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Sather Classical Lectures
A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought
Where does the notion of free will come from? How and when did it develop, and what did that development involve? In Michael Frede's radically new account of the history of this idea, the notion of a free will emerged from powerful assumptions about the relation between divine providence, correctness of individual choice, and self-enslavement due to incorrect choice. Anchoring his discussion in Stoicism, Frede begins with Aristotle--who, he argues, had no notion of a free will--and ends with Augustine. Frede shows that Augustine, far from originating the idea (as is often claimed), derived most of his thinking about it from the Stoicism developed by Epictetus.
- GenresPhilosophy
224 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
August 4, 2019
In this lecture series, Frede argues that the the first predecessor of our contemporary notion of free will is found in early Stoic philosophy. The ancient Greeks had no concept of will that is related to our notion. Frede argues for this thesis over the first five chapters; the last four chapters are more historical in nature, covering the views of free will of certain proto-Christian or Christian thinkers, who drew on neo-Platonic and neo-Aristotelian philosophy, which drew on Stoicism. This history matters a lot. A bunch of ancient philosophical concepts are now understood to be flawed or plain wrong (i.e., gods or daemons influencing our souls); so we must ask, is free will one of them?
I liked the first three chapters most, which present the most crucial part of the book: the radical contrast between the Stoics' and ancient Greeks' notions of willing. This contrast is due to their fundamentally different conceptions of the mind or soul. While the Greeks held a bi- or tripartite view of the soul (i.e., the soul is composed of appetitive, spirited, and rational components), the Stoics held that the soul is purely rational and unitary.
Different accounts of the nature of action follow from these different conceptions of the mind. Aristotle understood that the non-rational components of the soul are responsible for influencing our immediate experiences, or the impressions that show up to us spontaneously. The possible choices we have, in this world that presents itself, are thus limited by our non-rational faculties (which is shaped by habit and practice over long spans of time, outside the moment of choice). In choosing, we do not exert reason to quash wayward desires and forge our own path (as a way to describe our contemporary notion of free will). There is no notion of an internal willing power here. Aristotle also distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary actions, on the basis of whether there are physical or psychological constraints that would incapacitate any person from carrying out her intentions. There is no notion of an internal willing power here, either.
The Stoic view on action and willing is a striking contrast. This tradition rejected that there is any non-rational aspect of the soul. They held that the human capacity of reason makes it the case that any perception or thought necessarily is preceded by a moment, or pause, in which we (using reason) must necessarily assent to or reject that perception of thought. We can act irrationally because our reason can hold false beliefs about the value of certain objects, so can we assent to impulses that are bad for us.
Here we find the preliminary form of our contemporary notion of free will. The Stoics believe that we always start from some rational position independent of our immediate impulses and surroundings, we are able to evaluate and possibly reject any impulse. And many of us believe that our capacity to choose between options comes from some place independent of the impulses of the moment, and let us be free from these impulses. Many of us, when faced with the story of causal determinism told by 'science', are troubled. The idea of reason as transcendent from circumstances is inconsistent with the idea that everything is contained within the causally determined universe.
Frede does not evaluate whether the Greeks or Stoics are right, or whether our contemporary notion of free will is legitimate. I wish he did. In my view, the Stoic idea is totally wrongheaded, grounded on a false account of our psychology. I think if we think about this enough, it is possible to no longer be troubled by the 'problem of free will'; this is a problem only if we believe in the possibility of some isolated, transcendent faculty of reason. It is difficult to un-condition ourselves of our notion of free will because the assumption of transcendent reason is so deeply implicit within this notion that we have gotten to know the notion of free will without realizing it hinges on that assumption. Now we're so familiarized with this notion, as it appears everywhere not just in western philosophy but in culture at large, that by realizing its flaws we can't help but try to rationalize that it must be true.
I can't rate this book more highly because the second half of it covers various historical details that do not seem to be relevant for understanding the origin of our notion of free will; the contrast between the ancient Greeks and Stoics is sufficient. I wish Frede instead took this second half to evaluate our contemporary notion of free will in light of this history. Also, Frede's writing, although very simple, can also be repetitive or unclear due to vagueness.
I'd still recommend this book to any reader seriously interested in the problem of free will, or who wishes to have skepticism about it. The first half of the book, at least, is certainly worth reading. For a briefer read, which also presents debates between differing accounts of the history of free will, I'd recommend the article "Discovering Will: from Aristotle to Augustine" by Charles Kahn.
I liked the first three chapters most, which present the most crucial part of the book: the radical contrast between the Stoics' and ancient Greeks' notions of willing. This contrast is due to their fundamentally different conceptions of the mind or soul. While the Greeks held a bi- or tripartite view of the soul (i.e., the soul is composed of appetitive, spirited, and rational components), the Stoics held that the soul is purely rational and unitary.
Different accounts of the nature of action follow from these different conceptions of the mind. Aristotle understood that the non-rational components of the soul are responsible for influencing our immediate experiences, or the impressions that show up to us spontaneously. The possible choices we have, in this world that presents itself, are thus limited by our non-rational faculties (which is shaped by habit and practice over long spans of time, outside the moment of choice). In choosing, we do not exert reason to quash wayward desires and forge our own path (as a way to describe our contemporary notion of free will). There is no notion of an internal willing power here. Aristotle also distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary actions, on the basis of whether there are physical or psychological constraints that would incapacitate any person from carrying out her intentions. There is no notion of an internal willing power here, either.
The Stoic view on action and willing is a striking contrast. This tradition rejected that there is any non-rational aspect of the soul. They held that the human capacity of reason makes it the case that any perception or thought necessarily is preceded by a moment, or pause, in which we (using reason) must necessarily assent to or reject that perception of thought. We can act irrationally because our reason can hold false beliefs about the value of certain objects, so can we assent to impulses that are bad for us.
Here we find the preliminary form of our contemporary notion of free will. The Stoics believe that we always start from some rational position independent of our immediate impulses and surroundings, we are able to evaluate and possibly reject any impulse. And many of us believe that our capacity to choose between options comes from some place independent of the impulses of the moment, and let us be free from these impulses. Many of us, when faced with the story of causal determinism told by 'science', are troubled. The idea of reason as transcendent from circumstances is inconsistent with the idea that everything is contained within the causally determined universe.
Frede does not evaluate whether the Greeks or Stoics are right, or whether our contemporary notion of free will is legitimate. I wish he did. In my view, the Stoic idea is totally wrongheaded, grounded on a false account of our psychology. I think if we think about this enough, it is possible to no longer be troubled by the 'problem of free will'; this is a problem only if we believe in the possibility of some isolated, transcendent faculty of reason. It is difficult to un-condition ourselves of our notion of free will because the assumption of transcendent reason is so deeply implicit within this notion that we have gotten to know the notion of free will without realizing it hinges on that assumption. Now we're so familiarized with this notion, as it appears everywhere not just in western philosophy but in culture at large, that by realizing its flaws we can't help but try to rationalize that it must be true.
I can't rate this book more highly because the second half of it covers various historical details that do not seem to be relevant for understanding the origin of our notion of free will; the contrast between the ancient Greeks and Stoics is sufficient. I wish Frede instead took this second half to evaluate our contemporary notion of free will in light of this history. Also, Frede's writing, although very simple, can also be repetitive or unclear due to vagueness.
I'd still recommend this book to any reader seriously interested in the problem of free will, or who wishes to have skepticism about it. The first half of the book, at least, is certainly worth reading. For a briefer read, which also presents debates between differing accounts of the history of free will, I'd recommend the article "Discovering Will: from Aristotle to Augustine" by Charles Kahn.
October 12, 2019
Really significant insights into the Stoic origin of the concept, most of which are in the first 5 chapters. Nevertheless, I absolutely disagreed with his reading of Augustine in the end (I don't believe the author is biblically literate at all). Overall points are still relevant.
April 16, 2022
Beginning with a chapter concerned with Aristotle's conception of "Choice without will," and continuing with chronological explorations of the idea of free will in Stoicism and Platonist schools of thought, the book "A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought" soon delves into the thinkers at the core of this project, Origen, Plotinus, and Augustine. The author of this wonderful book, Michael Frede, was an esteemed academic of some renown; he was also the possessor of a smooth prose style that makes accessible the often difficult to comprehend ideas that were the works of these thinkers of early and late antiquity. This goes a long way to explaining the development of the notion of will, and of freedom of will, from its non-existence in the works of Aristotle and Plato, to the gradual sussing out of it in the later thinkers dealt with in this tome. Professor Frede develops the consistent ties between these thinkers, and also their sometimes-profound dissimilarities, as they all struggled to square the apparent fickleness of fate with the conception that all men, and all souls, were created 'free.' Readers with only a cursory knowledge of the ideas contained in this book, and of philosophy in general, will gain an appreciation of the details of these thinkers' systems and works, for they are present with crystalline clarity amid pellucid and non-opaque prose. By the time the book treats Augustine, whose conception of will, freedom, and the soul is the most despair-ridden of all the thinkers thus treated, one feels as if the ideas are a part of one's intellectual makeup. This is a tribute to the clearness of expression and the rigorousness of thought that is characteristic of the author and his attitude towards his subject. Accessible to the professional and the layman, "A Free Will" does justice to its subject matter, a 'calling card' for any book, let alone one on as obscure a subject as this one.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews