Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945

by David E. Johnson

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Military History, War, World War II

288 pages, Paperback

First published November 19, 1998

About the author

Political Scientist
Rtd. Colonel, U.S. Army

Reviews

[Katie Hanna · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's all about tanks and bombers, which was . . . boring . . . but it's really well-written and has a good, provocative thesis. So, four stars.

[Mike Kershaw · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a book for guys who like movies...or Sherman Tanks and Flying Fortresses.

Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers by David Johnson. The American GI in World War II had a number of burdens to carry on his shoulders during the European Campaign in particular that are well known if not widely acknowledged. Some of these have even slipped their way into popular culture. In the movie Kelly’s Heroes, ‘Oddball” (Donald Sutherland)*, the tank platoon leader, tries to sell Kelly (Clint Eastwood) on the inclusion of his tank platoon in the mission with the hook that “a platoon of Sherman’s can come in handy”. He then brags that, “…these tanks are the fastest in the European Theatre”. As a skeptical Kelly looks on, he then backtracks a bit acknowledging that all the German tanks they’ve faced have them outgunned. But he continues the sell, adding that they’ve added pipe lengths to their barrels in order to make ‘the Krauts’ think they’re mounting a heavier gun before offering even more outlandish deceptions such as loudspeakers and paint filled main gun rounds. Even the “Big Joe” character (Telly Savalas), the pragmatic and frustrated platoon ‘daddy’, trying to keep his platoon alive and heterosexual, admits to a captured German officer that the only good thing about the rain is that it, “…keeps our air corps from bombing us to he#@!”. Of course, Savalas, a WWII veteran, was probably just channeling his “Sergeant Guffy” character from The Battle of the Bulge (the movie, not the real thing, although more on that later) who had multiple Shermans shot out from under him (okay, so they were really M-24s, bear with me). Could the tanks of the most sophisticated nation in the world have been so poorly designed? Could the bombers of the country that can be said to have pioneered aviation have been so poorly employed? Are these questions we should even bother with today?

In case you might think this is just another “movies for guys who like movies” rant, Colonel (retired) David Johnson in Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers recounts that these fictitious characters are in fact stating the case made by many American Soldiers and journalists in the course of the European campaign. He includes the story of how General Eisenhower became alarmed at reporters spreading stories about the inadequacies of American armor. At the height of the real Battle of the Bulge, in which the American Army will lose some 2,000 tanks Eisenhower tries to head off what he sees as a loss of confidence in American Arms particular (this is also the period he has Private Slovik shot). Since his two most senior ‘armor’ commanders, Patton and Devers, had assured both him and the press of the superiority of American armor (Patton infamously saying his tankers couldn’t wait to take on the Royal Tigers), he queried the 2d and 3d Armor Division Commanders directly, trying to head off this criticism, rationalizing that American Soldiers had to be aware of the difficulty in shipping armor from the United States to the continent and the great capabilities of their systems. Both Division Commanders responses – blunt and unequivocal -- shocked Eisenhower. Major General Maurice Rose, later killed leading the 3d Armored Division in Germany responded with a 5 page memorandum outlining the deficiencies of American Armor; Major General I.D. White, commanding the famed “Hell on Wheels” Division (2d Armored) gave him 70 plus pages (which can be found, for you members of the ‘old corps’ in your “History of Military Technology” Textbook thanks to Major Alphin). Probably realizing at this stage of the campaign, there wasn’t much help coming, they both implore the Supreme Commander to at least tell senior leaders to quit telling everyone how great their tanks are for morale reasons. Colonel (ret) Johnson even quotes from one tank commander who turns the Supreme Commander’s equivocation against him, reminding him that the Tiger had first been encountered in North Africa so the shipping argument was really no excuse. In fact, senior American armor commanders had rejected larger guns and more armor under pressure from the ordnance branch as late as July 1944, misreading the lessons of the war to date. At this late in the campaign there was little Eisenhower could do other than mail the reports straight to Marshall and implore him to accelerate the deployment of the Pershing tank – which, in keeping with our cinematic theme, will show up in time for The Bridge at Remagen – but not much else.

In Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Colonel (ret) David Johnson takes us back to the interwar period to examine two of the biggest shortcomings of the American Army in World War II – the inadequacy of the American Armor force and the flawed doctrine of Strategic Bombing. Any student of the United States role in Europe in World War II will undoubtedly recognize these two facets of our contributions to the Allied effort to defeat Germany -- an opponent we long knew we would face. He starts by recounting the inadequacy of the mobilization for World War I, our dependence on foreign produced equipment and the wartime experience of both the tank and the airplane. He then takes through the inner war period, where conventional wisdom holds that it was a paucity of funding that left America in 1940 almost defenseless and with the 17th largest army in the world. Johnson argues that size WAS NOT what really mattered – it was organization and thinking. The airpower proponents, possessing a commercial advocacy, political sponsorship and achieving a degree of autonomy, fashioned a force unilateral in its focus – with a primary goal of establishing a separate service versus integrating aviation into the national security apparatus. The B-17 “Flying Fortress” typified this goal. Developed somewhat misleadingly as a coastal defense weapon, it was really was fashioned a strategic bomber -- the most iconic representation of what an independent air force wanted to achieve. “The bomber will always get through” was their mantra – a mantra which went down in flames over Schweinfurt and Regensburg in October 1943 when the Luftwaffe inflicted debilitating casualties on the 8th Air Force during the infamous “Big Week” Campaign (see 12 O-Clock High). Johnson’s argument that this single minded focus on strategic bombing as a vehicle to achieve service independence had the concomitant effect of neglecting both the long range fighter and the close air support missions – both of which would be required to defeat both the Luftwaffe and the Germany Army – in order to allow for reentry to the continent and to fulfill our obligations to the total defeat of Nazi Germany. Ground forces, at least to our Soviet allies, still mattered.

Less we think only our winged brethren suffered from this single-minded parochialism, Johnson similarly traces the development of armor during the same period. Despite brief experimentation with ‘mechanization’, between the wars the American Army bureaucratically ‘split the baby’ on the tank, allowing the existing branches – predominantly the Cavalry and the Infantry – to control the development of the weapons system, with effects later to be felt by later generations of American soldiers. This story is familiar from a personal perspective for those familiar with both Patton and Eisenhower’s biographies, but Johnson weaves these personal details within the bureaucracy and institutional culture of the Army, demonstrating, for example, how the ‘polo culture’ (Patton again, and others) contributed to the American Army’s sentimental retention of horsed cavalry – long after both the Germans and Texas Ranchers (as noted by the 1st Cavalry Division Commander) had already ‘mechanized’ their organizations. He also puts in context the flawed Tank Destroyer doctrine and how the American Army ignored lessons which ran against its institutional bias – both in pre-war maneuvers and in early experiences in North Africa. All of these factors will conspire to make ‘Oddball’ remark, when he is finally told that he is to pit his one Sherman against three Tigers which are guarding the bank, “…all I can do is let them shoot holes in me.”

In all seriousness, this is a great book to consider as the Army tries to trace it’s path forward in an era of decreasing budgets, war weariness and competing ‘lessons learned’. Some historians have argued that the real job of the Army is to not get it too wrong in periods between conflicts. We know of other examples from this same period, however, where our military was able to be ‘enough right’ – carrier airpower, amphibious doctrine, etc… that we probably shouldn’t accept such a low standard. Johnson postulates that more manpower and money, given the patterns established by the Army in this period, would have been wasted on maintaining obsolete force structure. We face similar debates today. Perhaps, we should accept that Napoleon’s dictum, that God is on the side of the larger battalions, is a wartime principle only. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers should at least make us think about it.

*Note: For those of you who are annoyed that I felt it necessary to parenthesize the actors who played the characters in Kelly’s Heroes please remember that Kevin Owen’s subscription to all “Movies for Guys Who Like Movies” was suspended when he became a member of The Council for Foreign Relations.

[Charles Inglin · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book evolved from Col. Johnson's doctoral thesis. A very readable account of how the lessons of World War I were interpreted, or misinterpreted, inter-service rivalry and the fight for scarce inter-war budget dollars affected the development of tactics and doctrine for airpower and armored warfare, and how the doctrines that resulted were badly flawed. Not for everyone, but an excellent book for students of military history.

One lesson the War Department (as it was then) drew from the vast expansion of the Army for World War I was the need to maintain a trained cadre to build a future army. Thus, faced with very tight budgets, they opted to spend money to keep up troop strength and skimped on equipment and technology. When the second world war loomed, the Army found itself with largely obsolescent equipment. With then nation leaning towards isolationism, the Navy was seen as the primary means of defense and received the lion's share of funding. Airpower advocates were pushing long range bombers as an adjunct to the fleet, able to intercept enemy ships far out to sea. As a result, funding for development of fighter aircraft and armored vehicles lagged.

Internal War Department politics played a major and somewhat detrimental role. The Army Air Corps was striving to become a separate and equal branch of the service, rather than an arm of the Army. They developed the doctrine of strategic bombing in part to back up their claim. Unlike the Germans, whose doctrine emphasized the role of aircraft as "flying artillery" to support the ground forces, the Army Air Corps believed that heavy bombardment of strategic targets could win wars alone and that close air support of ground troops was a low priority at best and a waste of resources at worst. They went to great effort and sustained heavy losses trying to prove the validity of this doctrine, but as the Strategic Bombing Survey at the end of the war demonstrated, the doctrine itself was fatally flawed. And in one of the supreme ironies of the war, the highest ranking American officer killed in the war, General Leslie McNair, head of Army Ground Forces, died while he was observing the start of an American offensive in Normandy when an American bomber supporting the attack released its bombs too soon and bombed American positions.

The tank was a significant new weapon introduced in the First World War. American involvement in actual combat was comparatively brief and experience with the tank limited. In addition, the early tanks had many flaws. Younger officers like George Patton saw the potential, but many senior officers remained skeptical of their value. In the inter-war years the tank and doctrines for its use suffered from a tug of war between the infantry and the cavalry, and occasionally the artillery. The infantry claimed, and received, jurisdiction over the tank based on its use to support infantry attacks. Official doctrine for tanks long remained as solely an auxiliary to the infantry. In the early '20's Captain Dwight Eisenhower was called on the carpet for writing a heretical paper proposing that with improvements in reliability, speed and firepower the tank would be the primary striking arm, supported by infantry.

For its part, the cavalry was torn between the traditionalists who insisted that horse cavalry was not obsolete and those who wanted to adapt the tank to traditional cavalry roles. Since by law, "tanks" belonged to the infantry, the cavalry experimented with armored vehicles they officially called "combat cars", though they were in fact really just light tanks. Cavalry doctrine emphasized speed over armor and firepower. Between the infantry and cavalry a doctrine developed that tanks were used to exploit breaks in the enemy line, to destroy and disrupt enemy command and control and supplies. There was little thought given to the role of enemy tanks.

Gen. McNair was a noted artilleryman, as well as a notable organizer and administrator. He backed the theory that enemy tanks should be fought by anti-tank guns, which conveniently fell under the purview of the artillery branch. As the army prepared for WWII and McNair assumed control of Army Ground Forces, he supported the development of "tank destroyer units" that were dedicated to defeating the enemy's tanks, allowing American tanks to then operate freely. Again, the flaws in this theory were not recognized until well into the war, when American tanks, reliable and fast, but under armored and under gunned suffered badly when they encountered German Panthers and Tigers.

The take away from all this is that doctrine needs to have a basis in reality and that institutional needs, desires and competing interests need to be examined critically. Especially at a time like this when tax dollars are tight and the alliances between service factions and the defense industry present every program as absolutely critical to national defense

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interestinging guy

who worked at the RAND Corporation


On October 30th 2022, Dr. David E. Johnson, Col U.S. Army (retired), a principal researcher at RAND and a leading intellectual in the field of national defense and military history, passed away following a long illness.

Dave was known as someone who called the shots as he saw them. His deep knowledge of military history provided a perspective to analyze problems and make sound policy recommendations that were valued by the senior decisionmakers in the Army and elsewhere.

As Christine E. Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, told us, “Dave was a friend, a mentor, a caring and generous colleague to so many of us, and was unafraid to speak truth to power.”

As Wormuth also recalled, Dave's love for the Army was evident throughout his basement study, which, “was covered floor to ceiling with books, paraphernalia, paintings, models, and figurines all having to do with the Army throughout history.”

A native of Texas, Dave graduated from Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, in 1972 with a B.A. in history. Upon graduation, he received a Regular commission in the Army, serving in the Infantry, Quartermaster, and Field Artillery branches. As a field artillery officer, he commanded the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery in the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. While in the Army,

Dave obtained a Ph.D. (1990) in history from Duke University; he also graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1994. His Ph.D. dissertation formed the basis of a highly successful military history book, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Innovation in the U.S. Army 1917–1945, published by Cornell University Press in 1998.

Brian Linn, a professor of military history at Texas A&M, recalled “reading “Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers“ for the first time and knowing that I wanted to follow a similar path. When I finally met Dave at the 2015 AUSA convention, after listening to him speak about military affairs, I understood how he was able to write such a brilliant book.”This book was but one of a very long list of articles and book-length works that Dave produced at RAND over the years.

In 1997, after a 24-year career, Dave retired from the Army. The next year, he joined the nonprofit RAND Corporation, in its Northern Virginia office, where he went on to play major roles in countless high-level projects, mostly for the Army, but also for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force.

Dave had leading roles in literally dozens of research projects, many of which involved examining the nature of future military operations and the future strategic environment.

In these projects, Dave was the individual others often turned to. Col Ric Schulz, U.S. Army (ret) recalled meeting Dave in 2019, when Schulz was beginning work on the J7 Joint Warfighting Concept. “Dave immediately demonstrated an intellectual savvy that enabled the team to navigate operationally and politically challenging issues,” Schulz told us, adding that Dave's “counsel was always on the mark.”

Dave was, indeed, a teacher,within RAND and the Army, and from 2010 to 2020, as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, where he taught courses in Grand Strategy. He was also an adjunct scholar, beginning in 2016, at the Modern War Institute at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he continued teaching Grand Strategy, as well as the challenges of military innovation.

As our colleague Mark Hvizda told us, “Dave's uncanny ability in the classroom [was] to pierce through complex subjects and ask the simple, direct questions that others struggled to articulate.” These questions, Hvizda went on, often paired sharp insights “with a sharper humor” and “refreshing humility.”

Over the years, one of Dave's most noteworthy traits was his strong desire to mentor junior staff and subordinates. Whether it was Army officers—from lieutenants to colonels—his students at Georgetown and West Point, or new staff at RAND, Dave took an interest, and devoted considerable time and effort to help.

Dr. Nadia Schadlow, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, recalled how “Dave always read my essays, commented on them, and was a great source of encouragement and wisdom. He was a true intellect—someone who later in his career remained interested in the work of others.” And, Schadlow added, “he remained creative until the very end of his life—which means he was an optimist at heart.

Dave—HR McMaster, U.S. Army (ret), former U.S. National Security Advisor told us—“was an empathetic, wise mentor to me and countless others. He would drop everything when someone needed assistance with a project, or just the sound advice that Dave always provided.”

Our colleague Raphael Cohen put it simply: “When Dave spoke, people listened.”

Dave was also an avid reader who loved to travel, and always appreciated living in the Washington, D.C., area—particularly for all the Civil War battlefields within striking distance. Gettysburg was his favorite and, as is usually the case with military historians, he relished the opportunity to analyze the decisions made amid battle and debate various “what ifs” that might have changed the course of history. For those fortunate enough to visit Dave's home, it was always a great treat to see his huge collection of military models, prints, and memorabilia.

Gen Christopher G. Cavoli, commander U.S. European Command noted that there is “no real way to explain the weight of Dave's loss. Dave was a relentlessly critical thinker. He made everyone around him think better. He woke up every day thinking about how to make the Army better.” His contributions to the U.S. military and the nation put him in a league of his own. His policy recommendations, writings, and the effect he had on the many people he mentored will stand as his legacy for many years to come.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

I enjoyed this book, what really comes out is how service and branch parochialism can hinder progression and innovation. Even more surprising is how senior officers during the interwar period did their best to stifle thought, for example limiting the writing of Eisenhower and Patton. Often, what has been attributed to poor leadership was the results of decisions made a decade earlier on what equipment Soldiers and Airmen will fight with when war arrives.

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

Johnson traces the origins of tanks and planes through their conception to the Shermans and B-17s that fought across the globe during WWII. He shows the constraints and tactical doctrine that was imposed and created based on the assumptions and infighting of the U.S. Army. Tanks suffered and planes flourished because of army culture and bureaucracy.

Why I started this book: Professional reading title and newly found audio... the perfect start for the new year.

Why I finished it: While reading this book, the line "For of all sad words of tongue or pen, The saddest are these: 'It might have been!' in the poem Maud Muller by John Greenleaf Whittier played on repeat in my head. Johnson was very clear about the turf wars in the U.S. Army during the 1920s-1930s and how those effected the development of planes and tanks. And as Hackworth in About Face: Odyssey Of An American Warrior points out, these problems are ongoing from the rifles to the Bradley assault vehicles, everyone has their hand in the till and fingers in the soup.

Read with: Freedom's Forge: How American Business Built the Arsenal of Democracy That Won World War II as it shows that it was mass production not quality that helped the Allies win.

[Stephen Graham · Rating 4 out of 5]

A useful look at the divergent cultures of innovation in the US Army between the wars. While it was a a time of significant technological progress in the civilian world, the Army's experience was divided. Unsurprisingly, aviation was more technologically innovative, with its ties to civilian pursuits and fewer ties to traditional military cliques. Tanks were more beholden to those cliques and suffered for it. Johnson usefully points out that without outside intervention, both tanks and air power suffered from ideological conformity. If you're interested in the operational approach of the US to World War II, this is useful.

[Abigail Kronenberg · Rating 5 out of 5]

A look at the politics and technology surrounding tanks and airplanes during and between the two World Wars. Balanced well between the two technologies and didn't get stuck deep in "rabbit holes."

[Sam Seitz · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a solid, though somewhat dry, treatment of the U.S. Army during the Interwar Period (though it also includes chapters on the world wars). The book focuses primarily on the role that bureaucratic infighting and inertia played in shaping American military doctrine and composition between the world wars. While this occasionally resulted in a level of minutia that even I found tedious, the research in this book is absolutely excellent. The real value of the book is that it offers a much more detailed and precise depiction of how the American Army became so hollowed out after World War One, as it supplements the standard narrative of low budgets and isolationist politicians with a detailed look at the military itself. In particular, Johson highlights how parochial interests and selective interpretations of the lessons of World War One led to a torturously slow transition to modern equipment and tactics. Instead of realizing the true potential of tanks and aircraft, for example, the leadership simply attached them to existing formations, assuming they would do little more than fill auxiliary support roles. These issues were compounded by a leadership largely set in their ways and resistant to change, as they feared it would result in their prized units being replaced. I think that Johnson perhaps oversells his argument a bit. After all, the U.S. was, alongside the British, the only completely mechanized army in World War Two. Moreover, there are compelling reasons to be cautious when introducing completely new equipment and technology (we are seeing this today with UCAS, for example). The book is, nevertheless, excellently sourced and well-argued. While it is a bit technical and somewhat limited in its coverage – it is far from a comprehensive look at interwar military innovation, after all – it is good at what it sets out to achieve.

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

The common belief is that the parasitic inter-war budgets were responsible for the Army's appalling condition at the beginning of World War II. Johnson makes a compelling case that the Army's own internal biases were to blame: resistance to mechanization, belief the bomber will always get through, and failure to develop an integrated land-air battle. The Army clung to these tenets well into 1943 despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary provided by the German Blitzkrieg, the Battle of Britain, and its own experience against the Germans.

[Ari · Rating 3 out of 5]

Focuses on the politics inside the war department about mechanization and aviation. Turns out that the respective histories of the armor and air branches had a lot to do with the bureaucratic maneuvering.

[Lee · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think I read this one earlier, but another time can't hurt. The author is keeping it interesting.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hard to innovate when there's no money. While the tank people went hungry, the Air Corps people really couldn't complain - not that it stopped them.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

Don't love his analysis or the book's structure, but the breadth of archival work is really impressive.