What do you think?
Rate this book
The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War
Within a variety of historical contexts, The Shaping of Grand Strategy addresses the most important tasks states have namely, how to protect their citizens against the short-range as well as long-range dangers their polities confront in the present and may confront in the future. To be successful, grand strategy demands that governments and leaders chart a course that involves more than simply reacting to immediate events. Above all, it demands they adapt to sudden and major changes in the international environment, which more often than not involves the outbreak of great conflicts but at times demands recognition of major economic, political, or diplomatic changes. This collection of essays explores the successes as well as failures of great states attempting to create grand strategies that work and aims at achieving an understanding of some of the extraordinary difficulties involved in casting, evolving, and adapting grand strategy to the realities of the world.
294 pages, Paperback
First published February 14, 2011
14 people are currently reading
437 people want to read
About the author
Williamson Murray
87 books50 followersWilliamson "Wick" Murray was an American historian and author. He authored numerous works on history and strategic studies, and served as an editor on other projects extensively. He was professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University from 2012 until his death.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
August 6, 2012
This book takes a very long journey to leave you back where it started - Grand Strategy is a tough nut to crack and there is no prescriptive solution. At the end of the day, it's all about having a vision of where the nation must go and reacting as reality intervenes.
There were some nuggets of goodness: Make mistakes that are recoverable, it's all about priorities, the great leader with the most success is he who can adapt to reality and still work toward Grand Strategy.
There were some nuggets of goodness: Make mistakes that are recoverable, it's all about priorities, the great leader with the most success is he who can adapt to reality and still work toward Grand Strategy.
Read
March 13, 2021"More perhaps than it ever has before, America’s future strategic success is likely to require both modesty in defining its strategic aims and patience in achieving them. Reconciling those requirements with modern America’s media driven combination of missionary zeal and limited attention span may be the nation’s toughest strategic challenge."
"In fact, the best analogy for understanding grand strategy is that of how French peasant soup is made – a mixture of items thrown into the pot over the course of a week and then eaten, for which no recipe can possibly exist."
"In a world in which outcomes are indeterminate, competent strategy consists not in establishing long-range goals and systematically structuring policies and procedures to fulfill them but rather in a clear understanding of one’s principles and priorities and a flexible, creative approach to realizing
incremental gains in the short term"
The Shaping of Grand Strategy is a collection of essays from various military historians about various eras of great power politics. Starting with Louis XIV, the book goes on to cover the Seven Years War, Bismarck's efforts at strengthening Prussia, British grand strategy shifts in the run-up to the world wars, and finally ending with President Truman's actions during the critical early period of the cold war.
Louis XIV is portrayed as obsessed with the accumulation of "gloire," a subject which perhaps best literally translates to glory but should be seen as "reputation" in order to be understood from a modern perspective. Unlike his multilateral-minded regent, the Sun King "abandoned a strategy based on alliances and international agreements for one based on unilateral action that increasingly isolated France. Committed to unilateralism, he tried to make his kingdom invulnerable by maintaining large military forces and building a band of the most technologically advanced fortifications to seal his borders. However, this quest for absolute security further alienated his
neighbors and made war all the more probable." His first war, the War of Devolution, was fought over his wife's, Marie Therese's, "rights" to various Spanish territories. The war ended after the Triple Alliance (Netherlands, England, Sweden) threatened to intercede on Spain's behalf. Following this, Louis XIV, after isolating the Dutch diplomatically, invaded their territory and amassed greater territory before the Dutch flooded their lands, forcing the French to retreat. It was at this point that Louis XIV decided that he'd done enough conquering and decided instead to simply reinforce his gains (making them more defensible with additional territory), seizing Strasbourg in 1681 and attacking Luxembourg in 1683 as the War of the Reunions. With the concluding treaty only granting Louis temporary control of the city-state, he went on to issue an ultimatum in 1687 demanding total control. With his defenses almost completely solidified, Louis sought a "last campaign" to ensure France's defensive strength and struck Philippsburg in 1689. The Germans, far from acquescing, held firm and fought it out in what was th be called the Nine Years' War. The English and the Dutch would join the German side. In the end, Louis was forced to cede territory in order to return to peace. His final war, the War of Spanish Succession, ensured his dynasty's control of Spain but at a terrible price in blood and treasure. The lesson here is that Louis lost "control of the narrative," and was seen as a war-mongerer even when he professed an end of desire for conflict. He might have changed in his long reign, but perceptions hardened after the Dutch War.
The Seven Years' War was the occassion for the shift in the British public imagination regarding their territory. No longer a country with colonies but an empire. As skirmishes began to break out in the Ohio Valley between British and French soldiers, King George II worried that the French might occupy the territory of Hanover, territory the British royalty and come to control. Because of this, he allied himself with Prussia which was facing off against Austria which still desired the return of the territory of Silesia. This is a short essay but the results are "The consequences of the Seven Years’ War in this respect were more profound in France, where public debate became more prominent. In Britain, the key change was a greater salience for imperial issues, which led to postwar attempts to make empire work. These, however, were the very attempts that led to the American Revolution."
