Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942

The Wehrmacht

by Robert M. Citino

For Hitler and the German military, 1942 was a key turning point of World War II, as an overstretched but still lethal Wehrmacht replaced brilliant victories and huge territorial gains with stalemates and strategic retreats. In this major reevaluation of that crucial year, Robert Citino shows that the German army's emerging woes were rooted as much in its addiction to the "war of movement"—attempts to smash the enemy in "short and lively" campaigns—as they were in Hitler's deeply flawed management of the war.

From the overwhelming operational victories at Kerch and Kharkov in May to the catastrophic defeats at El Alamein and Stalingrad, Death of the Wehrmacht offers an eye-opening new view of that decisive year. Building upon his widely respected critique in The German Way of War, Citino shows how the campaigns of 1942 fit within the centuries-old patterns of Prussian/German warmaking and ultimately doomed Hitler's expansionist ambitions. He examines every major campaign and battle in the Russian and North African theaters throughout the year to assess how a military geared to quick and decisive victories coped when the tide turned against it.

Citino also reconstructs the German generals' view of the war and illuminates the multiple contingencies that might have produced more favorable results. In addition, he cites the fatal extreme aggressiveness of German commanders like Erwin Rommel and assesses how the German system of command and its commitment to the "independence of subordinate commanders" suffered under the thumb of Hitler and chief of staff General Franz Halder.

More than the turning point of a war, 1942 marked the death of a very old and traditional pattern of warmaking, with the classic "German way of war" unable to meet the challenges of the twentieth century. Blending masterly research with a gripping narrative, Citino's remarkable work provides a fresh and revealing look at how one of history's most powerful armies began to founder in its quest for world domination.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, War, Germany

448 pages, Paperback

First published October 7, 2007

About the author

Robert M. Citino is an American history professor, scholar and writer currently teaching at the University of North Texas. He specializes in German military history and has earned acclaim by writing several historical books on the subject. He has appeared as a consultant on the History Channel several times on the subject of World War II and German military tactics.

Reviews

[happy · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this offering Prof. Citino looks at the Germany Army’s operations in both Russia and North Africa and how and more importantly why they ended is disasters for the Wehrmacht. He also traces the evolution of German military doctrine and thought from Frederick the Great thru to 1942.

In telling the story of Operation Blue and Rommel’s forays in the desert, the author looks at the German way of war and how it affected the results of these two offensives. One of major points he makes is that nothing in the German theoretical way of war prepared her for an extended war. Much like the US Army after Viet Nam, the German army of World War II didn’t want to discuss what went wrong in previous war. This resulted in an army unprepared for what happened in 1942.

The author makes the point that the philosophy of the German military can trace its roots to Fredrick the Great and his wars of the early 18th century. Germany/Prussia has always had a smaller population and fewer resources than its potential foes. Because of this, they developed the doctrine of strike first, strike hard and get the enemy to quit before they can bring their superior resources to bear. When the Soviets didn’t collapse in 1941, Germany was unprepared to make good the losses they had suffered by 1942. They went into the 1942 battles short infantry, tanks and most every other military resource. They were also extremely unprepared logistically to support 3 major operations - Stalingrad, the Caucasus, and Rommel and the Italians in North Africa, often leaving advancing armies stalled for lack of fuel. He cites numerous incidents where the advancing Panzers had to halt deep in steppes and deserts due to supply problems.

Traditionally the German/Prussian Army has pushed the decision making down the lowest possible level. This was the case in the Wehrmacht until the aftermath of the Soviet counter offensive in the winter of ’41. After that, the OKW in general and Hitler in particular took more and more of the authority away from his commanders in the field. In the author’s opinion resulting in major tactical mistakes and lost opportunities.

He also faults the strategic leadership of the Wehrmacht, not just Hitler. He is especially critical of Halder. According to Dr. Citino, not only did Halder not stand up to Hitler, he could not make up his mind where the major emphasis should be, Stalingrad or the Caucasus. He allowed Hitler to unduly influence the operations, splitting the two main thrusts to the point that they were unable to support each other.

All in all I found this a fascinating read on the German way of war. 4+stars

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

I got recommendations to read this series by several people, and one of them is a Youtuber who goes by the name of “TIK-History”, whose videos about the Eastern Front are the most informative on the whole platform. His videos are in-depth, and one of the few channels on YouTube that cites sources and uses critical thinking.


After reading this book all the way through, I have to give it a five-star rating, because it was written well, and I had no troubles following the story; however, there were several typos. Those typos were minor to me, and didn’t get in my way of enjoying what I had just read. For some, it might be a slight annoyance, but at 309 pages, you’ll love it.

To sum up, here is what Citino says: The German ideal of “Blitzkrieg” (which is actually an incorrect term, it is “Bewegungskrieg”) was not created out of the blue by the Wehrmacht in the 1930’s, rather, it was an updated version of the German/Prussian way of war dating back to Frederick the Great. The Wehrmacht was actually following in the traditions of its Prusso-German forebears.
Citino talks about what made Bewegungskrieg possible throughout the ages: a well-trained general staff, and the use of “auftragstaktik” or mission-based tactics; this generally meant that subordinated commanders (at a division, and/or corps level) were given relative independence to conduct operations that they saw fit to win the campaign. Citino talks about how Prussia/Germany conducted war: fast campaigns of movement, in which maneuver, speed, encirclement, initiative, and boldness were used by generals to overtake and encircle often much larger enemy armies in quick campaigns. These enemy armies would be defeated in either a few or one battle, and, it was assumed, that once they annihilated the enemy’s army, the enemy would surrender, and the war was over. German generals weren’t taught to care for logistics, intelligence, or numbers, because it was their belief that their army (and their race) was superior to whichever enemy they faced, on top of the fact that they gambled on the notion of a quick war or Bewegungskrieg. Citino’s book title is exactly what this book is about: at the end of 1942, this bewegungskrieg, and for that matter, the German traditional way of war making died. Citino’s book looks at the German army’s operations in Russia, and North Africa, where he breaks down and explains the German way of war, and how it and why it failed. Citino’s argues the main reason it failed was because it had run it’s course, and became outdated due to the material advantages of the allies. Yes, Hitler did meddle in the armies affairs, but he isn’t really the one at fault here, it was rather the fact that Germany was stretched thin, and it’s way of war that it had relied on for 300 years had been made obsolete.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 5 out of 5]

In a previous work, Dr. Robert Citino had made a very good case towards a uniquely German Way of War. Taking this examination from the macro scale of several centuries of history, to more of a micro approach with a single year, Citino looks at 1942 and declares that this was the year that the traditional German way of warfare was forever vanquished.

The German way of warfare was one of short, yet furious, front loaded (lacking deep reserves, everything was at the speartip), insanely rapidly paced campaigns based upon clear operational objectives. Usually these objectives entailed the annihilation of the opposing enemy force.

The German way of warfare was one of looking the enemy straight on, and knocking his lights out as fast as you could, before they even knew the punch was on its way. And in the close confines of Western and Central Europe, it was devastating.

Often outnumbered, and outgunned, the Germans tended to punch well outside their weight class. And Citino makes the point that everyone, including the US Army, lost it's first encounter with the Germans. The problem for the Germans was, what to do when your knockout blow fails to knockout the enemy?

1942 began with the Germans in a precarious position.

At the very gates of Moscow, the Wehrmacht was thrown back in disorder by a never say die Red Army, who subsequently launched a theater wide counteroffensive that forced all the German forces to fight desperately to survive, let alone hold their positions. In North Africa, Rommel was defeated in the swirling armored battles of Operation Crusader, and forced back to his starting point at El Agheila.

However, the chaos and defeats of the winter of 1941, were transformed in early 1942 into a turning of the tide back towards the Germans. Rommel made another sprint out of his El Agheila bottleneck and chased the British back to the Gazal line, while on the massive Eastern Front, the Germans held on, ground down the Soviet offensive, and prepared for a renewal of offensive operations sometime in the spring.

What happened next, as Citino so ably narrates and analyzes, was a series of dramatic successes that were among the greatest in the history of the German Army. First, in the Crimea, Erich von Manstein led a joint German/Romanian/Hungarian force to a spectacular triumph on the Kerch Peninsula, and then rapidly turned on his heel and pressed the Soviet forces in Sevastopol back to their inner fortresses. In exceedingly bloody fighting (including using the largest artillery pieces in human history to bombard the Soviet positions with), the Germans managed to smash the Russian forces defending Sevastopol and the Crimea was finally cleared of Soviet forces.

In Libya, Rommel demolished the British 8th Army in a spectacular victory won at Gazala, raced into Tobruk where he forced the surrender of over 30,000 Imperial troops, and then in a headlong pursuit chased after the routed and fleeing British deep into Egypt.

The greatest success, however, was in the Ukraine where the Red Army launched a surprise offensive aimed at seizing the industrial center of Kharkov.

Despite great initial success, the Soviets soon faced stiffening German resistance, all the while the German General Staff calmly prepared to annihilate them. Snapping at the exposed Russian flanks, the Germans launched concentric drives north and south of the vast Izyum bulge, and trapped a major portion of the Red Army in a giant kessel, or cauldron. Here the poor, doomed Russians were bombed, strafed, shelled, and shot to pieces while, in a blind panic, they desperately tried to flee back over the bridges of the Dnieper...bridges that Luftwaffe Stuka dive bombers had crashed into the flowing river.

The result was yet another horrific slaughter of Russian and Soviet young men. And the Germans claimed a quarter of a million prisoners, and no one knows exactly how many Red Army men were killed, though an estimate of 100,000 is not unfeasible.

Once again, the Wehrmacht was triumphant, and the German way of war was vindicated.

But as Dr. Citino points out, there were warning signs that, no, this wasn't exactly the case. These successes were enormous, certainly, but the Germans managed to win them in relative isolation. And had the Crimea demanded more of the Luftwaffe's attention, it is doubtful that the Second Battle of Kharkov (the first had been the year prior, and there would be two more before it was all over, with the Germans being 3-1 over the Soviets at Kharkov. Kharkov could be said to a graveyard of Soviet dreams) would have been as dramatic and decisive a success as it was.

In all of these cases, the Germans had to rob other sectors to make ends meet in the crucial engagements, and while junior and field level leadership was brilliant, as it always would be with the Germans, there were problems, disturbing problems, at the top end of the spectrum.

It wasn't just Hitler and the National Socialists taking control of the war away from the General Staff and the Army commanders, though that was a part. It was that those Army commanders, in order to win the glory they so desperately craved, were ever more willing to cede to the demands of Hitler and the NSDAP, even if it meant removing the long standing tradition of the independent field commander, able to be forgiven a strong will and disobeying orders, if he brought his Kaiser victory.

Now, even if victory was bought for Hitler, disobedience was likely to get you sacked. And possibly shot. The technocratic control of the National Socialists was, ironically, worming its way into the Wehrmacht and removing the Army's freedom, all the while the technocratic Communists were slowly de-Communizing the Red Army, and restoring much of what the Czar's had instilled over the centuries, in order to win against their greatest foe.

This book does a tremendous job of narrating how, despite these warning signs, the Germans gambled on two major rolls of the dice: a massive offensive out the Don Bend and into the Caucasus and towards the Volga, and a fait accompli from Rommel who was charging ever deeper into Egypt, even though Berlin never considered North Africa as anything else but a glorious sideshow.

The meat of the narrative is the gigantic fighting on the Eastern Front, though the two narrative streams share a common theme.

What worked before for the Germans, was now beginning to break down.

The planned encirclements in Fall Blau (yes, the Germans planned their encirclements ahead of time, rather than letting them be operations of opportunity as the ones in 1941 were) closed on thin air, as the Red Army simply collapsed and decided that he who flees, lives to fight another day. Stalin's 'Stand Fast' order be damned.

This strung the Germans out, badly, and gave them the false impression of an easy victory, and they very unwisely split their main thrusts in three directions: Voronezh, Stalingrad, and Grozny. And yet, as in Egypt, the deeper the Germans marched, as impressive as those gains were, and for every Soviet formation they blew to smithereens, their own losses mounted, and the iron law of logistics began to punish the Germans for their ignorance of the law.

Citino does make a great point, here, however: defeat was far from inevitable.

His retelling of the Caucasus campaign is the most detailed I have yet come across in a Western source, and he clearly shows how, being badly outnumbered, and operating on a logistical shoestring, the Germans came within an ace of their goals.

Truly, tactical and operational brilliance, and sheer force of will, honestly does cover many a strategic sin. However, military salvation can not be had on tactics alone, and the faulty German strategy failed them. Stuck on a 1200 mile long supply line, and fighting in the worst terrain on Earth, the German drive came to grief.

But oh so close they came.

The stories of El Alamein and Stalingrad should be familiar to all who read this, but Citino makes a couple of points that many may miss when analyzing those operations.

The German way of war was defeated by both the Anglo-American method of a reliance on technology and mass supply (note, that alone cannot save you. I argue that that peculiar method of war was only viable in conjunction with the Red Army paying the blood price for victory while the Western Allies paid the Iron price. On its own, without the East, I highly doubt the West would have stomach the cost victory against the Germans would have required) and direct brute force, and the Soviet method of concentric operations.

The Germans reliance on speed, ferocity, and maneuver simply failed them here, aided in defeat by the growing technocratic control from Berlin. And while the Western Allies were never as adept operationally or tactically as the Germans, they made up for it in sheer firepower. (About the only thing more fearsome than British artillery and American airpower was the awesome spectacle of massed Russian artillery).

And if the Russians never had the command and control expertise as the Germans, and never clawed their way to being tactical equals (no one was), at least they learned the operational art from the Germans, and would use the same devastating methods the Germans used in 1941, against their teachers in 1943 through to the end.

This is easily the best book written on the German campaigns of 1942, and the Eastern Front in 1942 in particular (save for the North, which gets ignored). And if you are a student of military history and strategy, or of German and Russian history, then this book is a clear must have.

Easy 5 stars.

[Sean Chick · Rating 5 out of 5]

Citino does for Germany in World War II what Tocqueville did for the French Revolution, depicting the Wehrmacht not as a radical new military force, but one very much in the German tradition. The force failed both as their opponents improved (and amassed more material) and as the military increasingly came under Hitler's hand. Yet, his take on Hitler is more nuanced, seeing in him aspects that were not traditionally German, such as tight control, and others that were such as his faith in the force of personality. Indeed, the overall argument is that the German army was a throwback military masquerading as modern because it mastered armor and airpower before the fall of 1942. Once their opponents matched material superiority to improvements in planning and tactics, the emperor had no clothes and the Germans were lost. Yet, the assessment, while at times harsh, is tempered with Citino's awe at German daring and tactical skill.

All in all, it is a well written and thought provoking account and I look forward to the sequel volumes.

[Jaap Hoogenboezem · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book, describes the campaigns of the Wehrmacht in 1942. The Wehrmacht started that year with impressive victories, but 1942 ended with the destruction op the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad and El Alamein. According to Citino, this marked the end of a particular way of German warfare (Bewegungskrieg, which does not aim at total battlefield superiority, but at concentrated and hard blows to knock one ally off the battlefield, in the hope that this would change the equation for other belligerents) that had characterized the way of war of Prussia and Germany since Frederic the Great.

It is interesting to see how the author analyses all the 1942 campaigns and puts them in the context of the history of German military doctrine.

In the last chapter he posits the thesis that Bewegungkrieg (which was at heart a poor man’s strategy) ran aground on the doctrine of industrial warfare of the allies (a rich man’s strategy based on limitless supply and first class logistics). That is an interesting thought, merely presented as an afterthought which really could have received some in depth treatment.

[Morgan Baliviera · Rating 4 out of 5]

Un lavoro di “immersione” nelle campagne di Russia e dell’Africa settentrionale portate avanti dalla Wehrmacht, nell’anno della svolta del 1942.

Le temibili armate tedesche, che portavano ad espandersi i confini del totalitarismo nazista in ogni angolo d’Europa, in questo saggio del prof. Citino vengono analizzate dettagliatamente, dandoci una panoramica sia del perché abbiano avuto - nei primi anni del secondo conflitto mondiale - così tanto successo, e sia del perché poi si siano fermate alle porte di Stalingrado, a pochi km dai pozzi petroliferi di Baku nel Caucaso e, a migliaia di km di distanza, nel caldo deserto egiziano, poco lontano da Suez.

Lettura consigliata anche a chi non è propriamente appassionato di tecnica militare, ma semplicemente vuole un approfondimento su un tema di così fondamentale importanza per la comprensione della seconda guerra mondiale e, di conseguenza, del mondo in cui tutti noi oggi viviamo.

[Olethros · Rating 4 out of 5]

-Clarificador.-

Género. Historia.

Lo que nos cuenta. Con el subtítulo Las campañas de 1942, aproximación al desgaste (en varios órdenes de medida) del ejército alemán en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, centrado en lo que sucedió tras el fracaso en la toma de Moscú y hasta el cerco soviético de Stalingrado, pasando por el norte de África, con la intención de ofrecer al lector las causas del inexorable descenso de la potencia de la Wehrmacht como fuerza ofensiva y los resultados de la ceguera de buena parte de la alta oficialidad (y de Hitler) ante ese hecho.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com....

[Carlos Wang · Rating 5 out of 5]

這是我閱讀本作者的第二部作品了。不過事實上，羅伯特‧M.奇蒂諾(Robert M. Citino)目前被引進的也不多，《從閃電戰到沙漠風暴》跟這《國防軍》三部曲 ，全部買下來還真是價格不斐。不過由於我很喜歡他另外一本書，所以這錢倒是花的很「阿莎力」。

老實說，跟那位同為美國東線權威的格蘭茲(David M. Glantz)相比，奇蒂諾在敘事能力跟文筆上高出甚多，基本上我覺得後者的這套《國防軍》可能是面向大眾更甚於專業讀者。特別是奇蒂諾寫了很多評論，這是我更樂見與期望的。

不過很多德棍可能非常不喜歡這部作品。因為奇蒂諾真的算是非常老實不客氣的指出了國防軍的各種缺失，甚至有點嚴厲。但前面提到的格蘭茲，德國自己的研究者格哈德‧P. 格羅斯(Gerhard P. Groß)，還有許多人也都做出類似的報告，奇蒂諾不是那個唯一揭開「國王的新衣」的小孩，事過境遷，也是時候揭開這層面紗了。

戰後，出於政治上的需要，國防軍的名譽得到了保全。早期的赫赫戰功跟有明顯優點且仍被需求的軍事學說，還有大量的將領撰寫了回憶錄，把罪過推給納粹跟希特勒，致使他們得以避開了與許多理應被追究的相關醜陋行為。但這些都在後冷戰時代的當下，陸續被揭開。就拿許多德棍堅持的，「盟軍只是憑著數量才打敗國防軍」這點來說，恰好就是奇蒂諾不斷抨擊的「先軍思想」。就是那個從普魯士延續下來的參謀本部與高級軍官，把克勞塞維茲的「戰爭是政治的延續」反過來思考的作為，完全無視於政治與戰略手段，只想用純軍事去解決的態度。對於現代總體戰來說，盟軍能夠把工業化成戰力來對敵人做全方面的打擊才是正確的戰爭方式，你沒有辦法做到，反而抱怨別人不公平，聽起來只像是敗犬之吠。更何況不論是蘇軍或者是美軍也都在進步，他們常常無視這種狀況。再來，另外一個被嘲諷的是蘇方的假資料問題。其實坦白說，數據不確實也不單只是蘇方才有，難道德、美、英就百分之百可信嗎？出於各種「需求」而謊報難道其他國家就沒有嗎？事實上冷戰結束後俄國公布了許多檔案文件，這都是可供比對參考的，也是現在許多研究者正在做的。格蘭茲在他的《巨人的碰撞》中就修正了不少這類問題，並告知讀者為何當年蘇方要這樣作假。我想，這才是更正確面對事情的態度吧。


總之，奇蒂諾在這三部曲的中心思想是很明確的，對被他用「德式兵法」稱之的普魯士/德國軍事傳統的評論。本書作者以1942年開始到1945年結束，一年一冊的方式一一剖析經過的主要戰役，告訴讀者其中利弊；他認為這套傳統有很大的優點，但局限性也非常鮮明。奇蒂諾試圖要做的是把過去被吹的虛高的現象平衡，而真正被作者痛斥的，是德國高級將官們戰後不斷擺脫的助紂為虐的那一面。

至於何謂「德式兵法」，奇蒂諾總結的要點很鮮明。這是一套按照普魯士/德意志歷史傳統發展出來的軍事傳統(其實每個國家都是如此)，這個中歐國家，四面受敵，沒有險要的天然疆界跟戰略縱深，資源短缺，注定了只能速戰速決，經不起消耗。於是他們必須總是抱持著積極的攻擊精神，尋求與敵人的主力決戰。要達到這個目標，則唯一選擇是保持運動戰狀態，採取分進合擊，向心包圍，打出一場「坎尼式殲滅戰」。要能夠做到這點，德軍除了有令人稱羨的參謀本部外，還有高素質的士兵與軍官，並採取「任務式導向」的作戰，也就是給予中層以下前線非常高的獨立性，讓他們可以臨場判斷選擇「最佳方案」來完成任務即可。德軍將他們這些特點與飛機、坦克兩種新式武器結合，打出了一場漂亮的多兵種混合作戰，在二戰前期所向無敵。這就是知名的「閃電戰」的秘密。(說句題外話，歷史有趣的地方在於，戰後卻有一支軍隊採取了這套「德式兵法」，那就是以色列國防軍。)

而在蘇德戰場碰了一鼻子灰，也徹底的暴露出了這種「德式兵法」的侷限性：它只適合在中等的戰略區域以及有順暢補給線支持下方能奏效。當敵人擁有寬廣的戰略縱深，不再隨意與你決戰，並且企圖利用補給線拖垮你貧乏的資源與補給時，「閃電戰」就露出破綻了。

奇蒂諾說，這些特徵在1942年開始就已經逐漸顯露，只被勝利掩蓋了。


‧東線

奇蒂諾指出，藍色方案是德軍在東線的分水嶺。

首先，希特勒要求的嚴格掌握指揮權與德軍傳統的前線自主性的衝突越演越烈，到了難以調和的地步。由於紅軍逐漸表現出在進步的戰術，導致前線將官開始審慎以對，但元首卻認為這是他們過於畏首畏尾，乃至於是在妨礙他取得勝利而失去信任，於是加強了控制力道，最後甚至引發了衝突。

最典型的例子在後來的44年。此時的東線局勢已經糜爛，紅軍開始全面反攻，而曼斯坦因在這時候依然企圖在烏克蘭發起攻擊，他一貫的向希特勒提出「讓我指揮整個東線戰事」的要求。元首拒絕了他，並說：「那些元帥們有時連我的話都不聽了，你怎麼肯定自己叫的動？」

作者說，其實不光只是這個問題。41年德國妄想在戰役層面一口端了蘇聯失敗後，就進入了總體對決，戰爭的指揮必須是一個具備理性，全面的戰略、政治與外交眼光的文官體系領導，這也是現代化政府的要求：文官必須能指揮槍，不能讓它自行其是。這是顯而易見的道理，只要看看隔壁的日本怎麼被陸軍激進份子牽著鼻子走，想想要是韓戰時杜魯門沒辦法解職麥帥，讓他為所欲為後果會如何就知道。奇蒂諾這次是站在希特勒這邊，而且，其實他真正想批判的是，44年的德國眼光無法只放在蘇德戰線，曼斯坦因卻依然企圖在戰役層面的勝利來達成「苦澀的和平」，這只是癡心妄想，這是從普魯士延續下來的“傳統”，只重視軍事，忽略國際戰略與外交，44年的德國它需要一個能綜觀全局的理性政府來指導。但作者又辛辣的說：「說來諷刺的是，如果存在這個政府就不會開始這場戰爭。」


其次，按照「德式兵法」在戰役層面上的戒律，其中心有一個不變的核，就是：分進合擊。不管兵分多少路，最終目標都是一致的，找出敵人有生力量，聚而殲之，這是才能快速結束戰爭，也符合日耳曼窮資源的打法。但蘇軍在藍色方案的進程中不再像41年戰爭剛開始那樣動輒死守最後被圍殲，他們不斷撤退(當然，也不排除只是潰逃)，讓德軍一而再，再而三的撲空。與之同時，他們佔領了廣大的國土，補給線不斷的伸張到短期內難以負荷，嚴重拖垮了後勤。「空間的暴虐」開始發酵，而紅軍卻在自己的基地等著反擊。德軍則是繼在克里米亞的勝利之後，第二場證明自己還沒在東線失敗。但藍色作戰之後，依照指示A、B兩個集團軍分別朝著不同的目標進軍，它拉長了戰線，稀釋了德軍原本就捉襟見軸的兵力，卻沒有找到蘇軍，反而增添了被容易反擊的側翼，只能用相對弱勢的僕從國軍隊去填補，彼此卻無法支援。

作者認為這不單只是「第四十五號元首命令」的鍋，而是德國本來的力量本來就不足以一口氣概括，而當時又還算順風順水的情況下也更不可能有人敢出來當那個「國王的新衣」中的小孩。


第二次哈爾科夫戰役就是紅軍的一個嘗試，從地圖上看明顯的突出部，德蘇雙方都不約而同的關注在此也不意外，歷史逗趣的地方在於兩邊都是由第六集團軍主攻。蘇聯方是鐵木辛哥負責計畫，奇蒂諾幽默的寫道：「史達林看到計劃的前半部會很滿意，但看到後半部可能會忍不住笑出來。因為鐵木辛哥向他要求增援二十個步兵師跟二十七個裝甲師。要是有這麼多部隊給他，史達林早就已經結束戰爭，坐在柏林了。」

對紅軍來說，這場仗的雖然慘敗，但也算是他們重整旗鼓的一場。甩開以前靠數量打仗的粗糙手法，在朱可夫的指導下開始重新拾起「多兵種集中定點火力突破，然後機動深入擴大戰果」的「大戰略縱深作戰」的精���。只是紅軍還沒有足夠的後勤來支援這樣的作戰，訓練跟指揮人員水平也還沒完全跟上，導致功敗垂成。

但是到了史達林格勒之戰，結局就不再相同了。


最後，奇蒂諾總結了兩件事情的死亡左右了德軍的勝敗。

首先是德式機動作戰的死亡。蘇聯史家把1942年12年到1943年12月標誌為戰事的第二階段，在這段時間發生了兩件標誌性的戰役：史達林格勒跟庫斯克。前者殲滅了國防軍一支野戰軍，後者阻止了德軍奪回戰場主動權的嘗試。如果說在曼斯坦因一開始建議的時間點即發動反攻的話，或許還來得及取得戰術的突襲性而包圍攻陷庫斯克，然而希特勒等高層卻想要「再更有把握」才發動，又多拖了幾個月。此時蘇軍早就已經在該地區做好了萬全準備，並聚集了重重兵力。這完全違背了過去信奉的「避實擊虛」的信條。

再來，德軍所集中的兵力是從戰線其他地方，以及原本要成為預備隊的戰力抽調而來，這對原本已經薄弱的防禦力量無疑是雪上加霜。部分將領曾主張應該放棄某些突出部，「拉直與重整」來調整配佈，這遭到拒絕。曼斯坦因則主張可以像他去年在哈爾科夫的那樣，先誘敵深入再反擊殲滅。亦同樣被打了回票。

這兩個建議，前者比較符合戰場現實，但違反了希特勒乃至整個國防軍高層的內心那種厭惡撤退與承認失敗，與政治上的問題。後者，奇蒂諾直接吐槽說，曼斯坦因過於傲慢，憑什麼認為蘇軍會犯同樣的錯誤，而且去年他們是在冬天發動過大的攻勢導致後勤失靈才被他得逞，夏天難道也會有同樣的問題嗎？敵人會傻兩次嗎？

總而言之，所謂的德軍失去戰場主動權，代表著他們過去的取勝方程式已經徹底失靈，敵人知道如何抵禦與反擊。而在1944年開始節節��退之時，希特勒依然堅持「死守陣地」，「不惜一切代價」的策略。這種做法要成功，必須要猜測出敵方的主攻方向，把僅剩的力量投入才有機會。但德國空軍已經無法負擔空中偵察的任務，而情報部門依然是廢渣，參謀本部居然只能憑著邏輯與推測來決定要怎麼防禦！而偏偏紅軍在欺敵戰術已經練得爐火純青，他們常常把德軍騙的團團轉。更可怕的是，實際上他們的攻勢是連動的，一波一波次序發動，要讓敵軍疲於奔命。

德軍坦克就算再怎麼奮戰，也只是杯水車薪。


其次是戰場自主指揮權的死亡。不過這點是由於科技的先進，特別是無線電。從此，來自大後方的干涉無時無刻的妨礙前線的運作，以至於現地指揮官甚至不能命令撤退或投降，德軍引以為傲的自主性全然喪失。這是個兩面刃。

更重要的是，與之相對的，史達林在多次失敗之後，開始意識到自己的不足，並在多次聽從意見取得勝利之後，而決定放權給自己的將官，紅軍開始走向專業指揮之路。

就這樣，歷史諷刺的現象發生了：德國人朝著當初蘇聯人犯的缺點逐漸失敗，而蘇聯人則是學習著德國的優點步步取勝。


作者最後對德軍的評價直接引用了一段：

歷史學家奧默‧巴爾托夫 (Omer Bartov)曾描述...國防軍的”去現代化”。.....殘酷的戰鬥撕裂了這支軍隊內部的現代化社會和人情紐帶，由此形成的真空被針對希特勒的個人崇拜和國家社會主義兇殘的種族主義意識形態所填補。但是，如果把話題嚴格限制在這支軍隊的作戰特點上，那麼“去現代化”就不是一個合適的提法。國防軍在作戰層面上從未去現代化。它的基本戰役和理念是重視指揮官的天才和意志，而輕視物質因素，這從一開始就談不上有多麼現代化。



‧論隆美爾

表面上看，沙漠似乎是最適合坦克戰的地方，但其實不然。後勤跟防禦陣地依然困擾著攻守雙方，而且這裡的地形是不可能打出場「殲滅戰」，最多也就是擊潰而已。

隆美爾是德國在二戰中最大的神話之一，作者並非說他徒具虛名，但這遠超過其應得的。當然，這除了當局的刻意營造外，也得歸功於這位元帥本人也擅長宣傳，而這來自於他在一戰中有次差點被奪走頭功的心理陰影有關。

奇蒂諾說隆美爾並非純普魯士人，但這在過往的德國軍事史上並不少見，他擅長進攻打機動作戰，也非常符合這個國家的軍事傳統。他的用兵按照中國傳統兵學上的說法就是「兵貴神速」。其實非洲軍不滿編，士兵疲憊，坦克不多，後勤物資也都跟不上需求，他只能趁著英國人還沒緩過氣來，打個措手不及。就跟當年南朝梁的名將陳慶之北伐一樣。

總之，隆美爾還是能接二連三的取得勝利跟其進取之心有關，他的物資很多取之於敵，奇蒂諾指出，非洲軍很多卡車都是英軍搶來的，以至於不管是英國空軍，甚至隆美爾本人，都常常「分不清敵我」。諷刺的是，當隆美爾聽到英軍把來不及帶走的物資爆破後，哀嘆說：「這要是留給我用可以發揮多大功效啊！」

論說德軍為何不攻擊馬爾它以確保運輸線。其實根本原因是希特勒根本也不重視這個戰場，贏了當賺到，輸了也不至於威脅德國本土。要攻擊那座島嶼只能依賴空軍，而這個稀有的戰力當時必須運用在東線同時發動的作戰上，根本抽不開身。再說，德軍通訊密碼已經被破解，在這種狀況下能否打贏也是個問題。

北非賈札拉之戰就是一場標準的正面誘敵側翼進襲包圍的代表作。英軍被擊潰之後，托布魯克的失守也就不意外了。但作者此時又吐槽：其實倫敦也早就沒太多意願守這塊孤島，它寧願把兵力放在埃及做機動防禦。所以當隆美爾第二次包圍這座城市時，它已不是如初次碰面那樣的要塞了。

而之後，當英國第八軍團在蒙哥馬利的整頓下，拿著充足美援，帶著滿滿不甘的士氣，準備反擊時，隆美爾的機動作戰就失效了。不過真正讓他最感慨的還是空優的喪失，沙漠之狐認為這才是自己真正無法取勝的原因：「在絕對空優的時候，就算派支原始人大軍來打現代歐洲軍隊也能贏。」

這個經驗在他之後指揮諾曼第時會繼續產生莫大的影響。


PS：關於這位名將，2019年也曾有一本《隆美爾神話》，書中集中討論了他跟希特勒的愛恨鳩葛以及他那「不朽的名聲」是怎麼建立起來，頗值得一看。


‧論「英式兵法」

其實每個國家都應該找到符合自己國情的戰爭方法。奇蒂諾說，自39年以來，屢戰屢敗又屢敗屢戰的英軍都自我消遣「擅長打撤退戰」，他們經不起損失，像東線那種玩法會亡國，所以，蒙哥馬利必須謹慎的使用手上的籌碼，他總是小心翼翼地集結兵力，準備充分的資源，做好計畫，有必勝把握才會出手。而作者認為，這種物資戰，也是德國無法取勝的戰爭型態。

不過，蒙哥馬利有時候的確會讓人懷疑他的將才，像他這樣謹慎小心，步步為營的作戰方式，不起眼，但穩定，很符合《銀英傳》中的角色楊所說的取勝方式，也是所有兵書上都會認同的「正兵」。《孫子兵法》中的「凡戰者，以正合，以奇勝。」不管，反正在阿拉曼之戰，英軍已經以萬全之勢去迎戰疲憊之師的德軍，勝負早沒有懸念。


‧論曼斯坦因

第六軍團被圍殲之後，德軍看起來像是要戰線總崩了，希特勒在此時叫來了曼斯坦因救火。他在克里米亞的表現累積了足夠威望，使他暫時獲取了整個頓河戰區的總指揮權(元首可不是那種輕易放手的人)。曼斯坦因的才能無庸置疑的，但這場勝利也是有蘇聯人自己的作死。奇蒂諾說，紅軍篤信「連續攻勢」教條，喜歡趁勝追擊一鼓作氣，但卻忽略了克勞塞維茲強調的「頂峰」，無視後勤極限與軍隊的疲勞，它們企圖不斷地擴大戰果終於讓大軍變成了強弩之末，而始終耐心等待的曼斯坦因則是在努力收縮戰線，調整兵力與調配之後，找到機會用現有的精銳發動反擊。結果就是德國又回到了42年初的態勢。這在當時被吹為奇蹟，特別是剛剛遭逢一場大敗之後。

曼斯坦因或許是公認的德軍中最有才華的將領，但如果希特勒讓他全權領導就能打贏蘇軍嗎？奇蒂諾的批判正如前面說的，也是德軍軍官普遍的通病，他認為德軍將領普遍認為在戰場累積勝利就能換取戰略乃至政治上的成功是個嚴重錯誤，是一種以為軍事可以解決政治失敗的謬誤觀念。曼斯坦因無法改變德國在許多方面的劣勢，拿破崙再怎麼善戰也未能征服歐洲，迦太基有漢尼拔也還是打不贏羅馬，一個軍事天才對整場戰爭的意義是很難說清的，畢竟，中間影響的變數太多了，但恰恰正是如此，這個命題才會如此難回答。


‧論「俄式兵法」


圖哈切夫斯基在戰後的學說可以說是非常先驅的，他按照俄國傳統的軍事基礎，提出的「大縱深戰略」如今獲得了更多的肯定。這位紅軍戰爭藝術之父已經看出了二十世紀的戰爭不能再像過去打一兩場決定性會戰就能結束，必須不斷發動攻勢，將敵人徹底的擊垮。戰役層面來說，將部隊分成三個梯次，第一梯次多兵種配合先鋒突破，第二梯次以裝甲機械化部隊為主，快速的從缺口穿插向敵人後方前進，然後再用空降等部隊投射包圍。這套打法曾經隨著圖哈切夫斯基等被清洗而遭到拋棄，不過在蘇德戰爭中又被拾起。

只是奇蒂諾指出，實際運用時有個問題在於：要是第一波沒能突破呢？結果是，紅軍將領就把第二梯次直接投入，結果在敵人準備充分的南牆下撞得頭破血流。這就是為啥紅軍動輒傷亡慘重的原因。

PS：《巨人的碰撞》裡，作者則更冷酷地指出，蘇共高層因為擔心士兵「知道的太多」，不願意給予太高層次的教育，他們只要「訓練的水平讓傷亡還在可接受範圍」就好，這就是為什麼紅軍即使在優勢的時候還是動輒有讓英、美戰史家目瞪口呆的損失數字。


‧北非與義大利是美軍的試金石


奇蒂諾指出，火炬行動乍看之下可能不太必要(馬歇爾主張直接對歐發動攻擊)，但對美軍來說卻是絕對必要的，如果沒有經過這場就直接D-Day，歷史可能就不同了。

之前看中國的網站「知乎」有人說「二戰前美軍還不如國軍」。這話不能說它全錯，就規模上來說確實是。但它明顯忽略了這個工業巨人覺醒後發動的軍事潛力隨時可以一下子把中、日一起打趴。

確實，翻開美國陸軍早期的歷史，沒啥好誇耀，最大的行動也就是自己人打自己人，一戰是在英法的陰影與指導下進行的。不過，內戰對美國的陸軍學說卻是決定性的影響，有別於李將軍的機動戰法，格蘭特標準的優勢火力物資戰打贏了戰爭，成為了這支軍隊的信條。雖然「先用火砲轟炸，在讓步兵突擊攻破戰線」，帶著這種思想上了一戰被狠狠的教做人，在英法友軍善意的勸告下做出了修正，美軍依然抱持「優勢火力」的思維繼續指導他們的陸軍。

42年美軍終於準備完成後，雖然看起來氣勢十足，但終究是一支許多年沒打過仗的軍隊(不過海軍早就跟日本打得你死我活了)，火炬行動便成為最大的試金石。事實結果也是證明了真的是不可或缺。實際結果各種混亂與悲劇，在久經戰陣的德軍面前像個小孩般的表現，被英軍同行鄙視(好歹已經對打多年磨成婆了)，美軍只能用鮮血去繳學費了。不過至少最後結果證明這是值得的。

奇蒂諾指出，美軍在北非，步兵的巴組卡反坦沒有一例成功擊毀，戰車跟坦克殲擊車被海放，只剩下砲兵確實地發揮了功效並讓德軍畏懼，這更加證明了之後應該要走的道路：就是火炮配制空的「優勢火力」。這基本上可以降低最低的己方損傷，雖然打不出華麗的戰役，但軍人本來就不用用鮮血去滿足某些戰史家的「心願」。更何況其實美軍也是可以機動穿插，畢竟他們是二戰中機械化程度最高的軍隊，英、蘇也都是這個工業巨人的威能加持，至於德國還在用畜力，日、義可能都不配上檯面。而將帥部分，負責歐陸戰線的艾森豪威爾終於可以大聲反駁後方那些質疑他「沒經過考驗」的媒體，在北非他磨練出了經驗，未來可以率領裝甲軍團大展身手的巴頓也冒出頭來，布雷德利也累積了威望。

德國在北非的失敗某種程度上是一個小一號的「史達林格勒」(突尼斯格勒？)，如果這支部隊能夠見好就收早早撤回南歐，雖然不見得能扭轉戰局但可能歷史走向會不太相同。這場戰爭最大的意義在於證明了德國沒辦法在海外遠征，雖說希特勒本來也沒放太多心思。

北非戰役之後，盟軍登陸義大利也是合情合理的判斷，這是個次要的戰場，但卻不可否認的產生了影響。希特勒不得不從吃緊的東線，抽調兵力前來防守此處，畢竟紅軍或許還很遙遠，但盟軍穿過亞平寧就可以逼近德國本土了。

這場戰一對美國人也很重要。這是北非戰後的第二場磨練，他們必須忍耐著英國友軍的鄙視，在一場又一場硬仗中磨練自己。在西西里，巴頓首次獨立策動一場機動作戰。在幾次登陸戰上，美國步兵撐過了德軍的反擊，並在砲兵掩護中穩住陣腳。並且領悟了：不要計畫太複雜的作戰，只是浪費別人的人生。

盟軍現在可以準備 D-Day了。

順帶一提的是，奇蒂諾把他的毒舌用在了凱塞林身上。顯然他對這位元帥得到的好評不甚認同，批判了他在西西里的撤退戰，然後指出義大利南部的地形本來就適合防禦，而凱塞林的打法是他們普魯士流傳下來的德式兵法中最討厭的陣地戰，在這種情況下，此公的「防禦大師」是值得商榷的。作者最後辛辣的說：「應該讓凱塞林也去東線廣闊無邊的平原經受一下紅軍的考驗才能更加毫無爭議吧。」


‧西線


奇蒂諾對諾曼第的結論也很直接，盟軍終於能夠完全把自己的經濟與工業潛力轉化為火力，然後向已經奄奄一息的德軍重重一擊。

這場登陸戰兩邊都存在著問題，但戰爭向來就是比誰犯的錯少，跟誰能最快修正，就能獲勝。

直接登陸德國是不可能的，從法國上岸是理所當然的選擇，共有上中下三策，下策從不列塔尼方向，雖然安全但是太遠，上策是離敵國本土最近的加萊，但太過「想當然耳」，諾曼第就成了向來最不疾不徐的中策。不過對於重視積極進取的德軍來說，他們反而喜歡選上策，所以也就以己之心度人，導致防守重點錯誤。盟軍當然也有些誤導的作為，不過影響程度難以判定。

而且真正的關鍵還是德軍自己本身的防禦實力。西線大部分都是佔領地，在沒有與英國取得和平之前，德軍必須派遣大量的兵力駐守，但這對在東線人力吃緊的指揮官而言，是非常刺眼的存在。就連希特勒也無法招架增援的要求，只好把完整的師一批一批調去，然後換回被打殘的傷兵敗卒。長期結果就是，西線看起來雖然有支大軍存在，但仔細考察就會發現，那大部分都是不及格的戰力，裝備次一等。更可怕的是，第三帝國那種疊床架屋的指揮體系，導致遇見緊急事態時，反應遲緩。雖說D日當天許多主官恰好都不在，就連某個元首也在睡覺不許人家打擾(奇蒂諾哀嘆說不知該如何評價，我笑說就“天佑盟軍啊”)，但前線留守的參謀跟副官其實也都很有能力，臨陣作戰還是可以應付，問題出在增援跟調動上的混亂，導致一開始完全不知如何正確地反擊，原本已經薄弱的防線，顯得更加無力。

敵人的錯誤就是我方的幸運。Cornelius Ryan 的《最長的一日》依然是最佳的敘事，看完可以發現，真的是”天佑盟軍”。艾森豪威爾說了：多虧D日的天氣預報準確。總之，這是一場偉大的勝利，但也不要過度的神話。奧馬哈灘頭那些將士的鮮血就是明證。


之前我一直覺得蒙哥馬利有點名過其實，不過奇蒂諾在本書中算是幫他洗白了一些。登陸後，盟軍一度被德軍阻擊的動彈不得，進度落後；東邊英、加拿不下卡昂，西邊美軍無法適應諾曼底周遭的詭異地形，加上天公不作美氣候不佳空優無法發揮而陷入苦戰。東邊蒙哥馬利的問題在於，因為他的大攻勢讓德軍把所有的裝甲師都集中過去，而且希特勒等司令部還是認為盟軍會在加萊發動第二次兩棲登陸，所以把預備隊等也都放到那邊。所以，基本上來說，英、加面對的是敵人西線的老本，碰壁似乎也還算情由可原。

幸好，此時美軍的布雷德利站了出來，他策畫了「眼鏡蛇行動」的大作戰計劃，成功地從西邊突破因為被兵力引走而極度薄弱的防線，取得了極大的進展，奇蒂諾說，雖然不是計劃之中，但也算是無心插柳，蒙哥馬利的牽制還是能記上一筆苦勞的。

只是可惜很快就掉漆。

奇蒂諾從之前盟軍開始在北非、義大利作戰時即強調過，別把作戰計畫搞得太複雜。還有，「敵人對於作戰能否成功是有表決權的」(語出克勞塞維茲的《戰爭論》)。市場花園作戰就是一個最好的明證，複雜的空降作戰，然後把增援的地面部隊賭在一條狹窄的走廊上能順利抵達，輕忽了德軍尚存的力量，最後結果就是蒙哥馬利的慘敗。

不過呢，作者有稍微替這位英國元帥緩頰(大部分的美國作者都是無情的嘲笑)，他說，1944年的那個夏天，德軍潰敗的樣子確實看起來就像已經沒什麼作戰能力了。但沒想到在回到自家門口後，忽然又生龍活虎。是莫德爾的功力還是主場優勢已無從知曉，奇蒂諾說，作戰剛在計劃中時它是可行的，但沒人知道發動後已經不是可行的了。

無論如何，這場拒敵於外的小振興算是給了希特勒再賭一把的底氣。


‧莫德爾

戰爭後期，最出風頭的人莫過於莫德爾，而這算是一種時勢造成的吧，他的才華在於防禦，特別是那種「不計一切代價」的硬幹法，這是順風順水時不需要的狀況。當然，他的成功部分歸功於能夠取得元首的絕對信任，乃至於甚至能夠當面嗆說：「是你在指揮還是我？」而莫德爾能夠得到這樣的寵愛，出自於「他們是同一種人」。儘管希特勒多次表現出他的冷酷無情，但他卻也承認：「我不想在莫德爾手下工作。」

這位被稱之為「元首的救火隊」也確實有一手，他能夠無情的壓榨出手邊所有資源，身邊能打不能打的人員，都要上去死守，平民百姓被迫遷移流離失所到死傷慘重毫不在乎，同僚苦苦哀求依然扣住預備隊不放等各種手段。但，中央集團軍潰敗之後，眼看著就要一瀉千里了，他卻能在華沙前反手一擊，又穩住了局勢，確實是能為人所不能。

他是希特勒需要的人。

但卻是德國的悲哀。而他在臨死前聽到戈培爾的演說後，憤怒地斥責納粹的虛偽性後果斷的自殺，是覺悟還是良心發現就只有天知道了。


‧阿登，破產前的最後一枚硬幣


奇蒂諾說，希特勒確認盟軍登陸後反而是有一種如釋重負的感覺，他終於不用為此提心吊膽，而且自信的認為可以再打出一場40年的勝仗，然後這次可以徹底讓英、美死心和談，就能專心對付蘇聯。所以希特勒斷然的下令「東線轉防守，西線全力主攻」，讓許多人都非常錯愕。

阿登之戰(守望萊茵)是希特勒這個即將破產的人手上最後一個硬幣。曾經讓歐洲羨慕的德國參謀本部，現在製作計劃時，只能依賴幾個坐在辦公室熬夜的文職。相對的，盟國策畫時現在已經動員上下，還要現地偵查來做參考依據(成不成功另當別論就是)。希特勒的直覺是對的，攻陷安特衛普，可以重創盟軍，並在西線取得主動權。但問題在於，現在的國防軍還有那個實力嗎？倫德斯泰跟莫德爾這次倒是意見一致，他們主張先打過默德河進行一場“小解決”，再來談怎麼擴展戰果，但這次兩位都沒能說服元首。

德軍選擇了一個惡劣的天氣發動攻擊，他們初期確實做到了出奇不意，而這之中多少是有盟軍自己的疏忽輕敵。留下美軍史上最大規模被俘紀錄的106師被布置在一個“幽靈前線”，成員都是各地拼湊來，訓練不足的人員，本是想讓他們在這個比較「涼」的前線磨練，結果敵軍卻從這裡展開突破，一下子就被打得暈頭轉向，包圍投降。

這邊奇蒂諾盛讚了艾森豪威爾，雖然盟軍一開始被打了個措手不及，但他當下就憑著直覺意識到敵人不是小打小鬧的反擊，而是一場大攻勢！這位統帥立刻把其他戰線先擱置，集中所有兵力圍堵，先求擋下，再來等待反擊。

這個策略也確實奏效了。短短幾天，什麼都缺就是不缺厄運的德軍就陷入強弩之末，而天氣一但轉晴，戰況就一瀉千里。本書作者用冷酷的筆調寫著：「一支只能在夜晚像個小偷般行動的軍隊基本上就已經打輸了戰爭。」

此時作者順便小談了一下德國空軍怎麼淪落到此一境地。其實也沒有啥特別，就是工業實力差距的體現，空軍跟海軍是最明顯不過的兵種。日本人領教到了，德國人也該試試看了。德國空軍一開始是以支援性質為主發展，但它被抓去打與其調性不合的不列顛空戰，碰了個壁，損失慘重。接著，在技術上又開始落後，新一代的機種遲遲不能定案，生產又延宕。這原因有過於迷信天才設計師與希特勒的攪局。總之，儘管德國搞出了世界上最早的噴射戰鬥機，但也於事無補。

不管陸軍的虎、豹式，還是空軍的Me 262、海軍的U-21，雖然都是先進，但對大局沒用的武器，徒留遺恨。


‧論國防軍的罪孽


這應該是奇蒂諾最讓德棍不悅的地方。

就在中央集團軍覆滅，盟軍登陸的險惡情勢下，1944年7月20日爆發了一次暗殺事件，但元首依然僥倖不死。戰爭結束後，面臨助紂為虐指責的國防軍，把這次行動當作是他們為納粹而戰的遮羞布，但事實真的是如此嗎？

我們來看看事件爆發後的反應好了。前線的士兵是憤怒的，他們覺得在這種緊要關頭還發生內鬨是不可饒恕的罪行。這種想法不難理解，畢竟士兵們大多處於資訊不對稱，而且後方一亂，前線就要遭殃。而其他高級將官呢？很遺憾，他們也幾乎都是一面倒地斥責發動暗殺的一方。當然，你也可以說那是被迫表態的，畢竟敢說同情的都已經被絞死了。不過就作者的一些考證，似乎也不全然如此。很多人把軍人的誓言抬出來，認為對元首的刺殺違背了這個神聖莊嚴的義務。奇蒂諾對此嗤之以鼻。他冷冷地指出，1918年，他們拋下威廉二世投降時可不是這樣說的。再者，國防軍把對威瑪共和憲法的誓言也早就拋在腦後了。誓言，不過是個概念而已。當年他們曾對德皇如是說。

真相是，國防軍將官們在納粹政權下收受了大量的好處，他們早就是既得利益者，也知道戰敗後將會面臨什麼樣的處境。希特勒在44年初的一場會議中結束前曾冷冷地說：「....各位，我們必然要打贏這場仗，不然諸君最好趁早替自己找條繩索。」

本書的結尾，奇蒂諾提到了一位國防軍元帥：舍爾納 (Johann Ferdinand Schörner)，他是大戰後期的一種典型，狂熱的納粹份子。他用各種恐怖的手段(槍斃，吊死)來「處分」各種被他認為是「叛國」的行徑，大量的殺害自己的士兵，哪怕是在希特勒死後一週依然故我。對此舍爾納的辯解是要維持軍紀好向美軍投降，但當紅軍來臨時，他卻搭著飛機逃往美占區，拋下他還在那邊「激勵堅守崗位」的士兵。結果美國人還是把他移交蘇聯審判，關了十年，之後回到西德，被那些士兵家屬控訴，又入獄再關了四年。

一個德國作家在49年即直言不諱的批判舍爾納，或許他對希特勒是很忠誠，但他底下的士兵呢？領著他們走向這無謂的犧牲，自己卻苟且偷生的時候難道沒有一絲愧疚嗎？莫德爾至少還坦率的一死！當然，此公並不能代表所有國防軍將領，但難道他就只是個特例嗎？戰後也有一些士兵留下回憶錄的，有一本曾被翻譯過的名作《被遗忘的士兵》，有興趣的可以找來讀讀。



最後，總的來說，這三部曲都交由同一人翻譯，品質基本上無可挑剔，雖然地圖略少了些，不過，網上自行找一下並不難。奇蒂諾這部作品比較偏評論性，個人覺得讀者肯定是要具有基本的歐戰概念，建議可以搭配《巨人的碰撞》對著看；西線部分，有部華人作者的《輝煌與泥濘》，透過講述巴頓在洛林與西線德軍的坦克戰交鋒講述了美軍的一些狀況，也是不錯的補充。當然，最最詳細的還是來自作者自己的推薦--這也是本書的一個特色--，他的註腳中滿滿的各種延伸閱讀，還加上了他的短評，非常的有參考性與價值。要說這本書有什麼缺點嘛，那就是略嫌有點灌水的嫌疑啦，其實作者可以不用寫的那麼長的。

不管怎麼樣，個人非常非常的推薦這部作品。

[Mike Harbert · Rating 4 out of 5]

An outstanding piece of research by one of the better WWII scholars publishing today. Unfortunately, this book would be greatly improved if it were edited by an actual person rather than by "spell check." The book is liberally sprinkled with inappropriate words -- no curse words -- but stupid spell check substitutions. At first, I thought it was mildly amusing (the navy having command of the saw - rather than command of the sea), but with these errors popping up every dozen pages or so, it quickly became irritating. Robert Citino's research and scholarship deserves better.

I would recommend that any serious scholar of WWII read Professor Citino's works. I would also recommend that the University of Kansas Press seriously consider replacing the editors used on this work with at least a high school graduate who is at least conscious.

[Ridel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Tragically Non-Fiction

Entertaining. That’s the word I would use to describe Death of the Wehrmacht, an analysis of WW2 from the perspective of the German Army. It avoids suggesting how the Third Reich might have won, instead focusing on the Wehrmacht’s deep roots and cultural legacies. Starting with Frederick the Great, its officers were the result of centuries of intellectual and philosophical refinement in the art of war. Indeed, this book is the sequel to The German Way of War, whereby the author analyzes two hundred years of Prussian/German military history and highlights its evolutionary advantages. Like the Wehrmacht itself, readers can skim past the statistics, ignore the lists of material needs, and focus on the thrilling Bewegungskrieg: the war of movement.

While the prequel covers two centuries of warfare, 1942’s staggering campaigns demand the same scope of coverage. The author fits the narrative into a natural three-act play, starting with the previous year as the Wehrmacht utterly crushes Yugoslavia and Greece. While appreciating its capacity to leverage operational movement, we also witness its logistical struggles, technical limitations and psychological drawbacks that pave the way for the second act’s confrontation: Barbarossa. Nazi Germany’s drive towards Moscow is thrilling reading. It’s incredibly entertaining. As a reader, you’ll have to decide whether or not you’ll allow yourself to enjoy war stories, but the tale of Hitler and Stalin in open warfare is some of the finest literature I’ve read all year.

As the third act dawns, there’s a sense of tragedy as Stalingrad and Kursk loom over the horizon. Even Rommel’s successes are nothing more than future cannon fodder for the American industrial juggernaut. The fact is that Death of the Wehrmacht delivers the case that the German Army’s strengths were also its weaknesses. Its aggressiveness made it the perfect mailed fist for a madman like Hitler. Its dogmatic avoidance of static warfare means it would never stop to consolidate its gains. The Wehrmacht spent two centuries with a material disadvantage and learned that offence is the greatest defence; it was always destined for tragedy. Military fiction readers need to put down their Kindle Unlimited garbage and pick up more works like this. It’s superb entertainment, and they’ll be gaining insights from a master of operational analysis. We’d all benefit from learning more from the past.

Highly Recommended.

[Patricia Roberts-Miller · Rating 5 out of 5]

Useful, clear, and persuasive. I found especially helpful the moments that Citino notes what the conventional reading is of the topic at hand (which is sometimes, but not always, a prolepsis). I also appreciated his restraint on counterfactual hypotheses about what figures should have done. The footnotes are very, very helpful.

ETA. On a second reading, it's even better. This is the most readable *and* thorough account of the Nazi military decisions in 1942. His footnotes are also thorough and helpful.

[Luka Novak · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is both intelectual and chronological sequel to The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich. If that book traced development of Prussian/German war fighting through centuries this one covers 192 only (with small dips into 1941). It examines the holy trinity of "German way of war", wars need to be short and sharp, when in doubt attack and move around enemy's flanks and what that ment for Wehrmacht in 1942. It examines Blau (summer offensive in southern Russia) and Rommel's offensives in North Africa.

Citino makes a good case that 1942 was German way of war in a nutshell and why it failed. It's not so much failure of fighting battles, it was that Germany in 1942 faced problems and enemies that their way of war simply couldn't overcome.

Well worth your time to read. And while it can stand alone you'd be much better off reading "German Way of War" first

[Fred · Rating 2 out of 5]

Citino was more interested in pushing an opinion than in becoming an expert on the battles he wrote about. I have five general categories of complaints. 1) There are many errors. Some are from sloppiness and some appear to be from relying on his hazy memory rather than taking good notes. In some parts it’s obvious that he had his source open while he was writing, but he failed to comprehend what was written and as a result rewrote correct statements into incorrect statements like in a game of telephone. Some errors are hard to explain: it seems like he just made things up so he could craft a snappy sound bite. 2) Despite the extensive bibliography, his knowledge is frequently superficial and leads him to make incorrect conclusions. 3) He relied on The Rommel Papers as a sole source for North African logistical data. Every competent historian knows better than to trust the German generals’ memoirs. Here it’s doubly bad because logistics was a sore spot for Rommel, making it naïve to expect an honest and accurate accounting. Citino could have gotten the real numbers from the German official history, which he cited a lot so he clearly had access to it. 4) Most appalling to me was an instance where he resorted to cherry-picking a single entry in Halder’s diary to support his thesis, while ignoring several nearby entries that refute it. 5) He used German transliterations of Soviet town names instead of English. I mean, come on: Ssalsk? The book reads like it was written by King Hiss.

Here are my specific complaints.

Page 20: Kleist wasn’t made a field marshal until February 1, 1943.

Page 35: He berates Stalin for ignoring warnings that the Germans would attack in June 1941. But Stalin’s goal was to provide no evidence of provocation so that he would appear to be an innocent victim and receive substantial assistance from the West. I fail to see how alerting the frontier forces would have made a meaningful difference, and reinforcing the frontier would have just stuck more heads into the noose.

Page 36: He distorts an event beyond recognition just so he can write a couple of snappy sentences. He claims the Soviet 8th Mechanized Corps crashed into the Soviet 13th Mechanized Corps going the opposite direction on the same road on June 22, 1941. "The result, needless to say, was a traffic jam of epic proportions. They might still be there, sorting themselves out, if the Germans hadn't destroyed them both." I looked up his reference, and it was the 13th Rifle Corps, not Mechanized. There was no epic traffic jam and the corps sidled past each other. Both corps survived until August 1941.

Page 47: He makes the false claim that it was the retreat from Moscow that destroyed Napoleon’s army, not the advance. Minard’s famous infographic shows that the advance cost 286,000 men, while the retreat cost only 126,000 men.

Page 56: In 1941, SS-LAH was a motorized brigade, not a Panzer division.

Page 69: 22nd Panzer Division had Czech tanks, not French. The Germans considered French tanks unfit for frontline service. (This is only the first of many errors concerning this unfortunate unit.)

Page 89: He claims that the fighting in the Izyum salient had died down by October 2, 1942. The salient was destroyed in May 1942, so I guess he’s technically correct.

Page 117: Rommel did not wear designer goggles: they were standard British goggles that had been captured.

Page 120: A blocking force is a Sperrverband, not a Sperrband.

Page 121: In March 1941 at Mersa Brega, the British had only one armoured brigade. They did not have Crusader tanks yet. Their captured Italian tanks were not reliable: 6th RTR had to abandon all of them due to breakdowns and running out of fuel. Before the battle a lot of them had overheating problems.

Page 122: 5th RTR only had 25 tanks to begin with, so the Germans could not have destroyed 25 at Agedabia. My best source says 9 were actually lost.

Page 123: Citino quotes a portion of the April 23, 1941 entry in Halder’s war diary and claims that Halder was only complaining about Rommel’s maneuver warfare and “never even mentions the subject” of logistics. He then launches into his caricatured thesis of German generals being concerned only with maneuver warfare and leaving mere logistical matters to clerks. This is selective quoting and cherry-picking that I consider dishonest. In the part of that day’s entry that Citino did not quote, Halder wrote, “Air transport cannot meet Rommel's senseless demands, primarily because of lack of fuel; aircraft landing in North Africa find no fuel there for the return flight.” Earlier in the diary, on February 8 Halder calculated the truck requirements to supply the Africa Corps. March 12: he calculated the different truck requirements for defense-only, conducting a minor offensive, and conducting a major offensive to Tobruk. April 1: he complained that “Rommel shows total lack of interest in supply organization. Transportation lying idle in Naples.” May 5: he summarized the truck situation in Libya. May 6: he complained that stockpiling supplies near the front was impossible. May 8: “Nothing new in Tripoli. Supply is the main problem, as before.” “Rommel is crying for more supplies, especially ammunition.” May 9: “Rommel’s distress calls for supplies are getting more urgent.” May 10: “Clamorings of the Africa Corps for supplies increase and grow more urgent.” May 11: “Situation in North Africa unpleasant. By overstepping his orders, Rommel has brought about a situation, for which our present supply capabilities are insufficient. Rommel cannot cope with the situation.”

Yep, that wacky old Halder sure didn’t care about logistics…

Page 124: Citino revives the old myth that 90th Light Division had specialized desert training and equipment. It was actually just cobbled together from random battalions and was unmotorized until 1942. The Germans actually had less desert expertise than the Italians and British and had to play catch up once they arrived.

The Suez Canal did not help the British build up faster. Convoys took the long way around the Cape of Good Hope and unloaded in Suez at the south end of the canal.

Rommel had more than a corps for Operation Crusader. He had an army-sized Panzer Group if you count the Italians. Is Citino siding with van Creveld, who notoriously dismissed the Italians as “useless ballast”? The Italians actually fought so well in this battle that the Commonwealth tried to falsify the historical record, claiming that some of their defeats at the hands of the Italians had actually been against Germans.

Page 125: The XIII Corps plan was not to frontally assault the Axis frontier line, break through, and then advance to Tobruk. The New Zealand Division actually skirted around the line on its way to Tobruk, while 4th Indian Division also skirted around it and then attacked the line from the rear.

