The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

Campaign Chronicles

by Alexander Mikaberidze

On 7 September 1812 at Borodino, 75 miles west of Moscow, the armies of the Russian and French empires clashed in one of the climactic battles of the Napoleonic Wars. This horrific - and controversial - contest has fascinated historians ever since. The survival of the Russian army after Borodino was a key factor in Napoleon's eventual defeat and the utter destruction of the French army of 1812.In this thought-provoking new study, Napoleonic historian Alexander Mikaberidze reconsiders the 1812 campaign and retells the terrible story of the Borodino battle as it was seen from the Russian point of view. His original and painstakingly researched investigation of this critical episode in Napoleon's invasion of Russia provides the reader with a fresh perspective on the battle and a broader understanding of the underlying reasons for the eventual Russian triumph.

Genres: History, Russia, Military History, Nonfiction, France, Russian History, War

304 pages, Paperback

First published November 1, 2007

About the author

Alexander Mikaberidze is assistant professor of European history at Louisiana State University in Shreveport. He holds a degree in international law from Tbilisi State University (Republic of Georgia, 1999) and a Ph.D. in history from Florida State University (2003). After working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (1996-2000), he taught European and Middle Eastern history at Florida State and Mississippi State Universities and lectured on strategy and policy for the U.S. Naval War College. For his contributions to the Napoleonic studies, he has been awarded the International Napoleonic Society's Legion of Merit Medal and La Renaissance Française's Médaille d'or du Rayonnement Culturel.


Dr. Mikaberidze specializes in the 18th-19th century Europe, particularly the Napoleonic Wars, and the military history of the Middle East. In addition to his articles, Dr. Mikaberidze has written and edited nine books, including Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: Historical Encyclopedia (2011), Napoleon's Great Escape: The Crossing of the Berezina (2010), The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon versus Kutuzov (2007), Historical Dictionary of Georgia (2007), The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815 (2005, winner of the 2005 Literary Prize of the International Napoleonic Society), The Czar’s General: The Memoirs of a Russian General in the Napoleonic Wars (2005).

Reviews

[Betsy]

BORODINO September, 1812 Napoleon has, since June, been trying to bring the Russian Army to battle in order to defeat them and find peace. Unfortunately for him, Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, who commands the 1st Western Army, has decided that retreat is the best thing. Let the vast expanses of Russia's interior do the work! And he has been right despite the protests of many Russians who demand a battle. Pytor Bagration, the commander of the 2nd Western Army, has made Barclay's life miserable by hinting that Barclay isn't a true Russian if he won't fight. Chaos reigns until Tsar Alexander decides to place Mikhail Kutuzov in command, not that he is an ideal choice, but the army backs him because he is Russian! Finally, there is to be a battle, one of the bloodiest battles in history, one in which both sides claim victory.

The author, Alexander Mikaberidze, does a fine job describing the fighting and intrigues of this battle and its consequences. The casualty lists are immense, the French cavalry losses never recover, and while taking Moscow (actually the Russians abandon the city) the French do not find peace. They spend a costly month in a burned out city before starting back to France. This notorious retreat seals the fate of the once-proud Grande Armee.

Most of these aspects are discussed, but since this was a battle fought mainly because of the need of one man, it is ironic that Napoleon was not at his best, only partly because of health. Napoleon's 'star' would rally, but it would never again be the inspiration it was before Russia and Borodino.

[Derek Weese]

Most books that deal with the Napoleonic Wars focus on either Napoleon or the British. The focus on the one makes certain sense as, well, the entire era is named after him after all; while the focus on the British can get annoying seeing as how they were largely involved in the periphery while the Hapsburgs, the Prussians and the Russians did most of the fighting/dying. However nearly all books on the subject deal with the Russians in a uniform way: they were brave, yet simple minded automatons.
The truth is that they were brave, and also Napoleons greatest foe and the ones responsible for his eventual defeat.
Dr. Alexander Mikaberidze writes the best book thus far written on the Battle of Borodino largely because he writes it from the Russian perspective. Alexander himself is a Georgian and his command of the Russian language gives him the requisite skill set to research Russian archives and to produce a far more balanced story of possibly one of the greatest battles in history.
The story of this climactic battle goes back to the winter of 1806-07 when Russia intervened on behalf of the Prussians who had been crushed with ease by the French forces under Napoleon. The old Army of Frederick the Great was destroyed at the twin Battles of Jena (led by Napoleon) and Auerstadt (led by Marshall Louis Nicolas Davout) and then ensuing cavalry pursuit across basically the whole of Prussia. Emperor Alexander I of Russia, an ally of Prussia, marched an army under Bennigsen to intercept and destroy Napoleon.
The following campaign took place in Poland and it was bloody, and fierce and made more severe by the harsh winter weather. At the Battle of Eylau in February of 1807 the Russians delivered Napoleons first battlefield defeat, forever tarnishing his army's aura of invincibility. However, in the spring, Napoleon rebounded and trapped Bennigsen's army with their backs to a river at the city of Friedland. Normally this is where a Military Historian would deliver a pithy comment about Sun Tzu and how by putting your army in death ground they will fight. However this strategy rarely seems to work other than for Sun Tzu. At Antietam Lee faced McClellan's much larger Army of the Potomac with his back to the Potomac River. Lee delivered a tactical defeat to the Union forces there and even managed to retreat unmolested (mostly) back to Virginia. However there is where the similarities end: Bennigsen was no Lee and Napoleon was sure as hell no McClellan. As a rule of thumb, if your enemy maneuvers you into death ground please bear in mind that generally he intends to kill you there. And at Friedland La Grande Armee killed a very large number of Russian soldiers, smashed their army and won one of Napoleon's most decisive victories. Emperor Alexander I was forced to come to terms with Napoleon and duly signed the Treaty of Tilsit.
This alliance though was fraught with problems from the get go. First of all Napoleon, one of the most ardent romanticists in history (one reason why it's so easy to admire him) was looking for a replacement for the less than faithful Josephine (as if Napoleon was himself a paragon of sexual virtue. The man could make most rappers and rockers look abstinent.) and looked, initially, to Russia to find a suitable marriage. Marriage was far more than just two souls falling in love and wishing to spend eternity together all others be damned (as awesome as that is); in this context marriage was also a political tool. (Which sucks if your the woman as this means that basically, your just a tool of state...) However the Russians weren't interested in having the little Napoleon rutting around with one of their young ladies of the Court. Napoleon at least found his match, but only after smashing the Austro-Hungarians in 1809.
While Napoleon was retrieving a disastrous situation in Spain by personally taking charge of his armies there, the Hapsburgs under Archduke Charles led their newly reformed army into Bavaria in the hopes of causing a nationalistic German uprising and thus destroying Napoleon's alliance. The Austro-Hungarians, however, were not to have their way. For one the German states actually rallied to Napoleon's cause with the Bavarian's, Saxon's and Badener's especially fighting like tigers against the Hapsburg invasion. Even worse Napoleon rushed reinforcements from across Spain, France and Germany and personally took charge driving the Hapsburg's back into Austria, taking Vienna, and fighting two horrifically bloody battles before the Austrians sought peace. (It must be said that Archduke Charles delivered Napoleon's second battlefield defeat at Aspern-Essling just outside Vienna.) One of the terms of the peace was Napoleon's marriage to young, gorgeous Maria Theresa who bore him a son. It was necessary to overview 1809 as part of the Treaty with Russia meant that Napoleon would receive Russian support in case of war with any European power.
Despite the less than joyous relationship with the Hapsburgs, Alexander and his Court was loathe to assist Napoleon in yet another conquest. Russian forces did push into Austrian controlled Galicia, but achieved little.
It didn't help matters any that Russia was less than happy with Napoleon's creation of an independent Polish state (the Grand Duchy of Warsaw: the Pole's would subsequently fight ferociously for Napoleon till the very end in honor of this) and the worse happenstance to befall the short lived and ill fated Franco-Russian alliance was the Decree's of Berlin.
At the Berlin Decree's Napoleon created the nail that would eventually be hammered into his coffin. It was here that the Continental System: whereby British goods were embargoed from the continent and only non-British goods could be traded across Europe in the hopes of ruining Britain's economy. Well and good...except it was a total failure. British goods were superior to French or even German goods and due to their means of manufacture were slightly cheaper as well. As a consequence many European states began means of contravening Napoleon's economic blockade. All of these factors led to mutual distrust and eventual bitterness between the two Emperors. (Napoleon seemed to especially take this hard as he actually liked Alexander and wanted to be liked in return.) All of these led to war.
Napoleon's assembled force was massive, close to 600,000 men invaded Russia. Napoleon's force, however, was an allied army made up of not just French but also Spanish, Dutch, Swiss, Austrian-Hungarian, Croatian, Polish, Italian and troops from all of the German states including Prussia. Most of whom would never see home again. The war, which was largely fought to uphold a failing economic system, spelt the doom of Napoleon.
Alexander (the author, not the Emperor) shows that the traditional way of viewing the Russian invasion of 1812 is false. It wasn't a designed strategy on behalf of the Russians to withdraw into Russia's interior and to scorch the earth as they went. This did happen but it wasn't necessarily by design. Napoleon with the main arm of the invasion (which was divided into three wings) tried to entrap the main Russian forces under Bennigsen again and annihilate them in one epic battle. Bennigsen, however, had different ideas. He refused to fight more than rear guard actions against Napoleon's forces which steadily drained men and material from Napoleon's rosters. Most importantly, however, it caused chaos in the Russian army.
Proponents of the 'retreat to victory' school of American Military History (especially amongst American Civil War scholars) tend to forget that retreating is a rather demoralizing event for the troops involved in said retreat. Their only major encounter was the Battle of Smolensk which Napoleon won although both sides would lose 10,000 men during the fighting and the old city itself was mostly destroyed, further eroding Russian morale especially when they, yet again, retreated. As a consequence Bennigsen was sacked and replaced by the older Mikhail Kutuzov. Kutuzov finally offered battle to Napoleon near Borodino, not far from Moscow.
Fought in two days spanning September 5-7, 1812 the Battle of Borodino was easily one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century nee all of Military History. The Allied forces mostly rushed headfirst against prepared Russian positions, blasting with huge numbers of massed artillery while being blasted in return. Massive, thundering cavalry charges from both sides swept back and forth across the field. The thunder of artillery and the crackling of musket fire literally morphed into one massive, unending apocalyptic cacaphony. By the end of the day the Allied forces had seized the key sites of the battlefield, but at dreadful cost. Roughly 35,000 ALlied and 45,000 Russian soldiers would either be killed, wounded or captured and there was very few of the latter. Riding along the corpse and body strewn battlefield the next day, after the Russian withdrawal, Napoleon and his staff came across a wounded Russian who was struck by one of the horses of one of his staff members. The staff officer muttered: 'He's only a Russian...' whereupon Napoleon whirled on him and exclaimed heatedly: 'In victory there are no enemies!' and he then ordered his Egyptian Mameluke bodyguard to give the Russian water from Napoleon's own flask. (It is highly doubtful that Hitler, who is too often erroneously compared to Napoleon [nothing could be more flattering to Hitler and nothing could be more insulting to Napoleon], would have offered such humanity to a fallen foe)
Napoleon won the battle, but just barely. And although he took Moscow, Emperor Alexander I refused to sign a peace. Kutuzov withdrew his army to Tauritson, south of Moscow and a perfect spot to block either an advance or a withdrawal by Napoleon via a southward route into the resource rich Ukraine. With winter coming on Napoleon would have no choice but to retreat. His retreat was pretty much the most disastrous retreat in Military History. Napoleon's grand Allied army was mostly destroyed and although he would rebuild his forces following the disaster his army would never be the same.
Alexander Mikaberidze's book is a very good one. If for nothing else read it for the Russian viewpoint to one of the most interesting and even stirring periods in all of human history. Well recommended.

[Windsor]

Still liked brezina more, although this account of borodino seems to be a little more organized than chandlers

[Piotrek K.]

Nie jest to opis epicki - kto takiego szuka, niech poczyta Tołstoja "Wojnę i pokój". To zapis w dużej części liczbowy: ilu było, ilu atakowało, ilu zginęło, ile armat, ile redut, ile szarż, ilu rannych. Są momenty bardziej dramatyczne, które sprawiają, że mimo wszystko ten skrupulatny zapis daje się przyswajać jako dość pasjonująca historia. Mamy więc opisy napięć pomiędzy oficerami dowodzącymi, opisy zmiatanych z tułowi głów, druzgotanych rąk, wyrzynania się oddziałów. Prawdę mówiąc, lepiej bym to sobie zwizualizował oglądając jakąś animację lub film, co zamierzam uczynić. Wartość książki w moim mniemaniu podnosi to, że autor przedstawia perspektywę obu walczących stron: francuskiej i rosyjskiej, przy czym ta druga – mam wrażenie – zajmuje więcej miejsca. Audiobook czytany jest przez sztuczną inteligencję, ale daje radę słuchać.

Poniżej garść ciekawostek, które może kogoś zachęcą do czytania:

Kolumny Francuzów maszerujące we wrześniu 1812 r. przed bitwą pod Borodino maszerowały w takim kurzu, że nie widziały się z odległości dwóch jardów. Ludzie byli tak spragnieni, że widziano człowieka, który położył się na brzuchu i pił końskie szczyny z ziemi.

Piechurzy z kawałków szkła robili sobie okulary oprawione w skórę zwierzęcą, żeby zasłaniać oczy, zawiązywali chustki wokół głowy, zostawiając szpary na oczy, zrywali liście z okolicznych drzew i kładli je na oczy lub do ust, żeby się ochłodzić.

W armii carskiej służyło wielu oficerów niemieckich oraz innych narodowości pokonanych przez Napoleona. Ten napływ cudzoziemców był źle widziany w armii – przypuszczam, że w niej żywy był nacjonalizm rosyjski. Ponadto w armii trwał opór przeciwko głównodowodzącemu, który był z pochodzenia Niemcem. Zarzucano temu dowódcy, że cały czas się cofa, a gdy padł Smoleńsk, car Aleksander musiał dokonać zmiany dowodzącego, wybierając na niego Kutuzowa.

Miał wówczas 65 lat, był otyły, był sybarytą, ale bardzo przebiegłym. Zyskał sławę wojnami na południu Bałkanów z Turcją. Aleksander osobiście go nie lubił, ale ugiął się przed vox populi, bo armia chciała mieć nowego dowódcę – rodowitego Rosjanina z zasłużonego rosyjskiego rodu.

Pewien francuski wynalazca, który nie wzbudził zaufania Napoleona, przyjął propozycję pracy dla Aleksandra, cara Rosji. Pracował w Rosji pod pseudonimem Schmidt i budował machinę latającą – coś w rodzaju sterowca z podczepianą gondolą – obiecując, że będzie mogło w nim siedzieć do 40 żołnierzy, którzy będą mogli zbombardować przeciwnika. Prace przeciągały się, wydano na nie ogromne ilości pieniędzy, ale w czasie bitwy pod Borodino sprzęt nie był gotowy. Niemniej jest ciekawe, że Aleksander miał nadzieję na wykorzystanie takiego bombowca w czasie napadu Napoleona.

Napoleon w tym czasie był już trochę schorowany, miał poważne trudności z oddawaniem moczu (kropelka po kropelce), przeziębił się także w czasie bitwy pod Borodino i miał gorączkę. W przededniu tej bitwy odbyła się bitwa o pewną redutę umocnioną przez Rosjan, gdzie wyrzynali się, atakując ją, Polacy, Rosjanie i Francuzi.

[Jeff Clay]

The first -- at least historically speaking -- of Mikaberidze's accounts of Napoleon's doomed 1812 Russian campaign (followed by The Burning of Moscow and The Battle of the Berezina), The Battle of Borodino was a confused and confusing slaughter of men and potentially a book of this battle could easily suffer the same fate. Fortunately, the author is too good of an organizer -- as well as a writer -- for that to happen.

The first 48 pages Mikaberidze spends on the weeks leading up to the big battle. I was aware of those early maneuvers and battles, Lubino, Smolensk, and Shevardino; of the Russians retreating and the internal distress and machinations brought on by that; of Napolean's growing frustration at not getting his big battle; but it was good to review it all again. The next 15 pages is spent on what he titles Armies and Leaders. Frankly, though I appreciated the effort that went into the numbers and charts and graphs, as a non-military tactician I skimmed these pages. The real meat of the book begins on page 64 with 6 September: The Eve of the Bloodbath. This sets the stage admirably for the bulk of the book, a detailed, almost hour by hour account of the day-long slug-fest.

The notes and bibliography that supports Mikaberidze's research and writing are copious. Reading archival, primary and secondary sources in, likely, his second language, Russian (Georgian being his native language), was clearly a great help to him in laying out the Russian sides of things. I use the plural of 'side' as there was much Russian rivalry before, during and after the battle. So much so that nationalistic 'spin' has played a role in re-counting Russian perspectives right up to the 21st century. On the French side there were conflicting reports of aspects of the battle as well, though generally less to do with national honor and more to do with personal.

Mikaberidze does a good job of laying out the long day interweaving differing accounts, bolstering the most likely, discounting the unlikely, and offering both strategic and tactical assessments all along the way. It clearly was a bloody confusing day and he deftly leads you back and forth across the wide battlefield, from morning to dusk, through cavalry charge after charge, retreat followed by advance, cannonballs, muskets and bayonets.

The short Aftermath chapter is just that: a re-counting of how both sides tried to physically and mentally recover their armies as well as 'spin' their 'victories,' both having claimed that distinction. Reading the stunned after-the-battle eyewitness accounts it's had to believe how hubris trumps reality, but of course we continue to see it all the time.

[David Longstreth]

One best read for a History for both History nuts and other's

The narration concerning the battle is very detailed and reads as well as possible.

The book does include a very well written summary that will inform the reader about the prior basics. however Reading Dominic Lievin's Russia Against Napoleon first would be recommended.

This is a very well researched book. The material of ( perhaps ) all previous written descriptions are referred to and some comparisons are provided. If the author has found they are wrong he provides the material and logic as to why.

There are OK maps. Too bad everyone did not adopt the Osprey books style maps. You could purchase the Osprey book as well so that you have better maps to use.

This is the first author not only to use Count Phillip de Segur and Gourgaud as references ( the book lists resources ) . He points out one of Gourgauds mis. . .- when he was just wrong.Segur is referred to by contemporary authors Allen, Leiven, Price.

It is too bad this book was not written just after Dominic Leiven since Leiven is the one author missing. I highly reccomend reading Russia Aagainst Napoleon Lominic Lieven as well as follow up books such as :

Napoleon : The End of Glory by Munro Price
MichaelLleggiere napoleon and Berlin
Napoleon 1814: The Defence of France by Andrew Uffindell
and don't forget War and Peace . . . if you have the time.

This book works well with Lievens books, I did not notice any differences. Except in Lieven's book he mentions where Osterman-Tolstoy shows up and Mikaerdize mentions other interesting facts. Still it was not until I read Price's book that he mentions that Osterman was a cousin of Leo.

enjoy.

[Kamil Gruner]

To szczegółowa książka naukowa, którą trzeba czytać w papierze z uwagi na liczne tabele i mapy. Książka koncentruje się na samej bitwie przez co moim zdaniem jednak zbyt mało miejsca poświęca samym przygotowaniom do wojny oraz wariantom prowadzenia kampanii (m.in. forsowana przez ks. Poniatowskiego koncentracja kampanii na Ukrainie). Mimo wszystko niesamowite dzieło, które z uwagi na olbrzymie wykorzystanie listów i pamiętników, doskonale oddaje ducha ludzi uczestniczących w tej masakrze.

[Faisal Khan]

Incredible, painstakingly well researched, impeccable piece of military history. incredible that a battle that happened 200 years ago in which there was so much chaos can be tracked with so much detail.

Big takeaway was Kutuzov was a poor general, Russian staff work was a mess and even by 1812 grand armee was a force to be reckoned with. Murat is a badass too.

[Francisco Javier]

There are two literary Napoleon battles , Waterloo with Victor Hugo , Borodinó with Tolstoi
Good book ,demystifies Kuruzov
I would have place the maps closer to the pages where the movements are shown.

[Eurydicegirlgmail.Com]

Balanced detailed

Revisits primary sources and develops analysis of the historiography built around this immense battle in RussIan identity. Interesting observations re Soviet era historiography

[Mark Bates]

Needs an editor.

[Shin]

This is the book a Russian general battled against Napoleon. Kutuzov was the greatest general in Russian history however his name is not so famous. But European power balance was protected by him. For Russian soldiers, he was like a god, and he brought peaceful time after Napoleon. Author wrote his strategy and character etc in this book.

[Rich]

A painstakingly researched account of the Battle of Borodino, mainly told from the Russian point of view. Since most English-language examinations of this important, terrible battle are told from the French point of view, Mikaberidze's fresh perspective makes for fascinating reading.