The Bismarck section is one of the most interesting, upending most of what I knew or thought I knew about him and his character. In point of fact, Bismarck was hardly blood thirsty and wasn't operating from a grand strategy nursed for years. His skill was in his ability to manipulate events as they came to pass to the advantage of Prussia. To elevate Prussia's position in the German Confederation to be equal to that of Austria's was his chief goal. He did not desire war with Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein Question, even though it was that war that in the end elevated Prussia's position so dramatically in Europe. This military victory was responsible for much of the adulation of arms among the Prussian middle class that would come to spell the doom for future generations of Germans. Many of his victories in fact reflected the failures of others, notably the vain Napoleon III.
The next essay is about the shift in British foreign policy in the lead-up to WWI. To sum it up "In 1890, Britain’s principal great power antagonists were France and Russia, while her friendliest relations were with Germany and its Triple Alliance partner Austria-Hungary. Twenty years later, precisely the opposite relationships prevailed.
In 1890, Britain’s imperial possessions and the lines of communication connecting them with the mother country dominated her strategic concerns, wholly overshadowing her interest in Continental affairs. Twenty years later, those priorities had reversed.
In 1890, British foreign policy continued to reflect the resistance to peacetime alliance commitments that had characterized it ever since Canning. Twenty years later, Britain had entered into formal alliances or ententes with Japan, Russia, and France and had negotiated what amounted to a permanent modus vivendi with the United States.
Finally, in 1890, as had been true ever since the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Britain remained predominant at sea. Twenty years later, confronted with the aggressive expansion of German naval power and the emergence of Japan and the United States as serious naval competitors, the British effectively had abandoned global naval supremacy. Meanwhile, the British army, in 1890 postured almost exclusively as a colonial constabulary, by 1910 had begun to reconfigure itself for large-scale
Continental warfare with Germany as the most likely adversary."
TBD.
"In fact, the best analogy for understanding grand strategy is that of how French peasant soup is made – a mixture of items thrown into the pot over the course of a week and then eaten, for which no recipe can possibly exist."
"In a world in which outcomes are indeterminate, competent strategy consists not in establishing long-range goals and systematically structuring policies and procedures to fulfill them but rather in a clear understanding of one’s principles and priorities and a flexible, creative approach to realizing
incremental gains in the short term"
The Shaping of Grand Strategy is a collection of essays from various military historians about various eras of great power politics. Starting with Louis XIV, the book goes on to cover the Seven Years War, Bismarck's efforts at strengthening Prussia, British grand strategy shifts in the run-up to the world wars, and finally ending with President Truman's actions during the critical early period of the cold war.
Louis XIV is portrayed as obsessed with the accumulation of "gloire," a subject which perhaps best literally translates to glory but should be seen as "reputation" in order to be understood from a modern perspective. Unlike his multilateral-minded regent, the Sun King "abandoned a strategy based on alliances and international agreements for one based on unilateral action that increasingly isolated France. Committed to unilateralism, he tried to make his kingdom invulnerable by maintaining large military forces and building a band of the most technologically advanced fortifications to seal his borders. However, this quest for absolute security further alienated his
neighbors and made war all the more probable." His first war, the War of Devolution, was fought over his wife's, Marie Therese's, "rights" to various Spanish territories. The war ended after the Triple Alliance (Netherlands, England, Sweden) threatened to intercede on Spain's behalf. Following this, Louis XIV, after isolating the Dutch diplomatically, invaded their territory and amassed greater territory before the Dutch flooded their lands, forcing the French to retreat. It was at this point that Louis XIV decided that he'd done enough conquering and decided instead to simply reinforce his gains (making them more defensible with additional territory), seizing Strasbourg in 1681 and attacking Luxembourg in 1683 as the War of the Reunions. With the concluding treaty only granting Louis temporary control of the city-state, he went on to issue an ultimatum in 1687 demanding total control. With his defenses almost completely solidified, Louis sought a "last campaign" to ensure France's defensive strength and struck Philippsburg in 1689. The Germans, far from acquescing, held firm and fought it out in what was th be called the Nine Years' War. The English and the Dutch would join the German side. In the end, Louis was forced to cede territory in order to return to peace. His final war, the War of Spanish Succession, ensured his dynasty's control of Spain but at a terrible price in blood and treasure. The lesson here is that Louis lost "control of the narrative," and was seen as a war-mongerer even when he professed an end of desire for conflict. He might have changed in his long reign, but perceptions hardened after the Dutch War.
The Seven Years' War was the occassion for the shift in the British public imagination regarding their territory. No longer a country with colonies but an empire. As skirmishes began to break out in the Ohio Valley between British and French soldiers, King George II worried that the French might occupy the territory of Hanover, territory the British royalty and come to control. Because of this, he allied himself with Prussia which was facing off against Austria which still desired the return of the territory of Silesia. This is a short essay but the results are "The consequences of the Seven Years’ War in this respect were more profound in France, where public debate became more prominent. In Britain, the key change was a greater salience for imperial issues, which led to postwar attempts to make empire work. These, however, were the very attempts that led to the American Revolution."
