مذكرات هنري كيسنجر- الجزء الأول

Henry Kissinger's Memoirs #1

by Henry Kissinger, هنري كيسنجر, عاطف أحمد عمران (مترجم)

In this first volume of his memoirs, Dr Kissinger covers his first four years (1969-1973) as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - and President Nixon's closest adviser on foreign policy. It is undoubtedly the most significant book to come out of the Nixon Administration. Among the countless great and critical moments Dr Kissinger recalls are his first meeting with Nixon, his secret trip to China, the first SALT negotiation, the Jordan crisis of 1970, the India-Pakistan war of 1971, and the historic summit meetings in Peking and Moscow. He covers the major controversies over Indochina policy during that period, including events in Laos, the overthrow of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, his secret talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris, his 'Peace is at hand' press conference, and the breakdown of the talks that led to the 'Christmas bombing' of 1972. He offers his insight s into the Middle East conflicts, Sadat's break with the Soviets, the election of Salvador Allende in Chile, issues of defense strategy, and relations with Europe and Japan.Other highlights are his relationship with Nixon, brilliant portraits of major foreign leaders, and his views as to the handling of crises and the art of diplomacy. Few men have wielded as much influence in the arena of American foreign policy as Henry Kissinger. This record makes an invaluable and lasting contribution to the history of this crucial time.

Genres: History, Politics, Biography, Nonfiction, Memoir, International Relations, American History

609 pages

First published January 1, 1979

About the author

Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.

During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.

Reviews

[Aaron Million · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wow - reading this book felt like I was taking a graduate-level college course on American foreign policy and diplomacy. A massive tome by Kissinger, one of the heavyweights of the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Incredibly, the 1,476 pages only takes the reader up the end of the first four years of his tenure as National Security Advisor.

I liked how Kissinger divided this book up: by year but - within the year - by subject matter (or, more specifically for this venture, by country). He deftly moves between trying to conclude the Vietnam War, establishing relationships with the USSR and China, arranging ground-breaking summits in both of those Communist-controlled countries, relationships with European countries, simmering issues in the Middle East, the India-Pakistan crisis of 1971, and Chile. Interspersed throughout all of the chapters are his assessments of the leaders that he was dealing with: their strengths, flaws, tendencies, and negotiating strategies.

This is, obviously, Kissinger's view of history and certainly nobody comes out looking better than he does. He mentions his ego so frequently that I think it almost became a character in the book. He does admit to vanity in several instances, specifically concerning his fight for attention and prominence with Secretary of State William Rogers. He also admits times when he was wrong, and he does give ample credit to other individuals on several occasions (Ellsworth Bunker, Nixon, Chou En-Lai, Dean Acheson, Melvin Laird, John Connally, to name a few).

For me, the most interesting parts of the book dealt with the Vietnamese peace negotiations (excruciating to be sure - I am not sure how anyone could have withstood the intense daily pressure that Kissinger and many others were subjected to), and his observations about Richard Nixon. I thought he was surprisingly forthcoming about their relationship, and he paints a well-formed portrait of a tortured, lonely, paranoid man. Reading about Nixon from Kissinger's viewpoint helps to understand why his presidency disintegrated shortly after the period that this book covers.

Overall, essential reading for anyone specifically interested in U.S. diplomacy, foreign policy, Cold War history, Vietnam War history, or the Nixon presidency.

[David Huff · Rating 5 out of 5]

At 1,476 pages, I'm pretty certain its the longest book I've ever read --- and I was quite careful to not drop it on my foot (or my face, while reading in bed). It was a very impressive, and exhaustively detailed account of Kissinger's first 4 years in the Nixon administration, 1968-1972. So much went on in that time frame, and I see it with different eyes now than I did as a high school student during that same period. You'll learn as much about Nixon, and many other world leaders of the era, as you do about Kissinger, and as an historical account this book is a treasure trove for future generations. I know that for many, Nixon and Kissinger were polarizing figures, but there is still much insight to be gained from such a well-written, well-detailed first hand account from one who was at the center of the storm.

And, yes, it is exhaustively detailed!

[Meihan Liu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Noticed that someone rated it two stars saying that "it's a five star book as far as historic record but for regular folk a 2-star endeavor. " Well, that's the very reason why that there are extraordinary people like the author of this book living the most exciting life one can ever imagine and making history of the human race during one of the most exciting periods of human history, and there are regular folks writing reviews that make no sense and yet still questioning the wisdom or legacy of the former kind.

[Lewis Weinstein · Rating 5 out of 5]

Full of fascinating detail ... 800+ pages ... Kissinger wrote the longest senior thesis in the history of Harvard University and he continues in that manner here ... but it is all interesting

[Yazeed AlMogren · Rating 3 out of 5]

كتاب سياسي وليس شخصي يحكي عن الحوادث السياسية في الحرب الباردة وكيف كان وزير الخارجية الأمريكي هنري كيسنجر يتعامل مع تلك الأحداث، أعتقد مفيد لمن يريد إجراء بحوث أو لمن يشغر وظيفة دبلوماسية

[muaad alqaydy · Rating 4 out of 5]

"الساسة الغرب لا يعنون ما يقولون في تصريحاتهم، وحين يعنونه ، يطبقونه بطريقة تجعل ما قالوه لا علاقة له بما طبقوه"
هذا ما أوحت به مذكرات هذا الثعب بارد القلب
الكثير من التفكير السياسي والكثير من الصراحة والكثير من المعلومات عن كيف يُتخذ القرار الأمريكي ، وشخصية هذا الرجل الطموح المغرور ، خريج هارفارد والباحث عن السلطة بقلبه وعقله .. ولعب توازنات القوى .. والسياسات الخلفية التي لا يعرف حقيقتها إلا بعد زمن.

[Giovanni Monachello · Rating 3 out of 5]

Today, one can easily find a great deal about the 'darker' side of the Nixon Administration. However, in order to read this book and to allow the reader to judge its tale impartially, there is one rule that the reader must adhere to; that rule is to remove the most controversial part of Richard Nixon's Administration's tenure, from their minds. The reader MUST forget Watergate and remember that this account pre dates that incident. Once the reader has accomplished this, not so easy, feat then they may begin. This book recounts an unusual side, it portrays a different angle; it gives a defence, a complete mirror image of what many of us have read, watched and listened to about this fascinating part of late 20th Century American politics. In other words, it portrays the case for the defence.

Will, desire and time are without doubt what are also required to read this book. The 'will' and 'desire' is not understated, this is a gargantuan piece of work. For anyone that is interested, very interested, in late 20th Century American foreign policy, and has the 'time' to immerse themselves into a profound and contemporaneous source, then they must read this book. It's underlying theme of the justification of actions that posterity has much criticised and condemned, is the central thesis of Kissinger's first volume; yes there is a second volume! The challenge that the author has placed on himself is immense by virtue of the fact of the many varied situations that had to be dealt with at the time. As the reader begins to feel that he or she is perpetually turning pages of this book, they are reminded of how far the world has moved on. Viet Cong, Khymer Rouge and the 'Soviet Union' have no relevance in today's world. On the other hand, one is able to read between the lines many of the origins of the geopolitical problems of today.

One that has a powerful link to today is the analysis of China. Kissinger recounts in some detail Nixon's eagerness to allow the Totalitarian state back into the global fold. Although, Kissinger's argument can, once again, be seen from the point of view that the choices that his administration had in extracting themselves from the horrendous experience of Indo China, gave them very little choice as regards the rapprochement with China. In particular, using China in order to counter balance the geopolitics of the time with the shadow of the Soviet Union still very much a threat.
Nevertheless, and without any great surprise, the one central thread that travels through the entire book is Vietnam. It is a subject that virtually dominates every decision, every move, every idea, in the attempt to achieve the goal of how to rid the American nation of the nightmare of Vietnam. Any other subject is engulfed by this philosophy. Even a detente with the Soviet Union all hinged on Vietnam. Added to the challenge, handed to this particular Administration, according to Kissinger, was the aggressively anti-government press, a war weary hostile public and a confrontational Congress. There lies the constant theme. Hanoi's duplicity coupled with American negativity and distrust of Nixon's efforts are repeated throughout the book and very much links the whole text together.

Any negatives about the book? Well, not many. Of course, the pre mentioned length of the book is I would say, for some, a drawback. Although the chapters are long they are, mercifully, broken down into sub chapters which is able to give at times a well earned rest for the reader. Nevertheless, by the time one reaches the one thousandth page you do get the feeling that this has been a challenge of Man v. Food proportions. On the other hand, one must always keep in mind that this is the work describes events that played a central role in the global history of our planet and at the time must have felt as if all depended on their outcome. It is also important to remember that these incidents, in a reasonably close, period of time, have in some cases moulded the political climate of today. Here, again, I very much refer to China.
So if that invaluable will and desire can be found in any potential reader who also has a profound inclination to find out why we are in the world of today and importantly how we reached this point, they will find this book a fascinating read. Inevitably, one can not ignore the fact that there is a second volume, which apparently will contain an account of something called Watergate.

[Bill Manzi · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book, due to length and level of detail, will not be for everyone. But it is a vitally important work for those who want to understand some of the critical foreign policy events in American history. This book deals with Kissinger's tenure as Richard Nixon's National Security Advisor from 1969-1972, and is the first volume of his memoirs. An astounding amount of history is compressed into that time period, including the Nixon opening to China, the intractable problems of the Middle East, with special focus on the triangular diplomacy involving the Soviet Union, Egypt, and the United States, the war in Vietnam, and the exceedingly tortured negotiations to end that war, (with a good look at the Nixon decisions on the excursion into Cambodia, the "Christmas Bombing", and the self described "brutal" treatment of the recalcitrant South Vietnamese as agreement neared), and the Indo-Pakistan war, and the "tilt" towards Pakistan. Any one of those items would be a book in itself, and the fact that Kissinger not only kept all of those balls in the air but manages, through this volume, to show how they were all "connected" is a testament to his brilliance. Dr. Kissinger has many detractors, and Nixon Administration policies, especially with regard to Vietnam, have drawn severe criticism over the years. Kissinger takes those critics on directly, and makes some strong and compelling arguments to justify his policy recommendations. Vietnam was a tragic error for the United States, but Kissinger brings an up close perspective to why many of the important players acted the way they did.
Kissinger's devotion to the "realist" school of diplomacy is evident through his actions and policy prescriptions described in this volume. His hard headed and "realistic" approach to bargaining are laid out clearly in his approach to the negotiations with North Vietnam, where he recognized that an unfavorable "balance of forces" on the ground would lead to an unsatisfactory outcome from the perspective of the U.S. His devotion to "equilibrium" govern his negotiations on SALT, and advise his relationship and policy recommendations with the Soviets.
For the historian this book is essential. Kissinger dealt with some of the very true giants of this (or any other era), including Chou En-Lai, Indira Ghandi, Le Duc Tho, Leonid Breznhev, Andrei Gromyko, Mao Tse Tung, Moshe Dayan, Anwar Sadat, Golda Meir, and so many others. He seems to me to be exceedingly honest about his relationship with Richard Nixon, who he described as brooding, lonely, and filled with resentment towards so many. He, in my opinion, fairly describes some of the dysfunction of the foreign policy methodology of the first term Nixon Administration, and takes some of the blame onto himself. (The relationship with Secretary of State William Rodgers is a big part of this dysfunction) Kissinger is writing to make sure history records his perspective, but he does so in a way that brings valuable insight to a critical time in U.S. foreign policy, when change and bold steps produced much disruption in this arena. Love them or hate them the Nixon-Kissinger team shook US foreign policy and produced real change that impacts us to this very day. A must read for those who love history or foreign policy.

[Alex Hope · Rating 4 out of 5]

OUTSTANDING MEMOIRS
very detailed; very thorough, beautifully written.
I do not want to judge Kissinger, yet it really sorrows me to what he did afterward: his shoughanate was really a disaster after Watergate. Nixon has built up everything for a successful and strong policy, yet Kissinger somehow screwed it all up…
Seen him pass such a long way and knowing what that would result in brings a great sorrow to me.
Nixon administration achieved peace with USSR, China, VIETNAM!!! (on good terms) and much more!
This is a very helpful book for anyone researching Nixon-Kissinger Years and anyone who has time… It really took me a LOT to get through this. 5 Days is still a long time; I usually would go through something like this in three days, yet Kissinger writes so beautifully and at some points makes such great references and jokes that you just want to google every speech, every document, every image.

[Andrew Noselli · Rating 3 out of 5]

Convinces this somewhat credulous yet clear-eyed American reader, who prides himself on being as clean-cut as Bob Haldeman, that the bombing campaign in southeast Asia which extending over Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam (whom we were defending against the North Vietnamese) was necessary because there was a viable Communist presence in these territories; and, furthermore, that the overthrowing of the Allende government in Chile was necessary because long-term accommodation of a second Cuba in the Western hemisphere was unacceptable. Today I purchased Pierre Bourdieu's Distinction on my Kindle, but it may be that I should prefer Kissinger's book on China instead, which was on sale for $14. Well, there's always next time.

[Michael Locklear · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is the other book that I closed-out last night (the first was Jon Meacham's "American Lion"). I was hoping, though lengthy, that Henry Kissinger's "White House Years" would be worth the time and effort. But I decided last night to call it an end.
I do believe that Dr. Kissinger enjoys writing about his career more that I could enjoy reading about it. The farthest that I could drag myself was around page 150. (In Meacham's book I only read the first hundred or so pages; not nearly the 150 that I mentioned in my review).

[Genevieve Monette · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read that book in US history in college. You can read it like a novel!!

[René · Rating 3 out of 5]

This heavy volume could have been entitled “How I single-handedly solved both the Vietnam and the Cold War”… Dr. Kissinger has such a high opinion of himself that it almost makes this valuable review of this era too pathetic to read. And to ensure that Le Duc Tho, who shared his Nobel Peace Prize, would not be seen kindly, he repeatedly calls him “Ducky” or makes fun of how their interpreters pronounced “schedule”. Interestingly, while he writes that Nixon always agreed with his staff to avoid confrontation, it does not seem to occur to him that Nixon would do the same with him (ending up stating that Nixon agreed with his recommendations every fifth page or so…).

[Julio The Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Devil writes his memoirs, and only the first volume. WHITE HOUSE YEARS covers Kissinger's stay at the Nixon White House from 1969 to 1973 when he served as National Security Advisor (NSA), and it is splendid stuff. No one interested in U.S. foreign policy, American history, and the the course of the empire in the last fifty years can afford to miss it. Here is the inside story, from a prejudiced angle to be sure, of the extrication of the U.S. from a lost war in Indochina, first openings to China, negotiations on nuclear weapons, Vietnam and the Middle East with the Soviet Union, Chile, Iran, India and Pakistan, re-building ties to Europe, and within the White House walls the secrecy and paranoia that led to Watergate. Kissinger rightly insists that he and Nixon had a chance to realign the world order of nations after the upheavals of the Sixties, and made the most of this chance. The cost paid by the U.S., and the rest of the world, must be assessed by the reader.

Kissinger had started out in public life in the late Fifties serving as a protege to Nelson Rockefeller, to whom this book is dedicated, sharing his boss's suspicions and misgivings about Nixon. The two had met only once, at Rockefeller's New York apartment, in an encounter that produced no visible results. But, in 1967, pursuing the presidency once again, Nixon had caught the eye of Kissinger by penning an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Asia After Vietnam", that hinted both at a U.S. exit and an opening to China. Kissinger backed Rockefeller in 1968, but cannily kept a hand in the Nixon campaign just in case. After Nixon's November victory he asked Kissinger to become his National Security Advisor, an obscure and up until then largely insignificant post. It was a meeting of Machiavellians. Nixon intended to sidestep his Secretary of State, William Rogers, and conduct his own foreign policy. Kissinger lunged at the only opportunity he might ever have to move from the Harvard classroom to policy maker. H.K. was a Jewish intellectual, a double-black mark in Nixon's book, but the new president needed him to gain legitimacy on the world stage.

Kissinger never said "the road to peace in Indochina goes through Moscow and Peking", but that's what he believed. Confronted with a triangular world where the U.S. could no longer issue diktats to friends and threats to enemies, Kissinger and Nixon naturally went in search of an alliance with the weaker party in the world of 1969, China. After a short and bitter visit to Western Europe, in which Nixon came off as a clueless statesman before Wilson, De Gaulle, and the Pope, Kissinger sent out feelers to Mao and Zhou En Lai by way of Poland. Kissinger did not intend for the Chinese to lean on their hypothetical Vietnamese allies; that was impossible. His goal was to move Peking from Hanoi as far apart as possible, leaving the North Vietnamese no choice but to negotiate an end to the war on terms favorable to Washington. Mao, having severed ties with practically all nations during the madness of the Cultural Revolution, and fearing a Soviet nuclear strike on China, greedily welcomed the chance to become a world player again. The invitation for Kissinger to visit Peking, made by way of a mutual friend, Agha Khan, the dictator of Pakistan, followed in 1971. Kissinger was determined to play on China's greatest fear, going back five thousand years: Internal turmoil leading to an invasion by the barbarians. The Chinese leaders were willing to make short term concessions, notably on Taiwan, without immediate payoff if they could reap greater rewards afterwards; perhaps in decades, perhaps centuries. This was a post-ideological age, he tells us. Labels such as "Communist" or "imperialist" meant little in the face of national survival. Kissinger's portraits of Mao and Zhou are instructive. Mao was the aging god, obsessed with his own mortality and legacy. Only philosophical issues interested him. Zhou was the pragmatic and intelligent, intellectual but, Kissinger warns us, a tough beast. No one climbs to the top of the Chinese Communist party lacking ruthlessness.

If you're going to play off two nuclear communist powers against each other, you must inflame mutual suspicion. The Soviet leaders had a different set of fears for Kissinger to play on and goals to achieve than the Chinese. Abroad, they feared a repeat of World War II; a war that caught them unprepared and nearly led to national extinction. Now, they feared lagging in an arms race they could not win and was biting into their domestic economy. This dilemma eventually doomed the Soviet Union, of course. In the third volume of his memoirs, Kissinger took credit for exploiting this weakness; here, he is silent. Kissinger's goal was to offer an arms treaty, SALT I, that would slow down the nuclear weapons race and grant the Soviets equal status as a superpower with the U.S., something to which China, Kissinger assured Brezhnev and Kosygin, could never aspire. Nor was the new looming friendship between the U.S. and China a threat to the Soviets. On the contrary. China must accept third or fourth power status for decades to come. By these offers and guarantees, Kissinger hoped to win Soviet cooperation for a negotiated end to the Vietnam War, reduce tensions between Israel and the Arabs, and move towards a final peace treaty in Europe settling continental borders. The Russians, Kissinger tells readers, insist every quid must have pro quo. No concessions unless the other side, in this case America, sheds something too. The Stalinist purges had taught the Brezhnev-Kosygin generation that there is no tomorrow in politics, local or global. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, to Kissinger was a middle-aged goat, stubborn and of limited intellect, but tough in negotiations, while at the end of the Sixties, Kosygin, Premier of the U.S.S.R., watched while power slept away from him in the direction of Leonid

Kissinger relates a revealing story about a conversation he had with De Gaulle in Paris in 1969. When the General asked him, "Why don't you get out of Vietnam?", Henry replied, "It would cause us credibility problems, in the Middle East, for instance". For that dubious stance, thousands of American GIs had to go on dying from 1969 to 1973. Mind you, Kissinger is not saying the war could be won; only that the U.S. could not be humiliated in losing. Nixon's "pitiful, helpless giant" would not be taken seriously by friend or foe if that hppened. Nixon had promised the American people "peace with honor" in Vietnam during his first term. Kissinger contends that an accord with Hanoi could only be reached after the costs of the war to the Communists had risen so high they would be forced to negotiate. First, strike at North Vietnam with even greater fury. The U.S. bombing campaign just in the North, not counting Cambodia and Laos, was greater for 1969-72 than during the Johnson years. Second, Vietnamization, the withdrawal of U.S. troops and turning responsibility for the war in the South to the Thieu government in Saigon required, along with more bombing, a show of force against the North Vietnamese in Cambodia and Laos. North Vietnamese sanctuaries must be eliminated if the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN), were to have a fighting chance to survive without the Americans. Kissinger makes no apologies for the secret bombing of Cambodia, Operation Menu, starting in 1969. Cambodia's head of state, Prince Sihanouk, knew that Hanoi, the Chinese, and the Russians. Of course, the U.S. Congress was kept in the dark, along with the media and the American public. Nixon ordered the Air Force to falsify flight plans over Cambodia, but that doesn't faze our hero and chronicler. The president needed a victory somewhere to convince the public he was sincere in wanting to end the war, and that justified the American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in April of 1970. Did American troops ever find the "Vietcong Pentagon in the jungle" they were supposedly looking for? No, but that doesn't bother our boy, who helped Nixon spin the invasion as a victory in the face of nationwide protests. That this invasion pushed the Khmer Rouge into the arms of Hanoi, setting the stage for the Cambodian genocide after 1975, is seemingly lost on Henry. The invasion of Laos by the ARVN the following year was an even bigger fiasco. The North Vietnamese mauled the South Vietnamese troops, who fought each other to escape by helicopter. It was with these ersatz victories behind them that Kissinger and Nixon set off for Peking and Moscow in 1972. Nixon described in his memoirs the two summits with the Communist powers as the height of his career, and Kissinger adds only colorful details here. Mao was eager for an anti-Soviet partnership with the U.S., and was more than willing to throw his friends in Hanoi under the bus, even sacrificing the recapture of Taiwan to "a hundred years from now, or later". The Soviet rulers were not so easy to appease. They smelled blood from both the U.S. military disaster in Indochina and the American public turning against the war. They went for the jugular one night in Nixon's dacha while he and Kissinger were setting out for dinner with Brezhnev. The three top Soviet leaders---Brezhnev, Kosygin, and the President of the Presidium of U.S.S.R., Podgorny, took turns pounding Nixon for three hours on Vietnam: Do you want to start World War III? You say you want an exit, and you increase the bombing of the North? Do you realize what this war is doing to the United States' image abroad? All valid questions, yet according to Kissinger Nixon remained silent all the time, like any good diplomat, and the Soviets signed the SALT I arms treaty without reservations, giving Nixon and Kissinger, after conniving with Mao against the Soviets, two diplomatic wins in 1972.

Kissinger once told the Foreign Minister of Chile, "History does not run through the global South. The path of history goes through Tokyo, Moscow, Berlin, Paris, London, Washington, and then back to Tokyo". However, the U.S. could not ignore the brush fires setting the Third World ablaze in the early Seventies. One nation slipping away from the American orbit threatened the whole galaxy. Chile was the first test case. The embers of the Cuban Revolution still burned in 1970, when Socialist Salvador Allende won the presidency in Chile in coalition with the Communists, defeating the U.S.-backed Christian Democrats. Unlike his approach to the Communist powers in Europe and Asia, Kissinger saw no nuances at play in Latin America. Allende was a Castroite candidate determined to install Marxist socialism in America's backyard. Any method to stop him was morally and diplomatically permissible. K's language is subtle and deceiving. He and Nixon sought to return Chile to the right path. When attempts to suborn the Chilean Congress into revoking Allende's victory failed, the C.I.A. threw its support behind anti-Allende military officers who might stage a coup, though Henry regrets that this only led to bloodshed, not an aborted presidency. After Allende's inauguration Kissinger followed Nixon's directive to "make the Chilean economy scream" to bring him down. For the conclusion, wait for volume two of Henry's memoirs. In 1971, another crisis erupted for the U.S., in South Asia. A ruler stands by his friends, and Nixon and K. raised no objections when president Khan of Pakistan slaughtered the Bangladeshi of East Pakistan when they demanded independence. K. was told in a telegram by the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan of mass rapes, genocide, and deliberate starvation yet, per custom, looked at the bigger picture. Mrs. Gandhi of India, champion of Bangladesh independence, had signed a defense treaty with the Soviet Union, and besides, Nixon hated her. When the Indian army poured into Dakha, E. Pakistan, Nixon sent U.S. warships to the Bay of Bengal to intimidate New Delhi and Moscow. The one million Bangladeshi deaths do not bother Kissinger. Such is superpower diplomacy. After tipping his hat to "America's friend for thirty years, the Shah of Iran", Kissinger turns his gaze one Israel, Egypt and Syria, engaged in a cold war from 1970 to 1973. America's debacle in Indochina made an active U.S. role in securing a Middle East almost impossible, a point proven by the failed Rogers Peace Plan, and Soviet intervention in the region inevitable. Kissinger sent out war messages to Sadat, who made a wise gesture in expelling some 10,000 Soviet military advisors from his country, but still sought Russian help in recovering the Sinai. Wait for his memoirs, volume II, for K.s imaginative resolution to this conundrum.

The last third of WHITE HOUSE YEARS is devoted to what was regarded at the time as Kissinger's greatest triumph and in retrospect his biggest failure, the Paris Peace Accords that seemingly ended the Vietnam War. In keeping with his "the world didn't understand me" logic, Kissinger blames the North Vietnamese for four years of stalled negotiations. His Hanoi counterpart, Le Duc Tho, insisted Washington remove South Vietnamese President Thieu as a precondition to signing a peace accord. Thieu, in turn, rejected a coalition government in the South with the Viet Cong. How to break the impasse? More bombing of the North, naturally. Nixon's "Christmas bombing" of Hanoi in December of 1972, condemned by everyone from NEW YORK TIMES editors to Pope Paul VI, is excused by Kissinger on the grounds that such savagery was the only language the North Vietnamese understood, and the one way to convince Thieu the U.S was behind him. Kissinger takes credit for forcing Tho back to negotiations, though it does not seem to occur to him the North Vietnamese were simply buying time. If Thieu required convincing by bombing the North, how good could the ARVN be? If the U.S. Congress opposed further escalation, and the antiwar movement in the U.S. was growing every day, how long would America back South Vietnam? Kissinger was had; he just won't admit to it. The January 1973 accord called for free elections in the South, with the date and process to be decided by an electoral commission including the V.C., not a coalition government, the gradual withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South, and the return of American P.O.W.s. This was not peace but a decent interval for the U.S. to crawl back home.

In his peroration, Kissinger writes that the statesman must be content to be paid not in the coin of the day but by history. A wise observation and a fair test. After four years of Nixon-Kissinger Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia lay in ruins, with over three million deaths, mostly civilians, and lunar landscapes filled with mines, unexploded bombs, and the vestiges of Agent Orange. The U.S. had wed a corrupt, authoritarian regime in Saigon which it had gifted with an air force, navy, and military training---and the ARVN still had no will to fight. The undeclared war had cost 58,000 American deaths and cost America's political class its legitimacy. Having negotiated with Moscow and Peking, Kissinger had proven that Communism was not monolithic and expansionist, undercutting the whole rationale for the war. Pro-American dictatorships reigned from Greece to Pakistan to Thailand and Brazil. Iran, that "pillar of stability", started down the long road to anti-American revolution. The Middle East was one year away from another futile and total war. Chile's democracy had become unhinged thanks to U.S. subversion. Western Europe and Japan, pillars of the U.S.-led post-war world, no longer confided in American leadership.

The cost of the war to the Nixon administration was staggering. Kissinger's boss became unbalanced from trying to run a personal foreign policy. Kissinger shared Nixon's passion, bordering on obsession, with secrecy in conducting diplomacy How else could K. visit Peking undetected? How were he and Nixon supposed to undercut the Departments of State and defense if their machinations came to light? You can't concentrate power in the National Security Advisor if the White House is running leaks. Their shared megalomania led Nixon and Kissinger to launch a two-pronged attack on their perceived enemies inside the White House and in the media, though Kissinger's need for the spotlight clashed with his antipathy for the press. Both men ordered wiretaps of their top aides and Nixon ignited the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg, a former Kissinger colleague at Harvard, over the PENTAGON PAPERS. Neither man was willing to acknowledge that plenty of staffers at State and Defense opposed the war, or at least its escalation, and that a free press is a check against the imperial presidency. But, from their perspective, if they broke the law in invading Cambodia and subverting Allende, why not break the U.S. Constitution?. Thus do empires fall victim to blow back. Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, and secret diplomacy with China and the Soviet Union sowed the seeds of Watergate, though Kissinger seems blinded to the connection between the two. The Henry Kissinger of the last page of WHITE HOUSE YEARS, with K. watching Apollo XVII take off from Cape Canaveral, is a lonely, misunderstood figure who takes pride in his immigrant heritage and the country that took him to its bosom. How much he did to destroy that country, and morality in public life, is not something he dwells on; let history judge, he muses. History has, and he's come out the worse.

[Mohammed omran · Rating 2 out of 5]

في أحد الازمان وأحد البلدان …كان يدير مخزن للغلال ، مدير ناجح .. وفي يوم لم يعد يعرف المدير الناجح ماذا يعمل؟
الفئران احتلت المخزن .. المأكولات صارت تتناقص .. الفئران قرضت الجبن والخبز المقمر ..

المدير الناجح لا يجلس ويداه على خصره أبداً، حارب الفئران بكل ما أوتي من بأس، لكنه وبالرغم من كل ما بذله لم يكسب الحرب .. الصابون وقطع الجبن تتناقص يوماً بعد يوم، الملابس اصبحت مثقبة ومهبرة، أعشاش الفئران بنيت داخل أكياس الطحين ..

لم تكتفي الفئران بإلتهام المأكولات وقرض الملبوسات وقضم الجبن والسجق، بل إنها راحت تسن أسنانها واظافرها بالجلود والاحذية والخشب ..
المدير الناجح أستمر في حربه مع الفئران دون هوادة .. وضع أكثر أنواع السموم قوة في كل جهة وكل صوب .. لم يستفد شيئاً !!!
جمع مدير المخزن أفضل أنواع القطط وأفلتها في المخزن ليلاً .. وفي الصباح وجد وبر القطط المسكينة وبقايا عظامها، لم تستطع القطط مجابهة الفئران، ولم يقتلها أقوى السموم ..

بدأ المدير الناجح بزرع افخاخ كبيرة .. وصار يحدث أن يقع بعض الفئران فيها في الفخ … لكن إذا وقعت خمسة فئران في الفخ ليلاً … فإنها تلد مالا يقل عن عشرين أو ثلاثين فأراً في النهار ..

وفكر المدير …و اهتدى إلى طريقة فريدة :
صنع ثلاث أقفاص جديدة .. رمى في كل منها ما كان يقع من الفئران الحية في الفخ .. امتلأ كل قفص من الاقفاص بالفئران .. لم يقدم للفئران طعاماً أو أي شيء ..

اختارت الفئران التي باتت على الموت ثلاث أيام .. خمسة ايام .. اختارت الفئران الأضعف بينها .. قطعتها، اكلتها واشبعت بطونها .. واعتادت على طعم الفئران وبعد وقت جاعت … بدأت تتصارع … وبنتيجة صراعها الدامي هذا … تسلطت على واحدة منها .. خنقتها .. قطعتها … اكلتها ..

وهكذا أخذ عدد الفئران يتناقص مع مرور الايام .. تبقى الفارة الاكبر، صاحبة العزم الأقوى التي اعتادت على طعم لحم الفئران ، وتتقطع الفأرات الضعيفات ويؤكلن ..

تحولت الاقفاص المملوءة بالفئران إلى ساحات حرب حقيقية … بقي في كل قفص من الاقفاص الثلاثة: ثلاث الى خمس فئران …

لذلك صارت كل فأرة من الفئران من أجل حماية نفسها تستغل فترة نوم أو سهو الفأرة الأخرى لتنقض عليها وتخنقها وتقطعها … وأكثر من ذلك … صارت تتحد فأرتان أو ثلاث في كل قفص ويهاجمن أخرى .. وتلك المتحدة في المطاف الأخير … تتحاين الفرصة ليأكل بعضها الآخر …

أخيراً بقي في كل قفص فأرة واحدة : الاقوى، الاذكى، الأكبر، الأكثر صموداً …

عندما بقي في كل قفص فأرة واحدة … فتح الرجل أبواب القفص وأفلت الفئران الثلاثة داخل المخزن .. واحدة واحدة ؟؟

بدأت تلك الفئران الثلاث، الضخمة، المغذاة … المتوحشة، المعتادة على أكل بنات جنسها، تنقض على فئران المخزن .. مهما بلغ عددها، تخنقها وتقطعها وتلتهمها .. ولكونها توحشت … صارت تأكل ما يؤكل من الفئران وتقتل الباقي من أجل حماية نفسها … كي لا تخنقها وتلتهمها الفأرات الأخريات … وهكذا ..

وخلال مدة قصيرة … تخلص المخزن الآنف الذكر من الفئران ...

الحكاية انتهت هنا .. سؤال أوجهه لكم أيها القراء الأعزاء:
كيف خطر في بال المدير الناجح هذا المكر الذي لا يخطر ببال الشيطان ؟؟


الجواب :
لأن مدير المخزن كان الفأر الأقوى الذي بقي سالماً بنتيجة تآكل أبناء جنسه .. لقد أصبح مديراً لذلك المخزن عن طريق التحايل والتخلص من أصدقائه ... طبق على الفئران أسلوب حياته الخاص .. الناجح من وجهة نظره.
هكذا تفعل الدول الغنية تجعل الدول الفقيرة تحارب نفسها عن طريق إعطاء كل طائفة أو فئة سلاح لكي يقضوا على بعض وتصبح الساحة خالية للاستيلاء على ثروات البلاد.
قصة "الفئران تأكل بعضها"

[Brandon Hung · Rating 5 out of 5]

This memoir was written before Kissinger setting up the consultancy firm that deals with sensitive geopolitical issues, so one is right to expect that this volume shall be free of conflict of interests with his clients, albeit always in a relative sense. Whether or not this memoir is more frank than other more recent publications by Kissinger, it is so common to observe his traits/convictions in foreign policy:

1) He regards human rights as a trivial issue and less important than maintaining balance of power.
2) Public opinion is considered to be an obstacle to successful foreign policy as it somewhat at odds with his secret style of dealing with foreign counterparts.

The controversies aside, with myriads of details, I appreciate his concerted effort in defending American interest in the midst of turmoil. His deep reflection in dealing with North Vietnam (as well as South Vietnam) is frank and thoughtful. With the hindsight one can dismiss his effort by the eventual fall of South Vietnam and the so-called "Domino Theory", but given the anti-war atmosphere in Congress and public, I think he already did his best in the formulation of Vietnamization policy at that time. He also justified the bombings while negotiation by pointing out the fact that the stance of North Vietnam Government softened by demonstration of American military power. This is a bold decision and cannot be free of controversy, but I wonder if there are any alternatives (say unilateral withdrawal?) to better serve the American national interest.

For opening with China, it is unfortunate that China has filled the vacuum of Soviet Union and becomes the main threat of global liberal order. The opening was also in the timing of Cultural Revolution when the violation of human right was so blatant (so is China now, probably). But one thing very clear is that the foreign policy of PRC, led by Zhou Enlai, was executed in a very pragmatic way and free of obsessions with ideological struggle, whereas the 'fighting spirit' initiated by Xi Jinping in foreign policy is considered to be complacent and threatening. Kissinger, praised to be an 'old friend of Chinese people' by PRC, probably won't criticised PRC in an open manner, but an intelligent scholar and an experienced diplomat like him shall have felt these not so subtle differences in Chinese foreign policy.

Apart from some minute technical details that he considered necessary, his narration of events is engrossing and page turning. His descriptions of personalities and interaction with his government colleagues (Nixon, Haldeman, Rogers, and his staff in NSC) and counterparts (Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Van Thieu, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Brezhnev, Drobynin) are insightful and often humorous. After all, while I agree with some other commenters that it won't be a book for everyone, you will learn a lot of wisdom by what he said (or what he omitted).

[John Harder · Rating 2 out of 5]

The White House Years is an excruciatingly detailed memoir of Kissinger’s statecraft from 1969 to 1973. This book is an invaluable resource, recounting our opening of China, the Vietnam peace talks and the Indo-Pakistan war. However if you are not a scholar of diplomacy (I most assuredly am not), I question if one’s time might be better spent than wading through 1,400 pages or relatively dry stuff. This is a 5 star book as far as historical record, but for regular folk it is a 2 star endeavor.

[Kyth Palma · Rating 5 out of 5]

The most exhaustive memoirs and definitely the longest book ever read. Despite the length, White House Years is indeed an important recount of Henry Kissinger's beginning in the world of diplomacy and all the crucial events during the early 70s - China, SALT Treaty, India-Pakistan and Vietnam War. All this through Henry Kissinger's efforts and deft. A must-read and engaging read. A man of high intellect and great skill.

[Jeff Keehr · Rating 3 out of 5]

I slogged through this tome because I wanted to know what it was like to live at that level. This man made decisions that affected millions of lives and he did it with amazing discipline and intelligence. I know he is vilified as a war criminal in many circles. And of course he was not going to reveal any malice in his own retelling of his actions. But as pure history it is fascinating.

[Youssef Mahmoud · Rating 3 out of 5]

قرأت المذكرات بحثًا عن وجهة النظر الأخرى حول حرب أكتوبر.. لكن الجزء الأول لم يصل إلى وقت الحرب، وآخر ما فيه كان في سنة ١٩٧٠. يبقى أن الكتاب مليء بالتفاصيل، وفيه بعض الأجزاء حول حرب الاستزاف (حرب عصابات كما سماها كيسنجر) وعن الوضع في الدول العربية المحيطة بإسرائيل.

[ALI SCHAKE · Rating 5 out of 5]

RIP Henry , a masterpiece mind of strategic and foreign policy. If you want to learn the diplomacy and how to think like brilliant in this category , you will surly need to read these three books of his politics diary in the White House

[Hans · Rating 1 out of 5]

Long and not a great read, I abandoned

[Tom · Rating 5 out of 5]

Whew, what an extraordinarily detailed epic tale. The detail is often fascinating as are the many backstories.

[Claire · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent

[Amani Yamani · Rating 5 out of 5]

#مذكرات_هنري_كيسنجر
الجزءالأول
الكتاب رقم (١٦) من قائمة ‫#تحدي_القراءة‬ لعام ٢٠٢٢/٢٠٢٣ وهو من مقتنياتي من ‫#معرض_الرياض_الدولي_للكتاب_2022
الناشر: ‬#الأهلية_للنشر_و_التوزيع
المؤلف: #هنري_كيسنجر
ترجمة: #عاطف_أحمد_عمران
سنة النشر:٢٠٠٥
عدد الصفحات:609
المدة المستغرقة لقراءة الكتاب: ٩ أيام (بعد جهد)

في هذا المجلد الأول من مذكراته، يغطي الدكتور كيسنجر سنواته الأربع الأولى (1969-1973) كمساعد للرئيس لشؤون الأمن القومي - وأقرب مستشار للرئيس نيكسون في السياسة الخارجية.

الكتاب يقع في 609 صفحة ، أنا متأكد من أنه أطول كتاب قرأته على الإطلاق واصعب كتاب قراءته من حيث حمله بين يدين، وكنت حريصًا جدًا على عدم إسقاطه . لقد كان سردًا مثيرًا للإعجاب ومفصلاً بشكل شامل عن السنوات الأربع الأولى لكيسنجر في إدارة نيكسون ، 1968-1972، هذه المذكرات تعلمنا الكثير عن نيكسون ، والعديد من قادة العالم الآخرين في ذلك الوقت.

شعرت وأنا أقرأ هذا الكتاب وكأنني أدرس حول السياسة الخارجية والدبلوماسية الأمريكية، وأعجبتني الطريقة التي قسّم بها كيسنجر هذا الكتاب: حسب السنة- حسب الموضوع.

بحسب قرائتي فيمكن أن تعتبر هذه المذكرات أهم كتاب تحدث عن إدارة نيكسون، فنجد خلال المذكرات تطرق كيسنجر إلى رحلته السرية إلى الصين ، والمفاوضات الأولى بشأن معاهدة سولت ، وأزمة الأردن عام 1970 ، والحرب الهندية الباكستانية عام 1971 ، واجتماعات القمة التاريخية في بكين وباكستان. وغطي العديد من الأحداث مثل، الأحداث في لاوس ، والإطاحة بأمير كمبوديا سيهانوك ، ومحادثاته السرية مع الفيتناميين الشماليين في باريس ، ومؤتمره الصحفي بعنوان "السلام في متناول اليد" ، وانهيار المحادثات التي أدت إلى "قصف عيد الميلاد" عام 1972.

وفي المذكرات نجد أن كيسنجر قدم رؤيته حول صراعات الشرق الأوسط ، وانفصال السادات عن السوفييت ، وانتخاب سلفادور أليندي في تشيلي ، وقضايا استراتيجية الدفاع ، والعلاقات مع أوروبا واليابان.



سلبيات وايجابيات للكتاب:

الطول المذكور مسبقًا للكتاب هو ، بالنسبة للبعض ، عيب. على الرغم من أن الفصول طويلة ، إلا أنها لحسن الحظ ، مقسمة إلى فصول فرعية قادرة على منح في بعض الأحيان راحة..

بسبب الطول ومستوى التفاصيل ، لن يكون متاحًا للجميع. لكنه عمل مهم للغاية لأولئك الذين يريدون فهم بعض أحداث السياسة الخارجية الحاسمة في التاريخ الأمريكي.

بسبب حجم الكتاب فلا يمكنك أن تقراءه وأنت مستقلي على ظهرك فقد يقع الكتاب في أي لحظة عليك.


كلمة أقولها:
فرحت بانتهاء الكتاب، ويبدو اني لن أقرأ الجزء الثاني مباشرة
أحمد الله أن دراستي لم يكن بها هذا الكم من الكتب، فقراءته للمتعة شئ وللدراسة شي

[John Lawson · Rating 1 out of 5]

Perhaps Henry Kissinger was a man of tremendous intellect.

I don't know.

But I do know this is one of the worst books ever written outside the realm of management textbooks.

It's a double-barreled assault: tedium and self-justification.

It's the kind of book that gets so deep into bureaucratic rigmarole that Melvin Laird is described as a "dazzling spectacle." It's the kind of book that has a chapter called "The Textile Fiasco."

And then the clumsy, heavy-handed attempts to justify every Vietnam decision. For the love of God, let there never be another book like this one! (Alas, this book is merely one of three volumes.)

[Dymbula · Rating 5 out of 5]

Další kniha, která mě utvrzuje v tom, že diplomacie a opravdová politika je velmi dobrodružná a zajímavá disciplína. S ohldem na dnešní marasmus musím ale připustit, že aby to tak bylo, měli by se na vrcholných funkcích pohybovat profesionálové a ne strejci z hospody, co jsou nejlepšími trenéry fotbalu na světě. Henry Kissinger byl obdivuhodná postava moderních dějin.
Kniha má úctyhodných 2100 stránek a všechny jsou napínavé.

[Fictional Memoir]

#مراجعة ليست لي ومؤقتة

من الكتب الجميلة, كتاب "مذكرات هنري كيسنجر", الجزء الأول و الثاني.

مذهل, رائع,جميل.

من يسألني عن كتب تتكلم عن الإدارة, أرشح له هذا الكتاب العملي

إداري ذكي و محنك, يمارس الواقعية في الحلول و حقق نجاح كبير جداً

قد يكون اعجابي بطريقة كيسنجر بسبب أني أتشارك معه في الأسلوب الواقعي

[Liedzeit Liedzeit · Rating 4 out of 5]

To be honest, I do not remember much about this book, except that I was rather proud of reading about one of our guys who has made it in the US. And I remember that he was a fan of Fürth. - I respect Christopher Hitchens but chose to have some doubts about his view about the man.

[Amr Elroby · Rating 4 out of 5]

واحد من اههم الكتب السياسة , لعراب السياسة الخارجية الامريكية فى فترة مهمة من الحرب الباردة , ان صح ان يتم تلخيص الكتباب فى جملة فهى ادارة السياسة باسلوب علمى
فصاحب المذكرات كان شغوف بتطبيق كل جديد حتى نظرية game theroy طبقها فى السياسة