Koran, Kalashnikov And Laptop: The Neo Taliban Insurgency In Afghanistan 2002 - 2007

by Antonio Giustozzi

Announcements of an impending victory over the Taliban have been repeated ad nauseam since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, particularly after the Presidential elections of 2004, which were said to have marked the 'moral and psychological defeat of the Taliban'. In moments of triumphalism, some commentators claimed that 'reconstruction and development' had won over the population, despite much criticism of the meagre distribution of aid, the lack of 'nation-building' and corruption among Kabul's elite. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials were still claiming, just before a series of particularly ferocious clashes, that 'the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles'. Later that year, the mood in the mass media had turned to one of defeatism, even of impending catastrophe. In reality, as early as 2003-5 there was a growing body of evidence that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. Rather than there having been a '2006 surprise', Giustozzi argues that the Neo-Taliban insurgency had put down strong roots in Afghanistan as early as 2003, a phenomenon he investigates in this timely and thought-provoking book.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Terrorism, Islam, Nonfiction, Middle East

176 pages, Paperback

First published October 26, 2007

Reviews

[Diane · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book provides an in-depth study of the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan since 2002. The focus is on explaining how the Taliban were able to regroup after their initial defeat. The author studies the Taliban's ideology and sources of support, but concentrates on the weakness of the Afghan government and its inability to control territory outside the capital.

[Will James]

Understanding the war in Afghanistan is often difficult, and the majority of objective analysis often focuses (with good reason) on the policies and personalities of Western actors (the Bush or Obama Administrations, NATO, European governments etc.) However, viewing the war from the Afghan perspective is less common. Knowledge of Afghan society - not least the methods, motivations, strategies and tactics of the Taliban - stems mainly from journalists inside the country, who face great difficulties in providing a rounded account of the conflict.



That is why Antonio Giustozzi's 'Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop' is such a refreshing read. Taking a strictly academic approach to what he calls the 'Neo-Taliban' he methodically and patiently explains the various developments in what is anything but a static organisation. The evolution of the Neo-Taliban since the swift collapse of their regime in 2001-2 into the lethal insurgency we see today took a great deal of effort, mistakes on the part of the Afghan government and the US-led coalition, and internal developments within the Taliban itself, both ideologically and practically.



The only problem I can find with Giustozzi's book is that it was written for publication in 2007, and the events since then may have superseded some of his arguments, recommendations and analysis since then. But if you want to get an accurate picture of how we got to where we are today in Afghanistan, then starting by reading this book wouldn't be a bad mistake.

[Corto · Rating 5 out of 5]

Concise, well sourced and dense with facts, this is a very good nuts-and-bolts analysis of the war in Afghanistan from 2001-2007. Of special interest is the section analyzing how the Taliban regrouped after the American invasion and implemented their insurgency. This book is very much deeply in the weeds and not light reading. If you want a good, short, big-picture look at the war from '01 to '07, get this from your library and read the 9 page conclusion.

[Philip · Rating 3 out of 5]

A useful and candid look at the emergence of the neo-Taliban in the pre David Petraeus counter-insurgency era. Confusion and a lack of common strategy within NATO and US commanders re-fighting the Tet Offensive.... Nothing surprising about that! Weak on the symbiosis with Pakistan Islamist revival but strong on the kleptocracy forming around Karzai.

[Kellyn · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is efficient in its descriptions of the Taliban's organizational structure and development from 2002 to 2007. The laptop part of the title is a bit misleading, as I don't think that word appeared elsewhere in the book. The closest relation to laptops in this book is the discussion of Taliban propaganda, but that comprised maybe two pages. All in all, good book, misleading title.

[Grahambo · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well researched, but dull. Good info

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good, but dense. He doesn't really come to any conclusions, its more just a compilation of information rather than an argument.

[Sues57 Schroeder]

I need to read this again, slowly and carefully.