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Understanding Institutional Diversity
The analysis of how institutions are formed, how they operate and change, and how they influence behavior in society has become a major subject of inquiry in politics, sociology, and economics. A leader in applying game theory to the understanding of institutional analysis, Elinor Ostrom provides in this book a coherent method for undertaking the analysis of diverse economic, political, and social institutions.
Understanding Institutional Diversity explains the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which enables a scholar to choose the most relevant level of interaction for a particular question. This framework examines the arena within which interactions occur, the rules employed by participants to order relationships, the attributes of a biophysical world that structures and is structured by interactions, and the attributes of a community in which a particular arena is placed.
The book explains and illustrates how to use the IAD in the context of both field and experimental studies. Concentrating primarily on the rules aspect of the IAD framework, it provides empirical evidence about the diversity of rules, the calculation process used by participants in changing rules, and the design principles that characterize robust, self-organized resource governance institutions.
Understanding Institutional Diversity explains the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which enables a scholar to choose the most relevant level of interaction for a particular question. This framework examines the arena within which interactions occur, the rules employed by participants to order relationships, the attributes of a biophysical world that structures and is structured by interactions, and the attributes of a community in which a particular arena is placed.
The book explains and illustrates how to use the IAD in the context of both field and experimental studies. Concentrating primarily on the rules aspect of the IAD framework, it provides empirical evidence about the diversity of rules, the calculation process used by participants in changing rules, and the design principles that characterize robust, self-organized resource governance institutions.
376 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
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About the author
Elinor Ostrom
81 books214 followersElinor Ostrom won the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
May 21, 2012
Academic theory is frequently a mess; the author needs to balance between correctly explaining the details of their case studies with sufficient power to be useful on other problems. And in the social sciences, where you can't really test theories, it's doubly hard.
With that in mind, Ostrom manages to synthesize a powerful and rigorous theory about how rules structure the use of common pool resources. Drawing from examples in political economy and game theory, she develops a model of how rules work (ADICO, on pg 139), and the kinds of institutions that lead to better outcomes than Hobbsian rational self-interest.
Her framework is rigorous enough to allow comparisons across diverse case studies, simple enough that most people can use it without being polymathic geniuses (*cough* Sheila Jasanoff *cough*), and flexible enough to accurately depicted the complexity of the real world.
Ostrom received the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for her work on common pool resources. I think any scholar working in this area who did not use Ostrom's framework would have some serious justification to do, so why only four stars? Well, first I'm not sure how well her framework can be extended beyond common pool resources; seeing everything as this kind of social dilemma is limited. Second, while this is a well-researched book, it's also a slog. I can't imagine sitting down and enjoying this book, which is not true of some academics.
With that in mind, Ostrom manages to synthesize a powerful and rigorous theory about how rules structure the use of common pool resources. Drawing from examples in political economy and game theory, she develops a model of how rules work (ADICO, on pg 139), and the kinds of institutions that lead to better outcomes than Hobbsian rational self-interest.
Her framework is rigorous enough to allow comparisons across diverse case studies, simple enough that most people can use it without being polymathic geniuses (*cough* Sheila Jasanoff *cough*), and flexible enough to accurately depicted the complexity of the real world.
Ostrom received the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for her work on common pool resources. I think any scholar working in this area who did not use Ostrom's framework would have some serious justification to do, so why only four stars? Well, first I'm not sure how well her framework can be extended beyond common pool resources; seeing everything as this kind of social dilemma is limited. Second, while this is a well-researched book, it's also a slog. I can't imagine sitting down and enjoying this book, which is not true of some academics.
September 29, 2017
Notes as usual:
* I added this to my wishlist after E Ostrom won the nobel prize and I thought "Oh this field of study looks interesting". Then this didn't actually make it out of the wishlist for four years, and once I finally bought it, it took my almost a month to complete it.
* It _is_ interesting, but the book is meant for post graduate students in economics. I'm not sure if I got out of it what I was meant to get out of it.
* The first three to four chapters are heavy on theoretical frameworks and not meant to read casually.
* But the idea of modeling social norms and intrinsic and extrinsic motivation mathematically is charming
* The last two chapters deal with empirical field research on communities self-organising to manage their own common-pool resources and are an interesting list of what works and what doesn't and under what conditions (scale and social ties are the important variables that I noticed)
* The ADICO framework for rules is also interesting and may be of general application and use.
* I added this to my wishlist after E Ostrom won the nobel prize and I thought "Oh this field of study looks interesting". Then this didn't actually make it out of the wishlist for four years, and once I finally bought it, it took my almost a month to complete it.
* It _is_ interesting, but the book is meant for post graduate students in economics. I'm not sure if I got out of it what I was meant to get out of it.
* The first three to four chapters are heavy on theoretical frameworks and not meant to read casually.
* But the idea of modeling social norms and intrinsic and extrinsic motivation mathematically is charming
* The last two chapters deal with empirical field research on communities self-organising to manage their own common-pool resources and are an interesting list of what works and what doesn't and under what conditions (scale and social ties are the important variables that I noticed)
* The ADICO framework for rules is also interesting and may be of general application and use.
February 20, 2019
Sólo leí el primer capítulo. Interesante, pero muy técnico. Desarrolla herramientas para pensar en problemas económicos, teniendo en cuenta el ambiente en que se desarrolla, las reglas de juego, y permite analizar si algunas cosas son endógenas y exógenas. Lo leeré después, pues parece ser muy técnico. Depronto no lo seguí leyendo porque utiliza, aunque para otras cosas, herramientas muy similares de micro y teoría de juegos que ya conozco. Depronto después lo retomo
July 3, 2023
Not the most accessible of Elinor Ostrom's books, but if you've already been convinced by "Governing the Commons" or one of the others then this is what you need to get to the next step. We get not just additional evidence and reasoning but also pragmatic criteria to recognize or build a well-governed commons.
February 18, 2020
Demasiado académico, pero interesante.
November 13, 2007
The basis of my Master's thesis, and good introductory text on Common Pool Resource management.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews