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Nations, States, and Violence
Nations, States, and Violence presents a revisionist view of the sources of nationalism, the relationship of the nation to culture, and the implications of nationalism and cultural heterogeneity for the future of the nation-state. It accepts the now-standard view that national identities are not inherited traits but constructed communities in order to serve political ends. But the resulting national identities do not emerge from some metaphorical plebiscite as had been suggested by some; rather they result from efforts by people to coordinate their identities with people who share at least some cultural traits with them. Coordination leads to powerful social and cultural ties that are hard to unravel, and this explains the persistence of national identities.
Understood as the result of coordination dynamics, the implications of national homogeneity and heterogeneity are explored. The book shows that national heterogeneity is not, as it is sometimes accused of being, a source of hatred and violence. Nonetheless, there are advantages to homogeneity for the production of public goods and economic growth. Whatever the positive implications of homogeneity, the book shows that in the current world, classic nation-states are defunct. Heterogeneity is proliferating not only due to migration but also because small groups in many states once thought to be homogeneous are coordinating to demand national recognition. With the prohibitive costs of eliminating cultural heterogeneity, citizens and leaders need to learn how best to manage, or even take advantage of, national diversity within their countries. Management of diversity demands that we understand the coordination aspects of national heterogeneity, a perspective that this book provides.
In addition to providing a powerful theory of coordination and cultural diversity, the book provides a host of engaging vignettes of Somalia, Spain, Estonia, and Nigeria, where the author has conducted original field research. The result is a book where theory is combined with interpretations of current issues on nationalism, economic growth, and ethnic violence.
Understood as the result of coordination dynamics, the implications of national homogeneity and heterogeneity are explored. The book shows that national heterogeneity is not, as it is sometimes accused of being, a source of hatred and violence. Nonetheless, there are advantages to homogeneity for the production of public goods and economic growth. Whatever the positive implications of homogeneity, the book shows that in the current world, classic nation-states are defunct. Heterogeneity is proliferating not only due to migration but also because small groups in many states once thought to be homogeneous are coordinating to demand national recognition. With the prohibitive costs of eliminating cultural heterogeneity, citizens and leaders need to learn how best to manage, or even take advantage of, national diversity within their countries. Management of diversity demands that we understand the coordination aspects of national heterogeneity, a perspective that this book provides.
In addition to providing a powerful theory of coordination and cultural diversity, the book provides a host of engaging vignettes of Somalia, Spain, Estonia, and Nigeria, where the author has conducted original field research. The result is a book where theory is combined with interpretations of current issues on nationalism, economic growth, and ethnic violence.
- GenresPolitics
180 pages, Hardcover
First published July 26, 2007
38 people want to read
About the author
David D. Laitin
13 books8 followersDavid D. Laitin is James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 10, 2015
The middle sections of the book are okay, and the final chapter laying out the normative implications has exactly as much value as every other final chapter laying out normative implications (none,) but the first two, which respectively 1) demolish primordialist theories of ethnic conflict and 2) lay out a rational choice account of ethnic identity, are fantastic.
September 26, 2025
Why review an outdated, post-old-cold war monograph? Because the issues it raises - though I disagree with the author's analysis - raise many still-timely issues. Unfortunately the response is, as of this writing, going the other way from the hopeful era he outlined. The author was an experienced Peace Corps veteran with many years experience and study in affected areas; so why give his work only three stars?
First, let me raise one point I do agree with: ethnic violence between groups and the state is overblown by a sensationalist media seeking "sexy" copy to boost ratings and circulation. Blood sells; peaceful coexistence - the everyday norm - does not. Hot-spot journalists are too quick to take partisan accounts of rebels and separatists or whatever at face value and not dig too closely at their cover stories, often masks to cover the real histories of their movements (which are typically not "ancient grievances.")
But in assessing the role of native actors and their accommodation tactics - or the reverse - he leaves out one salient protagonist: external powers often have a vested interest in stirring, supplying, and supporting ethnic rebels who otherwise might not take a militant road (ethnic Serbs in Bosnia, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.) In discussing external actors, he raises the relationship between colonial powers imposing their external language, but doesn't draw the parallel that "national "languages - French, Castilian - are products of an internal colonialism, enforcing obedience from the ruling elites' capital.
In analyzing India's nationalism, he raises the colonial question of English as an interference in a national language - Hindi - from filling that internal colonial role. The problem here is that India is no compact mass like France or Spain, but a subcontinent itself, like Europe. Hindi could not impose itself on all of India any more than French or German across Europe. English use in India, as in Europe, serves as a trans-linguistic business Latin.
Laitin then posits the European Union as an embryonic nation. This is 1990s wishful thinking. The EU is not, nor was designed to be, a unified state absorbing the national differences of its constituents. Its purpose is marketing and banking; while these commercial factors were important in creating making nations, the EU has no standing army to enforce nationhood. That belongs to NATO, a force controlled by an external power.
He also raises the contradiction between the old-style, intolerant nationalism of post-Communist states with the cosmopolitanism of old Europe. His prognosis is that they will adopt "modern attitudes" in due time. What Laitin failed to see is that this was always two-faced: treating Russian or Serbian as languages of the enemy, while turning a cosmopolitan face to Europe. We still see Estonian or Ukrainian nationalists venomizing Russian-speakers within their borders to foreign listeners - in fluent English! What has happened instead is the return of old-fashioned language nationalism to old Europe against immigrants and alien elements, while embracing cosmopiltanism for themselves.
Laitin sees liberal democracy as the cure for nationalistic grievance. Would that he were right, but he leaves open a dark hole even here. In creating autonomous language zones in a pluralist society, he gives sub-minorities only the options of assimilation or leaving, to create democratic harmony for the larger society. This flaw in multi-cultural theory leads to ethnic cleansing against sub-minorities outside the local language; it's no more desirable than force against majority-language speakers by local militants.
If all this sounds confusing, it's because this is a knotty problem whose solutions are less clear twenty years after Laitin wrote about them, in the aftermath of the great ethnic cleansings of the late 20th century. Time has not been kind to multi-culturalism, and not entirely because of right-wing nationalist resurgence.
First, let me raise one point I do agree with: ethnic violence between groups and the state is overblown by a sensationalist media seeking "sexy" copy to boost ratings and circulation. Blood sells; peaceful coexistence - the everyday norm - does not. Hot-spot journalists are too quick to take partisan accounts of rebels and separatists or whatever at face value and not dig too closely at their cover stories, often masks to cover the real histories of their movements (which are typically not "ancient grievances.")
But in assessing the role of native actors and their accommodation tactics - or the reverse - he leaves out one salient protagonist: external powers often have a vested interest in stirring, supplying, and supporting ethnic rebels who otherwise might not take a militant road (ethnic Serbs in Bosnia, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.) In discussing external actors, he raises the relationship between colonial powers imposing their external language, but doesn't draw the parallel that "national "languages - French, Castilian - are products of an internal colonialism, enforcing obedience from the ruling elites' capital.
In analyzing India's nationalism, he raises the colonial question of English as an interference in a national language - Hindi - from filling that internal colonial role. The problem here is that India is no compact mass like France or Spain, but a subcontinent itself, like Europe. Hindi could not impose itself on all of India any more than French or German across Europe. English use in India, as in Europe, serves as a trans-linguistic business Latin.
Laitin then posits the European Union as an embryonic nation. This is 1990s wishful thinking. The EU is not, nor was designed to be, a unified state absorbing the national differences of its constituents. Its purpose is marketing and banking; while these commercial factors were important in creating making nations, the EU has no standing army to enforce nationhood. That belongs to NATO, a force controlled by an external power.
He also raises the contradiction between the old-style, intolerant nationalism of post-Communist states with the cosmopolitanism of old Europe. His prognosis is that they will adopt "modern attitudes" in due time. What Laitin failed to see is that this was always two-faced: treating Russian or Serbian as languages of the enemy, while turning a cosmopolitan face to Europe. We still see Estonian or Ukrainian nationalists venomizing Russian-speakers within their borders to foreign listeners - in fluent English! What has happened instead is the return of old-fashioned language nationalism to old Europe against immigrants and alien elements, while embracing cosmopiltanism for themselves.
Laitin sees liberal democracy as the cure for nationalistic grievance. Would that he were right, but he leaves open a dark hole even here. In creating autonomous language zones in a pluralist society, he gives sub-minorities only the options of assimilation or leaving, to create democratic harmony for the larger society. This flaw in multi-cultural theory leads to ethnic cleansing against sub-minorities outside the local language; it's no more desirable than force against majority-language speakers by local militants.
If all this sounds confusing, it's because this is a knotty problem whose solutions are less clear twenty years after Laitin wrote about them, in the aftermath of the great ethnic cleansings of the late 20th century. Time has not been kind to multi-culturalism, and not entirely because of right-wing nationalist resurgence.
September 17, 2019
Interesting analysis of heterogeneity and homogeneity in nations. It shows how diversity is not a source of violence, although homogeneity is an obvious advantage for the production of public goods.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews