The notion of a Pax Britannica—a concept implying that Britain’s overwhelming strength enforced global peace in the era that began with Napoleon’s defeat in 1815—largely ended with the British Empire itself. Although most historians still view this period as a departure from the eighteenth century, when lengthy coalition wars were commonplace, critics argue that Britain had only limited means of exercising power in the nineteenth century and that British military or naval strength played an insignificant role in preserving peace.
In Deterrence through Strength , Rebecca Berens Matzke reveals how Britain’s diplomatic and naval authority in the early Victorian period was not circumstantial but rather based on real economic and naval strength as well as on resolute political leadership. The Royal Navy’s main role in the nineteenth century was to be a deterrent force, a role it skillfully played. With its intimidating fleet, enhanced by steam technology, its great reserves and ship-building capacity, and its secure financial, economic, and political supports, British naval power posed a genuine threat. In examining three diplomatic crises—in North America, China, and the Mediterranean—Matzke demonstrates that Britain did indeed influence other nations with its navy’s offensive capabilities but always with the goal of preserving peace, stability, and British diplomatic freedom.
In the past few decades some historians have cast doubt that there was ever a Pax Brittanica during the nineteenth century. They argue that British power began to decline after the Napoleonic Wars. These historians believe that Britain had limited means of using power after 1815 and that British military and naval power played a small role in preserving peace during the nineteenth century.
Dr Rebecca Berens Matzke, an Associate Professor of History at Ripon College in Wisconsin, refutes these arguments. The author professes that Britain’s diplomatic and naval power during the mid-nineteenth century was based on economic and naval strength. She stresses that the Royal Navy’s primary role was as a deterrent force in the nineteenth century. With its intimidating fleet, enhanced by steam-powered warships, supported by strong political, economic, and financial backing, British naval power was a real threat. British leadership had the primary goals of maintaining peace, stability, and equilibrium, in the quest of promoting and securing British interests. Naval power was used to intimidate other states, deter conflict or limit the scope of conflict, as well as press home British offensive power when required. Naval power allowed Britain to exert a free hand policy, instead of relying on allies, in crisis situations.
Matzke examines three diplomatic crises during the early Victorian Age (1838-1846). These include crises with the United States over boundary issues in Maine and Oregon, along with the Alexander McLeod incident; the First Opium War with China (1839-1842); and the Syrian Crisis (1839-1841) in the eastern Mediterranean. In her examination of the crises in North America, China, and the Mediterranean, Matzke shows that British naval power did influence other states during the early Victorian era.
The author makes a convincing argument that British diplomacy, backed by the Royal Navy, put Britain in the forefront of the Great Powers in the early Victorian age. Her study is based on primary source research including private correspondence, notes, and journals of statesmen. This study should be read by students and scholars interested in British diplomacy and international relations in the nineteenth century.