The Hard Hand of War explores the Union army's policy of destructive attacks upon Southern property and civilian morale--how it evolved, what it was like in practice. From an initial policy of deliberate restraint, extending even to the active protection of Southerners' property and constitutional rights, Union armies gradually adopted measures that were expressly intended to demoralize Southern civilians and to ruin the Confederate economy. Yet the ultimate "hard war" policy was far from the indiscriminate fury of legend. Union policy makers promoted a program of directed severity, and Professor Grimsley demonstrates how and why it worked. This volume fits into an emerging interpretation of the Civil War that questions its status as a "total war" and instead emphasizes the survival of political logic and control even in the midst of a sweeping struggle for the nation's future: the primary goal of the Federal government remained the restoration of the Union, not the devastation of the South. Intertwined with a political logic, and sometimes indistinguishable from it, was also a deep sense of moral justice--a belief that, whatever the claims of military necessity, the innocent deserved some pity, and that even the guilty should suffer in rough proportion to the extent of their sins. Through comparisons with earlier European wars and through the testimony of Union soldiers and Southern civilians alike, Grimsley shows that Union soldiers exercised restraint even as they made war against the Confederate civilian population.
A scholarly history of Union military policy toward southern civilians, with an emphasis that this policy evolved over time and was often exaggerated by contemporaries. Grimsley studies how this policy was defined by both severity and restraint, although he does not cover how this played out in the more vicious war in Kansas and Missouri.
Grimsley shows the evolution of this policy, with McClellan opposed to anything resembling hard war in the belief that southerners could be reconciled to return to the Union. The campaigns of 1862 and the policy of emancipation eventually changed this, although may commanders still sought a miliar victory during this interlude and largely ignored southern civilians. This changed in 1864, when Grant approved harsher methods, both to destroy Confederate resources and speed the end of the war. Most of this history is portrayed in terms of policymakers and commanders.
Interesting and nuanced, while not particularly easy to read.
This book is a well thought out and researched study of the evolution of Union strategy throughout the American Civil war, especially in regards to the treatment of noncombatants and their property. The early strategy was conciliatory and it gradually evolved into a more confrontational approached. Many people refer to the term total war when describing the tactics of General William Tecumseh Sherman's march to the sea. I prefer the term hard war because the tactics are tough but not ruthless. The army lead by Sherman has been mischaracterized as a unit that burned, and pillaged everything in their way. Although they did a lot of destruction, the official orders were to take what was needed for the troops and leave little that the Confederate forces could use, not to brutalize the civilians. So they did take and even kill plenty of livestock and did a lot of burning, and destroying mostly of barns, railroads, factories and public buildings. Most of the wanton pillaging and assault on noncombatants was unauthorized and some of the perpetrators were punished.
A very good analysis that fills in the gaps on Union strategy. Overlong at times, but he makes up for it with constant use of primary sources. It also broadened my view of McClellan. He held on to the policy of conciliation, even after most others had grown tired of it and were ready to move on to something more aggressive. Ultimately, poor troop discipline ruined the potential success of conciliatory policy for the Union.
First I want to mention a few problems with the book. Grimsley says little about Missouri after 1861 or Louisiana in general. In both cases the war did get far more brutal than anything Sherman ever dreamed. Also, there is some evidence that the Army of the Potomac in 1864-65 was very much embracing a hard war policy.
All of that said, this is a great book, a quick and direct read, sober in its analysis and with a lot of context. Unlike most American historians, who are parochial, Grimsley points out that Union hard war measures were not as total as supposed and well within the tradition of warfare in western civilization after 1648.
The result is a smart and knowing book free of agenda; Grimsley is more interested in why and how as opposed to the kinds of moral judgements that often cloud scholarship. One might say Grimsley is too kind to the Union effort, too detached from the horrors. Perhaps the Civil War tells us that no matter how kind we try to be, even with our "precision" bombs of today and selective burnings of 1864, that war creates savages of us all. Only the degrees matter. That though might be asking too much. Gimsley is no philosopher and that is fine.
Excellent discussion of the evolution of attitudes of Northerners and their military (both at the top and at the bottom). The final two chapters are very interesting in how and why the subject of the "Hard War" has persisted in American thought. Not an easy read (a revised PhD dissertation), but well worth the effort.
A must-read for not only Civil War buffs but anyone with an interest in war policy decision-making and execution. The defeat of an enemy can come from removing their ability to make war or removing their will to make war. Hard war can do both but especially the latter. This book is based on Grimsley's dissertation so expect a scholarly read as opposed to pop history. It's worth your time.
Very many primary sources and direct quotes. The whole book was very convincing at showing how the Union’s policy towards Southern civilians in the Civil War changed over time.
The best books teach you something you did not already know, preferably exploding a few cherished myths along the way, while simultaneously being entertaining. Sometimes they can even be, dare we say it, fun to read? Even books about such otherwise sober topics as war. On the first page of Mark Grimsley’s The Hard Hand of War, the author opens the book with a fascinating juxtaposition from the pen of Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard, warning about the rampaging Yankees pouring into northern Virginia.
In 1861 his accusations of violence were untrue, yet in their way they were also prophetic, for within three years they would be all too true. And later on that first page we learn that the man Beauregard was demonizing, Union General Irvin McDowell, was busy ensuring the safety of the wife of his enemy, Robert E. Lee, as McDowell camped in the shade of Lee’s house on Arlington Heights.
Military decisions are not made in vacuums and they are rarely made by one person, alone. The book makes good use of the various political arguments in the North about exactly what policies should be followed vis-a-vis Southern civilians, and discussions that took place early in the war are reflected by military decisions later. Sherman’s attitude toward Georgia, for example, seems but the logical extension of a quote from a speech by Senator Orville Browning, a Republican from Illinois, who openly said that the devastation which would make Sherman famous, or infamous, might become necessary.
This book's is about exactly what the subtitle says: how did the Union military treat Southern civilians, why did it treat them as they did, and why did the answer to those two questions change as the war went on? From the conciliatory policies of the early part of the war to the "hard war" of 1864-1865 this book is pretty thorough. It also looks at the limits of the changing policies, particularly how well they could be enforced. Emancipation is covered as it should be, but there is much more to it. Grimsley also looks at other instances of "total war" and makes good points about why the campaigns of Sherman and Sheridan did not qualify as such, both using subsequent examples like World War II but also events that predated Sherman like the Hundred Years War.
At 225 footnoted pages of main text this is not a hefty book. I think some more detail regarding policies later in the war in Missouri and Tennessee dealing with guerrillas would have been interesting and it reads a little like a doctoral dissertation (which it apparently was expanded from), but this doesn't detract from its merit. This is a sharp, efficient book and probably one of the most important books about the Civil War in the last 20 years if not ever. It cuts through the haze of a poorly understood aspect of the war.
Highly recommended to anyone interested in the Civil War.
I read this for a college history course. The book seemed more like a students senior history paper buffed up to make it a book. Reference after reference but not alot of substance to the reading. Not recommended