is about, because it's less a straightforward history of the war in Afghanistan, and more focused on the experiences of the Afgantsy, the Soviet soldiers that were there, and what they suffered afterwards.
The various chapters here, describe several elements of what the Russians went through in the intervention from the initial decision to go in, the storming of the palace, patrolling the countryside, fighting the muhajideen, dealing with locals, getting captured, seeing their comrades killed, sometimes even defecting, and then having to go back to a crumbling nation that had disowned the entire intervention.
It wasn't just soldiers that were there, as there were many Soviet advisers, and support staff including many women, whose stories are told here as well, trying to carry on with their jobs and lives that could end at any moment.
I would've wanted more politics and history here, and the book is already padded with some of that. There is a history of Afghanistan, and the infighting among the Afghan communist is detailed very well. There is no straightforward chronological description of the military operations; it seems that the country goes from the storming of the palace the a full blown occupation of the entire country, and I guess it sort if did happen in that manner, the point being to try and keep the new government afloat, but it just carried on and on, and the rest of the book consists of the scattered experiences of the occupation forces.
I would've wanted to know more about the failed efforts to win over the population by building infrastructure and the perspective of the Afghan government after Amin is overthrown.
It's a decent introduction to the war though; and it was difficult for me to find another comparable one volume treatment on the war.
The various chapters here, describe several elements of what the Russians went through in the intervention from the initial decision to go in, the storming of the palace, patrolling the countryside, fighting the muhajideen, dealing with locals, getting captured, seeing their comrades killed, sometimes even defecting, and then having to go back to a crumbling nation that had disowned the entire intervention.
It wasn't just soldiers that were there, as there were many Soviet advisers, and support staff including many women, whose stories are told here as well, trying to carry on with their jobs and lives that could end at any moment.
I would've wanted more politics and history here, and the book is already padded with some of that. There is a history of Afghanistan, and the infighting among the Afghan communist is detailed very well. There is no straightforward chronological description of the military operations; it seems that the country goes from the storming of the palace the a full blown occupation of the entire country, and I guess it sort if did happen in that manner, the point being to try and keep the new government afloat, but it just carried on and on, and the rest of the book consists of the scattered experiences of the occupation forces.
I would've wanted to know more about the failed efforts to win over the population by building infrastructure and the perspective of the Afghan government after Amin is overthrown.
It's a decent introduction to the war though; and it was difficult for me to find another comparable one volume treatment on the war.
November 23, 2019
Very interesting retrospective about Afghanistan, it helps to understand this nation better and why the USSR couldn't win this war. This book goes as a movie - very good way to get acquainted with this story. Highly recommended.
March 28, 2023
For readers who wish to know about the Soviet-Afghanistan War, it is broken down into easy to read topics. Filled with eyewitness accounts, it gives the reader different perspectives and experiences of the war as well as the social and political background of the war.
One portion I may add is the lack of Afghan accounts of the war, which may add to the dynamics of the book.
I do recommend reading Zinky Boys by Svetlana Alexievich, which is a good follow-up if one wishes to read further on the Soviet/Russian perspective of the war.
One portion I may add is the lack of Afghan accounts of the war, which may add to the dynamics of the book.
I do recommend reading Zinky Boys by Svetlana Alexievich, which is a good follow-up if one wishes to read further on the Soviet/Russian perspective of the war.
February 24, 2023
'The country we had been helping in every possible way for ten years now lay in ruins... We were greeted with sympathy and friendship when we came in. Now the ordinary Afghans threatened and insulted us as we departed.' - General Sebrov, 103rd Division
The Soviet-Afghan War is one of those conflicts that the majority of people don't really know much or think much about. Along with the Vietnam War, the Second Indochina War, and the Algerian War of Independence it creates a kind of tetralogy of poster children for powerful countries being brought low by rag-tag guerillas.
I'm no different and had little idea about the Soviet-Afghan War other than the obvious, so I thought I'd best add it to my stable of books on the above - and unfortunately alongside works like Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu and A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962, AFGANTSY was a bit disappointing.
The information is good, but the book is broken down into vague sections like 'Soldiering' and 'Fighting' - so rather than acting as a telling of the war from start to end, it jumps around from one section to the next. You'll have a bit near the end of one section talking about the withdrawal of the Soviets, and then the start of the next section will be back to when they first entered Afghanistan.
This makes for a disjointed and hectic reading experience and I didn't get the feeling of being invested in the Soviet-Afghan War as a conflict like I did with the others mentioned above.
