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Berlin 1961
A fresh, controversial, brilliantly written account of one of the epic dramas of the Cold War-and its lessons for today.
"History at its best." -Zbigniew Brzezinski
"Gripping, well researched, and thought-provoking, with many lessons for today." -Henry Kissinger
"Captures the drama [with] the 'You are there' storytelling skills of a journalist and the analytical skills of the political scientist." - General Brent Scowcroft
In June 1961, Nikita Khrushchev called it "the most dangerous place on earth." He knew what he was talking about.
Much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later, but the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was more decisive in shaping the Cold War-and more perilous. For the first time in history, American and Soviet fighting men and tanks stood arrayed against each other, only yards apart. One mistake, one overzealous commander-and the trip wire would be sprung for a war that would go nuclear in a heartbeat. On one side was a young, untested U.S. president still reeling from the Bay of Pigs disaster. On the other, a Soviet premier hemmed in by the Chinese, the East Germans, and hard-liners in his own government. Neither really understood the other, both tried cynically to manipulate events. And so, week by week, the dangers grew.
Based on a wealth of new documents and interviews, filled with fresh- sometimes startling-insights, written with immediacy and drama, Berlin 1961 is a masterly look at key events of the twentieth century, with powerful applications to these early years of the twenty- first.
"History at its best." -Zbigniew Brzezinski
"Gripping, well researched, and thought-provoking, with many lessons for today." -Henry Kissinger
"Captures the drama [with] the 'You are there' storytelling skills of a journalist and the analytical skills of the political scientist." - General Brent Scowcroft
In June 1961, Nikita Khrushchev called it "the most dangerous place on earth." He knew what he was talking about.
Much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later, but the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was more decisive in shaping the Cold War-and more perilous. For the first time in history, American and Soviet fighting men and tanks stood arrayed against each other, only yards apart. One mistake, one overzealous commander-and the trip wire would be sprung for a war that would go nuclear in a heartbeat. On one side was a young, untested U.S. president still reeling from the Bay of Pigs disaster. On the other, a Soviet premier hemmed in by the Chinese, the East Germans, and hard-liners in his own government. Neither really understood the other, both tried cynically to manipulate events. And so, week by week, the dangers grew.
Based on a wealth of new documents and interviews, filled with fresh- sometimes startling-insights, written with immediacy and drama, Berlin 1961 is a masterly look at key events of the twentieth century, with powerful applications to these early years of the twenty- first.
579 pages, Hardcover
First published November 10, 2011
164 people are currently reading
2730 people want to read
About the author
Frederick Kempe
11 books16 followersJournalist and author. Editor and associate publisher of The Wall Street Journal Europe, founding editor of Central European Economic Review.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 220 reviews
October 8, 2015
A fascinating read and a very well researched book, on a high vis potential flashpoint. Brings back the WHY, as why we were getting under our school desks, and neighbors were digging up their backyards. Kennedy had a rough start in his young administration on the foreign affairs front, the first being the Bay of Pigs, the second Berlin. This book goes into fine detail of all the players, on both sides of the Atlantic and of course the epicenter Berlin, that came darn close to starting WWIII.
January 21, 2018
The story of how the newly elected President Kennedy handed the Communist Bloc the initiative in the fate of Berlin, and how the world was set up for a nuclear trip wire the following year.
The book follows Khrushchev, Kennedy, Adenaur and Ulbricht as the latter two continually force the hand of their respective sponsors over the fate of Berlin, and the way the two superpowers handle, or mishandle, the resulting diplomacy.
I thought this was a very good book, filing an important gap in my knowledge and written in a non-partisan manner. I only wish it had been around in the early 90's, when I was studying American Politics of the period. And that just if it had been, I'd have had the sense to read it.
The book follows Khrushchev, Kennedy, Adenaur and Ulbricht as the latter two continually force the hand of their respective sponsors over the fate of Berlin, and the way the two superpowers handle, or mishandle, the resulting diplomacy.
I thought this was a very good book, filing an important gap in my knowledge and written in a non-partisan manner. I only wish it had been around in the early 90's, when I was studying American Politics of the period. And that just if it had been, I'd have had the sense to read it.
July 29, 2017
The Berlin Wall was a symbol, if not the symbol, of all that was wrong with communism. The monstrosity built not to protect its populace, but rather to stem the mass exodus of East Germans, (4 million from 1946-1961), for fairer pastures west. The Wall constructed literally to trap its citizens within and a constant and very physical reminder - until it came down in 1989 – of communist oppression. Growing up and somewhat ignorant of international politics and ideology during the ‘60’s and 70’s, the Berlin Wall was The Iron Curtain for me.
With the release of new materials from the US and Soviet archives the author does an excellent job in providing a detailed narrative of the decision to build and the actual construction of the Wall. Just as critical, Berlin 1961, provides the context behind this infamous historical event. Although most of us seem to remember the partitioning of Berlin as an overnight event, the Wall not only took weeks to build, but was years in the making. Dating back to the end of World War II with the constant emigration from East to West, this outflow of humanity was a chronic communist problem that needed to be “plugged”. Kennedy and Khrushchev were in the international spotlight at the time of the crisis, but behind the scenes East German General Secretary Walter Ulbricht was the “tail wagging the bear”, manipulating the Soviet leader into action as he watched his “dream” of a totalitarian communist Germany drain away. Without Ulbricht it’s difficult to envision The Berlin Wall. (One can only hope Ulbricht now occupies a special place in Hell for his special communist monument.)
I had some issues with the author’s hindsight and analysis of an indecisive President Kennedy. Not even a year into office and reeling after The Bay of Pigs and the Vienna Summit, where he was bullied by Khrushchev, Kennedy was caught flat-footed – to say the least – by the Berlin crisis. Yet it’s difficult to assign him all the blame. The US military, intelligence community and particularly the State Department were all taken by surprise. And although the Western Allies – DeGaulle (France), Macmillan (Great Britain), and Adenauer (“West” Germany) - had “advice” for the new young President, it was JFK’s finger on the proverbial red button, and the associated risk of global nuclear Armageddon. And if one is looking for historical figures who had dismal first years in office, Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill come to mind.
So although Kennedy might have been able to do “more” in stopping the building of The Wall, this hindsight presupposes preparation and the US was woefully unprepared. A non-nuclear military confrontation – especially with Ulbricht behind the scenes – could have quickly escalated into nuclear disaster. (As Brent Scowcroft states in this book’s introduction – “History, sadly, does not reveal its alternatives.”) What should also be taken into account is Kennedy’s 70+ % approval rating at the time, and that past and future Presidents “contained” rather than directly confronted similar Soviet actions – the 1953 and 1956 uprisings in Berlin and Hungary (Eisenhower); Prague Spring in 1968 (LBJ); and the occupation of Poland in 1981 (Reagan). On the other hand I do agree with the author that this Berlin crisis of 1961 set the stage for Cuban Missile Crisis of a year later.
Bottom line though, this is an excellent narrative of a pivotal moment in Cold War history – Highly recommended.
With the release of new materials from the US and Soviet archives the author does an excellent job in providing a detailed narrative of the decision to build and the actual construction of the Wall. Just as critical, Berlin 1961, provides the context behind this infamous historical event. Although most of us seem to remember the partitioning of Berlin as an overnight event, the Wall not only took weeks to build, but was years in the making. Dating back to the end of World War II with the constant emigration from East to West, this outflow of humanity was a chronic communist problem that needed to be “plugged”. Kennedy and Khrushchev were in the international spotlight at the time of the crisis, but behind the scenes East German General Secretary Walter Ulbricht was the “tail wagging the bear”, manipulating the Soviet leader into action as he watched his “dream” of a totalitarian communist Germany drain away. Without Ulbricht it’s difficult to envision The Berlin Wall. (One can only hope Ulbricht now occupies a special place in Hell for his special communist monument.)
I had some issues with the author’s hindsight and analysis of an indecisive President Kennedy. Not even a year into office and reeling after The Bay of Pigs and the Vienna Summit, where he was bullied by Khrushchev, Kennedy was caught flat-footed – to say the least – by the Berlin crisis. Yet it’s difficult to assign him all the blame. The US military, intelligence community and particularly the State Department were all taken by surprise. And although the Western Allies – DeGaulle (France), Macmillan (Great Britain), and Adenauer (“West” Germany) - had “advice” for the new young President, it was JFK’s finger on the proverbial red button, and the associated risk of global nuclear Armageddon. And if one is looking for historical figures who had dismal first years in office, Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill come to mind.
So although Kennedy might have been able to do “more” in stopping the building of The Wall, this hindsight presupposes preparation and the US was woefully unprepared. A non-nuclear military confrontation – especially with Ulbricht behind the scenes – could have quickly escalated into nuclear disaster. (As Brent Scowcroft states in this book’s introduction – “History, sadly, does not reveal its alternatives.”) What should also be taken into account is Kennedy’s 70+ % approval rating at the time, and that past and future Presidents “contained” rather than directly confronted similar Soviet actions – the 1953 and 1956 uprisings in Berlin and Hungary (Eisenhower); Prague Spring in 1968 (LBJ); and the occupation of Poland in 1981 (Reagan). On the other hand I do agree with the author that this Berlin crisis of 1961 set the stage for Cuban Missile Crisis of a year later.
Bottom line though, this is an excellent narrative of a pivotal moment in Cold War history – Highly recommended.
May 24, 2011
I love winning Goodreads Giveaways. Not because I get it for free but because I get it first!
Time it was and what a time it was. It was.
The power and weapons of one country controlled by one man: a bully, a binge drinker, a man who felt it insignificant to detonate millions of people, and a man who felt the political pressure of appearing weak. The power and weapons of another country controlled by one man: an indiscriminate sex addict, juiced on amphetamines, steroids, testosterone, phenobarbital, procaine and hormonal concoctions, with a shallow, theoretical understanding of geopolitics, a man who felt the political pressure of appearing weak. Actors, playing a part. The play was Berlin 1961.
The Berlin created by the defeat of Germany in 1945 was a fundamental mistake. You can't create a country miles away in a conference room, with a pencil, a map and a straight-edge. Divide a country up, on paper no less, and the absurdity should be manifest. Yet, post-bellum Germany was fractured based not on language, ethnicity or heritage, but by political philosophy.
Stupid. Pointless, all of it. And yet, 50 years ago, two leaders, in over their heads, almost blew us up.
There are different ways to tell this tale, like a conductor's 'read' of a well-known score. Frederick Kempe tells this story well, in an almost day by day fashion. I might have given Khrushchev's American tour more comedy and Kennedy's speech at the Berlin Wall more brio. But Kempe got it right in my view. I like his ultimate verdict - that Kennedy's lack of fortitude in Berlin, 1961 went a long way to ensuring the length of the Cold War - better than, say, Beschloss, who thematically insisted on labelling Kennedy bad at crisis avoidance but brilliant at crisis management. History by soundbite.
For all of Kennedy's missteps, however, the guy could give one helluva speech. At the Berlin Wall, he soared. Lasst Sie nacht Berlin kommen.
And that is why, after revisiting that terrifying time, I can say with absolute certainty that I too am a jelly donut.
Time it was and what a time it was. It was.
The power and weapons of one country controlled by one man: a bully, a binge drinker, a man who felt it insignificant to detonate millions of people, and a man who felt the political pressure of appearing weak. The power and weapons of another country controlled by one man: an indiscriminate sex addict, juiced on amphetamines, steroids, testosterone, phenobarbital, procaine and hormonal concoctions, with a shallow, theoretical understanding of geopolitics, a man who felt the political pressure of appearing weak. Actors, playing a part. The play was Berlin 1961.
The Berlin created by the defeat of Germany in 1945 was a fundamental mistake. You can't create a country miles away in a conference room, with a pencil, a map and a straight-edge. Divide a country up, on paper no less, and the absurdity should be manifest. Yet, post-bellum Germany was fractured based not on language, ethnicity or heritage, but by political philosophy.
Stupid. Pointless, all of it. And yet, 50 years ago, two leaders, in over their heads, almost blew us up.
There are different ways to tell this tale, like a conductor's 'read' of a well-known score. Frederick Kempe tells this story well, in an almost day by day fashion. I might have given Khrushchev's American tour more comedy and Kennedy's speech at the Berlin Wall more brio. But Kempe got it right in my view. I like his ultimate verdict - that Kennedy's lack of fortitude in Berlin, 1961 went a long way to ensuring the length of the Cold War - better than, say, Beschloss, who thematically insisted on labelling Kennedy bad at crisis avoidance but brilliant at crisis management. History by soundbite.
For all of Kennedy's missteps, however, the guy could give one helluva speech. At the Berlin Wall, he soared. Lasst Sie nacht Berlin kommen.
And that is why, after revisiting that terrifying time, I can say with absolute certainty that I too am a jelly donut.
December 8, 2020
Много добра и пространна книга, която проследява ден по ден месеците преди и след издигането на Стената, с достъп до много информация и разсекретени американски документи (но не и руски).
Събитията от началото на 60-те са истинска катастрофа, но външнополитическото управление на Кенеди и администрацията му е толкова слабо, че изобщо не проумявам как е поддържал имиджа си на полубожество (очевидно поредната масова психоза). Хрушчов е животно, но Валтер Улбрихт е още по-голямо такова.
Впрочем ей така, от каприз, ще си позволя да направя бегъл паралел между границата в Берлин и границата, която Сърбия прокарва през българските територии в Западните покрайнини. Заслужава си да се знае и тази история...
Събитията от началото на 60-те са истинска катастрофа, но външнополитическото управление на Кенеди и администрацията му е толкова слабо, че изобщо не проумявам как е поддържал имиджа си на полубожество (очевидно поредната масова психоза). Хрушчов е животно, но Валтер Улбрихт е още по-голямо такова.
Впрочем ей така, от каприз, ще си позволя да направя бегъл паралел между границата в Берлин и границата, която Сърбия прокарва през българските територии в Западните покрайнини. Заслужава си да се знае и тази история...
January 11, 2012
Historians of the Cold War have regarded as its worst crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, often citing it as its most significant event. However, in his "Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, And The Most Dangerous Place On Earth", former journalist Frederick Kempe has made a most compelling case instead for the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Berlin Wall's construction in the late summer and early fall of 1961, culminating in a standoff between American and Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie in late October. Kempe has written such an extraordinary work of historical and political science scholarship that this book deserves ample recognition as an instant classic of Cold War history, and one which will be remembered by present and future generations of historians and political scientists. Moreover, Kempe tells such a compelling tale that readers might err in thinking that this is a Len Deighton or John Le Carre novel, not a substantial tome of historical nonfiction. Quoting from General Brent Scowcroft's elegant Introduction, "Fred Kempe's contribution to our crucial understanding of that time is that he combines the "You Are There" storytelling skills of a journalist, the analytical skills of a political scientist, and the historian's use of declassified U.S., Soviet, and German documents to provide unique insight into the forces and individuals behind the construction of the Berlin Wall------the iconic barrier that came to symbolize the Cold War's divisions."
Kempe's book will be regarded by many as provocative, especially to those possessing a favorable view of John F. Kennedy's presidency. If nothing else, "Berlin 1961" is a most damning indictment of Kennedy's woeful inexperience and ignorance with regards to foreign policy; indeed, one could draw unflattering parallels between Kennedy's handling of American foreign policy in 1961, especially with regards to the Soviet Union and its allies, with those of the current President. Relying on recently declassified American, Soviet and German documents, as well as from other sources, Kempe demonstrates how Kennedy misinterpreted initial peaceful overtures from Khrushchev, and then how Kennedy was outwitted by Khrushchev, first at their ill-fated Vienna summit, and then, months later, as the crisis in Berlin pushed the United States and the Soviet Union toward the brink of nuclear war. Moreover, he explains how Kennedy's response to the Berlin Wall's construction was effectively, Kennedy's acquiescence in keeping the status quo, recognizing as permanent, a divided Germany and a Europe divided between the Western NATO democracies and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact totalitarian dictatorships, or rather, as Kempe himself concludes, "What Kennedy could not undo was the Wall that had risen as he passively stood by, which for three decades and perhaps for all of history would remain the iconic image of what unfree systems can impose when free leaders fail to resist." He offers a most gripping portrayal of a Kennedy administration at war with itself, between "doves" and "hawks", between the likes of United States ambassador to the Soviet Union E. Llewellyn "Tommy" Thompson and former United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Equally compelling is Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's strained relationship with East German leader Walter Ulbricht, which demonstrates that it was Ulbricht, not Khrushchev, who was most responsible for the Berlin Wall's construction, having drafted its plans weeks before obtaining the Soviet leader's approval. And yet, readers may regard as most memorable, the graphic accounts of East Berliners who risked death, in their attempts at gaining freedom across the Berlin Wall during its construction.
Kempe's book will be regarded by many as provocative, especially to those possessing a favorable view of John F. Kennedy's presidency. If nothing else, "Berlin 1961" is a most damning indictment of Kennedy's woeful inexperience and ignorance with regards to foreign policy; indeed, one could draw unflattering parallels between Kennedy's handling of American foreign policy in 1961, especially with regards to the Soviet Union and its allies, with those of the current President. Relying on recently declassified American, Soviet and German documents, as well as from other sources, Kempe demonstrates how Kennedy misinterpreted initial peaceful overtures from Khrushchev, and then how Kennedy was outwitted by Khrushchev, first at their ill-fated Vienna summit, and then, months later, as the crisis in Berlin pushed the United States and the Soviet Union toward the brink of nuclear war. Moreover, he explains how Kennedy's response to the Berlin Wall's construction was effectively, Kennedy's acquiescence in keeping the status quo, recognizing as permanent, a divided Germany and a Europe divided between the Western NATO democracies and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact totalitarian dictatorships, or rather, as Kempe himself concludes, "What Kennedy could not undo was the Wall that had risen as he passively stood by, which for three decades and perhaps for all of history would remain the iconic image of what unfree systems can impose when free leaders fail to resist." He offers a most gripping portrayal of a Kennedy administration at war with itself, between "doves" and "hawks", between the likes of United States ambassador to the Soviet Union E. Llewellyn "Tommy" Thompson and former United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Equally compelling is Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's strained relationship with East German leader Walter Ulbricht, which demonstrates that it was Ulbricht, not Khrushchev, who was most responsible for the Berlin Wall's construction, having drafted its plans weeks before obtaining the Soviet leader's approval. And yet, readers may regard as most memorable, the graphic accounts of East Berliners who risked death, in their attempts at gaining freedom across the Berlin Wall during its construction.
May 29, 2011
4.5 stars (out of 5).
The quality I have admired most in President Kennedy was his ability to grow, to learn from his mistakes. This is the story of many of his early mistakes. The source of those mistakes was brilliantly identified by the author as Kennedy not wanting to deal with the problem he had inherited in Berlin (much like President Obama not wanting to deal with the problem he had inherited in the economy), but almost trying to wish it away so he could deal with what he considered more important issues.
Kempe is a fine writer who is not afraid to spice up the narrative with wry, ironic humor from time to time. At times the book is a genuine page turner, particularly those dealing with the construction of the wall and the historic faceoff at Checkpoint Charlie. For the most part, the book is an engrossing, intelligent analysis of the relationships and thinking of the four key players and how the chess game played itself out. The final analysis is a bit disappointing in terms of certain what-ifs, but I do not want to spoil the author's conclusion.
Again I wish Goodreads at a half-star option: this was a 4.5 star book.
The quality I have admired most in President Kennedy was his ability to grow, to learn from his mistakes. This is the story of many of his early mistakes. The source of those mistakes was brilliantly identified by the author as Kennedy not wanting to deal with the problem he had inherited in Berlin (much like President Obama not wanting to deal with the problem he had inherited in the economy), but almost trying to wish it away so he could deal with what he considered more important issues.
Kempe is a fine writer who is not afraid to spice up the narrative with wry, ironic humor from time to time. At times the book is a genuine page turner, particularly those dealing with the construction of the wall and the historic faceoff at Checkpoint Charlie. For the most part, the book is an engrossing, intelligent analysis of the relationships and thinking of the four key players and how the chess game played itself out. The final analysis is a bit disappointing in terms of certain what-ifs, but I do not want to spoil the author's conclusion.
Again I wish Goodreads at a half-star option: this was a 4.5 star book.
June 28, 2021
cold war 🥶����
February 6, 2012
This is an excellent history of not only Berlin's crisis of 1961, but the dance between JFK and Khruschev that had been going on since 1960. The only problem I have is with one of the books two conclusions.
The first conclusion is that JFK's weakness over Berlin led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Absolutely. I don't think Khruschev would have taken the risk without Kennedy's weakness over Berlin and Bay of Pigs.
The second conclusion is a hypothesis that if JFK had stood up to the Soviet Union over Berlin and not allowed the Berlin Wall to become permanent, then perhaps Soviet domination of Eastern Europe would have been cut shorter, maybe by decades. This seems to be an overreach. Considering how brutally the Soviets had already out down uprisings in 1953 and 1956, I can't see their grip loosening over Berlin.
The first conclusion is that JFK's weakness over Berlin led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Absolutely. I don't think Khruschev would have taken the risk without Kennedy's weakness over Berlin and Bay of Pigs.
The second conclusion is a hypothesis that if JFK had stood up to the Soviet Union over Berlin and not allowed the Berlin Wall to become permanent, then perhaps Soviet domination of Eastern Europe would have been cut shorter, maybe by decades. This seems to be an overreach. Considering how brutally the Soviets had already out down uprisings in 1953 and 1956, I can't see their grip loosening over Berlin.
February 5, 2020
Crikey what a book! “Why would anyone write a book about an administration that has nothing to show for itself but a string of disasters?” - President John F. Kennedy, September 22, 1961.
That is how this book starts and that is how it continues from the very first page. The book is a long one (a tome actually), that covers only one year in President John F. Kennedy’s life - the year he was inaugurated-1961. A young, untried President was at the helm of the nation that was and still is the leader of the free world. He was up against a very formidable opponent. This opponent was battle-hardened, a consummate chess player and one who was the head of the Communist world - Nikita Khrushchev. The battle ground is the divided Berlin after the end of World War II. Khrushchev, fully aware of the danger and the powder keg that was Berlin, said over and over, “Berlin is the most dangerous place on earth.” Let me tell you, Kempe spares no punches as he writes in extreme detail about all the happenings in 1961, right from Kennedy’s disastrous Bay of Pigs offensive, through to the Berlin upheaval and the building of the wall and to the Cuban Missile crisis. We get an insider’s look at Kennedy’s and Khrushchev’s political maneuverings, back room dealings. Intelligence reports and an unflinching look at the world’s reaction to all the things that went on in that year. This book is very well-researched and very complex. It’s not for someone who is looking for escapist reading, but it immersed me totally right from the very beginning to the explosive ending. I am sure that I am not the only person in the world who didn’t realize how close we came to a nuclear war in this very alarming and unstable part of world history.The book is a tour-de-force in my opinion, in that it uncovers more than we have ever previously known about the young President Kennedy and his ongoing combative and unstable relationship with Mr. Nikita Khrushchev. At the very end of this book Kennedy makes a long-overdue visit to West Berlin, and on the western side of the wall he made his most memorable speech that he ever made on foreign soil. I will leave you with that.
“There are many people in the world who really don’t understand, or say they don’t understand, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that Communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin. And therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words. — “Ich bin fin, Berliner.” - President John F. Kennedy - West Berlin - June 26, 1963. (Just 3 short months before an assassin’s bullet killed him in Dallas.)
That is how this book starts and that is how it continues from the very first page. The book is a long one (a tome actually), that covers only one year in President John F. Kennedy’s life - the year he was inaugurated-1961. A young, untried President was at the helm of the nation that was and still is the leader of the free world. He was up against a very formidable opponent. This opponent was battle-hardened, a consummate chess player and one who was the head of the Communist world - Nikita Khrushchev. The battle ground is the divided Berlin after the end of World War II. Khrushchev, fully aware of the danger and the powder keg that was Berlin, said over and over, “Berlin is the most dangerous place on earth.” Let me tell you, Kempe spares no punches as he writes in extreme detail about all the happenings in 1961, right from Kennedy’s disastrous Bay of Pigs offensive, through to the Berlin upheaval and the building of the wall and to the Cuban Missile crisis. We get an insider’s look at Kennedy’s and Khrushchev’s political maneuverings, back room dealings. Intelligence reports and an unflinching look at the world’s reaction to all the things that went on in that year. This book is very well-researched and very complex. It’s not for someone who is looking for escapist reading, but it immersed me totally right from the very beginning to the explosive ending. I am sure that I am not the only person in the world who didn’t realize how close we came to a nuclear war in this very alarming and unstable part of world history.The book is a tour-de-force in my opinion, in that it uncovers more than we have ever previously known about the young President Kennedy and his ongoing combative and unstable relationship with Mr. Nikita Khrushchev. At the very end of this book Kennedy makes a long-overdue visit to West Berlin, and on the western side of the wall he made his most memorable speech that he ever made on foreign soil. I will leave you with that.
“There are many people in the world who really don’t understand, or say they don’t understand, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that Communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin. And therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words. — “Ich bin fin, Berliner.” - President John F. Kennedy - West Berlin - June 26, 1963. (Just 3 short months before an assassin’s bullet killed him in Dallas.)
October 5, 2018
Historical writers are masters of getting people to learn without realizing it. By writing historical events as stories, and using amazing first hand accounts these authors can turn something mundane into a page turner. Unfortunately, Berlin 1961 is not one of these books. Berlin 1961, by Frederick Kempe, is a retelling of the events regarding the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the face off between the western and eastern militaries that followed, also known as the Berlin Crisis. This book is rather dull, keeping itself only to quotes by Kennedy and Khrushchev’s opinions of what has going on and only straying slightly from that format. That being said it is an accurate retelling, and it does have its few moments where the book becomes more compelling, such as when talking about the infamous Standoff at Checkpoint Charlie. Overall, the book is decent at best, and awfully boring at its worst. I would only recommend this book to the those who have dedicated their lives to the study of the Cold War, as it will likely be uninteresting otherwise.
This book made me wish that I could learn more about the construction of the Berlin Wall in a more interesting manner. While the topic the book discusses is really complex and interesting, the book dilutes this with repetition and emphasis on quotes. The book often refers to the same thing multiple times, which slows down the progression of the book and makes it dull. The extreme emphasis on quotes in this book has many pages reading as trial manuscripts rather than a first hand account of a historical event. On the other hand the topic of the Berlin Crisis is an amazingly deep rabbit hole of information and first hand anecdotes. Unfortunately, the overuse of these stories and encyclopedia’s worth of information leads to the overarching story grinding to a halt.
This book made me realize that the Berlin Crisis was a much more complex, important, and dangerous situation than I once thought. I used to think it was a step along the way of escalating tension and the Cuban Missile Crisis, but I realize now how important it was. Additionally the Standoff at Checkpoint Charlie brought American soldiers and tanks face to face with their Soviet counterparts, mere feet apart. One wrong move could have meant war, or maybe even the end of the world. The Berlin Wall was a physical structure as much as it was a symbolic one, being a way to divide the world in two. The freedom-loving West versus the evil, Communist East. It marks a split in the world that still has major consequences today.
This book made me wonder about whether or not John F. Kennedy was as uncontroversial as he is portrayed today. This book appears to paint him as very controversial, and often unwelcome among his cabinet. In modern times, Kennedy is often portrayed as an all-American patriot who was loved by all. He is remembered as the President who solved the Cuban Missile Crisis and de-escalated tension in the Cold War, saving us from disaster. In reality, while he did accomplish those things and was a rather popular president, he was more controversial than usually considered today. The Bay of Pigs and other mishaps had his popularity on a steady downward trend towards the unfortunately early ending of his term.
The book, Berlin 1961 made me believe the book’s main claim, that Berlin in 1961 was the most dangerous place on Earth. First, the Soviet Union employed many East German secret police who killed and imprisoned many innocent civilians. Second, the international tension had risen to a point where war could break out at any second, and Berlin was where the two sides met. The place where tension grew to its highest point, Checkpoint Charlie, had a massive face-off between the two militaries where any wrong move could’ve lead to the total annihilation of the American society. On top of that, the governments of both the Soviet Union and the United States were constantly lying, cheating, and trying to spy on each other. This led to a state of constant fear between each other and an uncertainty for the future.
Berlin 1961 made me feel bored throughout my experience reading it. Frederick Kempe’s style of writing tends to be a very slow burn and to me I just didn’t enjoy reading it. Some books get to a point where you just can’t put it down and you may spend hours reading it, but with Berlin 1961, I was constantly finding myself uninterested with its contents. There are many instances where a dozen pages are dedicated to a singular conversation, and the only thing filling those pages is repetition of that conversation. Although that conversation may be important in the grand scheme of things, it isn’t exactly the most fun thing to read. The book often reads more similar to a textbook than a novel by a famous author, and I wasn’t having it.
This book made me see the theme of the Berlin Crisis and the Cold War as a whole. The overall theme displayed by the Cold War is one of trust, communication and their importance. When two former allies lost trust in each other, and began hiding things from each other, it began to spread fear of one another in their governments and their peoples. This mistrust and lack of communication lead to the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the two times humanity had come its closest to extinction. In the end, there was a hotline built between the Kremlin, the main Soviet government building, and the Pentagon, so that they could more easily communicate and peace could be assured.
This book made me hope that there is a chance that in the future that people will learn how to work to together, communicate and make the world a better place. If humanity learned only one thing from the Cold War, it should have been a world of fear is not only worse, but more dangerous than a world of acceptance. If we fear those we don’t know, it will only lead to hatred, which will lead to violence, which could also have been seen in World War Two, and the hate-motivated crimes committed by Germany. Unfortunately, the world never seems to learn its lesson, as these horrible ideals continue to be practiced all over the world. America is no stranger to hate or fear, but after such a close call with the Soviet Union, many would’ve hoped it could have ceased.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 8, 2021
'Berlín 1961' es un libro apasionante que cuenta de manera rigurosa, amplia y pormenorizada los acontecimientos que dieron lugar al levantamiento del Muro de Berlín, muro que fue construido para que los alemanes orientales no pudieran huir del "paraíso" comunista y que provocó el asesinato de centenares de ellos en su intento de recuperar su libertad. Con un estilo cronológico, ágil, muy vivo, saltando de escenario en escenario, más que leer un libro estamos asistiendo a un documental narrado, ya que sus descripciones nos permiten hacernos una idea muy detallada de cada acontecimiento. La descripción de los principales personajes, en especial sus motivaciones y su personalidad, unida a la de otros secundarios o terciarios, incluyendo a las víctimas del terror comunista, da al relato una intensidad que invita a su lectura y reflexionar sobre estos hechos. No es condescendiente con ninguno de ello, algo que agradezco, siendo crítico con todos los que intervinieron, o al menos evitando el halago fácil. Un excelente libro.
July 7, 2025
A riveting and meticulously researched history of the events leading up to the Berlin Crisis of 1961 at Checkpoint Charlie. I really enjoyed Kempe’s character analysis of both Kennedy, indecisive and insecure despite his suave demeanour and Khrushchev, witty and boastful while battling dissenters looking for any reason to oust him. Moral of the story, these two boys really just needed to talk it out. Miscommunications, miscalculations, civilian deaths and the Berlin crisis itself could truly have been prevented if Kennedy gave Khrushchev a call during his bubble bath. Kempe unknowingly makes a convincing argument for female state leadership lol
October 14, 2016
This book does an admirable job in providing an overview of the personalities and conflicts that shaped the creation of the Berlin Wall, but it is less successful at subjecting all involved to a similar level of critical rigour. Kempe paints Kennedy's fears of nuclear armageddon as crippling and emasculating, and there is a fawning appreciation of the more hawkish members of the administration and armed services that I found distasteful. Ultimately I found it unconvincing, but it is certainly well researched and gave me a few things to check out when I visit Berlin!
July 22, 2024
A well-researched and entertaining account of the Berlin Crisis of 1961. This book is not as dry as its title might sound—I had multiple people see me reading this book and say, “Berlin 1961 huh?” in an amused but polite tone that sounded somewhere between “That sounds boring” and “nerd alert!” This book read like a John Le Carre spy thriller to me.
Frederick Kempe lays out the necessary historical background for the building of the Berlin Wall, particularly the “brain drain” as skilled East Germans fled to West Germany and threatened the economic viability of East Germany, but this book focuses its attention on the main players: JFK, Khrushchev, Adenaur, and Ulbright. Kempe puts you into the shoes of each of them, explaining their strengths, flaws, and motivations. This is an excellent look at how diplomacy works (or doesn’t work) in practice on the world stage, where ego, pride, and poor communication can have disastrous consequences.
Kempe is most critical of JFK. He keeps his cards close to his chest until the epilogue where he uses words like “mishandled, amateurish, inconsistency, indecision, inaction, policy failure, alarmist” and other unflattering descriptions of JFK’s first year in office. Kempe is critical but never unfair; JFK himself once showed an admirable bit of self-awareness by telling a writer interested in writing a book on his first term, “Why would anyone want to write a book about an administration that has nothing to show for itself but a string of disasters!” If only JFK could have known how many books there would be on the Trump administration compared to the Obama and Biden administrations. It would have answered his question for him.
In Kempe’s view, JFK’s first mistake was showing “an amateur’s misreading of Khrushchev’s signals” after the Soviets welcomed JFK’s administration with a series of unilateral gestures, like releasing captured U.S. airmen. JFK’s failure to seize this early opportunity for better relations is just one of a series of mistakes Kempe accuses JFK of making during his first year. His most damning accusation is that Kennedy “passively stood by” and accepted the creation of the Berlin Wall as a solution to the Berlin problem. Kempe believes JFK’s “failure to resist” sold out the East Germans and forced them to suffer in an unfree system for 30 + years. Kempe does make a good case that the failures of the Bay of Pigs debacle and the Berlin Crisis helped Kennedy grow and handle the Cuban Missile Crisis more effectively later on.
Kempe hints that if JFK had shown a little more strength in 1961 the Cold War might have ended a little earlier. The brain draught of skilled workers to the West might have bled the Soviets dry and accelerated the collapse. Is that fair? As Brent Scowcroft mentions in his foreword, “History, sadly, does not reveal its alternatives.” JFK made the bet that it was better to accept the unideal solution of a wall over the risk of total war. We will never know whether he was right or wrong, but Kempe’s book makes a persuasive case.
Funny Moments
Kempe has a subtle sense of humor and an excellent eye for character revealing detail. Here are two of my favorite anecdotes:
1. Dean Acheson reassured Harry Truman’s concerns about JFK’s Catholicism—JFK overcoming anti-Catholic bias to win the presidency was a big story at the time—by noting with “knowing understatement” about Kennedy, whose womanizing and infidelities was a poorly kept secret amongst both his allies and opponents, “I don’t think he’s a very good Catholic.”
2. Mao Zedong, a former champion swimmer, tried to humiliate Khrushchev by taking him to an outdoor pool and performing graceful laps around the pool while Khrushchev “floundered in the shallows with the help of a life ring tossed in by some Chinese aides.” Mao later bragged that he had “so tormented Khrushchev it was like “sticking a needle up his ass.” Khrushchev knew he had been set up to look foolish and said, “All the while I was swimming, I was thinking, “The hell with you.”
One of the realizations of this book is that great statesman are just as human, flawed, and capable of acting childish as anyone else.
Frederick Kempe lays out the necessary historical background for the building of the Berlin Wall, particularly the “brain drain” as skilled East Germans fled to West Germany and threatened the economic viability of East Germany, but this book focuses its attention on the main players: JFK, Khrushchev, Adenaur, and Ulbright. Kempe puts you into the shoes of each of them, explaining their strengths, flaws, and motivations. This is an excellent look at how diplomacy works (or doesn’t work) in practice on the world stage, where ego, pride, and poor communication can have disastrous consequences.
Kempe is most critical of JFK. He keeps his cards close to his chest until the epilogue where he uses words like “mishandled, amateurish, inconsistency, indecision, inaction, policy failure, alarmist” and other unflattering descriptions of JFK’s first year in office. Kempe is critical but never unfair; JFK himself once showed an admirable bit of self-awareness by telling a writer interested in writing a book on his first term, “Why would anyone want to write a book about an administration that has nothing to show for itself but a string of disasters!” If only JFK could have known how many books there would be on the Trump administration compared to the Obama and Biden administrations. It would have answered his question for him.
In Kempe’s view, JFK’s first mistake was showing “an amateur’s misreading of Khrushchev’s signals” after the Soviets welcomed JFK’s administration with a series of unilateral gestures, like releasing captured U.S. airmen. JFK’s failure to seize this early opportunity for better relations is just one of a series of mistakes Kempe accuses JFK of making during his first year. His most damning accusation is that Kennedy “passively stood by” and accepted the creation of the Berlin Wall as a solution to the Berlin problem. Kempe believes JFK’s “failure to resist” sold out the East Germans and forced them to suffer in an unfree system for 30 + years. Kempe does make a good case that the failures of the Bay of Pigs debacle and the Berlin Crisis helped Kennedy grow and handle the Cuban Missile Crisis more effectively later on.
Kempe hints that if JFK had shown a little more strength in 1961 the Cold War might have ended a little earlier. The brain draught of skilled workers to the West might have bled the Soviets dry and accelerated the collapse. Is that fair? As Brent Scowcroft mentions in his foreword, “History, sadly, does not reveal its alternatives.” JFK made the bet that it was better to accept the unideal solution of a wall over the risk of total war. We will never know whether he was right or wrong, but Kempe’s book makes a persuasive case.
Funny Moments
Kempe has a subtle sense of humor and an excellent eye for character revealing detail. Here are two of my favorite anecdotes:
1. Dean Acheson reassured Harry Truman’s concerns about JFK’s Catholicism—JFK overcoming anti-Catholic bias to win the presidency was a big story at the time—by noting with “knowing understatement” about Kennedy, whose womanizing and infidelities was a poorly kept secret amongst both his allies and opponents, “I don’t think he’s a very good Catholic.”
2. Mao Zedong, a former champion swimmer, tried to humiliate Khrushchev by taking him to an outdoor pool and performing graceful laps around the pool while Khrushchev “floundered in the shallows with the help of a life ring tossed in by some Chinese aides.” Mao later bragged that he had “so tormented Khrushchev it was like “sticking a needle up his ass.” Khrushchev knew he had been set up to look foolish and said, “All the while I was swimming, I was thinking, “The hell with you.”
One of the realizations of this book is that great statesman are just as human, flawed, and capable of acting childish as anyone else.
January 22, 2024
An utterly fascinating read, and a must for anyone with even a passing interest in the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis is often said to be the moment we came closest to nuclear Armageddon (and with good reason), but Kempe makes a compelling argument that not only was the same true of the Berlin Crisis a year earlier, without Kennedy's failures in Berlin, Khrushchev wouldn't have felt emboldened to test his resolve over Cuba.
This book provides a mind-blowing level of detail on the deterioration in relations between the Kennedy and Khrushchev camps that led to the only military standoff between US and USSR forces in the entirety of the Cold War, as tanks from both sides faced off across Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin.
This book provides a mind-blowing level of detail on the deterioration in relations between the Kennedy and Khrushchev camps that led to the only military standoff between US and USSR forces in the entirety of the Cold War, as tanks from both sides faced off across Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin.
May 8, 2024
Frederick Kempe has a wonderful ability to produce scholarship of the highest order while entertaining the reader. This is a comprehensive review of JFK’s baptism by fire his first year in office revealing a far less assured leader than his image. History as written about JFK commonly captures his greatest perceived success in managing the Cuban missile crisis and catastrophic failure of the Bay of Pigs. The missing element of Berlin’s profound mismanagement in 1961 has been glossed over while the Berlin Wall is portrayed as inevitable in light of the overwhelming Soviet strategic advantages. This book expertly delves into all aspects of the Berlin Wall and profound impact to the resulting destiny of the western nations. This is another book that serves well the ability of people to think critically allowing for the gift of wisdom and discernment of our geopolitical reality.
October 22, 2024
Interesting stuff - Cuban Missile Crisis gets a lot more attention, but this forerunner crisis is often overlooked, and was arguably a lot more tense at times. Very thorough and interesting history of new president JFK and his early spars with Kruschev.
April 9, 2019
A super detailed narrative about how the Berlin's wall was constructed and its influence on the politics between US and USSR. The narrative is easy going and fluid, and if you like bibliography, thirty five percent of this book is that
May 28, 2018
Reads just like a spy thriller!
January 10, 2020
This was one of the most compelling history books I have read. It provides an in-depth look at both sides, U.S. and USSR, to the several crises of 1961 including the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Berline Crisis, and lightly on the Cuban misle crisis. I have a new understanding of JFK's indecisiveness and the mess he created by his inexperience. The number of lives that were lost in 1961 will be a stain on this popular president for all time.
The book was captivating, compelling, and artfully crafted. Kempe allows the reader to climb into the mind of both JFK and Khrushchev. Even though I knew how it was going to turn out, I was delighted to learn all the juicy detail behind this conflict-habituated era.
The book was captivating, compelling, and artfully crafted. Kempe allows the reader to climb into the mind of both JFK and Khrushchev. Even though I knew how it was going to turn out, I was delighted to learn all the juicy detail behind this conflict-habituated era.
May 13, 2011
“Berlin 1961” by Frederick Kempe is a non-fiction book which follows the political turmoil in 1961, a defining year in US-Soviet relationship. Nikita Khrushchev called Berlin "the most dangerous place on earth”, reading this book I found out why.
The book is divided into 3 parts:
Part I: “The Players” – the author introduced Nikita Khrushchev, John F. Kennedy, Walter Ulbricht and Konrad Adenauer. Mr. Kempe brings out their motivations and fear for the drama that is being staged.
Part II: “The Gathering Storm” – After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy’s political clout and respect among world leaders is at a low point, to say the least. Khrushchev sees this as his opportunity to stop the massive exodus from East Germany and closes the border. Kennedy’s admittedly poor performance is on display while he tries to ensure that Khrushchev doesn’t start a nuclear war.
Part III: “The Showdown” – This, for me, was the highlight of the book. The decisions in Moscow which resulted in a stunning border closure and its aftermath.
“Berlin 1961” by Frederick Kempe follows the events that shaped the course of the Cold War. The author juxtaposed between four of the major players — Nikita Khrushchev, John F. Kennedy, East Berlin mayor Walter Ulbricht and West Berlin mayor Konrad Adenauer.
Kennedy and Khrushchev were, to me, the most interesting view points of the book. Khrushchev’s bullying the young President while faking diplomacy should probably be studied in all political science courses. Reading how Nikita Khrushchev danced in diplomatic circles around the inexperienced Kennedy, who was just learning his job at the time was facinating. Kennedy breaking his diplomatic chops on a very serious matter is an aspect which helped him tremendously when it came to other diplomatic breaking points such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Mr. Kempe provides in depth analysis on the intrigue which occurred during 1961 as well as more intimate moments of triumph and anguish on all sides of the political spectrum. For Kennedy, 1961 was a strenuous year. Kennedy described that year as “a string of disasters” starting with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the failed Vienna Summit, the Berlin Wall put under his nose as well as a dangerous tank showdown in Checkpoint Charlie.
I found it fascinating that Kennedy, for all intents and purposes, allowed Khrushchev to construct the wall as long as he did not disrupt West Berlin or access to Freedom.
Of course, the wall did both.
Mr. Kempe argues that one of the most significant outcomes of 1961 was the perceived weakness Khrushchev found in Kennedy. That weakness prompted him to place missiles in Cuba thinking the young President would cave as he did in Berlin.
This is a fascinating book which brings historic figures to life. I am always fascinated by how decisions in the upper echelons of power are being made, for me books like this are a gold mine.
For more book reviews and bookish posts please visit http://www.ManOfLaBook.com
The book is divided into 3 parts:
Part I: “The Players” – the author introduced Nikita Khrushchev, John F. Kennedy, Walter Ulbricht and Konrad Adenauer. Mr. Kempe brings out their motivations and fear for the drama that is being staged.
Part II: “The Gathering Storm” – After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy’s political clout and respect among world leaders is at a low point, to say the least. Khrushchev sees this as his opportunity to stop the massive exodus from East Germany and closes the border. Kennedy’s admittedly poor performance is on display while he tries to ensure that Khrushchev doesn’t start a nuclear war.
Part III: “The Showdown” – This, for me, was the highlight of the book. The decisions in Moscow which resulted in a stunning border closure and its aftermath.
“Berlin 1961” by Frederick Kempe follows the events that shaped the course of the Cold War. The author juxtaposed between four of the major players — Nikita Khrushchev, John F. Kennedy, East Berlin mayor Walter Ulbricht and West Berlin mayor Konrad Adenauer.
Kennedy and Khrushchev were, to me, the most interesting view points of the book. Khrushchev’s bullying the young President while faking diplomacy should probably be studied in all political science courses. Reading how Nikita Khrushchev danced in diplomatic circles around the inexperienced Kennedy, who was just learning his job at the time was facinating. Kennedy breaking his diplomatic chops on a very serious matter is an aspect which helped him tremendously when it came to other diplomatic breaking points such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Mr. Kempe provides in depth analysis on the intrigue which occurred during 1961 as well as more intimate moments of triumph and anguish on all sides of the political spectrum. For Kennedy, 1961 was a strenuous year. Kennedy described that year as “a string of disasters” starting with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the failed Vienna Summit, the Berlin Wall put under his nose as well as a dangerous tank showdown in Checkpoint Charlie.
I found it fascinating that Kennedy, for all intents and purposes, allowed Khrushchev to construct the wall as long as he did not disrupt West Berlin or access to Freedom.
Of course, the wall did both.
Mr. Kempe argues that one of the most significant outcomes of 1961 was the perceived weakness Khrushchev found in Kennedy. That weakness prompted him to place missiles in Cuba thinking the young President would cave as he did in Berlin.
This is a fascinating book which brings historic figures to life. I am always fascinated by how decisions in the upper echelons of power are being made, for me books like this are a gold mine.
For more book reviews and bookish posts please visit http://www.ManOfLaBook.com
July 27, 2014
I am consistently surprised and switched on at all the “inside baseball” histories written recently about events we studied in high school history class. Usually it’s a British historian who accessed some archives that were off-limits during the Cold War and it usually reveals that things were a lot more complicated than we were led to believe in that high school textbook. Kempe, however, is an American, an award-winning journalist (e.g., Wall Street Journal), and now President of a foreign policy think tank in DC. What he has accomplished with “Berlin 1961” is superlative. First of all, the book elucidates the fact that the principal players on both sides of Checkpoint Charlie did NOT get along all that well, and all of them were practicing realpolitik as the tanks squared off and the Wall sprang up. Khrushchev, Mao, and Ulbricht, for instance, were not the monolithic Red alliance, and each of them was working for the perceived best interests of his respective nation, subtly and often at the expense of the others. MacMillan in London, De Gaulle in Paris, Adenauer in Bonn, and Brandt in Berlin itself were also doing so while repeatedly ruminating on what NATO membership entails in the face of the book’s looming Cold War crisis. The book tees up the “13 Days” movie nicely, as Kempe discusses the back-channel work Bobby Kennedy was conducting via a Soviet journalist/intel officer from the Embassy in DC as well as the tension between the Joint Chiefs and JFK’s top civilian advisors (to include retired General Lucius Clay, whom President Kennedy sent back to Berlin and who complicated the entire situation by inserting himself into a complex military chain of command). The more I read about President Kennedy himself, though, the more complex the picture. Like the book’s principal topic and the other world leaders involved, JFK was far more complex than Camelot and “Profiles in Courage”, and Kempe effectively describes that. I think this book is worth reading, especially in light of current European events, and—again—I think it provides an essential understanding for any objective look at the Cuban Missile Crisis (my personal favorite is “One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War” by Michael Dobbs) or the Berlin Airlift (i.e., “The Candy Bombers” by Andrei Cherny). Recommend.
August 9, 2016
Slow and overwrought.
And the fixation on dinging/damaging Kennedy is weird and forced. I understand the need to have a "thesis" for something like this, but once Kempe drops his--which is basically that Kennedy was a disaster and could have ended the Soviet Union in 1961 without firing a shot--it becomes hard to trust his reporting or sense of scope on other matters.
Mr. Kempe makes a big stink about a suggestion, made after the fact, that the U.S. could have bowled the wall over with tanks when construction began. This would have caused, in Mr. Kempe's mind, the Soviets to just back down, and eventually agree to reunification. Given Khrushchev's obsession with Berlin, that seems like a stretch. Obviously there's no saying what ripple effect a more direct confrontation in Berlin would have had, but Mr. Kempe's fantasy that the Soviets would have wet themselves and backed off seems pretty unlikely. And the alternative, just as likely if not more, was pretty damned devastating. Both the U.S. and USSR were convinced that the time might come, any day, for a preemptive nuclear strike. Kennedy was presented plans for either (a) a massive strike on Russia, killing 100 million, and STILL leaving some potential for the USSR to wipe out Paris; or (b) a lesser strike, killing 1 million or so, with far higher odds of a full on nuclear war.
Mr. Kempe wants us to think that Berlin was THE turning point, that it emboldened Khrushchev to put missiles in Cuba, and allowed the communist bloc to stay afloat by ending the refugee problem with the GDR. But his reporting undermines that. If anything, Berlin seems more like a necessary cog in the process--Khrushchev treated Berlin as the whole ballgame, was hellbent on fixing the refugee problem, and all of his allies/political pressure points were pushing him towards MORE provocation; Kennedy wasn't sure Berlin was worth starting a world war, most of his allies agreed, and those that didn't expected the U.S. to bear the entire brunt of any action. Given that wild imbalance of incentives, it is not hard to see why things played out the way they did (and why Kennedy did show sufficient "backbone" when the incentive on his end was upped significantly a year later in Cuba).
And the fixation on dinging/damaging Kennedy is weird and forced. I understand the need to have a "thesis" for something like this, but once Kempe drops his--which is basically that Kennedy was a disaster and could have ended the Soviet Union in 1961 without firing a shot--it becomes hard to trust his reporting or sense of scope on other matters.
Mr. Kempe makes a big stink about a suggestion, made after the fact, that the U.S. could have bowled the wall over with tanks when construction began. This would have caused, in Mr. Kempe's mind, the Soviets to just back down, and eventually agree to reunification. Given Khrushchev's obsession with Berlin, that seems like a stretch. Obviously there's no saying what ripple effect a more direct confrontation in Berlin would have had, but Mr. Kempe's fantasy that the Soviets would have wet themselves and backed off seems pretty unlikely. And the alternative, just as likely if not more, was pretty damned devastating. Both the U.S. and USSR were convinced that the time might come, any day, for a preemptive nuclear strike. Kennedy was presented plans for either (a) a massive strike on Russia, killing 100 million, and STILL leaving some potential for the USSR to wipe out Paris; or (b) a lesser strike, killing 1 million or so, with far higher odds of a full on nuclear war.
Mr. Kempe wants us to think that Berlin was THE turning point, that it emboldened Khrushchev to put missiles in Cuba, and allowed the communist bloc to stay afloat by ending the refugee problem with the GDR. But his reporting undermines that. If anything, Berlin seems more like a necessary cog in the process--Khrushchev treated Berlin as the whole ballgame, was hellbent on fixing the refugee problem, and all of his allies/political pressure points were pushing him towards MORE provocation; Kennedy wasn't sure Berlin was worth starting a world war, most of his allies agreed, and those that didn't expected the U.S. to bear the entire brunt of any action. Given that wild imbalance of incentives, it is not hard to see why things played out the way they did (and why Kennedy did show sufficient "backbone" when the incentive on his end was upped significantly a year later in Cuba).
June 21, 2011
I'll open this review with an admission of my ignorance. I had no idea Berlin was located so deep in East Germany. In my head, my whole life, Berlin sat on the border and the wall reflected that larger border.
So to find out (and probably not for the first time, but this was the first time it stuck) that Berlin was a strange island. So then I kept thinking of the Vienna of The Third Man and wondering how many other places were so strangely divided.
Oh, the Cold War. Such an odd moment in history.
Because most of the historical lessons of this book were new to me, I cannot speak with assurance on its accuracy or fairness. Kempe does not think highly of Kennedy's handling on 1961 and, in reading this account, I'm amazed that history has been so kind to him (though he apparently redeemed himself in 1962)
My take-away is simple; politics is filled with regular people acting poorly, misreading each other, gossiping, manipulating, lying, redefining truth and posturing. It's like junior high but with a lot more at stake.
So to find out (and probably not for the first time, but this was the first time it stuck) that Berlin was a strange island. So then I kept thinking of the Vienna of The Third Man and wondering how many other places were so strangely divided.
Oh, the Cold War. Such an odd moment in history.
Because most of the historical lessons of this book were new to me, I cannot speak with assurance on its accuracy or fairness. Kempe does not think highly of Kennedy's handling on 1961 and, in reading this account, I'm amazed that history has been so kind to him (though he apparently redeemed himself in 1962)
My take-away is simple; politics is filled with regular people acting poorly, misreading each other, gossiping, manipulating, lying, redefining truth and posturing. It's like junior high but with a lot more at stake.
September 5, 2012
A missed opportunity on many levels. The Berlin wall and all of the events that surround its creation are fascinating, but, strangely, not particularly momentus. The Vienna summit is an event and the wall going up is another explosive moment, but the rest is diplomacy and Kempe is not well enough equipped to give that much dramatic shape or momentum. Kempe's attempt to weave in the personal stories of German citizens whose lives were affected by the Wall is admirable, but it's done in a somewhat haphazard and peripheral way -- the human element is not compellingly intergarted into the story. Kempe's relentless Kennedy-bashing is tiresome, too, and ends up coming off as a personal/ideological grudge that, ultimately, made me distrust the general tenor of the book. Some interesting information, and the section dealing with the actual construction of the wall is fascinating, but ultimately a story that will hopefully be better told by someone else.
Currently reading
May 30, 2011“Berlin 1961” is a new book by Frederick Kempe that dramatically recounts fascinating cold war events that occurred in my youth and which I am recalling now, in this reading, via a series of “I-remember-that!” moments (a particular delight to this sexagenarian who can only remember where she parks her car by parking it always in the same spot). Kempe was more than 25 years with The Wall Street Journal as Berlin bureau chief and editor of the WSJ Europe edition, his previous books including “Father/Land: A Personal Search for the New Germany.”
August 14, 2014
This is a well-written account of 1961, which most must agree was a year that Kennedy had a rough time in. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight the author indicates what he believes were errors Kennedy made, and even Kennedy's admirers, of which I confess I am one, must agree that history shows it was not a good year for Kennedy--though whether it was as dire as Kempe indicates other historians may not agree. I found the book unfailingly excitng reading and well-written, dismaying as some of it is.
January 30, 2020
Very fast-paced and well-written. The book begins with an overview of the main characters and quickly gains steam in that fateful month of August, 1961. Before reading this book, I had a broad understanding of the Cold War. The Berlin crisis presented in this book put some of the missing pieces together. The book, perhaps most importantly, weaves the underlying comparison between a free, capitalist society and an enslaved, communist one into the tapestry of the narrative rather poignantly. Excellent read!
June 20, 2011
Frederick Kempe has a keen journalistic eye. He relates the political turmoil in Berlin in 1961, where Khrushchev called Berlin "the most dangerous place on earth." This book is very well researched with lots of info and insights into the decisions taken in shaping the Cold War. Berlin was a tale of two cities and the author includes some great photos.
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