Subversion As Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia

by Audrey R. Kahin, George McTurnan Kahin

This account of US foreign policy reveals the story of the covert activity in Indonesia undertaken by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the late 1950s.

Genres: History, Politics, Asia, Indonesian Literature, International Relations

328 pages, Hardcover

First published May 1, 1995

Reviews

[Awais · Rating 5 out of 5]

A detailed and authoritative account of U.S. involvement in the Indonesian rebellions during the 1950s. The Kahins provide a nuanced exploration of both American and Indonesian perspectives, highlighting the internal debates among U.S. policymakers over the threat of communism and domestic developments within Indonesia. It's an important case study in how foreign policy can be shaped, and potentially distorted, by faulty intelligence and ideological assumptions, particularly concerning the CIA and Dulles’ interpretation and subsequent response to developments in Indonesia. The sourcing is also incredible; the authors draw on access to numerous government and military officials in Indonesia.

Published in 1995.

[Jonah Lo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Essential reading for anyone who desires a clear-eyed view of the legacy of the Dulles Brothers, the Eisenhower Administration, and the House of Djojohadikusumo. This is the tale of the Bay of Pigs disaster on steroids. The United States, driven by hysteria over an imagined imminent Communist takeover of Indonesia and embittered by the China Civil War experience, sought to build up and radicalise a regional autonomy movement in Sumatra into an armed countergovernment, equipped with American (and Taiwanese) guns, pilots, planes, and submarines. This effort was only narrowly averted by careful and rapid manoeuvring by General Abdul Haris Nasution - who pre-empted the American pretext for direct naval intervention, dismantled the Sumatran resistance before it could sufficiently draw upon its benefactors, and shook Washington's faith in Padang enough for the Americans to withdraw its blank cheque and reconsider its strategy.

This is the Kahins at their best as senior scholars - bringing to bear not just an enormity of archival work, but also their own interviews and notes with Indonesian elites going as far back as the Bandung Conference itself.

[Syafira Kurnia]

Gbu