Eleven years before the founding of the People's Republic of China, and ten months into the Japanese invasion of China, Mao's discussion of protracted war provides fascinating historical insights through an original source document discussing the "War of Resistance".
Mao Zedong, also transliterated as Mao Tse-tung, and commonly referred to as Chairman Mao, was a Chinese Communist revolutionary, guerrilla warfare strategist, Marxist political philosopher, statesman and leader of the Chinese Revolution. He was the architect and founding father of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from its establishment in 1949, and held control over the nation until his death in 1976. His theoretical contribution to Marxism–Leninism, along with his military strategies and brand of policies, are collectively known as Maoism.
Mao rose to power by commanding the Long March, forming a Second United Front with Kuomintang (KMT) during the Second Sino-Japanese War to repel a Japanese invasion, and later led the Communist Party of China (CPC) to victory against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's KMT in the Chinese Civil War. Mao established political and military control over most of the territory formerly contained within the Chinese Empire and launched a campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries. He sent the Communist People's Liberation Army into Xinjiang and Tibet but was unable to oust the remnants of the Nationalist Party from Taiwan. He enacted sweeping land reform by using violence and terror to overthrow landlords before seizing their large estates and dividing the land into people's communes. The Communist Party's final victory came after decades of turmoil in China, which included the Great Depression, a brutal invasion by Japan and a protracted civil war. Mao's Communist Party ultimately achieved a measure of stability in China, though Mao's efforts to close China to trade and market commerce, and eradicate traditional Chinese culture, have been largely rejected by his successors.
Mao styled himself "The Great Helmsman" and supporters continue to contend that he was responsible for some positive changes which came to China during his three decade rule. These included doubling the school population, providing universal housing, abolishing unemployment and inflation, increasing health care access, and dramatically raising life expectancy. A cult of personality grew up around Mao, and community dissent was not permitted. His Communist Party still rules in mainland China, retains control of media and education there and officially celebrates his legacy. As a result, Mao is still officially held in high regard by many Chinese as a great political strategist, military mastermind, and savior of the nation. Maoists promote his role as a theorist, statesman, poet, and visionary, and anti-revisionists continue to defend most of his policies.
Soooooooo repetitive. God. Mao was a master strategist when it came to war, and he was damn near instrumental in developing Guerrilla Warfare, but I'll be damned if he doesn't repeat himself at least 3 times on all of his points. There's no doubt that what he was saying is true, because obviously it led to the defeat of imperialist Japan and the rise of Communism in China, but yeah, you get the point.
A major pro here is that Mao writes in a very accessible form; as you go down the line of historically known Communists, the writing style becomes easier to understand. Mao wrote this almost 100 years after the Manifesto was written, and even translated, it is easy to grasp.
A great manual for revolutionary Protracted war. But Mao also made this a very...protracted read.
In 1938, Mao Tse-tung gave this series of lectures of 120 points, advocating for a new strategy against fascist Japan. The Red Army was weak, and the Japanese Imperial forces appeared invincible. In a direct confrontation, Mao convincingly argued, the liberation army would be destroyed. Instead, Mao argued for a protracted guerilla strategy, forcing the Japanese to overextend themselves. It worked.
I only took off a star since Mao repeats the Stalinist slander against Trotsky. It's time to let the past rest: Trots and Maoists can easily agree on the effectivity of PPW in cases when the enemy has every advantage. They have institutions, we have patience.
Introdução "Sobre a Guerra Prolongada" foi escrito em 1938 por Mao Tsé-Tung, em meio à invasão japonesa em larga escala da China. O ensaio oferece uma análise estratégica e política explicando por que a China não poderia obter uma vitória rápida e convencional e, em vez disso, deveria travar uma longa guerra que alavancasse os pontos fortes do país e exaurisse o invasor. Ele enquadra o conflito como uma guerra de desgaste, na qual a persistência, a mobilização popular e as táticas flexíveis são decisivas.
Tese Central Mao Zedong argumenta que a superioridade militar inicial e a vantagem industrial do Japão não podem se traduzir em controle duradouro sem custos políticos e logísticos consideráveis. Ele afirma que a guerra prolongada, ao transformar as fraquezas da China em pontos fortes, pode desgastar os recursos, o moral e a posição internacional do Japão. O cerne da tese é que o tempo, o terreno e as pessoas favorecem um defensor resiliente e paciente.
Estratégia: Da Defensiva à Ofensiva O arco estratégico que Mao delineia vai da defensiva estratégica, passando pelo impasse estratégico, até a ofensiva estratégica. A fase inicial enfatiza a preservação das forças, evitando confrontos convencionais decisivos e utilizando a mobilidade e o terreno para frustrar o atacante. À medida que o inimigo se expande excessivamente e a resistência interna se intensifica, o equilíbrio se desloca para operações de maior escala e, por fim, para ações ofensivas para recuperar território.
Táticas: Guerrilha e Forças Regulares A guerra de guerrilha é elevada de um expediente temporário a um instrumento central de resistência nacional, atuando em conjunto com as forças convencionais quando as condições o permitem. Pequenas unidades móveis atacam as linhas de suprimento, coletam informações e mantêm pressão contínua, enquanto formações maiores engajam-se seletivamente para explorar as fraquezas do inimigo. Essa abordagem dupla busca combinar o alcance político da guerra popular com o efeito militar de campanhas coordenadas.
Mobilização e Organização Política Para Mao Zedong, a vitória militar é inseparável do trabalho político. O sucesso de uma guerra prolongada depende da mobilização dos camponeses, da construção de bases militares e da expansão da influência do partido por todo o campo. A educação política, as promessas de reforma agrária e a governança local são apresentadas como ferramentas para conquistar corações e mentes, garantir suprimentos e isolar colaboradores, transformando o apoio popular em poder logístico e moral sustentável.
Economia e Logística Sustentar uma guerra prolongada exige arranjos econômicos alternativos e logística descentralizada. Mao Zedong enfatiza a autossuficiência, a produção em áreas libertadas e sistemas de suprimentos flexíveis que negam ao invasor alvos fixos. A privação de recursos do inimigo e a constante mudança das bases econômicas são retratadas como maneiras de converter a escassez material em vantagem estratégica.
Frente Única e Diplomacia O ensaio destaca a necessidade de uma ampla frente única nacional para apresentar uma resistência coesa que possa atrair simpatia e assistência internacional. A cooperação com forças não comunistas, organizações de massa e apoiadores estrangeiros é defendida como um meio pragmático de ampliar a base da resistência e garantir ajuda material e diplomática sem abrir mão dos objetivos políticos.
Lições sobre Liderança e Moral A liderança é caracterizada por resistência, adaptabilidade e uma profunda conexão com a população. Mao enfatiza a disciplina, a instrução política e o cultivo da moral como vitais para sustentar campanhas prolongadas. A dimensão moral da resistência, enquadrando a luta como justa e patriótica, é fundamental para manter o compromisso popular ao longo de anos de dificuldades.
Legado e Impacto "Sobre a Guerra Prolongada" tornou-se uma declaração fundamental da doutrina militar revolucionária, influenciando tanto a conduta do movimento comunista chinês durante a Guerra Sino-Japonesa quanto movimentos insurgentes posteriores em todo o mundo. Sua síntese de mobilização política com estratégia militar flexível forneceu um modelo para movimentos que enfrentavam inimigos convencionais mais fortes, e permanece um texto fundamental nos estudos sobre guerra irregular e guerra popular.
PS: O brilhante pensamento estratégico de Mao Zedong!
A estratégia é por vezes categorizada como estratégia de guerra e grande estratégia – uma sendo o domínio dos militares e a outra o domínio dos políticos. Mao lembra-nos que a estratégia militar é impotente sem uma compreensão da grande estratégia. Mao e Clausewitz pareciam concordar neste ponto: a guerra é simplesmente a busca de fins políticos por outros meios. E, portanto, qualquer estratégia de guerra deve inevitavelmente estar ligada a objetivos políticos claros para o sucesso.
Leitura obrigatória!
Este é um livro relativamente curto que todos deveriam ler, mas que a maioria das pessoas nos EUA parece ignorar. Ele explica por que os EUA se envolveram tanto no Vietnã e perderam, provavelmente por que os EUA venceram a Revolução Americana e o potencial problema após as derrotas no Afeganistão e Iraque. A premissa é simples: se você prolongar uma guerra o suficiente, o inimigo se cansará e voltará para casa. Todos os elementos estão presentes, incluindo a dissidência política e a crescente oposição no país de origem do inimigo.
Read On Protracted War by Mao Tse Tung - his theories & strategies for how a non-state actor could strengthen themselves and be victorious against a powerful adversary in a protracted war (i.e. the Sino-Japanese War). Mao led the Chinese communists to victory in a protracted civil war against the Nationalist government of China, and then ruled China. Great read.
Good stuff. Kinda like a big ol' conglomeration of Clausewitz and TE Lawrence. Good handbook if you're going to be doing any guerrilla fighting anytime soon.
Though repetetive on certain topics, I really enjoyed it as a glimpse into both the strategic mind of one of the great communists of history and into the conflict of the time (which I feel is often glossed over and villanized in the west). While the content is specifically oriented towards the Sino-Japanese conflict, many of the topics discussed (such as the problems with the theory of national subjugation) provide important insights into the application of the revolutionary ideas and tactics that are a signiature of Mao. I found his three stages of protracted war to be particularly insightful as their ideas may be easily applied to other, similar situations in different parts of the world.
It's not a particularly enrapturing read, but I feel it is part of what makes a good foundation for revolutionary leftist theory (whether or not you agree with the philosophies specific to Mao). The revolutionary experience in China is one of the most prominent examples of a people's revolt and we must learn from the tactics and strategy
read this for my class on wars of decolonization (class is a slay). this book was super interesting when put in convo with our other readings and ideas, but it is legendarily repetitive LOL. also, this book would benefit hugely from a re-issuing that draws some diagrams and stuff, because a lot of the time he's talking about interior lines and exterior lines and encirclement and a lot of spatial stuff that can make your eyes glaze over.
his writings about mobilizing the whole people to win, about the different kinds of war (mobile, positional, guerrilla), and about the nature of the war against imperialist Japan is helpful since a lot of other anti-colonial strategists and thinkers are responding to him. also, it was interesting to see the material and historical factors that he uses to determine the fundamentals of how the course of the war will go, since it's not like detailed military strategy, it's more political (as he says, politics is war without bloodshed and war is politics with bloodshed).
“It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.”
Not only is Mao a great political theorist, he’s also a great military strategist. “On Protracted War”describes how and why protracted war is conducted. Mao analyzes the conditions in semi-colonial, semi-feudal China against imperialist Japan.
The three stages of protracted war: first stage is the enemy’s offensive and our defensive, second stage is the enemy’s consolidation and our preparation for counter-offensive, third stage is our counter-offensive and enemy’s retreat.
He discusses the role of political mobilizations during the War of Resistance. The function of mobilization is to explain the political aims of the war, build a political program, spread the word through newspapers, flyers, pamphlets, and inform the people of ongoing developments.
Make appropriate judgments and be flexible in war: switch between offensive and defensive, advance and retreat, assault and containment. Differentiate between mobile, guerilla and positional warfare, and understand which are primary or supplementary during the three stages of protracted war. Exploit the enemy’s mistake and grasp strategic opportunities.
This is an outline and blueprint for victory that can be achieved from a small force over a big force, from an inferior force over a superior force. Of course, Mao suggests to amend and discuss this depending on one’s circumstance.
Highly recommend reading this alongside MCDP-1 Warfighting. Mao was saying things in 1938 that align to how we should fight today. Many enduring concepts - flexibility, initiative, decisive action.
No shortage of propaganda as well, but this will help you understand the foundation of much of the eastern communist mindset today.
"History shows that wars are divided into two kinds, just and unjust. All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede progress are unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress, but we do not oppose progressive, just wars. Not only do we Communists not oppose just wars, we actively participate in them."
Certainly something to be read right now as the basis for Imperial Japan’s colonialist war against the united front in China could be seen as eerily similar to the chauvinistic wars of the United States as of late.
I came to Maos book on protracted warfare because I had been told that it “is a textbook on fighting gorilla campaigns which has lasted the test of time”. While the text was well written, and occurs in a fascinating and formative period of world history, I found it to be more PR than informative. In each successive section Mao chooses to reword the same or similar sentiments about Chinas eventual victory over Japan without much in the way of instruction or insight into how that is going to happen. While I’m glad I read it for it’s role in the history of China in the Second World War, I am not sure that I could recommend it others as revealing anything new about the conflict.