Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism , the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a position which has profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers. We should not search for one true logic, since there are many.
Even though this book was written a little over 20 years ago, their arguments for logical pluralism--the view that there is more than one genuine account of logical consequence--still bear relevance.
Most of their argument relies on examples. Classical logic has two different semantics--possible worlds or model-theoretic; and they show how other accounts of logical consequence, such as constructive logics, relevance logics, and so on, are useful. Moreover, each logic fits the essential criteria for what makes a logic: a logic has to explain the necessity of valid arguments; it has to have some account of the normativity of a valid argument; and the logic must be formal, in some sense (they consider five sense of "formal").
If you are looking for an extremely careful treatment of logical pluralism, this is not that book. Their work is more introductory, so the arguments are compact and fast. Yet, I think there is sufficient for anyone's philosophical needs. Although, some philosophical needs can be unreasonable....
Anyway, my only gripe with the book was the lack of a kind of explanation for what grounds each logic's application. I'm not sure I'm looking for a metaphysical argument, though my language suggests as much. Rather, I was not sure why I would want classical logic for one sub-domain of a natural language, constructive logic for another, and relevance logic for another.
I would have also appreciated more clarity about the utility of some logic. At the beginning of the book, they claim that the best way we can judge whether a logic is legitimate is, in addition to the other criteria mentioned, utility. But useful for what?
Any philosopher serious about studying the philosophy of logic should read this book. What a fun read.