Richard White argues that a process of accommodation, itself the result of "creative misunderstandings" (xxvi), emerged from interactions between French, British, and Algonquins in the pays d'en haut from the middle of the 17th century until the War of 1812. The critical element enabling the emergence of the physical and metaphorical spaces where this accommodation took place, what White calls "the middle ground", is the inability for long periods of time of whites to either dictate to or ignore the Indians in the area. When this equilibrium disappeared, the middle ground went with it. White describes his book as a "circular" tale, beginning when Europeans and Indians first met and saw each other as alien/other, moving through a period when the groups constructed a mutually understandable world, and ending with the re-creation of the Indian as alien/exotic/other. (paraphrasing xxv-xxvi)
White acknowledges one of the issues with his sources up front, which is a common problem of availability, but perhaps dismisses it too easily. He notes that moments of crisis generate the most records but does not acknowledge the biases that can be introduced by relying on these anomalous bursts/clusters of records. (xxxi)
In many ways, this is a book about negotiation (what White calls mediation). In negotiation terms, there was a shifting but nevertheless extant zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) among the Indians and Europeans for long periods of time. The existing of a ZOPA reflected each side's belief that the other had good, viable alternatives to a negotiated settlement. When the Europeans ceased believing that the Indians had alternatives, accommodation and compromise gave way to domination.
Notes
Ch. 1: The French entered a fractured world, full of Indian refugees fleeing Iroquois attackers. In that context, they were initially welcomed as manitous (spirits that could take many physical forms) and their assistance was welcomed. But the powers of the French proved less than divine, and it was only the threat of further Iroquois violence that pushed the French and Algonquin refugees together. “The alliance rested on a delicate balance of fear and temptation.” (32) The French role as mediators became increasingly important throughout the late 17th Century, and mediation became a source of power for the French. (33-34) By the end of the 17th Century, the Algonquins had regained strength and defeated the Iroquois, thanks in no small part to French mediations to resolve internal Algonquin disputes. (34)
TP: The French patted themselves on the back for their ability to manage the Algonquins, and White also seems to give them credit for this (35), but relying as he is on French sourcing, this is perhaps a bit dubious.
The Algonquin, and later Iroquois, recognized the French governor — whom they called Onontio — as the leader of the alliance, and as “father.” (36) This was a demotion from manitou. The French cemented the alliance by bestowing gifts in the Algonquin tradition, and through Algonquin channels. (36) “The alliance essentially merged the French politics of empire with the kinship politics of the village.” (37)
Although final victory over the Iroquois in 1701 led to the dissolution of the refugee camps in which the French/Algonquin alliance developed, the alliance survived and grew stronger as “the middle ground” emerged. (49-50)
Ch. 2: The “middle ground” emerged in stages. First, each side slotted the other into preexisting categories: savages and manitous. Then they tried to come to terms with each other, which was necessary since neither side could get what it wanted through force. (52) “Perhaps the central and defining aspect of the middle ground was the willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises.” (52) That these “premises” were often misunderstandings mattered little. As White notes, “Any congruence, no matter how tenuous, can be put to work and take on a life of its own if it is accepted by both sides.” (53) Indeed, this is something all negotiators know well!
The middle ground existed on both formal and informal levels, (53) but it was the informal level that defined the middle ground (59-60), even if it meant that it was not quite what either side would prefer under ideal circumstances. Sex and violence became two areas in which intense negotiation had to take place, and therefore bore much responsibility for the construction of the middle ground. (60) Sex example: 1694 Accault attempt to marry Aramepinchieue. (70-75) Violence examples (77-82)
Handing of murders provides a good example of the type of congruences, however, tenuous, that came to define the middle ground. (93)
Ch. 3: "The fur trade became part of the Middle Ground" (94) and was “structured by the overarching political relationship of French fathers to their Algonquin children. This alliance provided the means for linking the Algonquin system of exchange, with its emphasis on the primacy of social relation, to a much larger world economy.” (105) Goods had more than just material value for both parties, but particularly for the Algonquins, who used them for political, relational, practical, and symbolic purposes. (100-103) Despite epic levels of violence, trade “never completely broke down because the large political relationship of which it was a part persisted.” (112) All of this took place under the umbrella of familial relation that defined the middle ground. (112)
The emergence of the English gave the Algonquin additional leverage in negotiations with the French, initially in the context of the fur trade. (119-121) The French accepted less favorable terms to keep their alliance with the Algonquin together (127). Goods also had increasingly utilitarian value for the Algonquin. "...European goods became an integral part of Algonquin life, but by the end of the French period there was not, as yet, material dependence.” (140)
Ch. 4: The alliance "was largely Algonquin in form and spirit, and demanded a father who mediated more often than he commanded, who forgave more often than he punished, and who gave more than he received.” (143) “The result was an odd imperialism where mediation succeeded and force failed, where colonizers gave gifts to the colonized and patriarchal metaphors were the heart of politics.” (145) The alliance struggled in the first decade and a half of the 18th Century, but the strengthening British presence “provided the inducement for this reconstitution of the alliance….” (175) The French resumed gift giving and began medaling alliance chieftains (179). The alliance exploded “in imperial confrontation and village rebellions in the 1750s.” (185)
Ch. 5: In the mid-18th Century, French-British imperial competition focused on the Ohio Valley, creating new opportunities for “previously marginal” figures in Algonquin societies, such as Peter Chartier, who were able to create their own Indian Republics (189-192).
The end of King George’s War in 1748 gave the French a chance to repair the alliance, but instead they accelerated its decline. (202) This reflected, in part, the inexperience of the French leadership in Canada. (203) The French tried to remedy their mistakes in the 1750s with some success (212-217) It was perhaps too late. The politics in the pays d’en haut were changing. (222)
Ch. 6: The French and British came to see the outcome of the Ohio and Wabash village struggles as the key to the broader power struggle on the American continent. (223) The French underestimated the strength of their Algonquin alliance, over-estimated the strength of the British, and initiated an imperial confrontation that they would lose, losing Canada in the process. (227) The French and their Indian allies held out for a time, but in the end lost the Seven Years’ War, and Canada with it. (242-248) The Indians were not happy about this; they wanted the French and British to remain in a low-level state of competition, which would improve the Indian bargaining position. (255-256)
General Amherst and the British tried to forge a new paradigm for European-Indian relations that looked a lot more like traditional imperialism. Amherst was not interested in conciliation, and he sought to do away with the practice of giving presents. (257) The British approach led to the diminution of the power of chiefs, eliminating the possibility of mediation of disputes, and empowering the warriors ( 266-268) By 1762, the middle ground seemed ready to crumble. (268) Pontiac’s Rebellion led to the restoration of the middle ground, under a British father this time. (268)
Ch. 7: The story of Pontiac’s Rebellion is "the accommodation of the Alongquins and the British.” (270) The rebellion was a result of “the failure of the Indians to create a confederacy that would prevent British occupation of the region, the failure of the British to act as fathers or brothers, and the failure of Onontio to return.” (271) “In 1765-1766, peace and alliance on the middle ground returned.” (305)
The British resumed gift giving — budgeting 20,000 pounds annually for it. (310)
Ch. 7: William Johnson tried to model the British-Algonquin alliance on the French model, but could not persuade the British government to provide sufficient funds, nor could he reestablish the social infrastructure essential for the functioning of the middle ground. (315) The emergence of a new village world further complicated matters. The Stamp Act crisis of the 1870s led the British Crown to cut back gifts to the Indians, which, as we saw with French, can be fatal in a transactional relationship. (321) As the formal diplomatic middle ground receded, a new middle ground more analogous to the earlier French-Indian village level interactions emerged between backcountry settlers and Indians, beginning with the partial assimilation of white captives from the Seven Years’ War. (323) In this, Algonquin women played a central role. (325) The resistance of adult British prisoners to total assimilation led to the construction of a new middle ground. (327)
There were differences between the French and British experiences, however. The British found that they could buy what they wanted with rum — sex, among other things —and did not have to invest the time in building connections and cultural ties. (340-342) The results could be calamitous fits of violence, but resolution of these actually helped to build a middle ground. (343)
TP: The evil of alcohol. (423, among others)
Ch. 8: Simple version of post-American Revolution situation in the region: emergence of another imperial power — the Americans — recreated many of the same dynamics seen earlier between the French, British, and Indians. More complex version: village struggles for power were the predominant feature of the period, since the region had dissolved back into village level existence by the 1780s. (366-367) George Rogers Clark’s expedition provides an amusing tale of the power/necessity of working on the middle ground. (368-372)
indian hating, common among backcountry settlers, led to the destruction of parts of the middle ground, while occupying a small corner of it — that dealing with violence. (387) It also enabled the British to achieve their highest level of alliance success with the Algonquin in the 1780s, helping to restore some larger political coherence to the pays d’en haut. (410-412)
Ch. 9: Two fledgling confederacies confront each other — Algonquin and American. (415-416) The Americans fail to find the middle ground, while the British and French manage to remain on it. (448)
Ch. 10: The Americans no longer feared the Indians; the British were exiting the scene; and the Indians turned inward. Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh emerge, laying the foundation for the alliances of the War of 1812. Tecumseh after 1808 became the leader of an Indian confederation and then a British alliance-chief. (514-55) The British and Algonquin briefly resurrected an alliance on the middle ground in 1812-1813; Tecumseh’s death ended its rally. (517)