What do you think?
Rate this book
A Critique of Pure Tolerance
123 pages Beacon Press (December 16, 1997) English
123 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1965
8 people are currently reading
646 people want to read
About the author
Robert Paul Wolff
61 books43 followersRobert Paul Wolff was an American political philosopher and professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
Wolff has written widely on topics in political philosophy, including Marxism, tolerance (against liberalism and in favor of anarchism), political justification, and democracy.
Wolff has written widely on topics in political philosophy, including Marxism, tolerance (against liberalism and in favor of anarchism), political justification, and democracy.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
July 30, 2020
A mix of essays from three differently trained philosophers and a sociologists.
Robert Paul Wolff in 'Beyond Tolerance' essentially writes a historical viewpoint of tolerance and the idea of free speech, seeing how it has unravelled over time, and ends with the idea that we should abandon tolerance in favour of the community. As he puts it "We must give up the image of society as a battleground of competing groups and formulate an ideal of society more exalted than the mere acceptance of opposed interests and diverse customs. There is need for a new philosophy of community, beyond pluralism and beyond tolerance" (61).
Barrington Moore Jr in 'Tolerance and the Scientific Outlook' offers a pretty ridiculous and naive 'ideal' society, wherein science and evidence alone are the yardstick for truth and tolerance. As Moore puts it "science is tolerant of reason; relentlessly intolerant of reason and sham." (91). Moore takes a very aphilosophical and sociologically ignorant view of science and its construction, assuming an idealistic positivistic worldview, which is not only naive and cold, but ignores the very regressive power of an overly rationalistic worldview. One can only guess that Moore never read Adorno's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment'...
Herbert Marcuse in 'Repressive Tolerance' argues in an albeit imperfect manner (but probably the strongest of the bunch), wherein he argues for the necessary intolerance of intolerant (which he broadly characterises as Right wing) viewpoints, to allow for the inequality of freedom to be suppressed. This essay hasn't aged particularly well, and is certainly of its time. I imagine the rather dated feel to it, in light of the modern discussions around free speech, have probably tarred its image, especially with the pseudo-documentaries and antiSemitic conspiracies about 'Cultural Marxism' mentioning this text explicitly. But I think this essay is dismissed too quickly, and a more careful reading is required, and especially one which takes the context of the work into account, as the suppression of the Left was much stronger in this time, and the only way to counteract this was by suppressing the Right.
Robert Paul Wolff in 'Beyond Tolerance' essentially writes a historical viewpoint of tolerance and the idea of free speech, seeing how it has unravelled over time, and ends with the idea that we should abandon tolerance in favour of the community. As he puts it "We must give up the image of society as a battleground of competing groups and formulate an ideal of society more exalted than the mere acceptance of opposed interests and diverse customs. There is need for a new philosophy of community, beyond pluralism and beyond tolerance" (61).
Barrington Moore Jr in 'Tolerance and the Scientific Outlook' offers a pretty ridiculous and naive 'ideal' society, wherein science and evidence alone are the yardstick for truth and tolerance. As Moore puts it "science is tolerant of reason; relentlessly intolerant of reason and sham." (91). Moore takes a very aphilosophical and sociologically ignorant view of science and its construction, assuming an idealistic positivistic worldview, which is not only naive and cold, but ignores the very regressive power of an overly rationalistic worldview. One can only guess that Moore never read Adorno's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment'...
Herbert Marcuse in 'Repressive Tolerance' argues in an albeit imperfect manner (but probably the strongest of the bunch), wherein he argues for the necessary intolerance of intolerant (which he broadly characterises as Right wing) viewpoints, to allow for the inequality of freedom to be suppressed. This essay hasn't aged particularly well, and is certainly of its time. I imagine the rather dated feel to it, in light of the modern discussions around free speech, have probably tarred its image, especially with the pseudo-documentaries and antiSemitic conspiracies about 'Cultural Marxism' mentioning this text explicitly. But I think this essay is dismissed too quickly, and a more careful reading is required, and especially one which takes the context of the work into account, as the suppression of the Left was much stronger in this time, and the only way to counteract this was by suppressing the Right.
July 28, 2020
Odd forward that admits that the title is “lightly yet respectfully plagiarized” and that the text “may contain some ideas that are not alien to Kant” (vii). Summarizes the three essays as the first essay as written by “a philosopher trained in the analytical tradition […] allergic to Hegel” the second written by “a sociologist trained in the tradition that regarded all philosophy as absurd and dangerous,” and the third written “by a philosopher, an authority on Hegel, who considers the contemporary analytical tradition dangerous” (id.).
Wolff argues that “political tolerance is that state of mind and condition of society which enables a pluralist democracy to function” (4). However, “whatever the virtues of classical liberalism as a theory of the ideal political community, it was very quickly recognized to be inadequate as a portrait of the industrial democracy which emerged in the nineteenth century” (6). Tolerance is defined as “the ungrudging acknowledgement of the right of opposed interests to exist and be pursued” (21). Further: “pluralism is the condition which a modern industrial democracy must possess to function at all, but tolerance is the state of mind which enables it to function well” (23). Permutations and criticisms handled, runs up against the unsurpassable limit: “Pluralism, both as theory and as practice, simply does not acknowledge the possibility of wholesale reorganization of the society. By insisting on the group nature of society, it denies the existence of society-wide interests—save the purely procedural interests in preserving the system” (51). This form of democracy, “with its virtue, tolerance, constitutes the highest stage in the political development of industrial capitalism” (id.). It is “humane, benevolent, accommodating, and far more responsive to the evils of social injustice than either the egoistic liberalism or the traditionalistic conservatism from which it grew. But pluralism is fatally blind to the evils which afflict the entire body politic, and as a theory of society it obstructs consideration of precisely the sorts of thoroughgoing social revisions which may be needed” (52).
Moore argues that “toleration implies the existence of a distinctive procedure for testing ideas, resembling due process in the realm of law” (63). We needn’t accept any particular idea, but tolerance requires their serious consideration. Works through hypotheticals regarding the conflicts of a Marxist & conservative historian (55 ff) as well as waking into the Third Reich (67 ff). Notes that we can’t draw easy distinctions between “violence, dictatorship, and fanaticism” on the one hand and “freedom, constitutionalism, and civil liberties” on the other (74)—the link of “revolutionary violence” is there (id.) (and this should summon the readings of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” in both Derrida’s Force of Law and Agamben’s State of Exception). Ends with the notion that “science is tolerant of reason, relentlessly intolerant of unreason” (79).
Most significantly, Marcuse begins with the premise that “tolerance is an end in itself” (82), part of the suppression of violence, “required for protecting man and animal from cruelty and aggression” as “precondition for the creation of a humane society” (id). We are of course not there yet: “tolerance is extended to policies, conditions, and modes of behavior which should not be tolerated because they are impeding, if not destroying, the chances of creating an existence without fear and misery” (id.)—such as bombing Vietnam, say. “This sort of tolerance strengthens the tyranny of the majority against which authentic liberals protested” (id.). Accordingly, “tolerance toward what is radically evil now appears as good because it serves the cohesion of the whole on the road to affluence” (83). Argues therefore against “indiscriminate tolerance” (Baudelaire is cited for the notion of “destructive tolerance”) (88), as justified in academic debates and required for science and religion—but “society cannot be indiscriminate where the pacification of existence, where freedom and happiness themselves are at stake: here, certain things cannot be said, certain ideas cannot be expressed, certain policies cannot be proposed, certain behavior cannot be permitted without making tolerance an instrument for the continuation of servitude” (88). (He disagrees with the censorship of art in a digression (89).)
He carries the argument to “the telos of tolerance is truth” (90), and reminds the reader that it arises out of doctrinal strife: “of the Albigensians, Waldensians, Lollards, and Hussites” (91): “tolerance is first and foremost for the sake of the heretics.” Noting that “intolerance has delayed progress and has prolonged the slaughter and torture of innocents for hundreds of years,” he asks “does this clinch the case for pure tolerance?” (91). He finds that “the democratic argument for abstract tolerance tends to be invalidated by the invalidation of the democratic process itself” (95), wherein “effective dissent” is blocked by monopolistic practices, Orwellian mechanisms, and so on. “The decision between opposed opinions has been made before the presentation and discussion get under way—made, not by a conspiracy or a sponsor or a publisher, not by any dictatorship, but rather by the normal course of events,’ which is the course of administered events [cf. Agamben], and by the mentality shaped in this course” (97). It’s all somewhat proto-baudrillard:
To have that discussion is “to re-examine the issue of violence and the traditional distinction between violent and non-violent action” (102). At a certain point, non-violence transforms dialectically into violence, as with the Indian passive resistance or the general strike (103); “Robespierre’s distinction between the terror of liberty and the terror of despotism, and his moral glorification of the former belongs to the most convincingly condemned aberrations, even if the white terror was more bloody than the red terror." However:
Noting the objection that this is a “cancellation of the liberal creed of free and equal discussion” (id.), he concludes that an “impossible consequence” follows: “withdrawal of tolerance from regressive movements, and discriminatory tolerance in favor of progressive tendencies would be tantamount to the ‘official’ promotion of subversion” (107). Notes that violence from below has often pushed civilization forward, citing a number of revolutions and uprisings (108—some may look with downcast eyes upon mention of the Chinese revolution, though I suspect he means 1911). By contrast, “historical violence emanating from among the ruling classes” does not have this relation to progress (id.).
The key is accordingly in a “liberating tolerance,” intolerant to movements from the Right, tolerant to the Left (109). No wonder this text gets cited with derision by exercised Trump-voters and teabaggers and other deplorables. The stakes: “if democratic tolerance had been withdrawn when the future leaders started their campaign, mankind would have had a chance of avoiding Auschwitz” (109). So, yeah, fuck you, deplorables. What we have is a “marketplace of ideas” controlled by a monopolist: “in this society, for which the ideologists have proclaimed the ‘end of ideology,’ the false consciousness has become the general consciousness” (110).
Recommended for those who would prefer primary group diversity to a universal levelling of differences, readers who can agree only on trivial and superficial facts, and persons who break the historical continuum of injustice, cruelty, and silence.
Wolff argues that “political tolerance is that state of mind and condition of society which enables a pluralist democracy to function” (4). However, “whatever the virtues of classical liberalism as a theory of the ideal political community, it was very quickly recognized to be inadequate as a portrait of the industrial democracy which emerged in the nineteenth century” (6). Tolerance is defined as “the ungrudging acknowledgement of the right of opposed interests to exist and be pursued” (21). Further: “pluralism is the condition which a modern industrial democracy must possess to function at all, but tolerance is the state of mind which enables it to function well” (23). Permutations and criticisms handled, runs up against the unsurpassable limit: “Pluralism, both as theory and as practice, simply does not acknowledge the possibility of wholesale reorganization of the society. By insisting on the group nature of society, it denies the existence of society-wide interests—save the purely procedural interests in preserving the system” (51). This form of democracy, “with its virtue, tolerance, constitutes the highest stage in the political development of industrial capitalism” (id.). It is “humane, benevolent, accommodating, and far more responsive to the evils of social injustice than either the egoistic liberalism or the traditionalistic conservatism from which it grew. But pluralism is fatally blind to the evils which afflict the entire body politic, and as a theory of society it obstructs consideration of precisely the sorts of thoroughgoing social revisions which may be needed” (52).
Moore argues that “toleration implies the existence of a distinctive procedure for testing ideas, resembling due process in the realm of law” (63). We needn’t accept any particular idea, but tolerance requires their serious consideration. Works through hypotheticals regarding the conflicts of a Marxist & conservative historian (55 ff) as well as waking into the Third Reich (67 ff). Notes that we can’t draw easy distinctions between “violence, dictatorship, and fanaticism” on the one hand and “freedom, constitutionalism, and civil liberties” on the other (74)—the link of “revolutionary violence” is there (id.) (and this should summon the readings of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” in both Derrida’s Force of Law and Agamben’s State of Exception). Ends with the notion that “science is tolerant of reason, relentlessly intolerant of unreason” (79).
Most significantly, Marcuse begins with the premise that “tolerance is an end in itself” (82), part of the suppression of violence, “required for protecting man and animal from cruelty and aggression” as “precondition for the creation of a humane society” (id). We are of course not there yet: “tolerance is extended to policies, conditions, and modes of behavior which should not be tolerated because they are impeding, if not destroying, the chances of creating an existence without fear and misery” (id.)—such as bombing Vietnam, say. “This sort of tolerance strengthens the tyranny of the majority against which authentic liberals protested” (id.). Accordingly, “tolerance toward what is radically evil now appears as good because it serves the cohesion of the whole on the road to affluence” (83). Argues therefore against “indiscriminate tolerance” (Baudelaire is cited for the notion of “destructive tolerance”) (88), as justified in academic debates and required for science and religion—but “society cannot be indiscriminate where the pacification of existence, where freedom and happiness themselves are at stake: here, certain things cannot be said, certain ideas cannot be expressed, certain policies cannot be proposed, certain behavior cannot be permitted without making tolerance an instrument for the continuation of servitude” (88). (He disagrees with the censorship of art in a digression (89).)
He carries the argument to “the telos of tolerance is truth” (90), and reminds the reader that it arises out of doctrinal strife: “of the Albigensians, Waldensians, Lollards, and Hussites” (91): “tolerance is first and foremost for the sake of the heretics.” Noting that “intolerance has delayed progress and has prolonged the slaughter and torture of innocents for hundreds of years,” he asks “does this clinch the case for pure tolerance?” (91). He finds that “the democratic argument for abstract tolerance tends to be invalidated by the invalidation of the democratic process itself” (95), wherein “effective dissent” is blocked by monopolistic practices, Orwellian mechanisms, and so on. “The decision between opposed opinions has been made before the presentation and discussion get under way—made, not by a conspiracy or a sponsor or a publisher, not by any dictatorship, but rather by the normal course of events,’ which is the course of administered events [cf. Agamben], and by the mentality shaped in this course” (97). It’s all somewhat proto-baudrillard:
it is the whole which determines the truth. Then the decision asserts itself, without any open violation of objectivity, in such things as the make-up of a newspaper (with the breaking up of vital information into bits interspersed between extraneous material, irrelevant items, relegating of some radically negative news to an obscure place), in the juxtaposition of gorgeous ads with unmitigated horrors, in the introduction and interruption of the broadcasting of facts by overwhelming commercials. The result is the neutralization of opposites, a neutralization, however, that takes place on the firm grounds of the structural limitation of tolerance (97-98)These “factual barriers which totalitarian democracy [sic] erects against the efficacy of qualitative dissent are weak and pleasant enough compared with the practices of a dictatorship which claims to educate the people in the truth” (99). The democratic tolerance is of course more humane than the dictatorship: “the question is whether this is the only alternative.”
To have that discussion is “to re-examine the issue of violence and the traditional distinction between violent and non-violent action” (102). At a certain point, non-violence transforms dialectically into violence, as with the Indian passive resistance or the general strike (103); “Robespierre’s distinction between the terror of liberty and the terror of despotism, and his moral glorification of the former belongs to the most convincingly condemned aberrations, even if the white terror was more bloody than the red terror." However:
In terms of historical function, there is a difference between revolutionary violence and reactionary violence, between violence practiced by the oppressed and by the oppressors. In terms of ethics, both forms of violence are inhuman and evil—but since when is history made in accordance with ethical standards? To start applying them at the point where the oppressed rebel against the oppressors, the have-nots against the haves is serving the cause of actual violence by weakening the protest against it. (103)He therefore proposes the distinction between true and false tolerance, regressive and progressive tolerance (104 ff). These distinctions can be “made rationally on empirical grounds” (105), such as “it is possible to define the direction in which prevailing institutions, policies, opinions would have to be changed in order to improve the chance of a peace that is not identical to a cold war and a little hot war, and a satisfaction of needs which does not feed on poverty, oppression, and exploitation” (id.). “Suppression of the regressive ones is a prerequisite for the strengthening of the progressive ones” (106). This is based on a logic similar to Horkheimer in The Eclipse of Reason, wherein he laments the dominance of instrumental reason over the objective rationality of ends determination; here Marcuse has his eyes on the motherfucking prize.
Noting the objection that this is a “cancellation of the liberal creed of free and equal discussion” (id.), he concludes that an “impossible consequence” follows: “withdrawal of tolerance from regressive movements, and discriminatory tolerance in favor of progressive tendencies would be tantamount to the ‘official’ promotion of subversion” (107). Notes that violence from below has often pushed civilization forward, citing a number of revolutions and uprisings (108—some may look with downcast eyes upon mention of the Chinese revolution, though I suspect he means 1911). By contrast, “historical violence emanating from among the ruling classes” does not have this relation to progress (id.).
The key is accordingly in a “liberating tolerance,” intolerant to movements from the Right, tolerant to the Left (109). No wonder this text gets cited with derision by exercised Trump-voters and teabaggers and other deplorables. The stakes: “if democratic tolerance had been withdrawn when the future leaders started their campaign, mankind would have had a chance of avoiding Auschwitz” (109). So, yeah, fuck you, deplorables. What we have is a “marketplace of ideas” controlled by a monopolist: “in this society, for which the ideologists have proclaimed the ‘end of ideology,’ the false consciousness has become the general consciousness” (110).
It should be evident by now that the exercise of civil rights by those who don’t have them presupposes the withdrawal of civil rights from those who prevent their exercise, and that liberation of the Damned of the Earth presupposes suppression not only of their old but also of their new masters. (110)The thesis that tolerance should be withdrawn from reactionary ideas is conceded to be “anti-democratic,” but also is a response to “the actual development of the democratic society which has destroyed the basis for universal tolerance […] When tolerance mainly serves the protection and preservation of a repressive society, when it serves to neutralize opposition and to render men immune against other and better forms of life [eidos zoe!], then tolerance has been perverted. (111) Admits that “this is censorship, even pre-censorship, but openly directed against the more or less hidden censorship that permeates the free media” (111) (cf. Chomsky there). Good times.
Recommended for those who would prefer primary group diversity to a universal levelling of differences, readers who can agree only on trivial and superficial facts, and persons who break the historical continuum of injustice, cruelty, and silence.
May 1, 2014
Robert Paul Wolff writes 49 pages about the history of tolerance in the U.S. He argues that the concept has lost its value, as description and prescription, and saves the last page to say that we must overcome this “battleground of competing groups,” move beyond tolerance, and formulate the ideal of the common good.
Barrington Moore has issues about tolerance going too far, so that we end up with ridiculous positions. He believes that the “rational and secular outlook” can tell us when to be tolerant and when tolerance becomes intellectual cowardice and evasion.”
Herbert Marcuse argues that tolerance is a false ideal in a “totalitarian democracy” where it “mainly serves the protection and preservation of a repressive society….” Tolerance is a tool that respects those dissenting perspectives that lie within the “predominant framework of values,” i.e., our representative democracy. Common people are victims in a double sense. They are repressed and they are duped by educational and advertising propaganda. The bottom line is that “tolerance itself serves to contain…change rather than to promote it.” For those oppressed souls who have escaped a duped consciousness, violence is justified, not to “start a new chain of violence but try to break an established one.”
Initially, the “Pure” in the title of this book struck me as overdone and pretentious, but the notion of “pure” does suggest an over openness to any and all values where there’s no right and wrong. The three essays are united in the sense that they all have a problem with that perspective. Whether there’s a valid or workable alternative is a fair question. Also, as a question, to what extent is the notion of tolerance bound up with a ‘do no harm’ line drawn between one individual, group, or belief system and another, i.e., the boundary between what is tolerated and what is not? If so, what constitutes harm?
Barrington Moore has issues about tolerance going too far, so that we end up with ridiculous positions. He believes that the “rational and secular outlook” can tell us when to be tolerant and when tolerance becomes intellectual cowardice and evasion.”
Herbert Marcuse argues that tolerance is a false ideal in a “totalitarian democracy” where it “mainly serves the protection and preservation of a repressive society….” Tolerance is a tool that respects those dissenting perspectives that lie within the “predominant framework of values,” i.e., our representative democracy. Common people are victims in a double sense. They are repressed and they are duped by educational and advertising propaganda. The bottom line is that “tolerance itself serves to contain…change rather than to promote it.” For those oppressed souls who have escaped a duped consciousness, violence is justified, not to “start a new chain of violence but try to break an established one.”
Initially, the “Pure” in the title of this book struck me as overdone and pretentious, but the notion of “pure” does suggest an over openness to any and all values where there’s no right and wrong. The three essays are united in the sense that they all have a problem with that perspective. Whether there’s a valid or workable alternative is a fair question. Also, as a question, to what extent is the notion of tolerance bound up with a ‘do no harm’ line drawn between one individual, group, or belief system and another, i.e., the boundary between what is tolerated and what is not? If so, what constitutes harm?
February 3, 2020
Al di là dei ragionamenti convoluti e del gergo adoperato, l'idea sostenuta è: l'attuale tolleranza favorisce la repressione politica, quindi va eliminata. Ma in sostanza è: più repressione per tutti!
Marcuse arriva poi candidamente a enunciare con chiarezza che la tolleranza va eliminata solo per la destra politica, non certo per la sinistra... come se anche quest'ultima non avesse le sue tendenze totalitarie, esemplificate ad esempio in questo piccolo libretto (piccolo anche in senso lato).
Marcuse arriva poi candidamente a enunciare con chiarezza che la tolleranza va eliminata solo per la destra politica, non certo per la sinistra... come se anche quest'ultima non avesse le sue tendenze totalitarie, esemplificate ad esempio in questo piccolo libretto (piccolo anche in senso lato).
July 4, 2022
great little piece of political theory if you’re into short ruminations on democracy & liberalism
https://francesbeau.tumblr.com/post/6...
https://francesbeau.tumblr.com/post/6...
February 4, 2024
Extremely difficult but remarkably provocative.
October 15, 2024
A DIVERSE SET OF ESSAYS
At the time this book was first published in 1965, Robert Paul Wolff (whose essay in this volume is “Beyond Tolerance”) was a philosophy professor at Columbia University; Barrington Moore Jr. (“Tolerance and the Scientific Outlook”) was a member of the Russian Research Center at Harvard; Herbert Marcuse (“Repressive Tolerance”) was a philosophy professor at UC San Diego.
They jointly wrote in the Foreword, “The first essay is by a philosopher [Wolff] steeped in the analytical tradition, an authority on Kant, and, if interested in social theory and history, allergic to any emanations from the spirit of Hegel. The last essay [by Marcuse] is also by a philosopher, an authority on Hegel, who considers the contemporary analytic tradition dangerous, where it is not nonsense. The author of the middle essay [Moore] is a sociologist trained in a tradition that regarded all philosophy as absurd and dangerous. That we have managed to produce a book together is in itself some small tribute to the spirit of toleration.”
Wolff states in his essay, “the virtue of the modern pluralist democracy which has emerged in contemporary America is TOLERANCE… if we wish to understand tolerance as a political virtue, we must study it not through a psychological or moral investigation of prejudice, but by means of an analysis of the theory and practice of democratic pluralism. My purpose in this essay is to understand the philosophy of tolerance as well as to subject it to criticism… In the second section I explore several possible arguments for tolerance, and try to exhibit the theory of democratic pluralism as the product of a union of opposed conceptions of society and human nature. Only in the final section is the theory subjected to the criticisms which, in my opinion, make it ultimately indefensible in the contemporary age.” (Pg. 4)
Moore begins his essay with the statement, “I this essay I shall try to argue a thesis that once upon a time was taken for granted without much thought about its justification and which nowadays seems a bit old-fashioned and naïve. Very briefly it is that the secular and scientific outlook is adequate for both understanding and evaluating human affairs because it is able in principle, and less frequently in practice, to yield clear-cut answers to important questions… the rational and secular outlook can nerve men for mortal combat when the situation calls for it and prevent them from fighting or simply being foolish when the situation calls for rational discussion or some other behavior. It can tell us when to be tolerant and when tolerance becomes intellectual cowardice and evasion.” (Pg. 54)
Marcuse begins his own essay, “This essay examines the idea of tolerance in our advanced industrial society. The conclusion reached is that the realization of the objective of tolerance would call for intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, opinions, and the extension of tolerance to policies, attitudes, and opinions which are outlawed or suppressed. In other words, today tolerance appears again as what is was in its origins, at the beginning of the modern period---a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notion and practice. Conversely, what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression.” (Pg. 81)
He points out, “These background limitations of tolerance are normally prior to the explicit and judicial limitations as defined by the courts, custom, governments, etc… Within the framework of such a social structure, tolerance can be safely practiced and proclaimed. It is of two kinds: (1) the passive toleration of entrenched and established attitudes and ideas even in their damaging effect on man and nature is evident; and (2) the active, official tolerance granted to the Right as well as to the Left, to movements of aggression as well as to movements of peace, to the party of hate as well as to that of humanity. I call this non-partisan tolerance ‘abstract’ or ‘pure’ inasmuch as it refrains from taking sides---but in doing so it actually protects the already established machinery of discrimination.” (Pg. 85)
He argues, “Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right, and tolerance of movements from the Left… it would extend to the stage of action as well as of discussion and propaganda, of deed as well as of word. The traditional criterion of clear and present danger seems no longer adequate to a stage where the whole society is in the situation of the theater audience when somebody cries ‘fire.’ It is a situation in which total catastrophe could be triggered off any moment… by a rash speech of one of the leaders… if democratic tolerance had been withdrawn when the future [Fascist and Nazi] leaders started their campaign, mankind would have had a chance of avoiding Auschwitz and a World War.” (Pg. 109)
He added in his 1968 Postscript to this essay, “I suggested in ‘Repressive Tolerance’ the practice of discriminating tolerance in an inverse direction, as a means of shifting the balance between Right and Left by restraining the liberty of the Right, thus counteracting the pervasive inequality of freedom… and strengthening the oppressed against the oppressors. Tolerance would be restricted with respect to movements of a demonstrably aggressive or destructive character… Such discrimination would also be applied to movements opposing the extension of social legislation to the poor, weak, disabled.” (Pg. 119-120)
He concludes, “the alternative to the established semi-democratic process is NOT a dictatorship or elite, no matter how intellectual and intelligent, but the struggle for a real democracy. Part of this struggle is the fight against the ideology of tolerance which, in reality, favors and fortifies the conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination. For this struggle, I proposed the practice of discriminating tolerance. To be sure, this practice already presupposes the radical goal which it seeks to achieve. I committed this [begging the question] in order to combat the pernicious ideology that tolerance is already institutionalized in this society. The tolerance which is the life element… of a free society, will never be the gift of the powers that be; it can… only be won in the sustained effort of radical minorities, willing to break this tyranny and to work the for emergence of a free and sovereign majority---minorities intolerant, militantly intolerant and disobedient to the rules of behavior which tolerate destruction and suppression.” (Pg. 123)
This collection of essays is quite uneven; but Marcuse’s provocative essay is alone probably worth the price of the book (whether one agrees with him or not).
At the time this book was first published in 1965, Robert Paul Wolff (whose essay in this volume is “Beyond Tolerance”) was a philosophy professor at Columbia University; Barrington Moore Jr. (“Tolerance and the Scientific Outlook”) was a member of the Russian Research Center at Harvard; Herbert Marcuse (“Repressive Tolerance”) was a philosophy professor at UC San Diego.
They jointly wrote in the Foreword, “The first essay is by a philosopher [Wolff] steeped in the analytical tradition, an authority on Kant, and, if interested in social theory and history, allergic to any emanations from the spirit of Hegel. The last essay [by Marcuse] is also by a philosopher, an authority on Hegel, who considers the contemporary analytic tradition dangerous, where it is not nonsense. The author of the middle essay [Moore] is a sociologist trained in a tradition that regarded all philosophy as absurd and dangerous. That we have managed to produce a book together is in itself some small tribute to the spirit of toleration.”
Wolff states in his essay, “the virtue of the modern pluralist democracy which has emerged in contemporary America is TOLERANCE… if we wish to understand tolerance as a political virtue, we must study it not through a psychological or moral investigation of prejudice, but by means of an analysis of the theory and practice of democratic pluralism. My purpose in this essay is to understand the philosophy of tolerance as well as to subject it to criticism… In the second section I explore several possible arguments for tolerance, and try to exhibit the theory of democratic pluralism as the product of a union of opposed conceptions of society and human nature. Only in the final section is the theory subjected to the criticisms which, in my opinion, make it ultimately indefensible in the contemporary age.” (Pg. 4)
Moore begins his essay with the statement, “I this essay I shall try to argue a thesis that once upon a time was taken for granted without much thought about its justification and which nowadays seems a bit old-fashioned and naïve. Very briefly it is that the secular and scientific outlook is adequate for both understanding and evaluating human affairs because it is able in principle, and less frequently in practice, to yield clear-cut answers to important questions… the rational and secular outlook can nerve men for mortal combat when the situation calls for it and prevent them from fighting or simply being foolish when the situation calls for rational discussion or some other behavior. It can tell us when to be tolerant and when tolerance becomes intellectual cowardice and evasion.” (Pg. 54)
Marcuse begins his own essay, “This essay examines the idea of tolerance in our advanced industrial society. The conclusion reached is that the realization of the objective of tolerance would call for intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, opinions, and the extension of tolerance to policies, attitudes, and opinions which are outlawed or suppressed. In other words, today tolerance appears again as what is was in its origins, at the beginning of the modern period---a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notion and practice. Conversely, what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression.” (Pg. 81)
He points out, “These background limitations of tolerance are normally prior to the explicit and judicial limitations as defined by the courts, custom, governments, etc… Within the framework of such a social structure, tolerance can be safely practiced and proclaimed. It is of two kinds: (1) the passive toleration of entrenched and established attitudes and ideas even in their damaging effect on man and nature is evident; and (2) the active, official tolerance granted to the Right as well as to the Left, to movements of aggression as well as to movements of peace, to the party of hate as well as to that of humanity. I call this non-partisan tolerance ‘abstract’ or ‘pure’ inasmuch as it refrains from taking sides---but in doing so it actually protects the already established machinery of discrimination.” (Pg. 85)
He argues, “Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right, and tolerance of movements from the Left… it would extend to the stage of action as well as of discussion and propaganda, of deed as well as of word. The traditional criterion of clear and present danger seems no longer adequate to a stage where the whole society is in the situation of the theater audience when somebody cries ‘fire.’ It is a situation in which total catastrophe could be triggered off any moment… by a rash speech of one of the leaders… if democratic tolerance had been withdrawn when the future [Fascist and Nazi] leaders started their campaign, mankind would have had a chance of avoiding Auschwitz and a World War.” (Pg. 109)
He added in his 1968 Postscript to this essay, “I suggested in ‘Repressive Tolerance’ the practice of discriminating tolerance in an inverse direction, as a means of shifting the balance between Right and Left by restraining the liberty of the Right, thus counteracting the pervasive inequality of freedom… and strengthening the oppressed against the oppressors. Tolerance would be restricted with respect to movements of a demonstrably aggressive or destructive character… Such discrimination would also be applied to movements opposing the extension of social legislation to the poor, weak, disabled.” (Pg. 119-120)
He concludes, “the alternative to the established semi-democratic process is NOT a dictatorship or elite, no matter how intellectual and intelligent, but the struggle for a real democracy. Part of this struggle is the fight against the ideology of tolerance which, in reality, favors and fortifies the conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination. For this struggle, I proposed the practice of discriminating tolerance. To be sure, this practice already presupposes the radical goal which it seeks to achieve. I committed this [begging the question] in order to combat the pernicious ideology that tolerance is already institutionalized in this society. The tolerance which is the life element… of a free society, will never be the gift of the powers that be; it can… only be won in the sustained effort of radical minorities, willing to break this tyranny and to work the for emergence of a free and sovereign majority---minorities intolerant, militantly intolerant and disobedient to the rules of behavior which tolerate destruction and suppression.” (Pg. 123)
This collection of essays is quite uneven; but Marcuse’s provocative essay is alone probably worth the price of the book (whether one agrees with him or not).
May 11, 2018
Arguments range from unconvincing (Marcuse) to inscrutable (Moore). I read it because I thought Marcuse might be relevant to the campus/online free speech issues that are raging today, but he's not making the same arguments against free speech that current activists do, he's making Marxist ones, which are just not gonna convince the non-Marxists out there.
June 30, 2016
Mixed bag.
November 21, 2018
Provides a compelling and nuanced criticism of the ways a blind acceptance of tolerance can be damaging
May 24, 2020
Der Text hat die 68er Bewegung stark beeinflusst aber es scheint, dass sie Marcuse nicht verstanden haben. Marcuse kritisiert die demokratische Toleranz als selbstzerstörerisch und entwirft eine revolutionäre Toleranz, bei der man auch von intoleranter Toleranz sprechen kann. Seine Toleranz ist an der Aufklärung und der absoluten Wahrheit in Form von Freiheitsverwirklichung gebunden. Eine bedingungslose Toleranz gegenüber rückschrittlichen Bewegungen schließt dies vehement aus. Dennoch verherlichten die 68er Studenten afrikanische Diktatoren solange sie antiimperialistisch waren.
January 9, 2024
first essay was good, last two are relatively simple ideas cloaked in verbose philosophical bullshit.
first essay: an exploration of pluralism vis a vis tolerance, and why we have moved past needing pluralism. i wasnt convinced, but the discussions inspired much thought.
second essay: rational scientific inquiry is superior and we shouldn’t be tolerant to other schools.
third essay: absolute tolerance naturally favors the status quo and, thus, is repressive.
all three profesors are marxists and the explorations don’t go much deeper than the core ideas.
first essay: an exploration of pluralism vis a vis tolerance, and why we have moved past needing pluralism. i wasnt convinced, but the discussions inspired much thought.
second essay: rational scientific inquiry is superior and we shouldn’t be tolerant to other schools.
third essay: absolute tolerance naturally favors the status quo and, thus, is repressive.
all three profesors are marxists and the explorations don’t go much deeper than the core ideas.
February 1, 2024
Dizer o quê? É difícil imaginar um perpetrador infindável de sofismas pior do que Marcuse. Ele não foi simplesmente um autor de quem eu não gosto. Foi um sujeito que eu desprezo com todas as forças da minha alma.
June 7, 2020
Every organizer working for revolutionary change needs to read this book
January 22, 2021
I don't know how to review this. Partly informative, partly dangerous rhetorical shenanigans. Do read it, but reader beware!
January 7, 2022
Essenziell für alle, die mehr als nur den Schein der Dinge sehen wollen
November 28, 2023
The Marcuse essay is by far the most helpful.
November 29, 2021
I have rated this book low because I didn't agree with it. Perhaps readers who are more inclined to the opinions within will see the arguments as compelling. These essays cover issues of great import for today, and there are many cogent viewpoints. It is a slim and quite accessible book; it may be of interest, particularly to young progressives.
July 11, 2021
These three authors are considered some of the fathers of the leftist movement of today, or at least the ideals of the left in our current society - and that's one thing that hits me when reading this book from 1965, that yes, they seem to confine into a status quo of we have it ok but we have to change toward the ideal and then means to go against the ok in order to achieve the ideal. So tolerance is a no-go toward what was and what is, in order to be able to move forward to what will be. Because all of the authors have Marxist roots, we encounter the obsession with things like "class" and "revolution" that everything is seen through. It makes the writing what you would expect, in addition to some amount of philosophical leftist jargon. I will admit that the jargon was less than I expected, as the essays were possible to follow, but sometimes I was lost in words and detours. I did actually enjoy some parts, although I would rather see a better work on tolerance than these three attempts. This was also, admittedly, my first encounter in reading these three authors, so I'm in no way fluent in their thinking to be able to judge them well - but they are definitely names, and voices from the past, I will recognize and maybe look into in the future in order to understand them better and the world they influenced.
March 5, 2015
This didn't age particularly cleanly (that is a number of assumptions about truth & etc. are like not well suited to the sensibilities of the post-post-modern jet set) but i think it has some fundamentally interesting points about the underlying assumptions of pluralist tolerance (admittedly ones that have been done to death). IDK if you wanna scratch yr Marcuse itch and don't want to take up a lot of time, this is certainly an option?
January 20, 2019
I limiti della tolleranza, quando essa diventa strumento per mantenere lo status quo.
La tolleranza presuppone la libertà, ma un pensiero libero senza vera conoscenza non può essere.
L'assoggettamento alla maggioranza non è una garanzia, una male informata può ritenere anche opinioni "cretine" valide.
La tolleranza presuppone la libertà, ma un pensiero libero senza vera conoscenza non può essere.
L'assoggettamento alla maggioranza non è una garanzia, una male informata può ritenere anche opinioni "cretine" valide.
May 12, 2019
Sebbene datato, è ancora in grado di dare risposte, fornire suggerimenti, stuzzicare riflessioni su un argomento che oggi, al ripresentarsi di situazioni e ideologie vergognose, è quanto mai d'attualità.
December 29, 2017
On reread (7ish years later) it's significantly less impressive.
July 31, 2012
Again, this book requires some heavy thinking. Take your time and enjoy the process of thinking.
Read
December 22, 2017yeah great!
i hate neoliberalism and its tenants so ya fuck democracy whatever that is
i hate neoliberalism and its tenants so ya fuck democracy whatever that is
Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews