Overcoming Objectification: A Carnal Ethics

by Ann J. Cahill

Objectification is a foundational concept in feminist theory, used to analyze such disparate social phenomena as sex work, representation of women's bodies, and sexual harassment. However, there has been an increasing trend among scholars of rejecting and re-evaluating the philosophical assumptions which underpin it. In this work, Cahill suggests an abandonment of the notion of objectification, on the basis of its dependence on a Kantian ideal of personhood. Such an ideal fails to recognize sufficiently the role the body plays in personhood, and thus results in an implicit vilification of the body and sexuality. The problem with the phenomena associated with objectification is not that they render women objects, and therefore not-persons, but rather that they construct feminine subjectivity and sexuality as wholly derivative of masculine subjectivity and sexuality. Women, in other words, are not objectified as much as they are derivatized, turned into a mere reflection or projection of the other. Cahill argues for an ethics of materiality based upon a recognition of difference, thus working toward an ethics of sexuality that is decidedly ­and simultaneously ­incarnate and intersubjective.

Genres: Philosophy, Feminism, Gender

200 pages, Hardcover

First published December 7, 2010

Reviews

[Caleb · Rating 3 out of 5]

Cahill takes as her starting point the concept of objectification that much feminist discourse identifies as the problem with certain portrayals and treatments of women. She critiques the versions of objectification articulated by Nussbaum (1995), Langton (2009(?)), and LeMonchek (1986ish) as being too Kantian, which commits them to seeing the sexual body as akin to an object in certain ways. In other words, the body as an "object for sex"—which it is, at times, and often with positive effects—gets caught up in the dragnet as part of the "problem" of objectification. Using feminist accounts of embodied intersubjectivity (akin to what Cahill develops in Rethinking Rape), and an avowedly Irigarayan focus on sexual difference, she posits the problem as not objectification, but making another person derivative of the self (called "derivatization"). She then tests this concept against several situations that objectification struggles to judge.

I think the notion of derivatization is very useful...I will be using it in my diss. I was not completely convinced by her critique of objectification, though, especially Nussbaum's version, which is actually pretty sensitive to intersubjectivity and lived experience of the body. (It's really helpful to read Nussbaum's "Objectification" before or at the same time as reading the first chapter of this book.) I think grouping Nussbaum in with Langton and LeMonchek was a bit of a misstep, since the "they're all Kantian" critique needs additional detail in Nussbaum's case. I also wonder how Cahill would respond to the growing literature that recasts autonomy in relational terms, given the centrality of her rejection of Kantian autonomy.

I was inspired by her characteristically careful approach and framing of discussion of sexual violence, as well as her rigorous clarity about what is at stake with each claim in the text. Cahill is indeed an expert in this area, and I look forward to learning more from her!

[Amanda Hobson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Cahill's Overcoming Objectification is a strong and thoughtful theoretical construct. She breaks down the concept of objectification and articulates why it presents theoretical problems for the feminist movement, particularly as it grows out of the Kantian and Enlightenment construction of the person in which the mind is prioritized to the detriment of the body. This text is particularly useful for scholars working on gender and sexuality studies. It is incredibly readable and would be accessible to students for classroom use.

[Savage Mind · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found the distinction between objectification and derivatization very useful. Although the latter oncept should be more theoritically refined by the author I think the examples of mothers and disabled women offered a convincing argument in favor of the idea that objectification is not necessarily harmful.