Fall Of The Philippines

Ballantine's Illustrated History of World War II / the Violent Century: Campaign #16

by Ward Rutherford

Detailed account of the Fall of the Phillipines during WWII

Genres: History

160 pages, Paperback

First published October 1, 1971

Reviews

[George Kasnic · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this as a throwback to my childhood. I learned history from these books, initially. Many have not aged well. Ballantine books are British and written by WWII vets. But an unusual thing as they are published within two decades of the end of that war. The reference to the IJA as “J@ps” is present and distractive throughout. The research seems primarily on western sources. The author, like most of that era, expresses an opinion of MacArthur. It is evident from some statements that the author never came to terms with the military superiority of the Japanese Empire at this point of the war, falling back on the tropes of “luck” and “great men.” There is even a passage claiming the resistance on Bataan , a holy event back then, galvanized local allies, rather than addressing how the success of a non-western power would within the decade fuel the anti-imperialist movements which realized western militaries were not invincible. Could have used a few more maps, more an intro and survey than deep analysis.

[Andrew Wardle · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5 stars. Typically reliable military history monograph from this series, fleshing out the details of one of the multiple disasters befalling Allied arms in the early part of the Pacific War.
The campaign is described succinctly and there is good analysis of how a Japanese force of just 2 infantry divisions plus a few specialist units managed to conquer a large archipelago defended by many times their number of American and Filipino troops. As in British Malaya (also conquered embarrassingly quickly by 2 Japanese divisions), the colonial power was thinly-stretched by commitments elsewhere and relied too heavily on terrain and poorly-equipped indigenous troops for defence: but unlike Malaya, where there was only the understrength III Indian Corps, outdated aircraft and no naval support, MacArthur had an army he had been training for 6 years, a small but efficient fleet, and a large modern air force. And he had predicted accurately the area where Japanese landings would probably occur - and did. But the air force was caught on the ground due to bungling, and the Japanese landings were virtually unopposed. Once ashore, the Japanese used their air supremacy to keep the Allied troops unsettled, but it should still not have been possible to drive their hugely superior numbers into the Bataan Peninsula ("sack" as a Japanese commander called it) within days.
Resistance in Bataan delayed the Japanese beyond their timetable, but largely because General Homma had one of his divisions withdrawn to fight elsewhere in the Pacific. And the fall of the "impregnable" island fortress of Corregidor was a hugely- embarrassing rout. MacArthur did not endear himself to his troops by leaving them to their fate and escaping to Australia, and his appointment soon afterwards to command Southwest Pacific Area is a reminder that the British army was not the only one to reward failure with promotion.
The writing is generally good, though there are some infelicities which should have been edited out - just one example: "Bataan was, in the main essentials at least, supplied for a six month siege, though many things were unavailable or available only in limited quantities." Er....could you be just a BIT more vague about that ?!
Understanding of the Bataan phase of the campaign is not aided by the author moving Caibobo Point from the west to the east coast, and transposing the positions of the two American army corps. Again, something proofreading should have spotted.
But generally a good, workmanlike account of a campaign often dismissed in a few paragraphs.