How to Read Wittgenstein

How to Read...

by Ray Monk, Simon Critchley (Series Editor)

Approaching the writing of major intellectuals, artists, and philosophers need no longer be daunting. How to Read is a new sort of introduction — a personal master class in reading — that brings you face to face with the work of some of the most influential and challenging writers in history. In lucid, accessible language, these books explain essential topics such as Wittgenstein's determination to insist on the integrity and the autonomy of nonscientific forms of understanding.

Though Wittgenstein wrote on the same subjects that dominate the work of other analytic philosophers — the nature of logic, the limits of language, the analysis of meaning — he did so in a peculiarly poetic style that separates his work sharply from that of his peers and makes the question of how to read him particularly pertinent.

At the root of Wittgenstein's thought, Monk argues, is a determination to resist the scientism characteristic of our age, a determination to insist on the integrity and the autonomy of non-scientific forms of understanding. The kind of understanding we seek in philosophy, Wittgenstein tried to make clear, is similar to the kind we might seek of a person, a piece of music, or, indeed, of a poem.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Language, Reference, Linguistics, Logic, History

128 pages, Paperback

First published February 7, 2005

About the author

Ray Monk is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton, where he has taught since 1992.

He won the Mail on Sunday/John Llewellyn Rhys Prize and the 1991 Duff Cooper Prize for Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. His interests lie in the philosophy of mathematics, the history of analytic philosophy, and philosophical aspects of biographical writing. He is currently working on a biography of Robert Oppenheimer. (Source: Wikipedia)

Reviews

[Lori · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this book ahead of a novel coming up, the description of which mentions Wittgenstein: Bedraggling Grandma with Russian Snow. I'm not kidding or being humble here: I'm not intelligent enough to understand the great philosophers or probably the mediocre ones. My brain is not built for this. Metaphorically it's not tall enough to go on this ride. I was so intimidated I wrote bothered the author asking him if it was necessary to read Wittgenstein as a prerequisite to fully appreciating his novel, which I very much want to do -- and he said no.

But I try to be a completist so chose to do it anyway and I'm glad. 91.3% of it went over my head and is still flying around up there. That's fine because all my life I've admired and pondered art I don't understand, so why not philosophy. My experience reading this was not what Monk intended --

(fun! partly from reading the book, partly courtesy of GR Friend Mark, who majored in philosophy whereas I was commanded to leave and never return to Philosophy 101 by the only professor I've ever angered (and oh he was incensed!) for reasons that in retrospect seem understandable and valid, because I referred to Plato as an "idiot" in my first paper. Guilty as charged, though he ought to have dialed back his tirade to a 16-year-old befuddled first-semester freshman two weeks in and forced to take his class, and he definitely should have lowered the volume.)

-- and I came away with some understanding of how much I don't understand Wittgenstein, along with admiration of and respect (mixed with a bit of love) for this genius whose ideas about nonsense, babbling and silence don't have anything to do with me -- but ironically, they fit.

This book [Wittgenstein's, not Monk's] will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it – or similar thoughts.

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather – not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.

In the body of the book, Wittgenstein deals directly with this problem and draws a surprising conclusion: that the book is an attempt to express what cannot be expressed, and, therefore, nonsense:

Thus, the view put forward in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus appears to be that all philosophical propositions are nonsensical – including the ones in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

In the Tractatus itself, Wittgenstein says: ‘What can be shown, cannot be said.’

‘What causes hesitation,’ [Bertrand] Russell wrote, ‘is the fact that, after all, Mr Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said.’

In a letter to a prospective publisher, Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein warned that the book was difficult to understand and that von Ficker would most probably not understand it because ‘the content will be strange to you...But,' he added: 'this work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written.'

'In brief, I think: All of that which many are babbling today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it.'

[Donavan · Rating 5 out of 5]

About this I shall remain silent.

[Katia N · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the best short introduction into W's writing. It is structured as a commentary of the selected passages so it combines the best of the two words: the taster of the original and some explanations. It won't be sufficient for anyone who is seriously interested. But is a great start.

[Leanne · Rating 5 out of 5]

I think that the best introduction (or refresher) to the philosopher is the Short Introduction by Grayling, which I highly recommend: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

Monk's book is the best short interpretation for non-specialists. But it is an opinionated interpretation. And it happens to be one that I love!! Very interesting that Monk is not seeing latter Wittgenstein as a refutation of early Wittgenstein but rather as a necessary refinement of what he was trying to do in the first place. So interesting to discover that the Wittgenstein of my undergraduate philosophy days is no longer the father of logical positivism but is rather engaging in quite the opposite project: resistance to the scientism of our age.

Grayling did such a wonderful job in unpacking Wittgenstein in the clearest way possible (I say he should get a Nobel Prize for being the clearest explainer of Wittgenstein in history) but Monk gives what is a truly elegant reading of Wittgenstein, that I think paves the way for connecting Wittgenstein to Heidegger (hallalujah)... there is even a book called Groundless Grounds that I picked up on this very subject. Am enjoying immensely (AND would never have understood if not for Monk) https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1...

[David Hendrickson · Rating 4 out of 5]

In my attempt to read Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein, I realized I would need some help. This book was suggested by a friend. Monk does a great job linking Wittgenstein 's early work to the turn his thought took in his later writings. I finished the book quite confident I am ready for the challenge of Philosophical Investigations.

[S.M.Y Kayseri · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wittgenstein's philosophical thoughts, while at first has been influenced by the positivist and empirical thoughts of Frege and Russell, he can’t deny his roots of mysticism. I would consider him as the last of the line of the great German transcendental idealism, with his works set as the finale and completion of the thought. It was his ideas alongside with Kant and Schopenhauer that formed the bulk of my thoughts to satisfy my rational side of thinking. From Kant, I derived my thoughts that sensibility and understanding formed the self-limiting limit of our knowledge. From Schopenhauer, I divined that the body as I know is appearances constrained by time and space, but I can conceive of myself free from the physical world. Freed from time and space, this I is surely not a phenomena, but a noumena (the things that exists prior to our perception). And because this I exists prior to my perception, even of my own body, surely even the basic movements of the body flowed from this noumenal side of “I”. This is what is called as will, the upsurge of this very will from the noumenal world manifested in the phenomenal world, clothed in the defining fabric of time and space. And lastly from Wittgenstein, I affirmed that because this noumena which is “I” can never be known except in the phenomenal world, I lack the very basic faculty to expand on its nature, other than duly acknowledging its existence. What can be said, therefore, can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak therof one must be silent. This trinity of thoughts form the fabrics of reality, now I stand at the edge of precipice, the end of the line, biding my time to perform the leap of faith.

Now, I'm going to embark on a long digression regarding the spirit of Wittgenstein when he wrote the Tractatus and a cursory remarks regarding his later philosophy. Tractatus' main idea is hidden behind his words of: "...There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical..."

Thus Wittgenstein are trying to express the inexpressible i.e. things that can only be shown, not said such as ethics, religion, meaning of life. He insisted that the realm of the ethical is delimited (or can only be) through his book. If Kant said I had to forgo knowledge in order to make room for faith, Wittgenstein said that in order to make room for faith, I had to define knowledge’s limits.

He agreed that if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be-unutterably-contained in what has been uttered!

How then Wittgenstein aimed to express the inexpressible? Was he not contradicting himself by putting his philosophical thoughts in words? This jettison can be bypassed if one knew that Wittgenstein once said that philosophy ought only to be written in poetic composition. In poems, nothing directly given to its deeper meanings, but somehow it can convey the inexpressible meanings of life.

Now we can understand that the whole picture of the Tractatus is to define the expressible world. And this expressible world includes a several stages that resemble a flow, a process. We have the world, the data procured by the world, the thoughts formed from the data and then the depiction of the data in the form of proposition.

The world according to Wittgenstein is everything that is the case. What this means is that the world is everything that is so, as understood and limited by both sensibility and understanding. This simple definition of the data is in parallel with Wittgenstein’s rejection of the use of concepts such as objects, relations or predicates in defining the world. Thus, a stricter definition of the world could be that everything that is the case (it is so) as limited by the infallible sensibility.

The world then is obviously not static nor does it standalone. The world consists of data which contains, Wittgenstein said, “a state of affairs”. This data of the world in a state of affairs, is what Wittgenstein called as a fact. “He is in the room” is a fact simply describing the perceived sensible data that a man is in the room, being in the room is the state of affairs.

This facts then, rightly contains parts and relations to the other facts in the world. The world now stands in a web of relations. Because facts contain parts, it then can be pictured corresponding to the objects that constitute the facts. The author used the incident where Wittgenstein read about the court in Paris who uses a model to reconstruct an accident. The model stands as a picture to the fact (an accident has occurred) and the parts of the fact (the houses, the cars, the people) that represents the robustness of the initial fact constitute the logical form of the picture. This logical form of the picture is what we called as thought. In other words, thought is the representation of the fact via a logical picture.

And thought is, in return, when expressed in a way that is perceptible to the sense is what we called as the proposition. A complete cycle of the stage reveals that Wittgenstein wished nothing except the perfect recreation of the mental processes in both perceiving and articulating about the world. A constant reminder should be held in mind, whenever we faced difficulties in reading Wittgenstein, is that he never wished to construct an abstract and overly complicated notion of the world. He simply wished to have a perfect picture of reality.

So a proposition is a thought which is a picture reconstructing the state of affairs of the fact in the external world. If the proposition reflects the actual state of affairs it is true, and false in the opposite.

The important consequence from this is that propositions are supposed to reflect a portion of reality, and everything beyond that is senseless. Logic studies the inferential relation between one propositions to another, such as “Socrates is mortal” correlates with “Socrates is a man” and “All man are mortal”. But the entire three propositions are basically analytical statements that only serve to delineate whatever that is has already been contained in the first proposition. Logic thus is a tautology. Tautologies such as “It is either raining or not” sounds logical but it does not reflect a portion of reality, thus senseless. The proposition “it is either raining or not” does not resemble with any picture at all, thus it is again senseless. It is hard to grasp in the first place because we are embroiled with the fact that the statement is logical and thus true. But the statement only gives us information about our language, not a picture of reality. It is this automatic confusion between robustness of language and the depiction of reality that drives all the catastrophes in philosophy. Thus even though it is perfectly logical, it is simultaneously “transcendental” because it can only be shown (or felt) but cannot be said (in reality). Therefore, all propositions in the realm of the transcendental, according to Wittgenstein, can only be shown but not said. “The reason for this is that meaningful propositions are limited to picturing states of affairs in the world, and values found in ethics and aesthetics cannot be found in the world.” This is the essence and limit of the human world, as understood by Wittgenstein.

Thus it is clear that philosophy is not about debating transcendental propositions that is totally using language for an entirely wrong reason, but it is about elucidations of the limited the use of language and propositions to represents only possible state of affairs in the world and to correct any confusion while using it.

The later Wittgenstein was thought to be a complete break from the previous conclusions he made in the Tractatus. In my opinion, I maintained that he retain the very same conclusion albeit with a different kind of attitude. His later works still focused on the correct use of language but not in a scientific way as he famously did in the Tractatus, but in a more open discussion, resembling a sage speaking to his students. Therefore, I have no problem in reconciling his early and later thoughts.

[Kyaw Zayar Lwin]

Need to reread

[Ege · Rating 5 out of 5]

1. In the introduction, the author warns that what is written in the book is one possible way of interpreting Wittgenstein and there are also other ways. Therefore, the most of things written here belongs to the author. No, the most of things written here is written by me as what i understand from the book except the sentence that have 'I' in it, these sentences are written by me.

2. The book named 'The Science of Logic by P. Coffey' which defends the Aristotelian logic and criticize modern works on logic was reviewed by Wittgenstein in Cambridge Review in 1913.
I. The author believes the all propositions are of the subject-predicate form.
II. He believes that reality is changed by becoming an object of thoughts.
III. He confounds the copula 'is' with the word 'is' expressing the identity. (The word 'is' has obviously different meanings in the propositions like 'Twice two is four' and 'Socrates is mortal'.)
IV. H confounds things with the classes to which they belong. (A man is obviously something quite different from mankind.)
V. He confounds classes and complexes. (Mankind is a class whose elements are men; but a library is not a class whose elements are books, because books become parts of a library only by standing in certain spatial relations to one another - while classes are independent of the relations between their members.)
VI. He confounds complexes and sums. (Two plus two is four, but for is not a complex of two and itself.)
Wittgenstein's review was written at transitional stage in the relationship between him and Russell and helps one to avoid the MISTAKE of thinking that Wittgenstein's work should always been in contrast to Russell's work but he also adds all six of the mistakes which Wittgenstein accuses Coffey of making involve ignoring aspects of the work of Frege and Russell.
Russell thought that Leibniz's mistaken views about metaphysics can be traced to a mistaken assumption about propositions like the one Wittgenstein accuse Coffer in I: that every proposition has a subject-predicate form. It leads one to think that worlds consists only two things: objects, which correspond to subjects, and properties, which correspond to predicates. Russell proposed the world also contained relations such as 'John is taller than his father' or 'Four is the square root of sixteen'. A class is the extension of a propositional function. It is the collection of things that, when gives as values of the variables in the function, result in a true proposition. For example, the function 'x is a man' has the class of men.
II is a mistake only if the kind of philosophical realism espoused by Frege and Russell happens to be true. IV, V, VI consist mistake of misunderstanding of class as it was used in the logic of Frege and Russell.

3. As it is said before, Russell thought that Leibniz's mistaken views about metaphysics can be traced to a mistaken assumption about propositions. However, Wittgenstein though (in Tractatus) ALL philosophical views rested upon a mistaken understanding of our language. But isn't this a big generalization so we must regard it nonsense? Wittgenstein alludes this problem in the preface by simply saying that his book draws the limit to what can be expressed not to what can be thought since to draw a limit to thought requires thinking the both sides of the limit. However, why can't we argue this also for drawing limit to expression of thoughts? Well, I don't think drawing the limit on thinking requires such a thing. For example, one cannot think an object is both fully red and fully blue. Wittgenstein deals directly with this problem in 6.54. This remind the Tao Te Ching, the author says, and I see lots of people who saw this similarity. Conant and Diamond believe the propositions in Tractatus do not say or show anything. Yet, the author disagrees with them since it looks like Wittgenstein believed them.
In a letter to Ficker, Wittgenstein told him that the main point of the book is ethical, the book consists two parts: the written and the unwritten and the second part is the important one and ethical can only be delimited in his way. He also recommended him to read the foreword and the conclusion since these express the point most directly.
One of the most important opinions in the book is that there are clear sign in the Tractatus that Wittgenstein does indeed think that nonsense can, at least sometimes, show something cannot be said. One example is that a relation, which seems contradictory, of propositions 6.421 and 6.422.

4. The book tells us first what the world is, then what a fact is, then what a thought is, and then, at much greater length what a proposition is. This reminds me of this entry:
https://eksisozluk.com/entry/10434016

5. Bradley argued if relations existed, we would have to think of them as a kind of objects. Russell countered him by drawing opposite conclusion that since relations 'do' exist then they must be, indeed, a kind of object. Wittgenstein tried to convince Russell that the existence of objects, properties and relations was one of those things that had to be shown, rather than stated.
I think it's very important to remind his words from notes to Moore in 1914 in order to understand what Wittgenstein mean by saying and showing:
"The same distinction between what can be shewn by the language but not said, explains the difficulty that is felt about types, as to the difference between things, fact, properties, relations. That M is a thing can't be said; it is nonsense; but something is shewn by the symbol 'M'. In the same way, that a proposition is a subject-predicate proposition can't be said, but it is shown by the symbol."


6. According to Wittgenstein, we can know nothing about objects unless they constitute a fact. Facts are what correspond to (true) propositions. That's the reason why one cannot understand what 'the world is totality of fact' means unless he understands what a proposition is. Therefore, the smallest unit of meaningful language is not the word, which corresponds to object, but the proposition. A word like 'Fire!' is no exception since it is a short way of saying 'There is fire in this room'.
The idea of picture came to his mind when he saw the model could represent the accident because of the correspondence between parts of the model and the real things. In this way, the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects.
The courtroom model was a spatial picture. But it is not necessary that in every picture elements are spatially related. For example, a melody is held to represent a situation in the world but it cannot be achieved through spatial relations but rather temporal ones. All pictures, whether they have spatial or temporal relations, has a logical form and express a thought. The state of affairs pictured by propositions, the state of affairs might obtain in the real world or not. If it does, the proposition is true. If it does not, then the proposition is false. But either way, the proposition pictures a possible state of affairs.

7. Wittgenstein distinguishes between 'sign' and 'symbol'. The sign is a perceptible, physical thing and the symbol is what is common to all signs that are used to express the same thought. In everyday language same signs are used to express different thoughts, therefore, they are actually different symbols. A series of problems of philosophy occur due to the confusion caused by this disguise. However, one shall not think that there is such a thing as a correct sign-language or there is anything wrong with the language we have. The problem is the language does not wear its logical form.
Logic is a collection of tautologies and tautologies are not pictures of reality. For example, to know why 'it is raining or it is not raining' is always true is not about weather but our language. Tautologies lack sense but they are not nonsense because they are a legitimate part of our sign-language. Therefore, Wittgenstein calls tautologies and contradictions 'pseudo-propositions'.
Everything in the world can be pictured but a picture cannot represent its own pictorial form, that has to be shown. Form of our language is shown by logic, therefore, logic belongs to the unsayable.

8. Ramsey criticized 6.375 proposition that says only necessity/impossibility is the logical necessity/impossibility. For example the simultaneous presence of two colors at the same place in the visual field is (logically) impossible since it is ruled out by the logical structure of color. Wittgenstein also says the logical product of two atomic propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. Since the product of 'this is red' and 'this is blue' is a contradiction, then they cannot be an atomic proposition. In Tractatus, Wittgenstein explains it by reducing it to a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time. Yet, as Ramsey pointed out, this physical analysis - even if it had any scientific basis (which does not) - does not solve the problem. How do the necessary properties of matter, space and time be a logical necessity rather than a physical necessity? Therefore, in Some Remarks on Logical Form Wittgenstein changes his mind
and says some atomic propositions are mutually exclusive.

9. Wittgenstein wanted to publish Philosophical Investigations with Tractatus because so many of the remarks he wanted to include in this new book alluded to views he had published in Tractatus. Moreover, he felt his new work could be understood only with his early work.
In Tractatus, Wittgenstein had attempted to analyse the general form of the proposition, he had fallen victim to the tendenct to look for something in common to all the entities which commonly subsume.

10. The bearer of the name is not itself. For example, that Bertrand Russell died does not mean his name lost his meaning. Yet, in Tractatus he wrote "A name means an object. The object is its meaning'.

11. The way of Wittgenstein for clearing philosophical confusions has similarities with Freudian psychoanalysis. He does not offer an argument, yet a therapy. In his conversations and lectures, he draws these similarities and describes himself a disciple of Freud. According to him, Freud did not give us a scientific explanation, yet, he did more than that. He gives us a new mythology, a new way of looking ourselves.

12. There can be no such thing as private language, Wittgenstein argues in Philosophical Investigations, since the only criteria for this language would be private criteria, which is not actually a criteria. As far as I understand, Wittgenstein think what gives a word its meaning is that its using in language game, therefore, what gives 'pain' its meaning is not our subjective feeling of it but its using. Therefore, 'pain' cannot have a subjective meaning. He says "An inner process stands in need of outward criteria".
Kripke regards the section 243-315 not as the argument itself but the paragraph 202 is.

13. Reading the later Wittgenstein, the author says, as a behaviourist is analogous to reading the early Wittgenstein as a logical positivist.

14. "I was walking about in Cambridge and passed a bookshop and in the window were portraits of Russell, Freud and Einstein. A little further on, in a music shop, I saw portraits of Beethoven, Schubert and Chopin. Comparing these portraits I felt intensely the terrible degeneration that had come over the human spirit in the course of only a hundred years."
"Telling someone something he does not understand is pointless, even if you add that he will not understand it. (That so often happens with someone you love.) If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. ... The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the rest."

15. What is second part of Philosophical Investigations is Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology and Last writing on the Philosophy of Psychology. He talks about imponderable evidence, which have these characteristics:
1. It can be seen as evidence for particular judgement.
+ How do you know your father dislikes your boyfriend?
- I could tell by the way he looked at him.
+ And how did he look at him?
- Well, ... as if he didn't like him.
2. the value of the evidence varies with the experience and the knowledge of the person.
3. It cannot be evaluated, weighed, pondered, by appeal to any system of general principles or universal laws.

[Ai Miller · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a really marvelous little book--it really broke down Wittengenstein's arguments and made me excited to try to actually engage with Wittgenstein's writings on my own, especially the later stuff. I think the parts explaining Wittegenstein's earlier work was not as clear to me, which I'm gonna call a me thing and not a problem with Monk's writing or explanation. The later work though felt much more clear to me through Monk's explanations, and I found the chapter on language games to be particularly helpful and interesting! I definitely feel better equipped to try to go forth and read Wittgenstein's actual works after this, which means it did its job!

[Mohammad Mirzaali · Rating 2 out of 5]

کتاب ری مانک، فارغ از ترجمه‌ی نه چندان خوبش، کتاب جالبی ست و نه به شکلی عمیق، اما مقدمه‌ی درخوری برای خواندن ویتگنشتاین است. نویسنده همان کسی ست که شاید معروف‌ترین بیوگرافی ویتگنشتاین (یعنی «رسالت نابغه»ی ترجمه‌نشده) را نوشته و این زندگی‌نگاری، در این کتاب هم جا به جا خودش را نشان می‌دهد... مترجم اما استاد زبردستی در ترجمه‌های بی‌کیفیت از ویتگنشتاین‌شناسان بزرگی چون گلاک، انسکم، و حالا مانک است. ای کاش مثل سهراب علوی‌نیا ای دست به ترجمه‌ی این کتاب می‌شد

[M. · Rating 5 out of 5]

I should start asking myself if there is something Wittgenstein was not interested in. Despite the rare approach to philosophy, it remains one of these twentieth century essential looks that does not fall into relativism or scientism. I am not sure of being fully equipped to read his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus or even his more accessible Philosophical Investigations, but surely Ray Monk has managed to give his readers a wider perspective.

[archive ☄ · Rating 4 out of 5]

an outstanding beginner's course!! am now feeling informed + brave enough to tackle wittgenstein's surpassingly genius work <3

[Illiterate · Rating 3 out of 5]

Monk uses gobbets to introduce Wittgenstein’s life and philosophy, stressing his view of philosophy as an activity that clears up confusions caused by language.

[Vincent T. Ciaramella · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wittgenstein is one of my favorite thinkers. In fact, I feel he is underrated. It might be because the Tractatus looks like Ikea furniture instructions. The first time I tried to read it I had no clue what was going on. Well, it took some researching and reading about the author first to get me through the Tractatus. Ray Monk's book would have been a BIG help if I would have read it first.

Before you go and try to fathom Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, read this first. It will give you an idea of what you are about to read and how to read it. It will also put you in the mindset of Wittgenstein. He is not the most accessible person but once you understand him (if that's really even possible) it should make his work understandable.

Its a fast read and very clear. I am holding on to this book. I might revisit it down the road.

[Ed · Rating 4 out of 5]

If this book is indicative of others in the series I look forward to reading them. Monk, whose biography of W. I have read, does a wonderful job approaching W's writing chronologically, providing a condensed intellectual biography and providing me with a better understanding of W whose writings I have found very difficult. Most of what I have read about W tends to give the writer's view of W. This short book delightfully tries to stay close to W wrote. A very good place to start trying to understand W.

[Ralph Palm · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great book. It seems like it would be an introduction, but it's not. At least, it's not only that. Reading it feels more like having a conversation with an expert, after a conference, over a couple of beers. I wish more philosophy books were written this way.

[Petr · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a wonderful book. Nevertheless, Monk managed to pull Wittgenstein from a pedestal where I had put him after reading and learning about the Tractatus. Maybe it was due to Monk's clarification of what Wittgenstein thought, but I now see a pettier person than the genius I saw before. However, I do not have a deep enough background in philosophy to appreciate Wittgenstein's work in the context of its time. And maybe it is just me, living in a post-Wittgenstein world of thought that takes many of his groundbreaking ideas for granted. I recommend reading the book to anyone interested in Wittgenstein's work as Monk shows us not only his books but also excerpts from drafts or mail to illustrate what Wittgenstein had in mind.

[Graham · Rating 5 out of 5]

As "lay-reader" introductions to Wittgenstein go, this is stunning. It in some sense constitutes the typical intro to the main texts (and key concepts therein) of Wittgenstein, and this expository aspect is about as clear and precise as a text this brief on a thinker so complex could get.

What really makes it stand out, however, is Monk's emphasis on the question of just what exactly Wittgenstein is trying to do in these texts, and why it is that he does so. It is this issue which is perhaps the most opaque aspect of the Tractatus in particular, and it is here that Monk is really trying to show us how to read Wittgenstein. (I feel like if the Vienna Circle had grasped the main concerns and motivations behind the Tracatus which Monk details here, it is unlikely that they would have read him so incorrectly.)

This book is a succinct and clear way into examining the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein that will likely make one both ready and eager to tackle his work directly.

[Brother Gregory Rice, SOLT · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book is short, swift and fascinating, and the person discussed, Ludwig Wittgenstein, is worth the attention. He was an enigmatic, brash personality of prodigious intelligence of the early 20th century who questioned the way moderns philosophized in general. The most capturing aspect of his thought for me was his humility towards philosophic questions, and his religious approach to them.

Warning: the subject matter is at times quite opaque (particularly in the second quarter of the book dealing with analytical logic), the author himself is lucid. The subject matter being dealt with is notoriously difficult but the broad spectrum of the thought and the major strains of commentary are brought out clearly. The book operates primarily by walking through the facts of his work and discussing it with some biographical context for support.

[Ronnie · Rating 4 out of 5]

3 1/2

Short but useful introduction to Wittgenstein's body of work by the author of the excellent Wittgenstein biography "Duty of genius". By no means a companion book to the tractatus or the PI, but has interesting "Denkanstöße" and explications of Wittgenstein's thinking that can help understanding and contextualizing his work.

[Seyed · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you're travelling to a new country, it is nice to have a guide. One who is knowledgeable but doesn't warp every sight into his own perspective. Someone who leaves you to explore, to sample and to understand for yourself. Ray Monk is that guide for the work of Wittgenstein.

[Jackson Cyril · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wonderful book-- cannot recommend it enough. Longer review hopefully coming later when I gather my thoughts...

[Yohanes Saputra · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good introduction to the thoughts of Wittgenstein, his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations.

[Doug · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's funny that I had trouble understanding a book that was written to help understand a more difficult set of books and publications. I’m certain that my understanding of Wittgenstein after reading a 105 page book about his thoughts is below rudimentary. Nonetheless, I got a few things from ‘How to Read Wittgenstein’ that put words to what I have been thinking about a long time philosophically in my capacity as a neuroscientist. This is ironic based on the intentions of Wittgenstein.

One of the things that resonated with me relates to sensation and perception. Sensation is different than perception. Sensation is the input we receive from the world around us and also inside us. Perception involves the integration of those sensations into a mental construction of the world as a whole. Perceptions vary between people, so it's difficult to have a true idea of something that works for everybody. That being said, Wittgenstein, probably because of when he wrote this material, didn't consider the idea of natural selection, which would favor our perceptions being at least somewhat representative of the real world and not arbitrarily different. Phylogeny suggests that our neural connections are more alike than different (depending on scale, because at the very small scale they differ widely based on experience). This all suggests that our perceptions are perhaps more similar to one another then Wittgenstein would have suspected, although his philosophy isn't strictly about that.

Another aspect of this book that resonated with me is the idea of the subjectiveness of language and the fool's errand it is to debate the meaning of words. Scientists create words to describe what they experience/perceive. When an exception to a word’s definition arises, discussion ensues about whether and how that exception should fit the word; some may even question the value of the created word. Debates on whether or not some apparent exception should fit a word’s definition seem foolhardy. We created the word, it is imaginary, perhaps based on our knowledge of some previous time point. Trying to argue whether exceptions fit the rule or not seems nonsensical. Why not just adjust the language? Or just accept it as an exception? Or realize that words aren’t perfect?

I'm not sure where this idea appeared in this book, in what form it appeared, or even if it actually appeared at all, but while reading ‘How to Read Wittgenstein’ and other stuff at the same time, I had this idea that some disciplines are not interested in seeking truth, rather creating epiphanies that change the way that people think, and those epiphanies don't even need to be true to serve that purpose. It is really interesting that in his first book Wittgenstein says everything he wrote was nonsensical, but it still served a purpose, which creates a dilemma. But the dilemma is solved if you just assume that the nonsense created an epiphany.

The last chapter, “Understanding Others” is fascinating. It talks about Wittgenstein's concern that science was taking over other ways of knowing. I like the idea that the value of art isn't just for pleasure and lays outside of the purview of science. Wittgenstein talks about things that are known that are “imponderable”. It (kind of) relates to trusting experts, but interestingly the idea of bias is not discussed... but wait, what am I saying?! Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus could be interpreted as being entirely about bias… That Wittgenstein’s thoughts/works (through this book ‘about’ him) pull me both directions makes them interesting to consider.

I like the idea that being an expert (with lots of experience) means something, but also I'm concerned that experts are sometimes wrong or come to wrong conclusions, or are willing to say things as fact that are merely probable conclusions based on their perspectives. If an expert could be wrong about something that can be directly examined (And therefore proven wrong), then why couldn't they be wrong about something that is imponderable? Again, individual perception is a really cool thing to, er, ponder!

Now that I’ve read ‘How to Read Wittgenstein’, with many excerpts of his works, I need to decide if I really want to read Wittgenstein’s works without commentary. I have a feeling one could make a career of that and there are plenty of other books to read.

[Salem Zarir · Rating 5 out of 5]

لقد دفعني الكتاب للتفكير في أمور لم أبدأ قراءته رغبة مني بالبحث في هذه الأمور، وهذا هو التعبير الصحيح عن جملة نيتشة، أننا لا نسمع سوا الأسئلة التي نمتلك اجابتها، وأن القارئ لا يجد فيما يقرأ إلا ما كان لديه قبل شروعه في القراءة.

أقصد بالتحديد، أن الكتاب جعلني اتساءل مجددا عما يجعل العمل الروائي عظيما، ولقد عبر فتغنشتاين عن اعتقادي تعبيرا دقيقا، ومتسقا حتى مع الروايات الأحب إلى قلبي، ومع ما يختمر في ذهني منذ مدة: على الرواية العظيمة ألا تعالج مواضيعها بشكل مباشر، وعليها أن تكتم أكثر مما تقول. ألا يوضح هذا الأمر تماما لماذا تعد روايات ساندرسون مثلا روايات قميئة؟

نعم، لقد كان فتغنشتاين محقا عندما قال أن على الفيلسوف -وأرى أن هذا الأمر ينطبق على الروائي كذلك- أن يدرك أن ما يريد أن يقوله لا يمكن قوله، ولا يمكن استخدام اللغة للتعبير عنه إلا بالكف عن استخدامها -أي اللغة.

مؤخرا، استمعت الى معزوفة لاكريموسا في التشيك، تعزفها الاوركسترا التشيكية في أحد الكنائس القديمة وسط براغ. ورغم أنني بالطبع لا أتقن اللاتينية، إلا أنني أجزم بأنني -والملايين غيري- قد شعروا بالمعنى من وراء المعزوفة حتى قبل قراءة كلماتها باللاتينية وفهم معناها. ليس لدي أدنى شك بأنني لو حاولت الاستماع للكلمات لفهم المعزوفة لانتقصت من قيمتها فورا. إن اللغة ليست فقط وسيلة تواصل، بل عائق أمامه كذلك.

الكتاب نفسه ممتع، يصلح كمقدمة مقتضبة لفكر فيتغنشتاين كما يصلح كحاشية تقرأ لمن يستطيع فهم بعض أساسيات فكره. يمكن تلخيص ما أحببته في الكتاب بالاقتباس التالي: يؤمن العامة بأن العلماء موجودون لتعليمهم، أما الشعراء والأدباء والموسيقيون، فالغاية منهم التسلية فقط." نعم، لقد أسكرنا العلم حتى نسينا وجود أشكال أخرى من الفهم.

الجميل في المؤلف أنه قادر على منح القارئ شعورا بوجود معرفة حميمية بينه وبين فتغنشتاين، اذ لا يتم فقط شرح أفكار الأخير -بل هذا أقل ما يتم في الكتاب- بل يتم كذلك ايضاح بعد المفاصل الرئيسية في شخصيته، كما يجري القاء الضوء على محاور مهمة في فكره وسيرته.

[Eoin Conroy · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm clearly not a Wittgenstein expert, if it was necessary for me to read this book, so I am no position to judge whether this is a worthwhile introduction to his body of thought. What I have identified in this book (from my position of ignorance), is a self-defeating modus operandi, as Ray Monk attempts to provide a basic introduction, while simultaneously attempting to provide an original argument. It is almost impossible to introduce any philosopher's work without attempting to untangle strata of debates surrounding their work, but by attempting to do so, Monk characterises Wittgenstein as a sort of anti-positivist philosopher-poet, and doesn't seem to unpack his thought to a great extent. I'm not entirely sure whether this is the best mindset a reader should be in before diving into Wittgenstein's texts and the critical debates around his work, as I have stated earlier, I am largely ignorant of Wittgenstein.

I won't come down too hard on Monk's estimation of Wittgenstein though, as forming a worthwhile introduction to any area of knowledge at all and evade misunderstandings or reductions is a hubristic, impossible task (especially in a hundred pages!) The best that such a book can offer is a 'way in' - a way of thinking about something which will be looked back upon as much too simple once more knowledge has been accumulated, but it provides that necessary shove to start more advanced reading. Monk is successful in this regard, I think.

[Ji · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's one of those weekends when one had to babysit loads of laundries and picked up a small book that's been long forgotten on the to-read list. I have lots of praises to say about it. For one thing, I now feel itchy to go read "the blue and brown books" which I bought 10+ years ago.

The only criticism I have is Ray Monk's dedication to the almighty-Wittgenstein-ism. It's not the first time I saw this, from his Duty of the Genius, to his YouTube videos, and even a podcast about his search for Wittgenstein's tomb. It's understandable. One sitting too close to a giant would be completely buried in the giant's shadows, searching around looking for evidence of the giant's absolute greatness, and eventually lost his way out.

Nonetheless, Ray Monk's eagerness to take sides with Wittgenstein makes it sometimes boring to read, especially when it happened so unnecessarily. We are all humans.

[Nico · Rating 3 out of 5]

A decent introduction done by Wittgenstein’s biographer, Ray Monk. What really succeeds here is how Monk ties together early and late Wittgenstein and adds a lot of biographical and contextual information that shows just exactly where Wittgenstein was coming from when he wrote the Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations. I imagine there may be better introductions that read the works in question a little closer, but Monk does a fine job at touching the surface of the ever so enigmatic Wittgenstein, allowing the reader to gain a better understanding of the ol’ troublesome mystic logician before completely delving headfirst into his work.

[Spencer Baughman · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic primer to the multifaceted work of Wittgenstein. Having just read another primer to the works of Kierkegaard, it is easy to see how W exists in conversation with K, considering he was only one of a handful of other writers in his subject he bothered to take seriously or even care about in the first place. In my reading, this gives more of an import to the theological angle to Wittgenstein considering their shared protestant background. An important thinker nonetheless in the development of my own “Weltanschauung.”

[Gus Lackner · Rating 3 out of 5]

If Monk's chosen excerpts are representative, Wittgenstein made the distinction between formal and informal language clear. Russel's Principia Mathematica is to expert systems as Wittgenstein's work is to LLMs. Somewhat relevant to modern formal language work, but mostly out of date. Conclusion: it is not worth reading Wittgenstein directly, better to build on work in computer science based on this distinction if one is seeking results.