Achtung - Panzer!

by Heinz Guderian

A rare, enlightening account by an outstanding soldier reveals his thoughts and theories on armored warfare and motorized land battle--which he then put in action to devastating effect during World War Two. Guderian's treatise on the importance of tank development, and on modern mechanized technology, shows exactly why the Germans dominated land warfare in the early stage of the fighting.

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Military History, World War II, War, Nonfiction, Germany

212 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1937

About the author

Military theorist and innovative General of the German Army during the Second World War.

Guderian is considered to be the brain behind the Blitzkrieg strategy and one of the leading tank warfare tacticians.

After the war, the allies failed to find any war crimes committed by Guderian.

Reviews

[Larry · Rating 3 out of 5]

If ever you find a tank parked in your driveway and suddenly develop a need to invade a small country.. this is the book for you.

[Olethros · Rating 4 out of 5]

-En palabras del propio autor, “narrar el desarrollo del tanque desde el punto de vista del soldado que lo utiliza”.-

Género. Ensayo.

Lo que nos cuenta. Primero, una revisión de la concepción, actividad operativa en el campo de batalla y desarrollo de los tanques durante la Gran Guerra. Después, análisis de las innovaciones técnicas y tácticas del arma blindada (y de sus contramedidas) durante la postguerra. A continuación, una revisión de las fuerzas motorizadas y blindadas alemanas bajo las condiciones del Diktat de Versalles. Por último, exposición de postulados sobre la forma de combate de las tropas blindadas (analizando situaciones reales pasadas), su combinación con otras armas y la valoración de potenciales situaciones contemporáneas al autor.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Olethros · Rating 4 out of 5]

-En palabras del propio autor, “narrar el desarrollo del tanque desde el punto de vista del soldado que lo utiliza”.-

Género. Ensayo.

Lo que nos cuenta. Primero, una revisión de la concepción, actividad operativa en el campo de batalla y desarrollo de los tanques durante la Gran Guerra. Después, análisis de las innovaciones técnicas y tácticas del arma blindada (y de sus contramedidas) durante la postguerra. A continuación, una revisión de las fuerzas motorizadas y blindadas alemanas bajo las condiciones del Diktat de Versalles. Por último, exposición de postulados sobre la forma de combate de las tropas blindadas (analizando situaciones reales pasadas), su combinación con otras armas y la valoración de potenciales situaciones contemporáneas al autor.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Петър Стойков · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ген. Хайнц Гудериан е може би най-успешният танков генерал на Вермахта през Втората световна война, създател на т.н. бърза война (блицкриг, макар че той не я нарича така), основата на която е бързо и агресивно навлизане на самостоятелни танкови части през линиите на противника дълбоко зад неговата бойна позиция.

Благодарение на тази тактика, Германия завладява за отрицателно време половин Европа, но по-интересното в случая е, че Гудериан разработва доктрината на използването на танкови сили в тази книга не само преди да има какъвто и да е опит в ръководството на такива, но и преди изобщо танковете да станат основна част от военните сили на която и да е държава. Така той става първият и основен визионер за това каква роля могат да изпълняват танковите части в модерната война - принципи, които важат и сега.

Книгата е доста скучна, написана с тежък, технически, военен език и на 70% от обема си описва дотогавашната история в развитието на танковете и участието им в битки (което е съвсем малко, предвид че за пръв път за използвани през Първата световна война, а книгата е написана през 30-те), а в останалата - визията си за бъдещото им използване и като цяло за това как би изглеждала една бъдеща, неизбежна (според него, отново визионер или пророк) световна война.

[Erik · Rating 5 out of 5]

I'm not going to go into a grand review here, since this book is covered so well by many others and is a staple for anyone interested in armored warfare. I will say that I did find the book to be very well written and able to get across the virgin ideas of what modern tank warfare would come to look like, commencing just a few years after it was published and still ongoing today in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Guderian's importance in military theory cannot be overstated and should be on the reading list for everyone interested in modern warfare (WW2 to present). It does also provide some insights into WW1 and that is important too.

Easy 5 Stars. There are precious few books written which have a bigger influence on warfare then this one.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

Originally published in 1937, this is a seminal work on Tank warfare, by the Wehrmacht General Heinz Guderian, later to be one of Hitler's tank Generals that would set Europe ablaze. Here (or Heer if you like dad jokes) he is setting out a blueprint for what would become known as Blitzkrieg, the tactics and operational level guidelines for a future war. Most of the book is taken up with his appreciation for the failure to get to a war of movement in WWI, and the Allied development first of tanks themselves and then tank warfare, but it ends with his ideas of how a next war might be fought without allowing stalemates to develop. Christopher Duffy has done the the translation- new in the 1990s- and the British historian Paul Harris gives a good introduction and excellent notes at the end of each chapter- letting the reader know that Guderian is a better General than historian and does get things wrong or misinterpret things, having been on the other side from the Allies in what was then The Great War. It is a really fascinating look at the development of modern warfare from one of the developers themselves-with Harris' notes key to understanding the text more completely.

I have to say that I read this book on the way to - and during a Guided Tour of Belgian Battlefields, so I felt even more in touch with the topic for seeing the scenes of some of the WWI battles he uses as examples- and with the scenes of the war he would fight three years in the future. I especially liked that he did not treat all WWI offensives as stupid moves from remote officers wasting men, but rather explained the tactical situations and planning as being the best ideas current at the time, trying to solve the trench puzzle. Having a soldier who fought in that war explaining the rationale for tactical ideas attempted as if they were the logical next step in the struggle and not as all moronic thoughts tossed at the wall in desperation gives the armies a sense of agency we now seem to deny. When the tank and other mechanical resources became available- they were added to the previous best ideas- and did not replace them. He supports the narrative that the British and French armies DID practice a "Combined Arms" style that we would recognise today in the last few months of the war and DID crack the Kaiser's Army forcing the Germans to sue for peace- and this at the height of Hitlers beloved "stab in the Back" delusion of how the Germans lost that war. It is a fascinating look at European war's past and future- just before the Second War broke out. He does show a sad gullibility in discussing the Fuhrer's plans for synthetic Fuel and synthetic rubber- but the reader will be glad those products were really sort of vapourware then - and would never really wean Nazi Germany off Romanian Oil and other purloined resources.

There are several adult themes but no graphic injury descriptions, so this book might be good for a 12-13 year old Junior Reader-as long as some socio=political guidance is available to discuss passages involving "the Fuhrer" and Guderian's seeming gullibility about his boss. For the Gamer/Modeler/Military Enthusiast, this book can be considered essential reading. WWI gamers get a lot of tactical content, and WWII gamers get the prescient ideas from an Architect of Wehrmacht doctrine. Modelers and Gamers both get a lot of pictures of WWI and between the Wars tanks and other AFVs as well as scenario/Campaign/diorama ideas. The Military Enthusiast gets to listen to one of the prime developers of Panzer Warfare as he sounds out his ideas prior to proving them in WWII. The notes from Harris help to keep the narrative on the central path and further illuminate how these ideas would be expanded in the war to come. A strong package on the development of how we fight now.

[Robert · Rating 5 out of 5]

In 1931, Lieutenant-Colonel Heinz Guderian was named chief of staff to the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops, the center of Germany's work on mobile warfare and armored forces. Guderian was the public advocate while his new boss General major Lutz worked behind the scenes. Guderian reached out to leaders of the Nazi regime to promote the panzer force concept, attract support, and secure resources, including a demonstration for Hitler himself. Lutz persuaded, cajoled, and compensated for Guderian's often arrogant and argumentative behavior. In autumn 1936, Lutz asked Guderian to write a book that promoted the Mobile Troops Command and strategic mechanized warfare. The resulting work was “Achtung! Panzer!”. First published in German in 1937, Guderian’s best-selling book remained in print for much of the war but was only translated into English in 1992 by historian Christopher Duffy. (His memoirs, “Panzer Leader”, appeared in English in 1952). The book opens with a preface from General der Panzertruppen Lutz.
With 10 chapters, each with two to five subheadings, the first 133 pages recount the history of armored warfare from the World War I British and French introduction of tanks, and eventually Germany’s limited adoption of them. Drawing on the information available to him in 1937, Guderian provides a professional military assessment of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of their use during the Great War. He includes 14 maps to illustrate the various battles. In the following sections of the book, he surveys post-Great War developments regarding tanks and tank warfare, technically, tactically, and organizationally. This segment also lays out Guderian’s distillation of Germany’s (and his own) thinking on tank warfare.
Guderian’s analysis of the Great War battles reflects his own thoughts on tactics and especially tactics for mechanized warfare. The evolution of the tank to mounting a single main cannon in a turret capable of 360 movement sets the standard for tank armament – supported by multiple machine guns. He dismisses the Spanish Civil War as fielding too few tanks on any battlefield to offer any serious insights. His most interesting revelation is that the German mechanized force, rather than start with a blank page, adapted the British Army’s 1927 Provisional Instructions on Tank and Armoured Car Training, Part II as its first manual, subsequently modified to reflect Germany’s own lessons, experiences, and thoughts. Guderian freely admitted that the British and French had led the way in armor and tactics at the end of the Great War while Germany neglected to develop either
Each chapter includes endnotes provided by the translator and there is a one page bibliography of works cited by Guderian. This edition includes 40 black and white photographs of tanks of day (1916 to 1937) as well as the classic profile photo of Guderian himself. Unfortunately, the photos and captions are not tied to related points in the text. The imagery and Guderian’s original text clearly rely upon the classic reference work of the day, Taschenbuch der Tanks, by Heigl.
With an admittedly limited focus and only a short vision into the future (because of technology limitations), the book addressed two important questions which would require answering if an army was to be mechanized.
How will the army be supplied with fuel, spares and replacement vehicles?
And how to move large mechanized forces, especially those that are road-bound?
Guderian answered these questions in discussions of three broad areas: refueling; spares parts; and access to roads. He also called for radio receivers in all tanks as well as transmitters in command vehicles (in these pre-transceiver days). One additional point, reflecting both his historical analysis and in his prescripts for the future use of tanks, is the emphasis upon mass – concentrating armor into a major element in either attack or defense (usually by counterattack) rather than scattering and dissipating the power of armor by distributing it amongst and tying it to the infantry.
From our modern perspective, the ideas Guderian presented on how armored units should be organized and how they should fight are not surprising. And even in period, the ideas were all out there but no one had brought so many of them together and helped implement them as early and completely. The lessons of actual combat would offer further developments and tweaks but it’s all pretty much here.
• “we have no desire to impose a rigid tactical framework”
• “most important mission is not infantry support, but to destroy the enemy anti-tank defenses and suppress or blind the enemy artillery” first
• “The tanks will go ahead of the infantry when an extensive tract of open ground has to be traversed before the break-in. When the two sides are in close contact and the terrain favors the attack, the tanks will attack simultaneously with the infantry; the infantry will have to attack under artillery cover ahead of the tanks when we need to overcome initial obstacles – a stretch of river, for example, or barriers or minefields – before the tanks can intervene”
• What was needed was a “modern and fast moving force of infantry possessing strong fire power, and specially equipped, organized and trained in permanent co-operation with tanks”
• “if… rifle units were united permanently with tanks in a single formation, it would form a comradeship of army in time of peace – a comradeship that would prove its worth”
• “Airpower’s role is to “bring the entire depth of the enemy defense under simultaneous attack” and to ‘delay intervention of enemy reserves” road and rail traffic, command centers and the whole communications system…troop accommodations… - paratroops and air-landing forces”
Guderian offers a number of positive references to Hitler and his importance to the panzers, including Hitler’s words about motorization and mechanization at the 1937 Automobile Exhibition. Guderian would later say “The Fuhrer is a man of vision….[who] recognized the enormous significance …of road construction which is massive in scale and carried through on consistent principles….7,000 kilometers of autobahn.” Two and a half pages are dedicated to the “The Versailles Diktat” and how the Germans looked for loopholes. It is also generally known that Guderian was one of the very few generals to repeatedly challenge Hitler’s views and decisions and survive, although it cost him field commands on more than one occasion.
Guderian and his staff surrendered to U.S. forces on 10 May 1945. He answered Allied questions and denied being an ardent supporter of Nazism. He avoided conviction at the Nuremberg Trials because there was no substantial documentary evidence against him at that time, though having joined the U.S. Army Historical Division in 1945, the U.S. refused requests from the Soviet Union to have him extradited.
While interned by the Americans, his conversations were secretly taped. In one such recording, in conversation with Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb and General Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, Guderian said, "The fundamental principles [of Nazism] were fine". Guderian was released from captivity without trial in 1948. He retired to Schwangau near Füssen in Southern Bavaria and began writing. He remained an ardent German nationalist for the rest of his life. He died on May 14, 1954 at the age of 65.
“Achtung! Panzer!” remains an important milestone in the history of the development of armor and mechanized warfare, collecting and presenting principles for their use that still apply today. It is also an important historical work for understanding the thinking and operational art of the German army during the Second World War.

[Dave Clarke · Rating 3 out of 5]

Expecting an autobiographical account, but what I got instead was a call to arms wrapped up in an historical account of thx development of the tank by the allied forces in WW1, its misuse as a weapon of war and the consequences of the German army not developing with tanks or a dedicated anti tank defense … this is of course entirely a surprise of my own making, as I bought a job lot of Cassell military books a while back and never really pay much attention to their subject matter until after I’ve started reading them …

[Alex Ott · Rating 4 out of 5]

Quite good - detailed description of tank's history, and operations during WWI. Second part of the book provides some details about building the new army after WWI, and thoughts about future operations.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book goes in-depth at the transition from the use of Calvary in the First World War to the armored machines of the later war years. Provides many examples as to how different nations prioritized tank use and development in comparison to Germany.

[Stephan Kieft · Rating 4 out of 5]

Omschrijft goed hoe de oorlogsvoering van de 1e wereldoorlog veranderde door de uitvinding van het machinegeweer. Guderian schat heel goed in wat het belang van tanks en bepantserde kolommen zijn in de aankomende 2e wereldoorlog. Zeker lezen als je Blitzkrieg beter wilt begrijpen.

[Justin Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I picked up Achtung-Panzer because Heinz Guderian is often described as the father of the Panzer Division which defined World War II. After spending so much time studying this topic it made sense to read his work directly.

Achtung-Panzer can be summed up as- following the development of machine guns offensive power shifted from the Infantry to Tanks. In order for an offense to be successful Tanks must attack with surprise, en masse, and upon suitable terrain. The objective of such an attack is to establishing a breakthrough of substantial width and depth. In order to achieve such breakthrough all layers of the enemy defense must be attacked simultaneously by leveraging air power and motorized troops.

To support this argument Guderian spent a lot of time analyzing World War I. While this was good background, and makes sense seeing his work was released in 1937, it was a bit much for me.

The highlight was when Guderian described each role within the Panzer Division and the vehicle used to achieve this. This gave so much color to the Panzer division and its evolution over the course of World War II.

If you have a passion for tank doctrine this is a must read. If not Achtung-Panzer might not be for you.

[Readius Maximus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really pulled together the picture in my mind of how the German's were able to smash their opponents on the ground. I just find it so ironic that a country that hardly had any tanks in WWI and was forbidden to have any and was using wooden dummies for practice ended up perfecting tank combat and crushing their opponents.

I also find it ironic that in 1937 Guderian actually has to spend time explaining why cavalry and the days of the bayonet charge are passed... hahaha WWI not enough evidence for ya buddy?

Brief summary:

The machine gun and artillery has neutralized the offensive capabilities of infantry. At their best they can achieve a break-in at a considerably high cost.

In the tank the ground forces find there main offensive strength.

To achieve an effective breakthrough requires: Surprise, en masse, and suitable ground.

Surprise: He argues to forgo any bombardment before the attack unless to cover the engineers as they clear the minefield for anti-tank mines. Assembling in secret and camouflaging units as they move to the assembly area is key.

Attacking en masse requires broad enough front but a deep enough formation. He talk about having 3-4 waves of tanks each with unique objectives. The first line is the strongest and breaks the line and defeats the enemies armored counter attack and pursues the enemies HQ. Second line takes out the anti tank guns the first line missed and the artillery while the third line escorts the infantry in mopping up and expanding the break in. The fourth line is a luxury and is held back for the Command to use as it see's fit.

Ground is obvious, tanks can't attack across swamps or across rivers.

[Christian]

Not bad. Essentially, a tactician's textbook. Written pre-WWII, when tanks were still very much in their infancy. Guderian was ahead of all the leading foreign military "armoured specialists", in the way armour was to be employed in the field, and went on to prove it in Germany's early successes of the war. Reading through some of the theories and strategies could, at times, be a little tedious. Being a history buff, I found the best parts to be the actual recounting of tank battles in WWI, how they failed/succeeded, and what could be learnt from them.

What struck me most about this work is that it was written in a time when tanks were, at least by some, considered secondary to infantry. Tanks had only been used in relateively small numbers during WWI (compared with the actions that were to be seen in the following war), and were introduced later in the war (August, 1916). And these first tanks were slow, prone to mechanical failure, and difficult to handle over rough terrain. Consequently, the interwar years tanks were an untried weapon leading up to the outbreak of WWII, and the "Blitzkrieg" campaigns owed much of their success to (apart from Guderian) these fast, mechanically reliable, versitile machines, and the tank was never doubted again.

[Mike Harbert · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is not for the casual reader of World War II history. Written between the wars, this is Guderian's account of the development of German armored tactics which would later be labeled as "Blitzkreig" For the more serious WWII scholar, Guderian's book is essential reading that should sit beside Rommel's "Infantry Attacks".

[Alex Mader · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have been on something of a 20th century history deep dive this year and have been reading a few choice books on the topic, especially those from around the second world war. The first of these has been Heinz Guderian’s Actung-Panzer! which was written in the inter-war period by Guderian who would later demonstrate the arguments it contains as a high-ranking panzer officer in the Wehrmacht.


Actung Panzer! Is a fascinating discussion and analysis of the origins of the tank in the previous war and puts forward Guderian’s arguments as to how these events can be best understood and used to inform what effective future use of tanks will and should be. What is most striking about the book to me is how often his future predictions appear to be correct from our modern perspective, particularly as they relate to the effective use of tanks and their role in the wider theatre of war.


This leads to the interesting question of how much Guderian’s own influence on the doctrine of the Wehrmacht (which was significant) made his predictions more likely to become a reality. Or put another way, how likely it is that he would have been correct had he not himself had a hand in the making of those ideas into a reality? Thinking more broadly about the originality of ideas in general, is it possible that the arguments Guderian presents here were understood by others at the time (in whole or in part) and he was just the right person at the right time to understand them, write about them, and put them into action – or was there something particularly unique or original about Guderian? In what other areas can we observe similar phenomena?


I think these are perhaps unanswerable questions, but it is interesting to ponder this sort of ‘chicken and egg’ problem when it comes to new technologies (both social and technological) and the maturing process that appears to happen from when they are first used to when they stabilize.


The book itself is well written and clear, containing some stylings or phrases that I found enjoyably nostalgic of mid-century literature. It contains some passages which are difficult to follow without the use of the accompanying maps but is extremely detailed in its description and analysis and was clearly written with a militarily literate audience in mind.


One final idea I want to share is that of audience. After finishing the book the question dawned on me as to who exactly it was published for? Granted it would have originally been published in German for a German audience, it appears odd to me that these ideas would find their way to a commercially available book, rather than an internal document or memo. I do not know the answer to this question, but I wonder if it has anything to do with an effort on Guderian’s part to stimulate the appreciation of tanks outside of his limited departmental reach, at a time when the Wehrmacht was yet to fully mobilize. I also wonder if it was also considered a kind of public relations manoeuvre for the benefit of Guderian’s fame and career. Answers to these questions may be out there, but it is interesting from here to consider how this text came into the fame and availability that it has, especially when what it contains is of niche interest to a general audience (at least to my estimation).


Overall an enjoyable book that provoked a lot of thinking towards a greater understanding of inter-war military theory.

[Darius A. Vesa · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have to admit that it took me two attempts to read the book. Second attempt started 2 weeks ago. The book has to many unfamiliar names and events, especially from WW1 and that's the catch.

Half of the book revolves and studies important battles of WW1, the impact of newly developed arms like gases and the airplane, the importance of artillery and especially the shy appearance of tanks from 1916 to having huge impacts in late 1918.

Besides that, this book should be mandatory reading for everyone who feel lost when dealing with career changes and/or career opportunities. It took Heinz Guderian to research the book ~2 decades and only after 13 years from the first appearance of a tank into a battlefield, in 1929 he actually put his foot inside one.
Still, he was considered the father of modern doctrine of infantry motorization and "mechanization" of army division. Having experience with radio-signal, Guderian pushed that for every tank to have at least one radio receiver, while the tank commander had receiver-transmitter.
In other words, it takes discipline and vision to be able to finish this kind of research, considering that Germany was deprived of tanks due to the Treaty of Versailles. From Signal unit ( telegraph ) to radio-specialist and later staff officer, Guderian managed to research battles, identifying root-cause of attrition, compared types of arms and the reciprocal effect in terms of surprise, logistics and morale. For example: For WW1 battles, he concluded that although tanks have speed to create a breakthrough in defensive lines, infantry must be able to keep up to maintain the newly created front in terms of depth and width in order to negate the defense reserves to react.

From my reading perspective, at the beginning it seemed that I wouldn't be able to understand much, but after 2-3 chapters when historical names became familiar, I had a really pleasure reading it. Arms and guns were much more simpler to digest.

To quote:
"The cavalry had been the third main arm in 1914, and yet by 1918 its useful work had been confined to carrying messages and executing shortrange reconnaissances under the command structure of the infantry divisions."

[Martin Mcginley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Achtung Panzer! by Heinz Guderian is a fascinating and insightful work that remains one of the foundational texts on the development of modern armored warfare. Written by one of the key figures behind the creation of Germany’s Blitzkrieg strategy, Guderian provides a detailed account of the theory and practice of using tanks in combat. His vision of armored forces revolutionized warfare and played a critical role in shaping World War II.

The book is both technical and strategic, offering readers a deep understanding of tank tactics, mobility, and coordination with other military units. Guderian’s firsthand experience as a commander gives the book an authoritative voice, making it a valuable resource for military historians and enthusiasts alike. His writing is clear and methodical, and his explanations of tank deployment and the evolution of mechanized warfare are both thorough and compelling.

However, at times, Achtung Panzer! can feel dense and overly focused on military doctrine, which may be challenging for readers without a strong background in military history. Some sections can also come across as self-congratulatory, as Guderian emphasizes his own role in shaping the future of warfare. Nonetheless, the book provides critical insights into the development of tank warfare and is a must-read for those interested in military strategy and the history of armored combat.

Overall, Achtung Panzer! is a thought-provoking and essential read for anyone interested in the evolution of modern warfare, offering valuable insights from one of its most influential pioneers.

[Jason · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hitler's tank general documents the dawn of armoured warfare. I didn't really know what to expect from this and I was a little concerned it might be impenetrable, or at least very dry. It's certainly going to be interesting only for military buffs and tank fans especially, but it (ie, the translation) is at least readable and it's clear early on where the inspiration for blitzkrieg came from. Detailed accounts of most if not all WW1 tank actions are distilled into one big lesson for tank operations - tanks must attack en-masse with surprise, and must be supported by motorised troops if any gains are to be held. This was not well understood until the very late stages of WW1, and so even the arrival of tanks on the Western Front didn't have the effect it could have - with disastrous consequences both for the casualty figures and also for the progress of armour in general. By 1939 though, Guderian had turned Germany around to the point where it was far ahead of the Allies in the critical new discipline, and the rest, as they say, is history. It's a good job that Hitler hosed his generals so badly, because with experts like Guderian left alone to do their jobs, WW2 would have been very different. I can't recommend this to everyone, but if the title interests you, then the book won't disappoint.

[Batuhan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kitabı çeviren generalimizin dipnotları gayet iyi. Bu kitabın dipnotları terimler sözlüğüne girmeyi hakediyor o derece iyi. Tankları çekmek için kendinden buhar motorlu çekici(Dampfzugmaschine) yani traktörün atası bulunmuş. İngiliz ve Fransızların 1. Dünya Savaşında tanklardan yeterince faydalanamaması, Almanların kimyasal gazları düzgün kullanamaması ve kaçan fırsatlardan çok güzel bahsetmiş. En sonda düşmanın çıkarımları ve bizim çıkaracağımız dersler kısmı çok güzel. Heinz GUDERİAN 1. Dünya Savaşında İngiliz ve Fransızlardan yedikleri darbenin daha şiddetlisini 2. Dünya Savaşında onlara vuruyor. 1. Dünya Savaşında Almanlar, topçuları görerek atış yapmalı ve tanklara önlem almalıydı. İngiliz ve Fransızlar da daha çok tankla baskın yapmalılardı.
"Çok büyük çaplı topların zırh delici etkisi sebebiyle zırhlı gemilerden, tahkimli mevzilerden ve savaş uçağı yapımından vazgeçilmediyse, tanksavar savunmasının güçlenmesinden dolayı tankların anlamını yitirdiği sonucu çıkartılamaz." günümüzde tank çağı bitti diyenlere zamansal bir cevap vermiş. Süvariler asla bitmez! Her tankçının okuması gerekiyor. Kitabın sonundaki şu söz çok güzel "İcra sözden daha önemlidir. Savaş tanrıçası sadece cesur davrananları günün birinde zafer tacı ile ödüllendirir." Tekrardan çeviren generalimiz ve yazar generalin eline sağlık.

[Julio The Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

Consider the fact that during the Russo-German war General Heinz Guderian seized Smolensk, the key city on the road to Moscow, before either Hitler or Stalin thought it was possible. Or, that due to his high reputation he was one of the few German generals who could yell back at Hitler. Why? Guderian was not only the finest tank commander of the European war, pace Rommel and Patton, but also the military genius who designed blitzkrieg before war broke out. What if, Guderian proposed, we used the tank (panzer) not for direct engagement with enemy tanks but to bust holes in the enemy's defenses, then pour in infantry, all covered by air power. Guderian literally reinvented the wheel! ACHTUNG PANZER is that rare book that changes the course of history if it is read and adopted by the right people. In France De Gaulle read it, and even tried to get the French Army to adopt similar tank tactics but to no avail. In 1940 the French found out the cost of not reading the other side's military manuals. As the war in the East turned against Germany Hitler demoted Guderian but never fired him, a fact that allowed him to claim he was apolitical and avoid prosecution at the Nuremberg trials. From Kursk in 1943 to the Sinai in 1973 to Ukraine today tank-to-tank battles are rare precisely because of Guderian's revolution in tactics. Must reading even for those not inclined towards military history.

[Legate of Suvla · Rating 4 out of 5]

Panzerlerin Efendisi Heinz Guderian'ın 2. Dünya Savaşı'nın ayak seslerinin derinden hissedildiği bir dönem de yazdığı eser. Askeri sınıfına yönelik kaleme aldığından ötürü dili biraz ağır. Kitap öncelikle "siper savaşı" olarak adlandırılan 1. Dünya Savaşı'nın batı cephesine odaklandıktan sonra geleceğin savaşlarında zırhlı birliklerin oynayacağı rolün önemine vurgu yapıyor, ki Almanya'da bile ilk planda yazdıkları, özellikle Süravi sınıfından gelen komutanlar tarafından pek de kabul görmüyor. Kitabı esas değerli kılan ise 2. Dünya Savaşı'nda yazarın dediklerin tek tek tek çıkıyor olması, çünkü yazdıklarını 2. Dünya Savaşı'nda tatbik ederek ne kadar ileri görüşlü ve ufku geniş bir komutan olduğunu ortaya koyuyor. Öyle ki, bildiğim kadarıyla farklı bir sınıftan gelmesine rağmen tankların değerini, tankçı subaylardan daha iyi analiz etmiş bir komutandır kendisi.
Kitabın eksi yönlerine gelecek olursak taktik haritalar pek anlaşılır değil, ve ister istemez zırhlı birliklerin önemine vurgu yaparken tekrara düşüyor, bu da bir süre okuyucuyu sıkmakta.

Her zaman derim, bilmeyen adam "Rommel" der, biraz bilen araştırmış adam "Guderian" der, işi bilen adam ise "Von Manstein" der.

[Mike White · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Germany’s decision not to build tanks relieved the enemy Alliance of the need to provide anti-tank defence in the years 1916 to 1918; the Germans on their side underestimated the importance of the new tank weapon in general, which meant that they neglected anti-tank defence. The consequence was that Germany was beaten.”
Published in Germany in 1937, this is a respected Germany officer’s prescription for what the Allies called blitzkrieg when it was used in France in 1940. It begins with descriptions of tank battles 1916-1918 and draws the lessons that could be learned from them. Ground won by tanks was lost, waiting for infantry and cavalry to catch up and exploit the breakthrough, allowing the enemy to regroup and reinforce. Guderian presents a professional, critical appraisal of tank warfare and the current plans of Britain, France and Russia for their armies. He then proceeds to specify what is needed to exploit the advances brought by tanks, mechanised transport and aircraft into a winning army.
Not everyone’s cup of tea, but a fascinating insight into German military thinking prior to the Second World War.

[Keith Gerrard · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good book for any history or war buff. Heinz Guderian writing in 1937 theorizes what he called Total War, and we called Blitzkrieg.
This book is a short but thoughtful book. The author lays out the problem and provides his insight in resolving the mistakes of the past.
When I finished reading I wondered if the enemy ever read the book. Were they prepared or did they wait to be confronted and then try to solve the puzzle.

[Lysergius · Rating 4 out of 5]

An expert's view of Panzer tactics written before the reality of the Blitkrieg. It is all here, the requirements for a successful campaign. n a work characterised by a wealth of common sense Guderian manages to touch on all of the key aspects of tank warfare, such as, the role of the infantry, the engineers, anti-tank defence, air support etc. This is written and presented in a very logical and straight forward style without obfuscation or self aggrandisment. This is a masterwork.

[Alvin Setiawan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Containing tank development start from its first introduction in ww1 to its possible usage for the next war. Some about operational tactics discussed. This book also include several interesting tables such as technical specification of ww1 and interwar period tank and world production share of motor vehicles.

[Stephen Bedard · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book. Not only does it give the German perspective on the First World War, it also provides an insightful overview of the introduction of the tank and the ways it was used by the British and the French. This book has a wider application as a study of how organizations adapt or do not adapt to changing technologies.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a very good book about first, the development of the tank and then its use in the world wars. How major general Heinz Guderian used the German Panzer. But, not only that, he discusses the change from the tank being an infantry support vehicle to being its own separate divisional unit.

[Edu Okada · Rating 5 out of 5]

Unfortunately, this knowledge was used to create horror in Europe, but one cannot deny that this man was a true tactician, anyone who is interested in military history or even business leadership should read this work.

[Robert Hausladen · Rating 5 out of 5]

He was the master

Amazing to read these ideas written so long before they became reality. I was especially impressed by his analysis of the Russian army of that time. It suggests to me that if not for Stalin's officer purge the war may have ended much sooner.