7th Armoured Brigade occupied Sidi Rezegh before Rommel attacked it. There was no German ambush on the way there.

The Totensonntag attack had the Axis tanks and 15th Panzer Division’s infantry attacking from the south while 21st Panzer Division’s infantry formed an anvil in the north. It was not an east-west concentric attack.

Page 126: The Germans only got within 28 miles of 8th Army HQ, not 15. This is not a case of dueling sources: I looked it up in Citino’s source.

Page 127: 8th Army was not stripped to send forces to the Far East, it just had reinforcements diverted. The front was weak because there wasn’t enough transport to supply a large force that far away from the railhead and Tobruk.

Page 130: 15th Panzer Division’s commander’s name was spelled Vaerst, not Värst.

Page 131: 1st Armoured Division was on or a bit south of the Trigh Capuzzo, not well south.

Page 132: Ritchie was not correct to deploy some armor towards the south of the Gazala line: it didn’t give the British enough time to concentrate to face the Axis attack. He should have listened to Auchinleck and placed the armor concentrated and farther north. If Ritchie’s deployment was “obviously” appropriate, why was it defeated so badly? (“Obvious” is the word Citino uses in note 58.)

22nd Armoured Brigade was at the Trigh el Abd, not Knightsbridge.

Page 137: 7th Motor Brigade was at Retma, not Bir el Gubi.

Page 138: Rommel had 3 German divisions, not 4.

Page 145: Tobruk was legitimately invested, with most of the perimeter ending up being manned by the Italians. The British had to fight hard to break out in 1941. Citino makes it sound like the Italians weren’t even there.

Halder was disquieted by the Panzer Group’s strained logistics, not by the inability to cut off Tobruk’s seaborne supply line.

Page 146: Tobruk did have military value to the Axis. It was a port well forward of Benghazi. Without a railroad or unlimited trucks, forward ports were necessary to supply an advance into Egypt.

201st Guards Brigade was infantry, not armor.

Page 148: The highway was called the Via Balbia, not Balba.

Page 149: 7035 was the total number of sorties in North Africa in June 1942, not just from Fliegerkorps X. It seems like Citino thought Fliegerkorps X was the Luftwaffe’s North Africa unit, when it was actually the Greece unit that just loaned planes for this offensive. And it’s taken from page 699 of the German official history (volume 6), not page 629.

Page 178: He calls the 22nd Panzer Division the 2nd Panzer.

Page 179: He calls the 22nd Panzer Division the 21st Panzer.

Page 182: He claims 3rd Panzer, 23rd Panzer, and 29th Motorized Divisions had 90, 90, and 50 tanks, respectively. The actual totals were 162, 138, and 56, so he’s off by 35%.

Page 195: He claims that the Axis in North Africa received 3000 tons of supplies in June 1942 against a requirement of 60,000 tons, which was not once achieved in the war. His source was The Rommel Papers. The actual number was 32,327 tons arriving, and there were 13 months where the total exceeded 60,000. This is why your professors not named Citino taught you not to trust the German generals’ memoirs!

Page 196: Citino mislabels the Italian 20th Army Corps as 20th Motorized Corps. 90th Light Division is wrongly given the symbol of an armored reconnaissance unit. Some British infantry units are wrongly given motorized reconnaissance symbols.

Page 203: The Parpach (Kerch) line was not almost exactly the same width as the Alamein line. They were 10 miles and 40 miles, respectively.

Page 227: It was the Italian 8th Army, not 9th.

Page 230: The 16th Motorized and Grossdeutschland Divisions did have tanks in 1942, and having tanks was not a hindrance to rapid movement. The USSR had terrible roads.

Page 234: Citino insists that it was a big deal for 4th Panzer Army and 3rd Romanian Army to be diverted from the Caucasus to Stalingrad and the Don flank, leaving Army Group A with only two armies instead of four. But 4th Panzer Army had been so weakened by detachments to 6th Army and 1st Panzer Army that it comprised only four divisions when it headed north (1 Panzer, 1 motorized, and 2 infantry). When HQ 3rd Romanian Army left the Caucasus, it left behind all its divisions with 17th Army. The divisions it commanded along the Don were all fresh reinforcements that had never been earmarked for the Caucasus. Therefore, the diversion of those two armies away from the Caucasus cost Army Group A a mere four divisions.

Page 239: The Soviets did have a vulnerable flank in the Caucasus in the Nogai Steppe, the Germans just lacked the forces to stretch their line and take advantage.

Page 241: It was the Romanian 2nd Mountain Division, not Guards Division.

Page 245: It was the 44th Infantry Division, not the 4th. 76th and 295th Infantry Divisions did not reach the front until August 6. Citino left out the 297th Infantry Division from 51st Corps.

Page 247: Hube commanded the 16th Panzer Division, not the 3rd. The 3rd wasn’t even in 6th Army; it was in 1st Panzer Army. Citino makes the same mistake again on page 306, so this is not just a random typo.

Page 253: He says German pioneers were not trained in the coordination of fire and movement and were too encumbered to exploit the holes they made. This is flat out wrong. Pioneer training was on the par of regular infantry and they had similar amounts of machine guns and mortars. The pioneers’ encumbrance just didn’t let them carry as many bullets so they were more prone to run out. We’re expected to believe that this guy is an expert on the Wehrmacht?

Page 254: Note 106 cites the German official history volume 6, page 957, but that page does not contain the information Citino claims it does. It could be true, we just have no way of verifying it.

The Germans took 256,100 casualties in August 1942, not 200,000. And January 1943’s toll was higher, so it’s incorrect to claim August 1942 losses were a “high point during more than two years of war in the east.”

Page 257: Guderian was not distracted by Kursk during Operation Typhoon. That was in 2nd Army’s sector.

Page 273: Citino claims “The many analysts who criticize Montgomery for his formulation and handling of the El Alamein battle have never come up with any better suggestions.” Um, Citino cites Correlli Barnett a lot, and Barnett suggested that Monty shouldn’t have crammed two corps into the same narrow sector. Furthermore, Barnett wondered if the battle should have been fought at all. Operation Torch would have forced Rommel to retreat without a fight, so there was no reason to impale 8th Army on this bristly position other than to make Monty a viscount.

Page 275: Citino claims that “Great Britain had faced Germany alone for the first two years of the war”. Sure, if you ignore the Poles, French, and Soviets!

Page 277: Citino goes back for more of The Rommel Papers and makes a fool of himself again. Citino claims that in August 1942 Panzer Army Africa had 82,000 Germans and 42,000 Italians. But those selfish Italians gave themselves three times as much supply: 8200 tons for the Germans versus 25,700 for the Italians. According to the German official history (p. 775) the true numbers were 48,854 Germans and 54,000 Italians. And page 834 says the true supply totals were 22,178 tons for the Germans and 29,477 tons for the Italians. That was actually fairly equitable.

Citino also swallows Rommel’s claim of receiving only 120,000 tons of supplies over the first 8 months of 1942. The true number is 584,834 tons.

Page 279: The Trieste Division was actually in the very north behind the front at the beginning of the battle, not in the south.

Page 286: Citino misidentified three out of four of the Axis units overrun by Operation Supercharge. They should be 12th Bersaglieri Regiment, not “Italian Bersaglieri Regiment”; 115/15th Panzer not 155/15th Panzer; and 200/90 not 155/90. One error was from miscopying the German official history, and two errors were from faithfully copying the German official history’s mistakes.

Page 291: The 22nd Panzer Division again! It had mostly medium tanks at this point, not light. Its Czech tanks had been handed down to Panzerverband 700 and replaced with German tanks. And technically the Czech tanks were medium, not light. They were just obsolete by then.

Page 292: 21st Army’s commander was Chistyakov, not Christiakov.

Page 297: Not all of Romanian 4th Army was weak. 18th Infantry Division was a recent arrival and was still at full strength.

He says 29th and 16th Motorized Divisions probably had a total of 20 tanks. The actual numbers were 59 and 43 tanks, respectively. He’s off by 80%!

Page 300: Army Group B was not dissolved in November 1942; it was dissolved on February 9, 1943.

Page 301: 23rd Panzer Division started Operation Winter Storm with 95 tanks, not 30.

[Martin Samuels · Rating 4 out of 5]

Robert Citino is one of the most significant experts on the German Army of the period from 1919 to 1945, and of the 'German way of warfare' more generally, and this expertise is expressed through a prolific series of books. This one, covering 1942, is a fine addition to his output, and has subsequently spawned sequels for the subsequent years of the war.

In some respects, the title is a misnomer, in that the Wehrmacht clearly did not die in 1942, given that it took a further two and a half years of severe fighting before the war was finally ended. What Citino shows in this book, however, was how 1942 represented the death of the key essence of the German way of warfare, which had been at the centre of the country's military style for almost three centuries - Bewegungskrieg (war of mobility). He characterises this approach as one that was centred on an overwhelming energy and aggression by commanders, who could be relied upon not only to march to the sound of the guns but also to attack in the boldest manner, almost regardless of the odds. This reliance on very rapid movement and operations, coupled with the willingness of officers to take personal responsibility and of their troops to continue even in the harshest situations, made for an army that was almost irresistable.

What Citino shows in this book is how these characteristics brought the German Army some of its most stunning successes during the first part of 1942, such as Manstein's conquest of the Crimea and the victory at Kharkov, victories all the more astonishing because of the significantly disadvantageous odds in terms of force numbers and supply under which they were won. Yet he also shows how these victories led the German High Command, not merely due to Hitler's own personal military incompetence, but also the over-confidence of many of the officers around him, to push the army into a series of campaigns that was simply beyond both its capabilities and also beyond the context within which Begegungskrieg could operate effectively. Although the advances of late 1942 were again recordbreaking, whether those into the Caucasus or toward Stalingrad or those by Rommel that brought him almost to the gates of Alexandria, they left the German forces so totally overstretched, thinly spread and exhausted, that they were simply incapable of going any further, and were compelled to revert to the anathaema for every German commander: Stellungskrieg (war of positions). This form of warfare favours mass and material, both of which, by late 1942, the Allies had in abundance and the Germans did not. This was the 'death of the Wehrmacht'. After this, the result was never in doubt, even though it was hard fought.

Citino has a clear and engaging writing style. The chapters weave the whole enormous campaign into a clear narrative, capturing the key details on the ground without overwhelming the grand strategic view. The argument is well made and there are a number of useful asides, where he considers aspects of the warfighting approach displayed by the various armies. There are numerous maps and these are generally clear and useful, though on occasion there is mention of places that do not appear on the maps. A key achievement of Citino's narrative is how he avoids too much of the risk of hindsight - we know that the German campaigns faltered and stopped before reaching any decisive result, but the commanders (on both sides) did not have that luxury at the time. Citino brings out well the sense that, in the summer and early autumn of 1942, the German Army continued to sweep all before it, and might yet erupt into the Middle East, from North Africa and the Caucasus, with incalculable consequences.

An excellent work. Very highly recommended.

[Mark Blane · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic undertaking by Citino of explaining why 1942 was the beginning of the end for the Wehrmacht aka " Germany's defense strength, aka "armed forces" (basically Germany's Army forces since 80%-90% of the heavy lifting during WW2 was done by the Wehrmacht).

In order to get their, Citino takes you on a journey on the mentality of military training of the Wehrmacht and it's 300 years of Prussian military history. You cannot understand the death of the Wehrmacht without understanding it's military thinking. This book takes you there, and then gives the real world examples of battles fought by the Germans in all of the campaigns in 1942, which culminated in five full German victories in May of 1942: Gazala, Tobruck, Kerch, Kharkov, and Sevastopol. All five victories happening on the Eastern Front, and North Africa.

Casino then cleverly contrasts that with its downfall shortly thereafter resulting in three slow defeats (Stellungskrieg, aka "war of position) in Stalingrad, The Caucasus, and El Alamein (North Africa). The reader is offered objective evidence as to why this occurred ranging from a total 180 degree turn away from Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) doctrine, to no movement at all.

Surprisingly, for me, radio was one of the culprits. Now, a defiant Führer (Hitler), could make operational decisions 1000 miles away and influence the commander on the field, and not necessarily in all good ways. Citino goes into other reasons, but certainly radio is one that was eye opening for me, as I never consider the implications, and how it can go against 300 years of German doctrinal teaching in the art of Bewegungskrieg.

All in all, the reader will be left with a deeper sense of the Wehrmacht military doctrine and how it was powerful and successful, but also how it slowly began to unwind itself. Other considerations to think about were the entrance of the U.S. power in WW2, with its never-ending industrial strength, and it's Manhattan Project. However, Citino leaves those ideas for another book, or for others to discern. This book will become the main post sail in your arsenal of ships when it comes to German warfare in its successes and its losses, and eventual downfall that led to its eventual sinking in the mire of battles inside of WW2.

[David AL · Rating 5 out of 5]

El libro de Citino merece todos los halagos, es una obra magistral desde el punto de vista de la historia militar operacional, pero también desde la historia cultural de la guerra. Explica con toda claridad qué llevó al fracaso de las campañas alemanas de 1942 en el sur de la Unión Soviética y Egipto, aunque en realidad, como explica, fuera por un pelo, al menos en lo que respecta a sus objetivos últimos (toma de Stalingrado, conquista de los campos petrolíferos del Cáucaso y cierre del canal de Suez). Junto a los Glantz, Stahel, Rutherford, Millett, Murray o Schmider, entre otros, Citino es parte muy protagonista de la historiografía más avanzada del mundo anglo que se ha fraguado en los últimos treinta años, de una factura y calidad excepcional en el manejo de fuentes y con un gran poderío interpretativo a la hora de desmontar los mitos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Como parte de esta corriente renovadora, Citino demuestra que las campañas de 1942 supusieron el fin de una cultura o doctrina militar fraguada en la tradición prusiana-alemana desde el siglo XVII que se había basado en varios principios: la búsqueda de la aniquilación del enemigo en la alta capacidad maniobrera, las ofensivas concéntricas y las batallas de cerco; el altísimo grado de autonomía del oficial con mando sobre el terreno en la toma de decisiones, que decidía sobre el mejor modo de perseguir y alcanzar los objetivos marcados por el Estado Mayor; y la creencia en la primacía de la voluntad sobre la superioridad material y numérica del enemigo. La guerra industrial de masas que la Gran Alianza URSS-GB-USA fueron capaces de poner en marcha acabó haciendo inoperativa esa concepción alemana de la guerra artesanal nacida en la Edad Moderna. Por supuesto, el conocimiento cada vez mayor de las debilidades del enemigo favoreció la victoria aliada, que entre otras cosas mostró una preocupación infinitamente mayor por la logística (no hacer nada que no permitieran los medios con que se cuentan para sostener los despliegues operativos) y por la inteligencia (la alemana fue nefasta en todo el curso de la guerra).

La edición española, hoy casi imposible de encontrar, está llena de erratas. Un libro de esta calidad, además, merecía más y mejores mapas.

[Lloyd · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the first book in the trilogy Robert Citino has written about the German Army in World War II (WWII). I gave it 5 stars because it is a well written and informative book about the subject of the German Army. For history to be “well written”, it must be readable. In cannot be a boring drudge through facts and dates. This book explains the how and why of the German War doctrine and how it created early success but why that doctrine and its related success wasn’t sustainable in the long run. Also, how the history of German (and in particular Prussian) armies impacted the practices and tactics of the German Army in WWII. And then, why those previous events and the “will” of the smaller army overcame the odds in the past, but could no longer be heavily relied upon in the future. There is plenty of info in this book on Hitler’s interference in the strategies and tactics and how that was no help to the German war effort. And, I think there is an even presentation not often found in WWII history of how Germany’s allies in WWII (the Italians, Romanians and Hungarians) preformed. Mr. Citino gives them credit when it is due and points out their failings when necessary, along with explanation for their failures. And, the Germans bare a large part of the responsibility for those failures due to lack of logistical support.

[Maria · Rating 4 out of 5]

1942 contained the biggest Wehrmacht triumphs of its entire history at Kerch and Kharkov and it contained it's biggest defeats at El Alamein and Stalingrad. Citino argues that all of these campaigns followed the Prussian/German traditions of the "independence of the subordinate commander." Those traditions were broken by Hitler and chief of staff General Franz Halder with their access to daily radio reports. That the whole Wehrmacht and Hitler believed that short, rapid agression was the solution to Germany's chronic shortages and disadvantages. And while they were so close, the seeds of their defeat were present the whole time.

Why I started this book: This has been on my professional reading list for years, but was recently recorded as an audiobook. So I bought it and eagerly started it.

Why I finished it: I love a long history audiobook, and I listened to this in large gulps. I'm so glad that this was recently recorded and am looking forward to The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944-1945.

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book is certainly interesting. It uses multiple battles and campaigns from Operation Barabossa to explain why the Germans failed to adequately respond to the Soviet Unions offensives later in the war: the Wehrmacht kept on looking for decisive battles of destruction to win the conflict. The Soviets simply bided their time and attrited the German forces to such a degree that the Germans lost nearly all initiative following their initial advance into the Soviet Union.

Well written and does a good job of explaining the decision making process of the German Army along with their doctrinal biases and why it fell short. Most importantly, the book is not written as a form of apologilia for the atrocities that the Wehrmacht and other elements of the German state committed during the conflict. It simply explains what the Wehrmacht did and does not shy away from mentioning the crimes against humanity the Nazis committed during this terrible conflict.

[Kiowa · Rating 4 out of 5]

For the military enthusiast-and there is no greater epic in history full of the greatest thematic hyperbole than the Eastern Front and the high water mark of German military conquest in late 1942.

Although undoubtedly a good thing, the death of the Wehrmacht reads like a tragic love story or incredible rags to riches story.

Citino manages to deliver the three turning points for Germany in ‘42 in an effortless, concise and friendly pace.
Not only are the campaigns covered in satisfactory detail, but the insights are just as profound, objective and agreeable as the pace.

I’ve read hundreds of stories and accounts about the Wehrmacht but this surely ranks as one of the best; most notably Citino’s insights into the Prussian/German military culture and ethos - citing greats like Clausewitz. Superb book.

[Xavier · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent and thoroughly readable operational level account of the German campaigns in 1942, a year which saw stunning heights and crippling lows for the Wehrmacht. Citino explains the events and operational decisions by drawing on the history of the military doctrine of bewegungskrieg, characteristic of the Prussian army since it came into existence. The doctrine called for “a short and lively war” to be fought in a highly aggressive style, with commanders and officers in the field making many of their own decisions to respond to the current situation. The title refers to the ultimate failings of this traditional way of war made clear in 1942.

I’d highly recommend this book to anyone who already has some knowledge about WWII and is fascinated by Germany, it’s way of war, and it’s repeated trouncing if it’s enemies at the operational level, but ultimate defeat.

[Iain · Rating 4 out of 5]

An engaging read that makes some intriguing points. The author's footnotes are an interesting blend German writing and sources as diverse as wargame magazine articles and general histories. The one unifying theme is very few primary sources. In general it works well, although the author does at times make contentions I have never heard put forward without any sources whatsoever.

That said, this is a must read for anyone interested in the German army during 1942.

[JerryDeanHalleck · Rating 2 out of 5]

Detailed, balanced account of German leadership and campaigns of 1942. Citino relates the Das Herr Generalship back to "German Army tradition" which goes all the way back to Von Clausewitz. and Von Moltke. He also takes a look at the Soviet side, and the British in North Africa.

Citino seems to be very knowledgable. But his informal, chatty style grated on me. Otherwise I'd give it 3 stars.

[solo · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5★ rounded up. despite being subtitled "German Campaigns of 1942", it actually presents a fairly compelling take on The German Way of War™ in general, presumably expanding on Citino's previous work. well, and on the campaigns of 1942 as well, since we're at it. i think i'll be reading more Citino...

[Brice Fuqua · Rating 5 out of 5]

How the German army went from six victories to two colossal defeats in the space of one year. Citino's book is scholarly , yet highly readable. Recommended for WWII buffs. Also, check out Cinitno's excellent lectures on YouTube .

[harmony B · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic summary of events telling a story of breathtaking scope without (mostly) resorting to the jargon of describing units moving around the battlefield. Incredibly compelling story about the beginning of the end for fascist Germany.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Aside from being a fantastic read and a masterful argument for the nature of the totalitarian war-machine of Nazi Germany, this book never strays from foregrounding that the goal of that war-making machine was genocidal at its roots.

[Rudy · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5 stars; is a clear, operationally focused summary of the Wehrmacht campaigns of 1942. Brings out personalities of individuals and armies, and is able to connect numbers and narrative effectively. Does a great job with context. A real page turner.

[Tomáš Bazinek · Rating 4 out of 5]

Popis německých tažení v roce 1942 a proč došlo k jejich neúspěchu: taktika neustále vpřed narazila na své limity.

[JimmytheFoot · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of my favorite modern war studies books.