Regardless, an interesting subject, and the parallels drawn especially between this and the Vietnam War by Braithwaite are apt and compelling. I enjoyed AFGANTSY, but I don't think I'll be drawn to read it again.
December 25, 2014
How well you like this book depends on your starting point, i.e. how much you knew about this war before you started reading. I knew little, and I was keen to learn, so I've given it five stars because it was fantastically useful to me. As others have said, it's not an academically profound work, but I appreciated the stance of the author which was even-handed and the fact that he set himself the task of giving a chronological account of the war and stuck to it, writing in a straightforward style and weaving in personal accounts with some compassion.
As a Western reader, used to a dearth of information about the Soviet Union, some of the things I found most illuminating were: the ruminations of the Politburo on whether or not to invade at all; the spurious motivations conjured up by the West on why the Soviets would wish to invade; the fact that, as things unravelled under Kamal, the Soviets were aware that the conditions for a socialist revolution did not exist and recommended that the Afghan government build a pluralistic society that recognised Islam (wot!?!); how Najibullah was abandoned; how Soviet soldiers fared on their return to the motherland once the Soviet Union itself was falling apart; some of the factors in the attempted coup against Gorbachev, and the account of post traumatic stress syndrome.
A great insight into the Soviet Union, as well as Afghanistan. (I knew more about the latter than the former.)Unfortunately, the Americans and the Brits don't seem to have read this book, or learned much from the Soviet experience.
Someone else has written a really negative review here in Russian. I would really love to know what it says, and what that person's perspective is.
As a Western reader, used to a dearth of information about the Soviet Union, some of the things I found most illuminating were: the ruminations of the Politburo on whether or not to invade at all; the spurious motivations conjured up by the West on why the Soviets would wish to invade; the fact that, as things unravelled under Kamal, the Soviets were aware that the conditions for a socialist revolution did not exist and recommended that the Afghan government build a pluralistic society that recognised Islam (wot!?!); how Najibullah was abandoned; how Soviet soldiers fared on their return to the motherland once the Soviet Union itself was falling apart; some of the factors in the attempted coup against Gorbachev, and the account of post traumatic stress syndrome.
A great insight into the Soviet Union, as well as Afghanistan. (I knew more about the latter than the former.)Unfortunately, the Americans and the Brits don't seem to have read this book, or learned much from the Soviet experience.
Someone else has written a really negative review here in Russian. I would really love to know what it says, and what that person's perspective is.
January 28, 2013
Afgantsy is a good book to read about those Russian soldiers who have served in Afghanistn during the former USSR's occupation of the country. There are a few accounts that I didn't know before like the death of the first Communist President, Noor Mohammad Taraki, the coup d'état against Hafizullah Amin etc. By reading this book one can say that it is a déjà vu. The same scenario is taking place in Afghanistan as the Nato and other coalition forces are preparing for the withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan as the Russian did in 1989. The government and people are worried as they were at the time of Russian withdrawal...
In general it is a good book for those who are interested in Afghanistan and its volatile history.
In general it is a good book for those who are interested in Afghanistan and its volatile history.
May 6, 2014
defintely a great read considering every thing the Russians did in Afghanistan was seen by a biased lens or was made to be seen like that.
There are elaborate details about all the circumstances and even minute plans of small operations.
one is made to see that even there were humans on Russian side as well not some evil species and once the intial folly was done there were normal human beings which fought , lived and died with normal thought process instead of a red crusade.
Can be termed as a Russian side of the story it is but is definitely worth a read to get that point of view.
There are elaborate details about all the circumstances and even minute plans of small operations.
one is made to see that even there were humans on Russian side as well not some evil species and once the intial folly was done there were normal human beings which fought , lived and died with normal thought process instead of a red crusade.
Can be termed as a Russian side of the story it is but is definitely worth a read to get that point of view.
December 26, 2020
This is the first book, I have read about the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The writing is crisp, and engaging. This offers a look at the ways Soviets became embroiled in Afghanistan, and how they withdrew. The book shows the characters of the various belligerants, down to the lowly soldiers who did the fighting, as well as their mortal enemy, the mujaheedin. There a clear cut view of what happened and why it happened, and why the war couldn't have been won. It is an impressive book, and a good recommendation to know about the tumultuous years of the Russians in Afghanistan.
January 6, 2014
James hasn't read this so that makes me smartter and him notter.
February 4, 2025
It was a bit meh
March 6, 2022
I have long thought about reading a book on the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and with the Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrating some interesting parallels with the war of 1979-1989, it seemed now was a good time to hit up Braithwaite's book. Thankfully 'Afgantsy' has almost entirely met my expectations and I would suggest that it would be a perfect introduction to the subject. Also, it provides a significant level of insight into the Soviet & Russian military mindset and doctrine. Oh, and it must also be seen as a study of a war that was misunderstood and perhaps not studied enough by those in the west who took on a similarly doomed task.
First off, Braithwaite writes with clarity and accuracy; this is a book written by someone who knows his stuff. 'Afgantsy' is well grounded in Soviet and Russian sources, and it is obvious throughout the book that the narrative about the war is more complex than what often passed as the truth during the late Cold War (or for that matter what was said about Afghanistan since then). Braithwaite does his best to ensure that he doesn't condemn the war into a simple parable of 'the USSR's Vietnam'. He even goes so far as to try and find redeemable aspects of the Soviet effort, particularly including initiatives in education and women's rights.
Of course the war was also started in error, was fought for almost all the wrong reasons, and ended in tragedy (especially for the Afghans) and Braithwaite hits all the relevant targets here. This is most evident in how the relations between the USSR before the 1979 invasion are examined and discussed. The descent into an engagement that the Politburo really didn't want, and then carried out in a half-arsed manner is dissected with all the expertise an ex-Ambassador could and should bring. Braithwaite is first and foremost a policy and politics expert and he brings all this to bear in that part of the book.
That the conduct and operational aspects of the war, as fought by the Soviet forces and their Afghan allies is not examined in such as fuclsome a matter is a minor irritant, and an understandable one. It would have been most illuminating if more and deeper consideration was given to how the Soviets fought their war, including tactical doctrine, weapons and battles waged. Instead Brathwaite is a little more cursory than what might be hoped. I would suggest there must be other and better books that focus on this aspect of the history.
The repercussions and aftermath of the Soviet war in Afghanistan is given plenty of informative and interesting coverage and again Braithwaite does a good job of challenging popular stereotypes and myths. He also ensures that, from a non-Russian perspective, one can see how the veterans of that war were and still are important to the political and social life of Russia. From commanding generals who were either attackers or defenders of the rise of Russian democratic movements, through to the nationalistic politicians and military men who use their Afghanistan experience to base their support of Putin on, 'Afgantsy' makes sure the full picture is given due diligence.
Another, and arguably minor criticism, is that this e-book edition did not include the illustrations that I assume were in the physical editions. In fact a title such of this would benefit from numerous photos as the panoply of people and places discussed requires some degree of augmentation (especially for those too young to recall the history).
In conclusion, 'Afgantsy' is a superb history of the Sovet Union's longest war and one that, hopefully like the current war against Ukraine, ended in humiliation and futility. I have no problem whatsoever recoomending Braithwaite's work to anyone interested in the subject.
First off, Braithwaite writes with clarity and accuracy; this is a book written by someone who knows his stuff. 'Afgantsy' is well grounded in Soviet and Russian sources, and it is obvious throughout the book that the narrative about the war is more complex than what often passed as the truth during the late Cold War (or for that matter what was said about Afghanistan since then). Braithwaite does his best to ensure that he doesn't condemn the war into a simple parable of 'the USSR's Vietnam'. He even goes so far as to try and find redeemable aspects of the Soviet effort, particularly including initiatives in education and women's rights.
Of course the war was also started in error, was fought for almost all the wrong reasons, and ended in tragedy (especially for the Afghans) and Braithwaite hits all the relevant targets here. This is most evident in how the relations between the USSR before the 1979 invasion are examined and discussed. The descent into an engagement that the Politburo really didn't want, and then carried out in a half-arsed manner is dissected with all the expertise an ex-Ambassador could and should bring. Braithwaite is first and foremost a policy and politics expert and he brings all this to bear in that part of the book.
That the conduct and operational aspects of the war, as fought by the Soviet forces and their Afghan allies is not examined in such as fuclsome a matter is a minor irritant, and an understandable one. It would have been most illuminating if more and deeper consideration was given to how the Soviets fought their war, including tactical doctrine, weapons and battles waged. Instead Brathwaite is a little more cursory than what might be hoped. I would suggest there must be other and better books that focus on this aspect of the history.
The repercussions and aftermath of the Soviet war in Afghanistan is given plenty of informative and interesting coverage and again Braithwaite does a good job of challenging popular stereotypes and myths. He also ensures that, from a non-Russian perspective, one can see how the veterans of that war were and still are important to the political and social life of Russia. From commanding generals who were either attackers or defenders of the rise of Russian democratic movements, through to the nationalistic politicians and military men who use their Afghanistan experience to base their support of Putin on, 'Afgantsy' makes sure the full picture is given due diligence.
Another, and arguably minor criticism, is that this e-book edition did not include the illustrations that I assume were in the physical editions. In fact a title such of this would benefit from numerous photos as the panoply of people and places discussed requires some degree of augmentation (especially for those too young to recall the history).
In conclusion, 'Afgantsy' is a superb history of the Sovet Union's longest war and one that, hopefully like the current war against Ukraine, ended in humiliation and futility. I have no problem whatsoever recoomending Braithwaite's work to anyone interested in the subject.
September 20, 2020
Western media coverage of any Soviet activity was always necessarily scant. Now, this book provides impeccable detail of the political and military events that surrounded and engulfed the Soviet invasion, the war and what lead to the appalling aftermath, both for the people of Afghanistan and for the returning veterans, of the Soviet-Afghan war. I cannot think of a “good war” but Braithwaite provides breath-taking detail of what must surely have been one of the very nastiest that humanity has ever conjured up.
Back in 1994, under the auspices of Russian Glasnost (openness), President Boris Yeltsin sent 3 Russian helicopters to RAF Gatow, the Royal Air Force airbase in Berlin, Germany. These aircraft were to be exhibited and displayed in the final RAF Gatow Air Show before the RAF base closed for good and all UK troops were withdrawn from Berlin at the End of Cold War Drawdown. As a Russian speaker, I hosted the helicopter crews on behalf of the RAF; one pilot was one of the “Afgantsy” having flown in Afghanistan during the war. His comrades, who had not experienced the war, made fun of him but it was clear after just a few hours with him that the war had destroyed him. During the next few days that I was with him, I witnessed first-hand the torment he was going through. During the years that followed, I have been haunted, wondering what horrors he witnessed or had been involved in; this book offers answers, and they are not nice.
This exhaustively researched document provides facts and detail I would not have thought possible to extort from the closed societies of, in-turn, the Soviet Union, CIS and Russian Federation but importantly, it offers first-hand information, from witnesses and protagonists of both sides, about skirmishes and politics, large and small. It is a triumph and demonstrates a skilful collation of events, transformed into a coherent and logical testimony of the political and military machinations. At times, I left its pages feeling hollow and despondent but it was like a repugnant drug that I had to keep going back to.
This is not an easy read, and seldom a pleasant one, but it is both devastating and spellbinding. You’ll need to push-on into it to be captivated and you will leave it incredulous and changed. I wish it had been available before I went to Afghanistan in 2007.
Back in 1994, under the auspices of Russian Glasnost (openness), President Boris Yeltsin sent 3 Russian helicopters to RAF Gatow, the Royal Air Force airbase in Berlin, Germany. These aircraft were to be exhibited and displayed in the final RAF Gatow Air Show before the RAF base closed for good and all UK troops were withdrawn from Berlin at the End of Cold War Drawdown. As a Russian speaker, I hosted the helicopter crews on behalf of the RAF; one pilot was one of the “Afgantsy” having flown in Afghanistan during the war. His comrades, who had not experienced the war, made fun of him but it was clear after just a few hours with him that the war had destroyed him. During the next few days that I was with him, I witnessed first-hand the torment he was going through. During the years that followed, I have been haunted, wondering what horrors he witnessed or had been involved in; this book offers answers, and they are not nice.
This exhaustively researched document provides facts and detail I would not have thought possible to extort from the closed societies of, in-turn, the Soviet Union, CIS and Russian Federation but importantly, it offers first-hand information, from witnesses and protagonists of both sides, about skirmishes and politics, large and small. It is a triumph and demonstrates a skilful collation of events, transformed into a coherent and logical testimony of the political and military machinations. At times, I left its pages feeling hollow and despondent but it was like a repugnant drug that I had to keep going back to.
This is not an easy read, and seldom a pleasant one, but it is both devastating and spellbinding. You’ll need to push-on into it to be captivated and you will leave it incredulous and changed. I wish it had been available before I went to Afghanistan in 2007.
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