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Wilson's Ghost: Reducing The Risk Of Conflict, Killing, And Catastrophe In The 21st Century
With Wilson's Ghost , Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight deliver an impassioned plea and a decisive and multi-faceted program for making the 21st century a more peaceful century than the last. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war that has followed, have made their argument even more imperative. In a provocative synthesis of the pragmatic, historical, and philosophical arguments for avoiding war and achieving a sustainable peace, McNamara and Blight put forth a plan for realizing Woodrow Wilson's dream. The plan begins with a moral imperative that establishes the reduction of human carnage as a major goal of foreign policy across the globe, and details the necessity of adopting new policies to support that goal.
McNamara and Blight argue that now is the time for a radical approach to reducing the risk of human carnage, and they demonstrate why we cannot afford to fail in this effort.
McNamara and Blight argue that now is the time for a radical approach to reducing the risk of human carnage, and they demonstrate why we cannot afford to fail in this effort.
176 pages, Paperback
Published June 1, 2003
3 people are currently reading
183 people want to read
About the author
Robert S. McNamara
54 books42 followersRobert Strange McNamara (June 9, 1916 – July 6, 2009) was an American business executive and the eighth Secretary of Defense, serving from 1961 to 1968 under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, during which time he played a large role in escalating the United States involvement in the Vietnam War. Following that, he served as President of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981. McNamara was responsible for the institution of systems analysis in public policy, which developed into the discipline known today as policy analysis. McNamara consolidated intelligence and logistics functions of the Pentagon into two centralized agencies: the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Supply Agency.
Prior to public service, McNamara was one of the "Whiz Kids" who helped rebuild Ford Motor Company after World War II, and briefly served as Ford's President before becoming Secretary of Defense. A group of advisors he brought to the Pentagon inherited the "Whiz Kids" moniker.
McNamara remains the longest serving Secretary of Defense at over seven years.
Prior to public service, McNamara was one of the "Whiz Kids" who helped rebuild Ford Motor Company after World War II, and briefly served as Ford's President before becoming Secretary of Defense. A group of advisors he brought to the Pentagon inherited the "Whiz Kids" moniker.
McNamara remains the longest serving Secretary of Defense at over seven years.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
February 4, 2010
A must read for anyone involved in foreign affairs. Shows just how pervalent the lack of cultural understanding is in the circles of national leaders - across the world. Some great lessons that cost dearly to learn.
August 22, 2017
I recommend that you read this book! Excellent writing, excellent ideas. The arguments here are always well developed, civil,and articulate, and the authors have a lot of wisdom to share. Make sure you get the 2003 edition with the post 9/11 afterward.
The title alludes to President Wilson's fear of the "typhoon" to come if the nations of the world did not ascribe to the moral goal of reducing killing and the political goal of multilateralism in international affairs. The authors do not spare Wilson the criticism he deserves for unintentionally encouraging communal killing by his promises of self-determination, but they use it as an excellent lesson in the need for multilateral input in policy making, and the need to employ realistic empathy (as opposed to sympathy) with regard to friends and enemies. In fact the conclusion is that lack of empathy was Wilson's Achilles heel.
WHAT WAS REALLY GREAT:
1. Given that McNamara spent a long time in politics, I was truly impressed by his nonpartisanship. He practices what he preaches regarding empathy. For instance, I was surprised at McNamara's praise of MacArthur's attitude during the occupation of Japan. McNamara says nothing less than total surrender could have healed relations with Japan so well, and he uses it as a model for successful intervention in situations of communal killing. His treatment of the many presidents discussed seems relatively fair-handed as well.
2. The discussion on developing "realistic empathy" was absolutely tremendous and very timely even now, over a decade after the last revision of the book. Not only is it a great principle for statecraft, but for personal relations as well. It is also a great corrective for the rash conclusions and actions we might arrive at via nationalism and exceptionalism. If you only skim, read this discussion p64-6.
3. The discussion of "bringing in Russia and China from the cold" --helping them to become and be treated as partners at the table of nations, rather than ostracizing and stigmatizing them--was thought provoking.
4. The insider anecdotes and illustrations from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, and even more revealing, the conferences held by parties involved years later, were very illuminating. McNamara has a wealth of personal experience in international affairs and he has taken the time to reflect on that capital to arrive at very fruitful observations, particularly on the fragility and unpredictability of international crises.
