The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World

by Baki Tezcan

Although scholars have begun to revise the traditional view that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries marked a decline in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire, Baki Tezcan’s book proposes a radical new approach to this period. While he concurs that decline did take place in certain areas, he constructs a new framework by foregrounding the proto-democratization of the Ottoman polity in this era. Focusing on the background and the aftermath of the regicide of Osman II, he shows how the empire embarked on a period of seismic change in the political, economic, military, and social spheres. It is this period – from roughly 1580 to 1826 – that the author labels “The Second Empire,” and that he sees as no less than the transformation of the patrimonial, medieval, dynastic institution into a fledgling limited monarchy. The book is essentially a post-revisionist history of the early modern Ottoman Empire that will make a major contribution not only to Ottoman scholarship but also to comparable trends in world history.

Genres: History, Middle East

306 pages, Hardcover

First published September 30, 2010

Reviews

[Tariq Mahmood · Rating 5 out of 5]

Can you guess who took the first stab at writing the first history of the world? None other than the indefatigable Arab Ibn Khaldun, who is considered the father of modern history. His Muqaddimah reads like a scientific study of past events and was followed by number of other Muslim historians clearly motivated by him. Baki follows lost this tradition in Islamic cultures. A tradition of critical analysing their own history. I found his confrontational style very very satisfying indeed. Why he asks, is one regicide (Britain) considered as progress as another (Ottoman, Turkey) as a sign of decline? Indeed a most pertinent observation which must be pondered in detail unfortunately before history can be re-written again. For to take down existing opinions is far more difficult than defining new ones. Baki’s attempt is most admirable but needs to be urgently repeated all over the world where orientalism has left a deep and ugly mark.

While reading about the battle between Kanun and Sharia, I had a fantastic revelation. If Sharia was Allah’s Kanun then surely it must include all of His creation, which can only mean that the real and proper Sharia has to be His Laws of Nature. For it is only the Laws of Nature which every created creature is bound to once created. All other laws including the man’s descriptions of Sharia are therefore redundant and obsolete as every kanun changes with change of the Ruler.

This book presents a brilliant analysis of the Ottoman history. Who really controlled the infamous fracticides? What attributes were required to remain a Sultan? Who really called the shots, the absolutists or the Constitutionalists? Baki has provided compelling evidence to demonstrate how the power shifted from absolutism to constitutionalism after the Ottomans started to rely on Devshirme to run their huge state. The infamous ‘Harem’, instead of a degenerate sexpot of orgy was in effect an institution for producing and grooming future Sultans with the help of a very able class of civil servants supplied by Devshirme. I have a clear image of an all powerful Ottoman royal family kept in constant check by the constitutional Janissaries, making sure that every Sultan was able to tow the policy agreed by their selected viziers. Small wonder that the Ottomans were able to rule such a huge kingdom for so long.

Baki details the first known regicide of Osman II and argues pretty convincingly that he was killed because he was openly trying to rebel against the constitutional vice, made up of Janissaries as the mighty Ottoman army had become a financial hub rather than a fighting force. Pretty much like the Turkish or Pakistani army of today. Who says we can't learn anything from history?

The book also explains the social classes in the Empire with power in the hand of the Askeri class who owned 80% of the resources. The devshirme were also converted from a once potent fighting force to financial ombudsmen, collecting taxes and conducting various types of business.

The reasons of the demise of the Sultanate? Well Baki argues that the Askeris did not take up Capitalism and Corporatism as vigorously as modernists in Britain for instance. There was a different approach in land management as well rather than the popularly held view of loss of the vast tracts of land. Again Baki takes a very apt analogy with Britain losing America only to rebound and take up India and vast straits of Africa through largely a policy of aggressive corporate trade policy, which is still being followed generally. There was also the absence of the bourgeois against Lords and Barons in the Sultanate which could be a significant factor in the loss of Ottoman prestige as the bourgeois was slow to take up the nationalism.

In the end, I have come to a very valuable conclusion. History should be written by a representative of the natives, as well as outsiders, leaving the readers to conclude for themselves.

[Alp Eren Topal · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book was so good it made me cry. An extended review will follow. Be on the look out.

[J.M. Hushour · Rating 4 out of 5]

Baki makes a convincing argument for a re-periodization of Ottoman history into a Second Empire (1580-1826) characterized by a new monetary market economy, deposition and regicide as proto-democratic endeavors and the resuscitation of the janissaries as a socio-political force. The latter is the most interesting approach he brings to the table. His economic arguments are a little dry and he tends to go off on wacky, incredibly detailed tangents on coups, but the book is solid. If anything, it should certainly spark some methodological/conceptual debates here and there.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Contesting the dominant “rise and decline” narrative in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire, Baki Tezcan, in The Second Ottoman Empire, argues that the pre-Tanzimat era of Ottoman history should instead be divided into two different phases of empire, one medieval and one pre-modern. By examining the factors that have been promulgated traditionally as symptoms of decline and reinterpreting them as advances towards modernity, the author creates a new paradigm through which this period can be studied.

Tezcan’s inquiry begins with the question of why regicide in Britain (and elsewhere in Europe) has been seen as a sign of progress, while the murder of Sultan Osman II has been considered symptomatic of stagnation. The first chapter outlines the decline of the timars (grants of land in exchange for military service) and their transformation into a tax-farming system, which, Tezcan argues, led to a greater emphasis on monetization in the economy. This made the cadastral surveys obsolete, which in turn caused the obsolescence of kannunames (surveys of local laws and customs). Secular law declined as its divine counterpart rose to negotiate new financial realities, which led the state to integrate religious jurists in its inner workings. These figures lost the political autonomy they once had, but gained new influence in high politics. As the economy became more complex and the legal system more centralized, a new class emerged that was driven by market interests.

At this point Tezcan introduces the reader to the two factions that he believes conflicted in the political realm after the reign of Mustafa I. There were the absolutists, who believed in the royal prerogative of the monarch, and the constitutionalists, who thought that there should be laws to restrict the powers of the sovereign. The author then proceeds to show how the succession of Ahmed I, and those who came before him, were internal family matters, but subsequent sultans were determined by the public lawmakers, to the extent that they were able to stay the traditional fratricide that accompanied a royal’s ascension to the throne.

Following an economic analysis, Tezcan examines the ways in which Murad III attempted to take power away from the grand vizier by centralizing court power around the new positions of chief white and black eunuchs, thus creating a group with interests in maintaining absolutism. He then chronicles the life of Osman II, whose failed attempts to eliminate the Janissaries and institute a more modern army have traditionally been seen as a major cause of stagnation (and decline) of the empire. Tezcan argues otherwise, however, claiming that Osman II was intending to create a mercenary (sekban) army that would have ensured his personal power and been a step towards absolutism. He then argues that the Janissaries, who have traditionally been seen as an outdated military force that used its power to hold back modernization, were actually a benefit to the empire if one considers them as a sociopolitical force. The author shows that, while the Janissaries were growing in number and burdening the payroll, few of the new recruits were actually performing military duties. Instead, most were taking advantage of the corps for their access to credit and involvement with the market, which gave them the chance to establish entrepreneurial ventures. Due to the fact that opportunities with the Janissaries were so lucrative, one needed to bribe the officers in order to be accepted, something that was only possible when the monetization of the economy allowed for the creation of a slightly wealthier stratum of society. The Janissaries, therefore, were heavily involved in the development of a pre-modern middle class, and were therefore a force of progress. By killing Osman II (and several other sultans), they ensured their ability to function in this capacity, until they were destroyed by Mahmud II prior to the Tanzimat reforms.

Tezcan’s invocation of economic factors can be dry and muddled at times, but overall his book is pioneering as a new way of thinking about Ottoman historiography. Although some have complained about his terminology, he makes a solid case for reinterpreting the regicide of Osman II as a turning point in favor of modernity. If nothing else, he provides excellent reasons for historians to reconsider the traditional narrative of rise and decline and explore new perspectives. Overall, The Second Ottoman Empire is essential reading for any scholar who wants to be more knowledgeable about past and future trends in research on the Ottoman Empire.