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Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
This second edition of the Oxford Handbook of Free Wil l is intended to be a sourcebook and guide to current work on free will and related subjects. Its focus is on writings of the past forty years, in which there has been a resurgence of interest in traditional issues about the freedom of the will in the light of new developments in the sciences, philosophy and humanistic studies. Special attention is given to research on free will of the first decade of the twenty-first century since the publication of the first edition of the Handbook. All the essays have been newly written or rewritten for this volume. In addition, there are new essayists and essays surveying topics that have become prominent in debates about free will in the past decade, including new work on the relation of free will to physics, the neurosciences, cognitive science, psychology and empirical philosophy, new versions of traditional views (compatibilist, incompatibilist, libertarian, etc.) and new views (e.g.,
revisionism) that have emerged. The twenty-eight essays by prominent international scholars and younger scholars cover a host of free will related issues, such as moral agency and responsibility, accountability and blameworthiness in ethics, autonomy, coercion and control in social theory, criminal liability, responsibility and punishment in legal theory, issues about the relation of mind to body, consciousness and the nature of action in philosophy of mind and the cognitive and neurosciences, questions about divine foreknowledge, providence and human freedom in philosophy of religion, and general metaphysical questions about necessity and possibility, determinism, time and chance, quantum reality, causation and explanation.
revisionism) that have emerged. The twenty-eight essays by prominent international scholars and younger scholars cover a host of free will related issues, such as moral agency and responsibility, accountability and blameworthiness in ethics, autonomy, coercion and control in social theory, criminal liability, responsibility and punishment in legal theory, issues about the relation of mind to body, consciousness and the nature of action in philosophy of mind and the cognitive and neurosciences, questions about divine foreknowledge, providence and human freedom in philosophy of religion, and general metaphysical questions about necessity and possibility, determinism, time and chance, quantum reality, causation and explanation.
672 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2001
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
April 19, 2008
Excellent resource. A must have for all those interested in the metaphysics of free will and issues of moral responsibility. The contributors are the best of contemporary philosophers working in the relevant fields today. This book will not disappoint.
June 16, 2020
A remarkably readable book, covering the full breadth of arguments on free will. This is a really great sourcebook, comprised of 20-some essays examining the problem of free will from many different angles. Kane writes a beautiful opening chapter, summarizing the overall shape of the arguments on this topic, and the book is helpfully divided into grouped sections - physics and determinism, Frankfurt type thought experiments, the consequence argument, Compatibilism, Libertarianism, neuroscience, and several more. While I didn't find all of the arguments to be equally helpful - I skipped all of the analytical logic chapters, as well as the fairly abstract libertarianism chapters - the essays are mostly written in a plain, convincing style. The essayists argue with one another in a readable fashion, and with plenty of helpful examples.
Out of all of these essays, the one that most resonated with me was from the "Nonstandard Views" chapter, where there really is quite a potpourri of different perspectives. In "Living without Free Will", Derk Pereboom makes an excellent argument for why his take of hard incompatibilism is true, free will is a myth, and why life is still very much worth living. On the other hand, Ted Honderich's essay "Determinism as True" seems almost intentionally provocative for physicists in particular:
"The first thing to be noted of these supposed quantum events ... is that there is no experimental evidence in a standard sense that there are any. ... In that very long time in science ... there has been no direct and univocal experimental evidence of the existence of quantum event"
Honderich does go on to try to define "events" in a twisty, philosophical way, but it feels like he is being needlessly provocative here, no? In general, however, the book does seem to take many QM theories seriously. There is, after all, a chapter in this sourcebook titled "Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will", which sounds like proper r/iamverysmart material.
Out of all of these essays, the one that most resonated with me was from the "Nonstandard Views" chapter, where there really is quite a potpourri of different perspectives. In "Living without Free Will", Derk Pereboom makes an excellent argument for why his take of hard incompatibilism is true, free will is a myth, and why life is still very much worth living. On the other hand, Ted Honderich's essay "Determinism as True" seems almost intentionally provocative for physicists in particular:
"The first thing to be noted of these supposed quantum events ... is that there is no experimental evidence in a standard sense that there are any. ... In that very long time in science ... there has been no direct and univocal experimental evidence of the existence of quantum event"
Honderich does go on to try to define "events" in a twisty, philosophical way, but it feels like he is being needlessly provocative here, no? In general, however, the book does seem to take many QM theories seriously. There is, after all, a chapter in this sourcebook titled "Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will", which sounds like proper r/iamverysmart material.
April 21, 2017
Vivo e encarno o paradoxo no dia-a-dia. A cadeia causal determinista faz sentido para mim e, no entanto, intuitivamente “sei” que posso escolher escrever isto ou não. Não alardearei a minha liberdade com base em intuições e sensações. No entanto, não estou disposta a renegá-las até ser confrontada com provas convincentes que as rebatam.
Parece-me necessário proceder à enumeração das leis naturais e investigar as relações de causalidade que estão na origem de todos os eventos. Afirmar que as leis físicas dão conta de tudo o que está por detrás da acção ou da vontade humana parece-me reducionista e limitado. Há que averiguar que leis são estas. Sendo isso possível, o determinismo passe talvez a ser impossível de contrapor.
As leis não necessitam de reconhecimento humano (muito menos de aprovação) para existirem; a nossa ignorância relativamente aos nossos factores condicionantes não implica que eles não nos condicionem. No entanto, devido às consequências que aceitar a perspectiva determinista acarreta (se é que temos escolha) a nível, por exemplo, das penalizações criminais e do funcionamento da sociedade em geral, não podemos (idem) tomar este passo levianamente.
Perante o paradoxo, perante este impasse, parece-me prudente, por questões pragmáticas, aceitar o livre-arbítrio pelo menos em situações sociais, visto que isso parece trazer vantagens para a vida em sociedade, e manter a mente aberta quanto ao determinismo ou até mesmo acreditar nele.
Viver na ilusão de liberdade basta? Quer tenha livre-arbítrio ou não, saber que o tenho ou deixo de ter não altera essa condição. Se o determinismo for verdadeiro e fizer uma birra, começando a tentar ir contra aquilo que acho que penso que seriam normalmente as minhas escolhas, também isso seria necessário. Só há margem para fazer birra se se for livre, e nesse caso, o amuo será direccionado a nós mesmos.
De qualquer maneira, não posso não escolher, e isso de algum modo já me parece determinista. De entre as escolhas que talvez tenha, sendo quem sou e dadas as circunstâncias, parece-me que em qualquer mundo possível faria a mesma escolha. Se medito sobre o assunto, a minha concepção tende a ser determinista, mas vivo no paradoxo, porque ajo como se fosse livre.
Tal facto já me perturbou mais.
Há um certo absurdo na vida, quiçá derivado da total ausência de uma verdade ou de verdades universais, que me leva a crer que as questões filosóficas não têm nenhuma resposta certa, o que não me impede de tentar procurar sempre uma resposta que mais se adeque ao mundo que me rodeia e a mim mesma. Até aí vivo no paradoxo.
Parece-me necessário proceder à enumeração das leis naturais e investigar as relações de causalidade que estão na origem de todos os eventos. Afirmar que as leis físicas dão conta de tudo o que está por detrás da acção ou da vontade humana parece-me reducionista e limitado. Há que averiguar que leis são estas. Sendo isso possível, o determinismo passe talvez a ser impossível de contrapor.
As leis não necessitam de reconhecimento humano (muito menos de aprovação) para existirem; a nossa ignorância relativamente aos nossos factores condicionantes não implica que eles não nos condicionem. No entanto, devido às consequências que aceitar a perspectiva determinista acarreta (se é que temos escolha) a nível, por exemplo, das penalizações criminais e do funcionamento da sociedade em geral, não podemos (idem) tomar este passo levianamente.
Perante o paradoxo, perante este impasse, parece-me prudente, por questões pragmáticas, aceitar o livre-arbítrio pelo menos em situações sociais, visto que isso parece trazer vantagens para a vida em sociedade, e manter a mente aberta quanto ao determinismo ou até mesmo acreditar nele.
Viver na ilusão de liberdade basta? Quer tenha livre-arbítrio ou não, saber que o tenho ou deixo de ter não altera essa condição. Se o determinismo for verdadeiro e fizer uma birra, começando a tentar ir contra aquilo que acho que penso que seriam normalmente as minhas escolhas, também isso seria necessário. Só há margem para fazer birra se se for livre, e nesse caso, o amuo será direccionado a nós mesmos.
De qualquer maneira, não posso não escolher, e isso de algum modo já me parece determinista. De entre as escolhas que talvez tenha, sendo quem sou e dadas as circunstâncias, parece-me que em qualquer mundo possível faria a mesma escolha. Se medito sobre o assunto, a minha concepção tende a ser determinista, mas vivo no paradoxo, porque ajo como se fosse livre.
Tal facto já me perturbou mais.
Há um certo absurdo na vida, quiçá derivado da total ausência de uma verdade ou de verdades universais, que me leva a crer que as questões filosóficas não têm nenhuma resposta certa, o que não me impede de tentar procurar sempre uma resposta que mais se adeque ao mundo que me rodeia e a mim mesma. Até aí vivo no paradoxo.
February 11, 2014
The second edition of the Handbook contains 28 new or revised essays. It can be taken as a second volume as it carries on from the first edition which remains worth reading in its own right. It contains more on determinism.
The rest of this review relates to the second edition. It is sourcebook on the many diverse views that are prevalent on free will and related topics. We can view the book as addressing the question: Is there any sense that our actions are up to us? And, then discussing the question in many context, including religion and physics. It focuses, however, on views that take into account new developments in neuroscience, psychology, and philosophical studies.
The book is accessible to those who are not familiar with professional philosophy but, even though there is an excellent introduction by Robert Keane, they would find it easier going to first read his "A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will". Even so, are are a few essays that contain material that might have to be skipped over.
The issues addressed include moral agency and responsibility; accountability and blameworthiness in ethics; autonomy, coercion and control; criminal liability, responsibility and punishment; consciousness and the nature of action; divine foreknowledge and providence; necessity and possibility; determinism; time and chance; quantum reality; causation and explanation.
The rest of this review relates to the second edition. It is sourcebook on the many diverse views that are prevalent on free will and related topics. We can view the book as addressing the question: Is there any sense that our actions are up to us? And, then discussing the question in many context, including religion and physics. It focuses, however, on views that take into account new developments in neuroscience, psychology, and philosophical studies.
The book is accessible to those who are not familiar with professional philosophy but, even though there is an excellent introduction by Robert Keane, they would find it easier going to first read his "A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will". Even so, are are a few essays that contain material that might have to be skipped over.
The issues addressed include moral agency and responsibility; accountability and blameworthiness in ethics; autonomy, coercion and control; criminal liability, responsibility and punishment; consciousness and the nature of action; divine foreknowledge and providence; necessity and possibility; determinism; time and chance; quantum reality; causation and explanation.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews