The Art of Diplomacy: How American Negotiators Reached Historic Agreements that Changed the World

by Stuart E. Eizenstat

Inside the greatest diplomatic negotiations of the past 50 years In one readable volume, diplomat and negotiator Stuart E. Eizenstat covers every major contemporary international agreement, from the treaty to end the Vietnam War to the Kyoto Protocols and the Iranian Nuclear Accord. Written from the perspective that only a participant in top level negotiations can bring, Eizenstat recounts the events that led up to the negotiation, the drama that took place around the table, and draws lessons from successful and unsuccessful strategies and tactics. Based on interviews with over 60 key figures in American diplomacy, including former presidents and secretaries of state, and major political figures abroad, Eizenstat provides an intimate view of diplomacy as today’s history. The Art of Diplomacy will be an indispensable volume to understand American foreign policy and provide invaluable insights on the art of negotiation for anyone involved in government or business negotiations.

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, American History

520 pages, Hardcover

Published May 28, 2024

About the author

Stuart E. "Stu" Eizenstat is an American diplomat and attorney. He served as the United States Ambassador to the European Union from 1993 to 1996 and as the United States Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 1999 to 2001.

Reviews

[WM D. · Rating 4 out of 5]

When I started reading this book. I was surprised by the amount of information that he obtained from all of the past presidents and the various members of past administrations on how they were able to make various deals with different countries through negotiations.

[Bruce Bean · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Art of Diplomacy by Stuart E. Eizenstat
Stuart E. Eizenstat, The Art of Diplomacy (New York: 2024)
Stuart Eizenstat's The Art of Diplomacy offers a comprehensive examination of major diplomatic challenges spanning the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Drawing on his extensive career in government service and international negotiations, Eizenstat provides both historical narrative and analytical framework for understanding how diplomacy succeeds and fails in complex geopolitical environments.
The book opens with Henry Kissinger's diplomatic breakthrough with China, establishing a framework for examining transformative negotiations. Eizenstat notes Kissinger's observation about his relationship with President Nixon: "The weird thing is that Nixon and I were not particularly close but in the analysis of international situation we were pretty identical" (p. 9). This sets the stage for exploring how diplomatic achievements often emerge from unexpected partnerships and strategic alignment rather than personal affinity.
The Vietnam War Negotiations: A Case Study in Diplomatic Complexity
The most detailed section of the book examines the protracted negotiations to end American involvement in Vietnam. Eizenstat traces the conflict's escalation through multiple administrations—from Truman and Eisenhower's initial commitments through Johnson's deployment of more than 500,000 troops. By the time Nixon and Kissinger assumed office in 1969, they recognized that the war was strategically lost. Johnson had already initiated "Vietnamization"—transferring combat responsibilities to South Vietnamese forces—a policy that was working reasonably well and that Nixon continued.
The secret negotiations, which began in February 1970, reveal the intractable nature of the conflict. North Vietnam's chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho, opened with maximalist demands: unilateral U.S. withdrawal, abandonment of the Thieu government (South Vietnam's president was Nguyen Van Thieu), and no guarantee of POW releases. Le Duc Tho explicitly stated there would be no ceasefire unless the United States accepted all of Hanoi's conditions. He understood his leverage came from American public opinion, and the first rounds of secret talks ended with North Vietnam insisting the U.S. accept all its demands (p. 20).
Eizenstat demonstrates Kissinger's use of triangular diplomacy to break the stalemate. The opening to China helped isolate North Vietnam, while Kissinger encouraged West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who was pursuing Ostpolitik with the Soviet Union, to pressure Moscow to lean on Hanoi. These efforts bore fruit in summer 1972 when the Soviets intervened and North Vietnam conceded ground on positions it had held for years.
Meanwhile, Vietnamization proceeded: by 1972, U.S. forces had declined to 69,000 with only 6,000 in combat roles; by early 1973, only 25,000 American troops remained in country. Congressional action complicated negotiations when the Mansfield Amendment of June 22, 1971 mandated U.S. withdrawal within nine months of POW releases—a provision Eizenstat characterizes as "silly" given the already small number of remaining U.S. troops.
North Vietnam's Easter Offensive of March 30, 1972 proved a turning point. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) held with U.S. air support and a naval blockade of North Vietnam. Hanoi may have lost as many as 100,000 troops and 450 tanks. Recognizing Nixon's likely reelection, North Vietnam modified its negotiating position in August 1972, dropping demands for U.S. withdrawal before settling other issues and ceasing to insist on the South Vietnamese government's immediate end. In October 1972, Le Duc Tho proposed a "government of National administration of national accord" to mediate between Saigon and the Vietcong.
The negotiations' most difficult phase involved South Vietnamese President Thieu, who proved "nearly impossible" to work with and grew angry with Kissinger (p. 22). When presented the agreement text in English, Thieu was told he "can't change a word" (p. 22). Kissinger did secure important concessions: continued U.S. resupply of ARVN forces, prohibition on further infiltration, and assurances of withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia (though Eizenstat's skeptical "ho ho ho" suggests doubt about Hanoi's commitment to the latter).
After Nixon's reelection, Thieu proposed 69 changes to the agreement. Le Duc Tho then abandoned previously accepted positions, most notably regarding Vietcong prisoner releases and withdrawal of U.S. civilian maintenance personnel. When talks broke down on December 14, the Nixon administration employed "military force as leverage" through the "Christmas bombings" (December 18-30, 1972). On January 9, 1973, Le Duc Tho reversed course again; final agreement came January 13, 1973—virtually identical to the October 8 proposal.
Eizenstat presents an unflinching assessment of the agreement's limitations. Even Kissinger admitted "it was not a wonderful deal" (p. 23). The U.S. allowed 160,000 North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam while committing not to provide new weapons to ARVN forces. Thieu refused to sign, but Kissinger and Nixon offered him $1 billion in military and civilian assistance while making clear the U.S. would withdraw regardless of his agreement. Plans for attacking the supply-laden Ho Chi Minh Trail evaporated when James Dean's testimony to Watergate prosecutors destroyed Nixon's capacity to act. In June 1973, Congress prohibited further military funding for any action "land, sea, or air" despite North Vietnam's escalating ceasefire violations.
Scope and Structure
Beyond Vietnam, The Art of Diplomacy examines numerous other diplomatic challenges:
• Iran and negotiating with radical theocracy
• Middle East diplomacy from Camp David to the Abraham Accords
• The Good Friday Agreement and George Mitchell's efforts in divided Ireland
• Holocaust justice—belated and imperfect
• The Balkan wars
• Afghanistan's trajectory from victory to failure
• Iraq across two wars
• International trade negotiations both domestic and foreign
• Climate change as "the supreme test of diplomacy"
The book concludes with a chapter on "lessons on the art of diplomacy" and includes 100 pages of notes, suggesting thorough documentation and scholarly rigor.
Assessment
Eizenstat's treatment of the Vietnam negotiations demonstrates sophisticated understanding of how domestic politics, international pressure, and military realities intersect in diplomatic negotiations. His account reveals the frustrating reality that strategic insight (recognizing the war was lost) and tactical skill (triangular diplomacy with China and the USSR) could not overcome fundamental problems: South Vietnamese political obstinacy, North Vietnamese determination, and American domestic constraints. The agreement ultimately proved not an end to conflict but merely an American exit strategy that left South Vietnam to its fate.
The Art of Diplomacy serves both as historical record and practical guide for understanding modern diplomatic challenges. Whether examining historical cases like Vietnam or contemporary issues like climate change, Eizenstat brings the perspective of a practitioner who has navigated the complex terrain where policy ideals meet political realities.

[Randal White · Rating 5 out of 5]

In times of international (and national) problems like today, the author points us to the study of past diplomatic situations in order to deal with todays seemingly intractable issues. Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, China, Russia, and on and on. By examining the past, we can learn what worked and what did not. It seems like we are always ready to use military action, even though it often causes unforeseen problems.
Eizenstat was "in the room" during many pivotal situations. I wish he was today.
This is a LONG book. I spent a great deal of time reading it, pondering upon it, and rereading portions again. I cannot help but think that I am a more knowledgeable and thoughtful citizen because of it. Bravo to the author!
Also, as I write this, I cannot help but be impressed with the multi-national "prisoner exchange" that has just happened. What a great use of diplomacy to involve so many countries and parties in the exchange. Maybe, just maybe, we can use the example to tone down the rhetoric and sabre rattling

[Stan Kosick · Rating 4 out of 5]

I wanted to read this book before Ambassador Eizenstat spoke locally. I had read Kissinger's "Diplomacy" 30 years ago. Eizenstat's recent Art of Diplomacy filled in some of the details. I do not say blanks because the history is there for the reading. Eizenstat shares his perspective on many of the crucial agreements- most of which he was involved- made in the past 50 years. He outlines the true craft of statesmanship.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was originally going to give this 4 stars, but the final chapter made it a 5 star book for me. The accounts and information were amazing. The chapters about Bosnia, German reunification, Afghanistan, and Iraq were some of the best. This is good book for someone interested in negotiations and/or becoming an international diplomat.

[Jack Voss · Rating 5 out of 5]

a must read. got to meet Stuart and ask some questions. sobering conversation. but this breaks down some of the biggest feats in diplomatic history, and fundamentally bolstered my understanding of recent history, the evolving geopolitical climate, and the role of USA diplomacy

[bookloverberk · Rating 4 out of 5]

i love this book because it not only gives us great examples of political strategy used in America but it also gives us bad examples. this is how the world will heal is learning about the pros and cons of America.

[Emma · Rating 3 out of 5]

DNF page 19, I just couldn't get past all of the Henry Kissinger praise.

[Blair · Rating 5 out of 5]

“The Art of Diplomacy” is a book about large, historical agreements that American negotiators have helped reach, over the past 50 years. These agreements include the following topics:

1. National Security e.g., Vietnam War
2. Acting as a Mediator e.g., Abraham Accords
3. At War – Iraq, Afghanistan
4. In Multinational Negotiations e.g., GATT

The author - Stuart Eizenstat – is both a participant in some of these negotiations, and an insider – who draws eleven conclusions for successful negotiations through interviews and careful analysis of key figures involved in American Diplomacy. He discusses the roles of Presidents from Nixon to Biden, great Secretaries of State including Kissinger, as well as military and political leaders from allies and enemies alike.

What I liked most about this book was the author's insider view of these huge events that transformed our world. These include the Fall of the Soviet Union, Unification of Germany, Peace in Northern Ireland. These are all momentous and transformational milestones, and I could understand them so much better because of this book.

The book also clarified (and revealed) things I wasn’t aware of including the need to involve the various US States in Trade Agreements and the amount of contact with countries such as Cuba – the latter being for settling the war in Southern Africa and with FARC in Colombia. I had thought there would have been no contact between Americans with the Cubans?

The author’s eleven points for successful negotiations – summarised in the last chapter of the book – comprise a very helpful guide that I think could be used in every major negotiation. I’ll refer to them in the future but the ones that stick out in my mind include:

1. Go with the tide - he says “Seize the moment” when the timing is right.
2. Select the right negotiator
3. Prepare. Prepare. Prepare
4. Ensure you have top level support e.g., from the President
5. Listen carefully to your counterpart’s goals
6. Develop personal relationships
7. Follow through on implementation.

I also found the photos to be very helpful.

There was nothing I disliked about the book – although it should be noted that this is not a light read.

It’s a great book.