Fascinating stuff!
Other reviewers have commented on the obvious aspects, but the part that struck me the most was the incompetence of the political planning around the invasion of Italy and the handling of the Balkans. The entire strategy appears to have been driven by wishful thinking and fantasy. So we get surreal beliefs around Yugoslavia and Tito, and ideas that sound utterly insane to our ears, like the suggestion that these countries would, after the war, revert to monarchies.
What's important, of course, is that all this sounds so depressingly familiar; exactly what we saw in Iraq, and before that in Vietnam. On the one hand we have The Establishment, certain that its manichean simplistic view of the world (one type of communism, all evil; one type of islam, all evil) is all that is necessary to put together a plan. On the other hand we have the exiles and entrepreneurs in The Capital, happy to tell The Establishment whatever it wants to hear.
We have been led to believe that this incompetence is something new and postwar, that the Present at the Creation generation were somehow uniquely skilled in their insight and ability. Apparently not!
So why do we not hear much about these cases?
I'm guessing it's some combination of
- mostly these were Britain's decisions and responsibilities. The US political establishment could make no hay from them. And for most people, most of the time, what good is history if you can't use it to beat up someone else?
- what happened after the end of the war: Germany, the Iron Curtain, Fall of China, Korea; were so much more momentous that these more minor details got lost and forgotten. The US was hegemon, Britain was retreating to West of Suez, who cared about mistakes made a few years ago regarding some minor Mediterranean countries?
But it MATTERS! Perhaps if someone at the time had made more of a big deal of this, had pointed out just how easy it is to build a political/military strategy upon a house of sand, just how easy it is to believe what you want to believe, just how utterly untrustworthy are a foreign country's emigre's (particularly those spoiling for a fight) we might have had a wiser political class over the next two generations?
There are other interesting small details all the way through. For example Moorehead is well aware of the existence of the Bengal famine (though puts the number at 3/4 million, presumably that was the number believed at the time) but puts it in the context of everything else in the war.
(There were 300,000 famine deaths in Greece, there were 670,000 or so just from the Siege of Leningrad, there was Holland.)
Moorehead points out, and I think was clear to everyone writing and planning at the time, that war sucks, and it sucks for everyone. Much of the writing since then, especially by the generations born after the war, is not interested in this sort of synoptic view; all that matters is "how the war hurt my tribe, and how that shows that [the system] hates us". Prioritizing "how my tribe was hurt" over the total horror of war for everyone was, of course, the Adolf Hitler strategy; and mainly leads to the urge for a rematch...
So, yeah, read Alan Moorehead. And think of the big picture whenever you hear special pleading about how one group suffered in the past. (It's not only emigres who have an agenda...)