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The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866
This is a new history of the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, which paved the way for German and Italian unification. Geoffrey Wawro describes Prussia's successful invasion of Habsburg Bohemia, and the wretched collapse of the Austrian army in July 1866. Blending military and social history, he describes the panic that overtook Austria's regiments in each clash with the Prussians. He reveals the blundering of the Austrian commandant who fumbled away key strategic advantages and ultimately lost a war--crucial to the fortunes of the Habsburg Monarchy--that most European pundits had predicted they would win.
313 pages, Paperback
First published July 13, 1996
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About the author
Geoffrey Wawro
16 books78 followersGeoffrey Wawro is the General Olinto Mark Barsanti Professor of Military History at the University of North Texas, and Director of the UNT Military History Center. His primary area of emphasis is modern and contemporary military history, from the French Revolution to the present.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
November 29, 2009
This book by Geoffrey Wawro on the Austrian-Prussian War of 1866 offers the reader a decent and easy to read account of this largely forgotten war. Most people have heard about the battle of Koniggratz but in this book Wawro provides the full story of how this disastrous battle came about. I must admit I was surprised of the level of stupidity shown by the Austrian commanders. Wawro offers some very interesting insights into the decisions made by the Prussian and Austrian High Command and the results. I found that the book was very easy to read and the narrative flowed along smoothly. The maps provided (26) were also easy to read and follow. The authors level and depth of research is excellent and I don't think you could fault him in his conclusions, The one and only compliant that I have with the book is the cost.
May 30, 2020
Wawro, one of the founders of the renowned Military History Center at the University of North Texas, has written one of the finest works on the Austro-Prussian and Italian War of 1866.
Delving into the political causes of the war, Wawro demonstrates how the rift between Vienna and Berlin over the leadership of the German Confederation, inexorably marched both states to war with each other. This book is written primarily from the Austrian perspective, a perspective often not seen in works on the topic as the focus is overwhelmingly on the Prussians. By focusing on Vienna and their reactions to the escalating crisis and the mobilization of the Army for war, one sees more clearly how the war panned out the way that it did.
In short, it was a war that Austria fought poorly from top to bottom.
As Wawro points out, the Austrian Army was poorly trained, and woefully led. It would be the area of leadership that would be Vienna's greatest failing. For not only would Vienna make a hash of the diplomatic and political stakes leading up to the armed portion of the conflict, but they would showcase even more inept leadership on the battlefield. This ineptitude in the field would be exacerbated by a shocking level of outdated thinking, and myopia in the establishment of Army doctrine.
The Austrian Army was an army which simply mistrusted it's soldiers, viewed them as barely literate apes, and designed tactical doctrine accordingly. The Austrian Army was a sledgehammer. Big, heavy, ponderous, packing a considerable amount of firepower, and coming at you in a hollering tide of glittering, leveled bayonets.
One can make the correlation for a more American audience that a fellow middle of the 19th century analogy would be the Union Army of the US Civil War. Both were forces reliant upon brute strength, mass, and overwhelm firepower to bludgeon an enemy to death. Both also happened to be typically slow operationally, and both were overly reliant upon fixed logistical networks, and both had troubles with dynamic tactical situations.
This was all well and good for the Austrians...if they were fighting Napoleon fifty years earlier. Rather, they were fighting the Prussians Army, an Army reliant upon individual initiative, dynamic thinking at all levels, innovative technologies like the Dreyse Needle gun (the first operational bolt action rifle), and a reliance upon speed, and force multipliers of the psychological kind (read fury and ruthless aggression) to make up for a lack of mass and brute force. If the Austrian Army was the Union Army, the Prussians had an analogy, mostly, in the Rebel Army of the US Civil War.
The Austrian doctrine was predicated upon the past, while that of Prussia was designed to create a new form of warfare, and to entirely change the rules.
And once war broke out, the Austrians quickly discovered just how unready for modern war they really were.
Without going into the details of the Campaign and the culminating Battle of Könnigratz, the Austrians were simply blown away by the Prussians Army.
Quite literally.
The Austrian habit of howling bayonet charges merely lead to heaps of dead and wounded Hapsburg soldiers as the superior rate of fire of the Prussians and their infantry's bolt action rifles cut through the Austrian masses like a scythe. The Prussians also, almost always, sought out the Austrian flank to relentlessly turn it and crush it. Invariably, Austrian troops tended to flee the field from the Prussians at every turn.
Those who survived, that is.
The only real saving grace for the Austrians was their splendid artillery which dominated the early hours of the bloodbath that was Könnigratz. But if the Austrian artillery was top notch, their infantry weren't, and their tactical leadership was abysmal. The Austrians weren't helped by being equipped with muzzle loading rifles, which could fire three to four aimed shots a minute...far less than the Prussians. (Wawro states that these rifles could fire one shot a minute, but that is plain wrong, as any reenactor or avid black powder rifleman will tell you).
The Prussians knack for seeking the tactical flank operated on the grander scale as well, and the strong position that the Austrian General Benedek had taken along the Bystrice River, was itself turned by a Prussian double envelopment, and a former natural fortress was turned into a veritable charnel house once the Austrian North Army collapsed. Benedek could have won the Battle earlier in the day, had he launched his reserves in a counterattack against the stymied Prussians Elbe Army, busily being hammered by Austrian artillery. But Benedek never thought in the offensive, much to his Staff's chagrin.
Könnigratz, and the Prussian victory in the war marked the terminal decline of the Austrian Empire, as Prussia's victory gave impetus to the nationalistic movements which ripped the Empire apart well before the Great War hammered the nails into the coffin lid.
The Prussian reliance upon unrelenting speed, both tactically and operationally, meant that the war was over before the French could muster an army on the Rhine to aid Vienna, and Russia was busy waging a war in the Caucasus, and likewise flabbergasted at the speed of the Prussian success, too much so to respond.
Wawro points out that the Emperor's war aims, had Vienna been successful, would have smothered the flame of both German and Italian nationalism, likely forestalling said movements within the Empire, and would have restored the old balance of power on the continent. Perhaps, an Austrian victory in the war may have even precluded the Great War, and the rise of the revolutionary systems.
But Wawro stresses that such is mere guess work.
The Italian theater is told in detail as well, and here the Austrians were successful, defeating the Italians at Custoza. However, the decisive theater was that in Bohemia, and Austrian victory against the Italians was negated by the overwhelming disaster suffered at the hands of the Prussians.
And from then on, the Hapsburg Imperium descended on their terminal spiral towards dissolution.
This was an excellent book, and one of the best on the 1866 War. Highly recommended.
Delving into the political causes of the war, Wawro demonstrates how the rift between Vienna and Berlin over the leadership of the German Confederation, inexorably marched both states to war with each other. This book is written primarily from the Austrian perspective, a perspective often not seen in works on the topic as the focus is overwhelmingly on the Prussians. By focusing on Vienna and their reactions to the escalating crisis and the mobilization of the Army for war, one sees more clearly how the war panned out the way that it did.
In short, it was a war that Austria fought poorly from top to bottom.
As Wawro points out, the Austrian Army was poorly trained, and woefully led. It would be the area of leadership that would be Vienna's greatest failing. For not only would Vienna make a hash of the diplomatic and political stakes leading up to the armed portion of the conflict, but they would showcase even more inept leadership on the battlefield. This ineptitude in the field would be exacerbated by a shocking level of outdated thinking, and myopia in the establishment of Army doctrine.
The Austrian Army was an army which simply mistrusted it's soldiers, viewed them as barely literate apes, and designed tactical doctrine accordingly. The Austrian Army was a sledgehammer. Big, heavy, ponderous, packing a considerable amount of firepower, and coming at you in a hollering tide of glittering, leveled bayonets.
One can make the correlation for a more American audience that a fellow middle of the 19th century analogy would be the Union Army of the US Civil War. Both were forces reliant upon brute strength, mass, and overwhelm firepower to bludgeon an enemy to death. Both also happened to be typically slow operationally, and both were overly reliant upon fixed logistical networks, and both had troubles with dynamic tactical situations.
This was all well and good for the Austrians...if they were fighting Napoleon fifty years earlier. Rather, they were fighting the Prussians Army, an Army reliant upon individual initiative, dynamic thinking at all levels, innovative technologies like the Dreyse Needle gun (the first operational bolt action rifle), and a reliance upon speed, and force multipliers of the psychological kind (read fury and ruthless aggression) to make up for a lack of mass and brute force. If the Austrian Army was the Union Army, the Prussians had an analogy, mostly, in the Rebel Army of the US Civil War.
The Austrian doctrine was predicated upon the past, while that of Prussia was designed to create a new form of warfare, and to entirely change the rules.
And once war broke out, the Austrians quickly discovered just how unready for modern war they really were.
Without going into the details of the Campaign and the culminating Battle of Könnigratz, the Austrians were simply blown away by the Prussians Army.
Quite literally.
The Austrian habit of howling bayonet charges merely lead to heaps of dead and wounded Hapsburg soldiers as the superior rate of fire of the Prussians and their infantry's bolt action rifles cut through the Austrian masses like a scythe. The Prussians also, almost always, sought out the Austrian flank to relentlessly turn it and crush it. Invariably, Austrian troops tended to flee the field from the Prussians at every turn.
Those who survived, that is.
The only real saving grace for the Austrians was their splendid artillery which dominated the early hours of the bloodbath that was Könnigratz. But if the Austrian artillery was top notch, their infantry weren't, and their tactical leadership was abysmal. The Austrians weren't helped by being equipped with muzzle loading rifles, which could fire three to four aimed shots a minute...far less than the Prussians. (Wawro states that these rifles could fire one shot a minute, but that is plain wrong, as any reenactor or avid black powder rifleman will tell you).
The Prussians knack for seeking the tactical flank operated on the grander scale as well, and the strong position that the Austrian General Benedek had taken along the Bystrice River, was itself turned by a Prussian double envelopment, and a former natural fortress was turned into a veritable charnel house once the Austrian North Army collapsed. Benedek could have won the Battle earlier in the day, had he launched his reserves in a counterattack against the stymied Prussians Elbe Army, busily being hammered by Austrian artillery. But Benedek never thought in the offensive, much to his Staff's chagrin.
Könnigratz, and the Prussian victory in the war marked the terminal decline of the Austrian Empire, as Prussia's victory gave impetus to the nationalistic movements which ripped the Empire apart well before the Great War hammered the nails into the coffin lid.
The Prussian reliance upon unrelenting speed, both tactically and operationally, meant that the war was over before the French could muster an army on the Rhine to aid Vienna, and Russia was busy waging a war in the Caucasus, and likewise flabbergasted at the speed of the Prussian success, too much so to respond.
Wawro points out that the Emperor's war aims, had Vienna been successful, would have smothered the flame of both German and Italian nationalism, likely forestalling said movements within the Empire, and would have restored the old balance of power on the continent. Perhaps, an Austrian victory in the war may have even precluded the Great War, and the rise of the revolutionary systems.
But Wawro stresses that such is mere guess work.
The Italian theater is told in detail as well, and here the Austrians were successful, defeating the Italians at Custoza. However, the decisive theater was that in Bohemia, and Austrian victory against the Italians was negated by the overwhelming disaster suffered at the hands of the Prussians.
And from then on, the Hapsburg Imperium descended on their terminal spiral towards dissolution.
This was an excellent book, and one of the best on the 1866 War. Highly recommended.
December 24, 2010
This is the 9th and thus far the worst book on my summer reading list on 19th century Europe. This, like many others on the list, has been gathering dust since I purchased it around ten years ago. Why is this conflict important? The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 settled the struggle for predominance in Germany in favor of Prussia. Four years later a unified Germany under Prussian domination went on to defeat France. An Austrian victory may have delayed German unification and would have changed the course of European history.
Here is a list of what pisses me off about this book:
1) Arrogance. In his introduction Wawro states that no one else in the 130 years since the war has done what he has done. No one. The over-riding cause of Austria's defeat was not her use of muzzle-loading muskets and Napoleonic shock column infantry attacks awhile Prussia was using breech-loading Dreyse "needle-gun" rifle and looser and more efficient fire formations; nor her grossly inefficient supply system and lack of s General staff; no, it was the incompetence of Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek, the senior Austrian general which was the main cause of her defeat. Benedek was indeed overmatched and out-generaled by his Prussian counterpart von Moltke but I was not convinced that this was the main cause of Austria's defeat.
2) The chapter describing the origins of the war was second, after one on tactics. If I was to write a book about a war, the first chapter would be about the causes of said conflict, and why it matters to the reader.
3) Wawro's repeated and heavy-handed use of italicized words in the middle of sentences to make a point. It comes across like screaming at the reader. Typically, italics are used for foreign words, but Wawro uses them on what he considers key phrases that the reader is too stupid to notice otherwise.
4) The book is hard to read. The font is small and faint.
5) Some of the worst maps I have ever seen in a history book are here. They were badly done computer generated maps that look like grade school art class rejects.
EDITED on 12/23/2010
I re-read this book in November when I used it as of several sources on a term paper about the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The book was still somewhat annoying, but I raised the rating from 2 stars to 3 stars because I had more appreciation for Wawro's research.
Here is a list of what pisses me off about this book:
1) Arrogance. In his introduction Wawro states that no one else in the 130 years since the war has done what he has done. No one. The over-riding cause of Austria's defeat was not her use of muzzle-loading muskets and Napoleonic shock column infantry attacks awhile Prussia was using breech-loading Dreyse "needle-gun" rifle and looser and more efficient fire formations; nor her grossly inefficient supply system and lack of s General staff; no, it was the incompetence of Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek, the senior Austrian general which was the main cause of her defeat. Benedek was indeed overmatched and out-generaled by his Prussian counterpart von Moltke but I was not convinced that this was the main cause of Austria's defeat.
2) The chapter describing the origins of the war was second, after one on tactics. If I was to write a book about a war, the first chapter would be about the causes of said conflict, and why it matters to the reader.
3) Wawro's repeated and heavy-handed use of italicized words in the middle of sentences to make a point. It comes across like screaming at the reader. Typically, italics are used for foreign words, but Wawro uses them on what he considers key phrases that the reader is too stupid to notice otherwise.
4) The book is hard to read. The font is small and faint.
5) Some of the worst maps I have ever seen in a history book are here. They were badly done computer generated maps that look like grade school art class rejects.
EDITED on 12/23/2010
I re-read this book in November when I used it as of several sources on a term paper about the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The book was still somewhat annoying, but I raised the rating from 2 stars to 3 stars because I had more appreciation for Wawro's research.
January 7, 2017
you can understand how Germans' 1870, 1914 and 1939 strategies invented through 19th century by Clausewitz and Moltke in battlefield and Bismarck behind the curtains.
the book is easy to read and so far the most valuable source about the topic. strongly recommend.
the book is easy to read and so far the most valuable source about the topic. strongly recommend.
February 12, 2018
A well-researched and cogently argued book let down by shoddy formatting choices (footnotes at the bottom of each page not separated by any sort of border, maps scant in both number and detail). Still, I learned a lot about a war that I never knew happened before.
January 31, 2009
Very well-written and informative history of this brief war.
February 18, 2021
**** How the map of 20th-Century Europe Was Drawn ****
Two key events any student wishing to understand 19th-Century European history, and which helped shape the map of the continent as it entered the 20th, were the unification of Germany and that of Italy, and the gradual, corresponding weakness and dismemberment of once-mighty Habsburg Austria. In this exhaustively detailed book, which grew out of his doctoral dissertation at Yale (and which won the 1994 prize for Best Dissertation in Austrian Studies, granted by the Austrian Cultural Institute in New York), Geoffrey Wawro chronicles the short but decisive war between Prussia and Austria (and secondarily between Austria and Italy) in the summer of 1866 by which Prussia began to become Germany and Italy’s northern frontier assumed its modern shape—at the expense of Austria and the small states of the German Confederation. In his analysis of the day-to-day strategy and tactics (or, in Austria’s case, the almost total lack of them, at least any which made any sense!) employed by the Prussian and Austrian armies, he shows how fortunate Prussia was to have key elements which combined at just the right times and places to bring victory. Otto von Bismarck and Helmut von Moltke were the master diplomat and tactician. Bismarck saw that, with the right amount of determination and utter ruthlessness, a great nation-state could be created out of the confusing muddle of small principalities, always jockeying and/or fighting for power and advantage, that had been created by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Moltke, chief of the General Staff, made sure that the Prussian army was equipped and trained with the latest rifles (the famous Needle Rifle) and artillery. Together they recognized how Austria was too big and too full of mutually-antagonistic ethnicities to be effectively governed, and how its military establishment had degenerated into decadence and incompetence; as shown by the unfolding events of the war, its top leaders had no idea how to fight a war and consistently made poor decisions, its troops were poorly trained if at all, the different nationalities had no great love for each other, and commands were often given in a language (German) many of the troops could not even understand. The result was a victory for Prussia which left Austria at its mercy; Prussia annexed several of the smaller German states which had allied with Austria, Hungary split off into an autonomous region (the state was, in fact, renamed Austria-Hungary), and Italy annexed Venicia, including the namesake city. Austria was permanently weakened and no longer could be considered a major power.
Prussia followed up its victory in this war with another in the Franco-Prussian War four years later (see Wawro’s book on this subject, which I have also reviewed). Prussia annexed the remaining small German principalities and became Germany, another Great Power; Austria-Hungary continued to decline; new alliances among the major powers were formed; nationalistic fervor continued to rise and sabers rattled with increasing frequency; and, as Wawro shows in the concluding and most important section of the book, the stage was set for the eruption, in August 1914, of the Great War for which in many ways the smaller conflict of 1866 was the catalyst.
**** review by Chuck Graham ****
Two key events any student wishing to understand 19th-Century European history, and which helped shape the map of the continent as it entered the 20th, were the unification of Germany and that of Italy, and the gradual, corresponding weakness and dismemberment of once-mighty Habsburg Austria. In this exhaustively detailed book, which grew out of his doctoral dissertation at Yale (and which won the 1994 prize for Best Dissertation in Austrian Studies, granted by the Austrian Cultural Institute in New York), Geoffrey Wawro chronicles the short but decisive war between Prussia and Austria (and secondarily between Austria and Italy) in the summer of 1866 by which Prussia began to become Germany and Italy’s northern frontier assumed its modern shape—at the expense of Austria and the small states of the German Confederation. In his analysis of the day-to-day strategy and tactics (or, in Austria’s case, the almost total lack of them, at least any which made any sense!) employed by the Prussian and Austrian armies, he shows how fortunate Prussia was to have key elements which combined at just the right times and places to bring victory. Otto von Bismarck and Helmut von Moltke were the master diplomat and tactician. Bismarck saw that, with the right amount of determination and utter ruthlessness, a great nation-state could be created out of the confusing muddle of small principalities, always jockeying and/or fighting for power and advantage, that had been created by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Moltke, chief of the General Staff, made sure that the Prussian army was equipped and trained with the latest rifles (the famous Needle Rifle) and artillery. Together they recognized how Austria was too big and too full of mutually-antagonistic ethnicities to be effectively governed, and how its military establishment had degenerated into decadence and incompetence; as shown by the unfolding events of the war, its top leaders had no idea how to fight a war and consistently made poor decisions, its troops were poorly trained if at all, the different nationalities had no great love for each other, and commands were often given in a language (German) many of the troops could not even understand. The result was a victory for Prussia which left Austria at its mercy; Prussia annexed several of the smaller German states which had allied with Austria, Hungary split off into an autonomous region (the state was, in fact, renamed Austria-Hungary), and Italy annexed Venicia, including the namesake city. Austria was permanently weakened and no longer could be considered a major power.
Prussia followed up its victory in this war with another in the Franco-Prussian War four years later (see Wawro’s book on this subject, which I have also reviewed). Prussia annexed the remaining small German principalities and became Germany, another Great Power; Austria-Hungary continued to decline; new alliances among the major powers were formed; nationalistic fervor continued to rise and sabers rattled with increasing frequency; and, as Wawro shows in the concluding and most important section of the book, the stage was set for the eruption, in August 1914, of the Great War for which in many ways the smaller conflict of 1866 was the catalyst.
**** review by Chuck Graham ****
July 7, 2024
An excellent overview of this pivotal 19th-century conflict. Most people forget that Italy, in the guise of the Kingdom of Piedmont, actively participated in the conflict. The unification of Italy was the long-term result. This conflict also foreshadowed the ineptitude of Napoleon III and the slow and steady decline of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
July 14, 2015
There is a straight line from Clauswitz to Moltke and thence to the Austro-Prussian War (1866), Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), WWI (1914-18) and finally WWII (1939-45). Prussia/Germany re-wrote not just the tactics of war but the grand strategies. For 100 years, in the Teutonic halls of politics and the military corridors -- usually both so intertwined so as to be hard to differentiate one from the other -- war really was the means to the ends. In the process, a new nation rose in ascendancy, the maps of Europe -- and elsewhere -- were re-written again and again, and of course many millions died. In the end the old Prussia/Germany was broken by its own process, only to arise anew, though fundamentally different. In the beginning though, there was Moltke and the 7 weeks conflict known as the Austro-Prussian War (which actually also included Italy, Bavaria, Saxony and a few other Germanic states). This then was the Germanic military launching pad. It previewed the new Prussian tactics of envelopment and pocket battles with heavy, rapid firepower against the Napoleonic era of musketry and columns, elan and foolish cavalry charges as employed by the Austrian Empire. New and bold against decidedly old and frankly tired. War as offensive policy versus 18th century defensive fortifications. There was much to be learned about the changing nature of warfare after this war, if only the powers that be paid any attention. (The more one reads history the more one sees that our mighty hubris obscures and obstructs lessons in front of us.)
Wawro does a very good job putting this "little war" in the grand context it should be in. He clearly shows the lineal connection between the past -- from political and military historical perspectives -- and through to the mid-20th century. He also does a superlative job bringing the major players to life. Especially the delinquent and incompetent Austrian grand commander, Field Marshal Benedek, who so dithered and fumbled away one opportunity after another. Wawro's writing style lends itself well to the tenseness and climax of the great battle of Koniggratz.
History is a game of 'what-ifs.' What if Austria had triumphed and humiliated the greater German project. How would things have been different. Speculate on, but only novelists and wargamers can re-write history.
Wawro does a very good job putting this "little war" in the grand context it should be in. He clearly shows the lineal connection between the past -- from political and military historical perspectives -- and through to the mid-20th century. He also does a superlative job bringing the major players to life. Especially the delinquent and incompetent Austrian grand commander, Field Marshal Benedek, who so dithered and fumbled away one opportunity after another. Wawro's writing style lends itself well to the tenseness and climax of the great battle of Koniggratz.
History is a game of 'what-ifs.' What if Austria had triumphed and humiliated the greater German project. How would things have been different. Speculate on, but only novelists and wargamers can re-write history.
December 12, 2009
The only update on this forgotten event in English. Wawro should be highly commended for authoring a well-written account on a conflict which led to the unification of Germany and helped usher in the modern world.
January 15, 2016
Cracking history of this relatively little known war
Describes why the two armies were in most aspects badly matched
and all the major battles in fine narrative detail
An excellent read i have already read twice its that good
Describes why the two armies were in most aspects badly matched
and all the major battles in fine narrative detail
An excellent read i have already read twice its that good
May 30, 2007
Like Wawro's book on 1870-71, this is THE account of the 1866 war.
March 15, 2018
Wow, this is amazing. I love the Austro-Prussian war story...
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews