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Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
The nature and reality of self is a subject of increasing prominence among Western philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. It has also been central to Indian and Tibetan philosophical traditions for over two thousand years. It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind. Leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan traditions join with leading Western philosophers of mind and phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood from these multiple perspectives. Self, No Self? is not a collection of historical or comparative essays. It takes problem-solving and conceptual and phenomenological analysis as central to philosophy. The essays mobilize the argumentative resources of diverse philosophical traditions to address issues about the self in the context of contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. Self, No Self? will be essential reading for philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of the self and consciousness, and will offer a valuable way into the subject for students.
350 pages, Hardcover
First published February 4, 2011
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January 27, 2022
if you like this review i now have website: www.michaelkamakana.com
050917: collection of critical essays on the self, no-self concepts. some very good of traditions somewhat read (advaita-vedanta, Buddhism, phenomenology) some of tradition i do not know (analytic) so i have no educated opinion, only some dissatisfaction with arguments... this is the reason i raise the rating to five: it inspires me to think/write out these arguments...
again, this is first draft, amateur, interested if not argumentative, and no more than book review. rather than focus on any one or several essays, i shall try to describe my own concept of the self, somewhere between the Indic and phenomenological concepts, to clarify, express, such thought to myself if no one else. there are no doubt other essays from other thinkers who could engage and critique such thought...
av and bd have original, opposing, radically different concepts of the self. in av the self is the human essential, the necessary focus, organizing, creating coherent experiences of self in world, thought, dreams. all sorts of bd have to some degree refused the concept of self as anything other than conventional, illusory, mistaken, with reduction of self to flow of experiences in time, arising, departing, and 'empty' of conceptual essence but product only of 'dependent origination', that is, only the results of previous events/environment rather than defined by itself. in bd there is thus the necessary intuition/experience of such emptiness to alleviate the thinker/meditator from bounds of this world... both av and bd have the particularly Indic purpose of soteriological value, of transcending the ground, the cycle of samsara (rebirth/redeath)...
the problem for av is to recognize one's original, ultimate, 'self' as unified with Brahman. the world is either illusion or real but both ways are distraction hindering union with this all, Brahman. the self thus suffers, feels incomplete, inadequate, because it tries all the other ways to satisfy this need (wealth, power, sex) all failing in some way, and must recognize this advaita- 'non-dual'- being of self, world, immanence...
the problem for bd is to recognize there is no persisting self, nothing to unify, nothing to even call 'self'. i have read much more bd than av and must address the common argument that because we talk only of transience, momentariness, how can we assert any continuing 'self' as responsible, thinking, subject, so characterized and defined to karma and thus freeing it from samsara... this is bd distinction of identity and continuity...
when i think of bd and continuity i think in quantum physics terms, however little understood without necessary math (in other words not at all- maybe...) and think of 'identity' as particles and 'continuity' as waves. neither exists without the other. it all depends what you are looking for. from that famous 'double-slit experiment' we get the 'interference' pattern of waves but also the 'pointillist' effect of particles. but there is no ether to carry waves and also there are no particular elements, so we have to create concepts of 'quantum packets' and theorize about 'wave collapse' then do stuff with math i will never understand... so for me, bd is quantum and 'self' is as illusory as either quantum packets of energy or wave collapse...
the images of flickering flame or combination of parts independent but only effective when made into 'empty' cart, are viewed as flawed in one (analytic) essay because they do not recognize autonomy, intelligence, of imagined. this i respectfully dispute, for aside from such enlightenment being exactly such awareness, from a certain perspective the ever-changing yet singular flame through time characterize to me exactly what both experiential consciousness and 'narrative' 'self' are... obviously sense, thought, emotions, are essentially transient, temporal, yet 'self' also can only arise narratively if they are 'fueled' in whatever manner of greed, hatred, delusion... this 'autonomy' (analytic) argument seems as relevant as particles 'deciding' which slit to pass through or somehow going through both...
phenomenology is perhaps closer to av, but the 'how' of concept 'self' is that very autonomy i think bd refuses. ph is always consciousness 'of' and thereby the 'self' is in essence, inside, always present in the questions of expression, body movements, thoughts, and so the 'self' must by definition be real and not illusion. ph is always about 'intentionality', consciousness always 'of' something, whether thought, emotion, relations, and so there is 'self' though this is only built of transient and transcendent illusions of unity. this is not the risible 'fiction' of say Hume, but is maybe not the ultimate but only conventional truth of 'self'. ph does not have the usual Indic concern with samsara, karma, moksha, despite which husserl will say truly recognizing this 'style' of thought is ‘enlightenment’ akin to religious experience... my most favoured ph is that of merleau-ponty, in which perception is key in such that there is no need of Cartesian or other substances to 'have' experiences...
ph and Buddhism rather than av, seem to me offering the best concept of 'self' by recognizing there is, ultimately, 'no-self'. i do not agree with either the Cartesian theatre model of representations, or the human fictional bundles of sensations, but rather the 'emptiness' and 'co-dependent' models of human 'self'. perhaps this is my way to unify such opposites in a 'jaina' (and quantum) way, that is, true from this perspective and true from this other perspective and inexpressible...
note: someone explain this discomfort i always have with the phrase 'what-it-is-like' as much as 'sense-data' or 'qualia'. this seems a refusal of conceptualizing rather 'what-it-is' and 'how-it-is', tending towards collapsing distinctions of senses, thoughts, actions (how exactly is music like liquid sculpture? how is something seen ‘like’ something tasted?), all human somewhat autonomous 'expression', into metaphors (like) becoming realities (is) and so reifying the persistent, real, acting, 'self'... but then maybe i have just not read enough... there are so many books to read and so little time...
more
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy
Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood Through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies
Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective
The Experiential Dimension of Advaita Vedanta
Hindu Theology of Liberation, A
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
Jainism as Meta-Philosophy
050917: collection of critical essays on the self, no-self concepts. some very good of traditions somewhat read (advaita-vedanta, Buddhism, phenomenology) some of tradition i do not know (analytic) so i have no educated opinion, only some dissatisfaction with arguments... this is the reason i raise the rating to five: it inspires me to think/write out these arguments...
again, this is first draft, amateur, interested if not argumentative, and no more than book review. rather than focus on any one or several essays, i shall try to describe my own concept of the self, somewhere between the Indic and phenomenological concepts, to clarify, express, such thought to myself if no one else. there are no doubt other essays from other thinkers who could engage and critique such thought...
av and bd have original, opposing, radically different concepts of the self. in av the self is the human essential, the necessary focus, organizing, creating coherent experiences of self in world, thought, dreams. all sorts of bd have to some degree refused the concept of self as anything other than conventional, illusory, mistaken, with reduction of self to flow of experiences in time, arising, departing, and 'empty' of conceptual essence but product only of 'dependent origination', that is, only the results of previous events/environment rather than defined by itself. in bd there is thus the necessary intuition/experience of such emptiness to alleviate the thinker/meditator from bounds of this world... both av and bd have the particularly Indic purpose of soteriological value, of transcending the ground, the cycle of samsara (rebirth/redeath)...
the problem for av is to recognize one's original, ultimate, 'self' as unified with Brahman. the world is either illusion or real but both ways are distraction hindering union with this all, Brahman. the self thus suffers, feels incomplete, inadequate, because it tries all the other ways to satisfy this need (wealth, power, sex) all failing in some way, and must recognize this advaita- 'non-dual'- being of self, world, immanence...
the problem for bd is to recognize there is no persisting self, nothing to unify, nothing to even call 'self'. i have read much more bd than av and must address the common argument that because we talk only of transience, momentariness, how can we assert any continuing 'self' as responsible, thinking, subject, so characterized and defined to karma and thus freeing it from samsara... this is bd distinction of identity and continuity...
when i think of bd and continuity i think in quantum physics terms, however little understood without necessary math (in other words not at all- maybe...) and think of 'identity' as particles and 'continuity' as waves. neither exists without the other. it all depends what you are looking for. from that famous 'double-slit experiment' we get the 'interference' pattern of waves but also the 'pointillist' effect of particles. but there is no ether to carry waves and also there are no particular elements, so we have to create concepts of 'quantum packets' and theorize about 'wave collapse' then do stuff with math i will never understand... so for me, bd is quantum and 'self' is as illusory as either quantum packets of energy or wave collapse...
the images of flickering flame or combination of parts independent but only effective when made into 'empty' cart, are viewed as flawed in one (analytic) essay because they do not recognize autonomy, intelligence, of imagined. this i respectfully dispute, for aside from such enlightenment being exactly such awareness, from a certain perspective the ever-changing yet singular flame through time characterize to me exactly what both experiential consciousness and 'narrative' 'self' are... obviously sense, thought, emotions, are essentially transient, temporal, yet 'self' also can only arise narratively if they are 'fueled' in whatever manner of greed, hatred, delusion... this 'autonomy' (analytic) argument seems as relevant as particles 'deciding' which slit to pass through or somehow going through both...
phenomenology is perhaps closer to av, but the 'how' of concept 'self' is that very autonomy i think bd refuses. ph is always consciousness 'of' and thereby the 'self' is in essence, inside, always present in the questions of expression, body movements, thoughts, and so the 'self' must by definition be real and not illusion. ph is always about 'intentionality', consciousness always 'of' something, whether thought, emotion, relations, and so there is 'self' though this is only built of transient and transcendent illusions of unity. this is not the risible 'fiction' of say Hume, but is maybe not the ultimate but only conventional truth of 'self'. ph does not have the usual Indic concern with samsara, karma, moksha, despite which husserl will say truly recognizing this 'style' of thought is ‘enlightenment’ akin to religious experience... my most favoured ph is that of merleau-ponty, in which perception is key in such that there is no need of Cartesian or other substances to 'have' experiences...
ph and Buddhism rather than av, seem to me offering the best concept of 'self' by recognizing there is, ultimately, 'no-self'. i do not agree with either the Cartesian theatre model of representations, or the human fictional bundles of sensations, but rather the 'emptiness' and 'co-dependent' models of human 'self'. perhaps this is my way to unify such opposites in a 'jaina' (and quantum) way, that is, true from this perspective and true from this other perspective and inexpressible...
note: someone explain this discomfort i always have with the phrase 'what-it-is-like' as much as 'sense-data' or 'qualia'. this seems a refusal of conceptualizing rather 'what-it-is' and 'how-it-is', tending towards collapsing distinctions of senses, thoughts, actions (how exactly is music like liquid sculpture? how is something seen ‘like’ something tasted?), all human somewhat autonomous 'expression', into metaphors (like) becoming realities (is) and so reifying the persistent, real, acting, 'self'... but then maybe i have just not read enough... there are so many books to read and so little time...
more
Buddhism: A Philosophical Approach
What the Buddha Thought
Nietzsche and Buddhist Philosophy
Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis
Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation
Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood Through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies
Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective
The Experiential Dimension of Advaita Vedanta
Hindu Theology of Liberation, A
Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings
After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a Secular Age
Jainism as Meta-Philosophy
December 10, 2012
A very good anthology. Almost all of the contributors work off of one another, and very many are familiar with each other's work.
One warning though is that almost all of the contributions are quite dense. One should be wary of approaching this without some background in topics of the Self, Philosophy of Mind, or etc.
My personal favourite was probably Fasching's article on the self of Advaita Vedanta. For students of either Indian Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, or etc., this is very interesting and he gives an admirable exposition of the somewhat unusual character (as compared with Western and other conceptions of the "self") of the Advaitic atman. Highly recommended.
Also very interesting was Miri Albahari's essay, on her view of what "no-self" means in Buddhism. The article is rather dense for those not familiar with this area, but her thesis can be stated rather simply as:
Buddhism is not denying a "self" in the sense of a "thinker" behind the thoughts, or "perceiver" behind the perceptions. Rather, she holds that Buddhist texts are trying to encourage oneself not to "identify" with this perceiver (forming a kind of ego-entity - "I am like this," etc.) -- that's right, she holds that the Pali Buddhist sutras hold that _there is indeed a perceiver._ Thus the Buddhist position on her view is not greatly different from that of, say, Advaita Vedanta. A very interesting thesis that goes rather against the grain of the vast majority of Buddhist secondary scholarship.
Overall a good collection, but do be warned that (besides Fasching's essay which is a bit of a lighter read), it will require some heavy mental lifting.
One warning though is that almost all of the contributions are quite dense. One should be wary of approaching this without some background in topics of the Self, Philosophy of Mind, or etc.
My personal favourite was probably Fasching's article on the self of Advaita Vedanta. For students of either Indian Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, or etc., this is very interesting and he gives an admirable exposition of the somewhat unusual character (as compared with Western and other conceptions of the "self") of the Advaitic atman. Highly recommended.
Also very interesting was Miri Albahari's essay, on her view of what "no-self" means in Buddhism. The article is rather dense for those not familiar with this area, but her thesis can be stated rather simply as:
Buddhism is not denying a "self" in the sense of a "thinker" behind the thoughts, or "perceiver" behind the perceptions. Rather, she holds that Buddhist texts are trying to encourage oneself not to "identify" with this perceiver (forming a kind of ego-entity - "I am like this," etc.) -- that's right, she holds that the Pali Buddhist sutras hold that _there is indeed a perceiver._ Thus the Buddhist position on her view is not greatly different from that of, say, Advaita Vedanta. A very interesting thesis that goes rather against the grain of the vast majority of Buddhist secondary scholarship.
Overall a good collection, but do be warned that (besides Fasching's essay which is a bit of a lighter read), it will require some heavy mental lifting.
September 22, 2012
A great collection of essays on the nature of the self in Asian thought. Some of the best work I have seen in using Western philosophical tools to unpack the depths of Hindu and Buddist metaphysics.
October 10, 2023
Кілька розділів варто перекласти українською. Загалом збірка крута для філософії.
February 17, 2021
What's particularly cool about this anthology is the extant to which the contributors had access to each others' essays prior to publication. I don't mean access to previous works, although there's that too, but specifically the essays contained in the volume. This allows for a greater sense of coherence across the entire book, which was extremely helpful in my case as I know virtually nothing about the Asian ideas that are presented.
That all said, it's still tough keeping the subtle differences among the attempts at describing the various understandings of consciousness, subjectivity, selfhood, etc... All of which is to say that we're living in an intellectually stimulating time when all these ideas are being entertained by serious thinkers.
That all said, it's still tough keeping the subtle differences among the attempts at describing the various understandings of consciousness, subjectivity, selfhood, etc... All of which is to say that we're living in an intellectually stimulating time when all these ideas are being entertained by serious thinkers.
June 20, 2022
Some great ideas bogged down in ton of basically unreadable, unparseable philosophical jargon. It is also not so deep as people think - it is just masking it with smart feeling language. There are better books on the topic. Way better. Also - as with all philosophy - this is just empty talk, just opinions of people with little to no data. These questions can never be answered by philosophers even in principle. All they can do is talk about it forever. The actual answers will be provided by actual scientits - neurologists, psychiartists and surprisingly enough, computer scientists. IMHO terribly overrated.
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