The Bismarck section is one of the most interesting, upending most of what I knew or thought I knew about him and his character. In point of fact, Bismarck was hardly blood thirsty and wasn't operating from a grand strategy nursed for years. His skill was in his ability to manipulate events as they came to pass to the advantage of Prussia. To elevate Prussia's position in the German Confederation to be equal to that of Austria's was his chief goal. He did not desire war with Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein Question, even though it was that war that in the end elevated Prussia's position so dramatically in Europe. This military victory was responsible for much of the adulation of arms among the Prussian middle class that would come to spell the doom for future generations of Germans. Many of his victories in fact reflected the failures of others, notably the vain Napoleon III.
The next essay is about the shift in British foreign policy in the lead-up to WWI. To sum it up "In 1890, Britain’s principal great power antagonists were France and Russia, while her friendliest relations were with Germany and its Triple Alliance partner Austria-Hungary. Twenty years later, precisely the opposite relationships prevailed.
In 1890, Britain’s imperial possessions and the lines of communication connecting them with the mother country dominated her strategic concerns, wholly overshadowing her interest in Continental affairs. Twenty years later, those priorities had reversed.
In 1890, British foreign policy continued to reflect the resistance to peacetime alliance commitments that had characterized it ever since Canning. Twenty years later, Britain had entered into formal alliances or ententes with Japan, Russia, and France and had negotiated what amounted to a permanent modus vivendi with the United States.
Finally, in 1890, as had been true ever since the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Britain remained predominant at sea. Twenty years later, confronted with the aggressive expansion of German naval power and the emergence of Japan and the United States as serious naval competitors, the British effectively had abandoned global naval supremacy. Meanwhile, the British army, in 1890 postured almost exclusively as a colonial constabulary, by 1910 had begun to reconfigure itself for large-scale
Continental warfare with Germany as the most likely adversary."
TBD.
December 11, 2022
The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War edited by Williamson Murray, Richard Sinnreich, and James Lacey is a book that I made a mad dash through last year as part of a reading group with a friend. I returned to the book not too long ago, and I have to say it is more than a little uneven. Murray's Introduction and Sinnreich's conclusions were solid, the extended tour down Louis XIV and Bismark lane was interesting, but some of the others came across as a little weak. I was surprised by Colin Gray's chapter on Truman, which at time was tortured, written somewhat anachronistically, and had some amount of repetition. His chapter, arguably, came off much better when it was quoted by Sinnreich in the conclusion. The book, is at its heart, a history book with a nod towards generalizability. There are 8 or so case studies, each describing a leader in a period of war and change. Though uneven, it was a pretty instructive. Sinnreich's attempt to weave everything together and then throw a few lines in the direction of modern relevance for US foreign policy was praiseworthy.
Unfortunately, some of the key lessons are a little bit off. Grand Strategy is mostly seen in retrospective, and leaders are very rarely organized around a grand strategic principle. Even among the ones referenced here, only two had an explicit grand strategy. Two of the others are brought up as having said that foreign policy is like drifting downstream. You can steer, but you cannot command. Mostly it is just leaders doing what they can at the time, facing a mixture of trends they cannot really control, and responding to it dynamically with the right approach. It is little wonder that Hal Brands and others have to defend Grand Strategy, because you might wonder if it is as important as some of the buzz suggests it is.
Of course, the book does leave you with useful information about grand strategy, but I honestly liked it more for its snapshots into history and for a selection of good quotes in which an adventurous, historically minded student of politics might just find a reasonably well-stocked quarry to mine.
Unfortunately, some of the key lessons are a little bit off. Grand Strategy is mostly seen in retrospective, and leaders are very rarely organized around a grand strategic principle. Even among the ones referenced here, only two had an explicit grand strategy. Two of the others are brought up as having said that foreign policy is like drifting downstream. You can steer, but you cannot command. Mostly it is just leaders doing what they can at the time, facing a mixture of trends they cannot really control, and responding to it dynamically with the right approach. It is little wonder that Hal Brands and others have to defend Grand Strategy, because you might wonder if it is as important as some of the buzz suggests it is.
Of course, the book does leave you with useful information about grand strategy, but I honestly liked it more for its snapshots into history and for a selection of good quotes in which an adventurous, historically minded student of politics might just find a reasonably well-stocked quarry to mine.
March 5, 2018
I was attracted to this volume by the quality of the scholars and the topics listed in the table of contents. It does not disappoint. An introductory and concluding essay sandwich seven case studies of grand strategy in action. The editors' common contention is that our prevailing definitions and comprehension of grand strategy are strained and, when subjected to rigorous analysis, are found insufficient. The seven case studies in this book support that contention even as the authors agree that the definition and usage need not be completely defenestrated. It is history, culture, and military theory rolled into one. Strategy cannot be considered out of its contexts. The chapters on Bismarck (Jones) and Truman (Gray) are especially refreshing. Although I suspect that this book would appeal to a narrow audience, it is written in an accessible they may appeal to a handful of non-scholars and defense professionals. Recommended with those reservations.
June 29, 2020
-not particularly relevant
-some chapters are more interesting than others
-academic/assigned book
-some chapters are more interesting than others
-academic/assigned book
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews