Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus : A Political Biography

by Moshe Ma'oz

Traces the life and political career of Syria's President Assad, discusses his determination to unite the Arab world, and analyzes his policy decisions.

Genres: Middle East

240 pages, Paperback

First published February 20, 1989

Reviews

[Austin Barselau · Rating 3 out of 5]

At the time of writing this review, a major offensive by Syrian opposition forces precipitated the end of more than five decades of Assad family rule, commenced in 1971 by Hafez al-Assad. As a testament to popular unrest at the Assad dynasty, rebel forces ransacked and desecrated Hafez’s mausoleum, drove his son Bashar into Russian exile, and tore off the locks of the notorious Sednaya death camp prison to reveal a “slaughterhouse” of human rights violations. The abuses of the Assad regime merit closer scrutiny in its immediate aftermath, including examining how such rule should be evaluated in light of the development of the Syrian state and popular sentiment over its rule.

In the 1988 ASAD: THE SPHINX OF DAMASCUS, author Moshe Ma’oz, professor emeritus of Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, attempts to provide an evenhanded political biography of the patriarch of the Assad family, Hafez, from his rise to the peak of his power. Ma’oz portrays Hafez as a transformative figure in the developmental period of modern Syria, arguing that Hafez had transformed the country from a “weak and vulnerable state” to a “strong, stable and assertive” player in the regional community. Underscoring his intelligence, pragmatism, and Machiavellian instincts, Ma’oz describes a leader who for the first time created a centralized government within the country’s borders, provided domestic political and economic reform, and articulated a foreign policy doctrine that sought regional unity and strategic balance against Israel.

While Ma’oz is mostly praiseworthy of Assad’s perceived political genius, even going as far to say that he showed sincere “care for the well-being of his people” (if only he could comment on Hafez’s reception today), he does criticize him for his tribalistic ruling coalition, largely failed foreign policy (including a mismanagement of the PLO and failure to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict), and inadequate domestic reforms (including bureaucratic mismanagement, inflation, professional brain drain, and the brutal repression and indiscriminate massacre of the Hama rebellion). Ma’oz’s profile of Hafez, a man whose shrewdness and enigmatic personality led some to call him the “sphinx of Damascus,” reveals the inception of Assad family rule, its multiple shortcomings, and the seeds of its own future destruction.

[Phoenix · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sins of the Father

The book begins with an excellent two chapter retrospective of Syrian history from Ottoman times through to the French Mandate and the early years of independence - this alone makes the acquisition of the book worthwhile Maoz writes that, with the exception of the urban religious and political elite who favoured Ottomanism, the region lacked a political centre and people largely directed their allegiances along the lines of highly local ayan (clan) and ulama (clerical) ethnic divisions. The influence of the Sultan was minimal and forced. To paraphrase Tom Lehr, everyone who was Sunni, Shiah, Kurd, Nusayri (Alawawite), Turkoman, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, or Druz hated each other and "all despise the Jews". (pp3 - quote from Isabel Burton - 1870 "the Inner Life of Syria".) Under the French Mandate, equality of persons was established in 1930 however pressure from the ulamas forced this to be rescinded in 1938.

In the 14th century Ibn Tamiyya issued a fatwa declaring that the Nusayris (Alawites) were even greater infidels than Jews (pp20). Against this background it may be surprising that Asad, an Alawite, was able to take and maintain power. Of Asad's early life, before the age of 16, there has been extremely little that has been publicly revealed, however Maoz argues his village of Qardaha was a regional epicenter of Alawite politics (pp23). Asad's luck or genius was to extend the Alawite strategy of alliances with other minorities such as while maintaining Alawite centrality and control, and making himself a champion of pan-Arabism which grew out of the Christian Arab community in the ME. Yet on a personal level Asad had no loyalties and quite easily resorted to imprisoning or liquidating his rivals when it suited him, including his co-conspirators in the 1966 junta.

Asad, a pilot, rose quickly in the ranks of the Syrian military promoting himself to Field Marshal and was able to maintain his own network of intelligence. In 1970 he opposed the government's decision to intervene Jordan on behalf of the PLO by refusing to offer air cover arguing that this would involve Syria in a war with Israel without the benefit of a larger agreement in the Arab world. The Ba'th party removed Asad and Mustafa Tlas (later Minister of Defense) from their positions on Nov 12, 1970. The next day Asad arrested Ba'th leaders including President Salah Jadid and occupied government and party offices becoming President in February 1971. In a testament to Syrian democracy he is "elected" in a referendum in March 1971 with an overwhelming 99.2% of the vote. His "popularity" increases even more with majorities of 99.6% and 99.9% in '78 and '85 respectively. (pp49)

Within the region Asad did not hold much personal influence based on positive cooperation, with the exception of Lebanon where he maintained an extensive intelligence network under Colonel Ghazi Kan'an, an Alawite relative and head of Military Intelligence. His prime role was to act as a spoiler, opposing both Egyptian and Jordanian efforts in reaching peace agreements with Israel, launching an attack on a train of Soviet Jews in Austria to distract Israeli attentions in 1973 and supporting factions of the PLO who opposed Arafat, whom he despised as Asad's manifestation of pan-Arabism saw Palestine as but an element of a Greater Arabian Syria which would control Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Israel as well. Within Syria many of the key military roles were held by cousins and other close relatives, including his brother Rifat. The country is highly militarized with army officers receiving significantly higher pay than their civilian counterparts. In 1980 Ba'th Party cofounder Salah al-Din Bitar noted that "the two real bases of the regime are dictatorship and confessionalism [sectarianism]" (pp70) - two weeks later he was assassinated.

The book ends in late 1987, 11 years prior to Hafiz Asad's death. Readers will appreciate the fact that Maoz packs a lot of detail into each page, and that his assessment is realistic. To Asad's credit he notes that Asad has gained the support of the rural peasantry (fellahin) through land reform, electrification (the Euphrates damn), and the extension of credit for machinery and mega projects such as the damming of Lake Asad - all of which was accomplished with the securing of Soviet help. The middle class were rewarded with roles in the government bureaucracy, though corruption remained rampant. Conversely, many of majority of the fellahin remained poor and landless, because the government held on the large plots of land seized from the large landowners in 1963 for itself.

As Syrian rights activist Anwar al-Bunni observed in 2005, "The regime's political strategy depends on planting landmines throughout society. But the mine doesn't explode if you place your leg on it--it explodes when you remove your leg from it. The regime planted the land mines then placed their legs on them so that if the regime goes, the society will explode." Though written as a current current I find this kind of book quite helpful as we have the advantage of time to assess the whether or not the author was indeed correct. In large part his son Bashar has continued the policies of his father. Bashar's nurturing of Hiz b'Allah allows Syria to continue it's control of Mount Lebanon and Syria's proxy war with the Israelis and his handling of the Syrian uprising has similarities to his father's approach to the regime's dissidents in the 1980s, particularly in Hama. By examining the strategies and tactics of Asad Sr. one gain insights into those of his son.