5. The discussion of the moral and strategic limitations and dangers of nuclear weapons is excellent.
6. The discussion of multilateralism was good. Multilateralism and empathy should be pursued always as a first option, and always as an ongoing political strategy. I agree that getting perspective from our allies and friends would help save us from a multitude of international gaffes and missteps. I would not personally step to the policy of "zero tolerance multilateralism" however. At some point every sovereign nation must have the option to take an action for the preservation of the nation, whether other nations agree or assent or not.
WHERE I DISAGREED THE MOST
Suggestions to modify the UN to phase out the Security Council and give the Secretary-General command of a fighting force with a mandate to demand total surrender are well-intentioned, but I have two concerns. First, democracy is not infallible, and eliminating the great power vetoes could make it more likely for the UN to take action for reasons other than clear preservation of life from killing. Second, these changes would make the Secretary-General a very powerful figure, and clearly erode the sovereignty of constituent nations.
The title alludes to President Wilson's fear of the "typhoon" to come if the nations of the world did not ascribe to the moral goal of reducing killing and the political goal of multilateralism in international affairs. The authors do not spare Wilson the criticism he deserves for unintentionally encouraging communal killing by his promises of self-determination, but they use it as an excellent lesson in the need for multilateral input in policy making, and the need to employ realistic empathy (as opposed to sympathy) with regard to friends and enemies. In fact the conclusion is that lack of empathy was Wilson's Achilles heel.
WHAT WAS REALLY GREAT:
1. Given that McNamara spent a long time in politics, I was truly impressed by his nonpartisanship. He practices what he preaches regarding empathy. For instance, I was surprised at McNamara's praise of MacArthur's attitude during the occupation of Japan. McNamara says nothing less than total surrender could have healed relations with Japan so well, and he uses it as a model for successful intervention in situations of communal killing. His treatment of the many presidents discussed seems relatively fair-handed as well.
2. The discussion on developing "realistic empathy" was absolutely tremendous and very timely even now, over a decade after the last revision of the book. Not only is it a great principle for statecraft, but for personal relations as well. It is also a great corrective for the rash conclusions and actions we might arrive at via nationalism and exceptionalism. If you only skim, read this discussion p64-6.
3. The discussion of "bringing in Russia and China from the cold" --helping them to become and be treated as partners at the table of nations, rather than ostracizing and stigmatizing them--was thought provoking.
4. The insider anecdotes and illustrations from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, and even more revealing, the conferences held by parties involved years later, were very illuminating. McNamara has a wealth of personal experience in international affairs and he has taken the time to reflect on that capital to arrive at very fruitful observations, particularly on the fragility and unpredictability of international crises.
5. The discussion of the moral and strategic limitations and dangers of nuclear weapons is excellent.
6. The discussion of multilateralism was good. Multilateralism and empathy should be pursued always as a first option, and always as an ongoing political strategy. I agree that getting perspective from our allies and friends would help save us from a multitude of international gaffes and missteps. I would not personally step to the policy of "zero tolerance multilateralism" however. At some point every sovereign nation must have the option to take an action for the preservation of the nation, whether other nations agree or assent or not.
WHERE I DISAGREED THE MOST
Suggestions to modify the UN to phase out the Security Council and give the Secretary-General command of a fighting force with a mandate to demand total surrender are well-intentioned, but I have two concerns. First, democracy is not infallible, and eliminating the great power vetoes could make it more likely for the UN to take action for reasons other than clear preservation of life from killing. Second, these changes would make the Secretary-General a very powerful figure, and clearly erode the sovereignty of constituent nations.
October 26, 2022
Written before 9/11 seems a quant view of the world without International and Domestic terrorism.
Where is the chapter on reducing arm sales, including guns of all kinds to private owners?
And the chapter on avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe as Putin threatens to detonate over his childish desire to own Ukraine seems very polly-anna.
But hey, its McNamara - not know for making the best decisions.....
Where is the chapter on reducing arm sales, including guns of all kinds to private owners?
And the chapter on avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe as Putin threatens to detonate over his childish desire to own Ukraine seems very polly-anna.
But hey, its McNamara - not know for making the best decisions.....
May 29, 2009
I skimmed it.
July 7, 2009
Merged review:
September 29, 2009
Good book by McNamara applying Wilsonianism to the 21st century's problems in International Relations.
August 4, 2010
رائع جداً . . رجل الحرب والسلام الاول ويلسون يصطدم بجشع وظلم وطغيان الدول في القرن العشرين حتى وصولهم إلى أيامنا هذهـ
" مترجم "
" مترجم "
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews