How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle

by Gideon Rose

IN 1991 THE UNITED STATES trounced the Iraqi army in battle only to stumble blindly into postwar turmoil. Then in 2003 the United States did it again. How could this happen? How could the strongest power in modern history fight two wars against the same opponent in just over a decade, win lightning victories both times, and yet still be woefully unprepared for the aftermath?

Because Americans always forget the political aspects of war. Time and again, argues Gideon Rose in this penetrating look at American wars over the last century, our leaders have focused more on beating up the enemy than on creating a stable postwar environment. What happened in Iraq was only the most prominent example of this phenomenon, not an exception to the rule.

Woodrow Wilson fought a war to make the world safe for democracy but never asked himself what democracy actually meant and then dithered as Germany slipped into chaos. Franklin Roosevelt resolved not to repeat Wilson’s mistakes but never considered what would happen to his own elaborate postwar arrangements should America’s wartime marriage of convenience with Stalin break up after the shooting stopped. The Truman administration casually established voluntary prisoner repatriation as a key American war aim in Korea without exploring whether it would block an armistice—which it did for almost a year and a half. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations dug themselves deeper and deeper into Vietnam without any plans for how to get out, making it impossible for Nixon and Ford to escape unscathed. And the list goes on.

Drawing on vast research, including extensive interviews with participants in recent wars, Rose re-creates the choices that presidents and their advisers have confronted during the final stages of each major conflict from World War I through Iraq. He puts readers in the room with U.S. officials as they make decisions that affect millions of lives and shape the modern world—seeing what they saw, hearing what they heard, feeling what they felt.

American leaders, Rose argues, have repeatedly ignored the need for careful postwar planning. But they can and must do a better job next time around—making the creation of a stable and sustainable local political outcome the goal of all wartime plans, rather than an afterthought to be dealt with once the "real" military work is over.

Genres: History, War, Politics, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Military History, American History

431 pages, Paperback

First published October 1, 2010

Reviews

[James Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

How wars end. They end in peace. It's not clear from Rose's title or from anything I read about this book beforehand, but this is a history of American grand strategy in the 20th century. Grand strategy is the direction steered in to enable you to win the stable peace you desire when the fighting ends. So this is a history of how America has achieved its brand of peace during the last century. It tells how political and military leaders have handled the endgame of war in making force serve politics as each war ended. Generally our leaders at each war's end have learned the most from the previous wars and base their reactions on it, and that's why Rose says we always fight the last battle.

The author's perspective on some of these issues is fresh to me. So I read with interest his explanation of how Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points were designed to prevent a harsh punishment of Germany and Austria to forestall the bitterness that could lead to another war. But his naivete and good-heartedness ran against the grain of British and French desire for retribution. We know what happened. I read how the decision to use the A-bombs on Japan was more of a decision dictated by the fact that we'd developed the weapon and not to use it would've been political suicide because every American death after its availability would have been blamed on the decision. The peace talks to end the Korean War were stalled until Eisenhower, the new president, threatened to expand the war with atomic weapons. Nixon, his vice-president, learned how toughness could produce results and tried the same tactics in Vietnam, without results. What Rose writes about Vietnam fits my own understanding. For this reason I thought his analysis of how Nixon and Kissinger got us out of the war the most comprehensive and clearly explained I've ever read. Rose explains how we screwed up the endgame in both wars in Iraq. Both in the Gulf War and in 2003 we failed by not having a clear policy and organization to meet the political realities once the military was finished. Both times we created a mess, adversely affecting American prestige and long-term strategic interests.

The conclusions Rose comes to about the endgames of these wars and the results achieved amounts to a kind of wisdom. Obviously he comes to his conclusions through hindsight. It's true what they say about hindsight, that it's 20/20. But hindsight is also true.

Rose tells a history based on pragmatism, a realpolitik though it's seasoned liberally with morality. In a section headed "The Strong Do What They Can" he explains that only the strongest nations can be geopolitically proactive, a conviction first expressed by the Greek historian Thucydides in the 4th century BC and still believed to be applicable today. Weak nations can only react to immediate developments. Those nations who're global leaders can project policy aimed at the future and potential problems. This is how he sees Iraq at the time of 9/11. Following the attack on New York and Washington, the U. S. had several options on how to use its power, wealth, and influence, including developing alternatives to fossil fuels which would free the west from dependence on the Middle East, or work toward the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Regime change in Iraq to produce a more stabilized Middle East was seen as one of the options and was the one chosen. It's emphasized that a team other than Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld would have chosen differently. Or the same team, given different circumstances, could have chosen differently. The strong do what they can, Rose insists. They're able to project, and Iraq was going to have to be dealt with sooner or later. Rose sees 9/11 as having the same importance and influence as the 1950 Communist invasion of South Korea, that is as a catalyst bringing about a new phase of international politics, this one characterized by American unilateral activity.

Many people would object to Rose's conclusions. He's forgiving of American policies. He sees all of America's actions in the light of grand strategy--how do you win the peace and ensure the greatest economic and military security for the nation? One way is to use conflict to create and maintain stability. For this reason Rose doesn't look at the horrors of the nightly news. He looks at American foreign policy as that which projects American security. It's hard to find fault with the rationale for that security. Without being cynical, without seeing instances of flagrant imperialism, he sees America using its great strength to secure peace for Americans and to ensure stability in those areas of strategic importance. He describes American grand strategy as trying to pacify the world piece by piece. Few people, especially our leaders, articulate it in such grandiose fashion precisely because it sounds grandiose. If you look away from the hypnotic pull of television news and newspapers with their gloomy sense of western decline and economic doom, Rose sees promise. Sometimes we're clumsy, sometimes we stumble, but we're getting it right.

[Ariel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rose's book has a fairly simple premise: that U.S. administrations frequently learn the wrong lessons from the past, and mistakenly apply them to the wars of the present. The book also argues that endgame negotiations, from WWI to Iraq, repeatedly lacked coordination between military strategy and political outcome. To illustrate these points, Rose takes the reader on a tour of U.S. wartime decision-making, attempting to interpret the motives and intentions of politicians as they sought to bring each war to a close.

The book's best chapter deals with the war in a Iraq, where discussion is framed around three key questions: "Why did the administration choose to go to war against Iraq in 2003? Where did the notion of a light post-war footprint come from? And how did such a predictably self-defeating approach to the operation get enshrined as national policy?". It provides a clear (and disconcerting) explanation of what went wrong, why, and how.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book looks at war termination, which is the phase of a conflict that precedes the actual peace treaty but includes the time in which both sides, or at least parties on both sides, are trying to end the fighting. Rose really did some great research in this book, and the product reflects his thoroughness. He provides a different angle on a lot of 20th century US conflicts that I was mostly unfamiliar with. His criticisms are sharp but fair and moderated by his appreciation for the difficulty of these circumstances. He's very good at getting to the nub of the issue, or the key dispute or problem that made the war difficult to end. He also blends realist and liberal analysis very well, showing a flexible, non-doctrinaire mind and excellent attention to context and contingency. Both political scientists and historians should find the nuance and skilled use of theory appealing in this book.

Rose's strongest chapters are on the older American wars, starting with Vietnam and going backwards. It actually would have been really cool to have a chapter on the Civil War, especially on some of the earlier peace overtures, but alas, this book is more present-minded than that. His chapter on WWII in Europe focused on the question of whether to continue the alliance with the USSR or try to gain an upper hand on them in a nascent Cold War. Rose sensibly concludes that the only realistic policy was to continue the alliance in order to head off the possibility of a separate peace between Germany and the USSR and to avoid creating a conflict where there didn't have to be one.

Readers who know a bit about 20th century wars are likely to gain the most from Rose's chapters on WWII in the Pacific, the Korean War, and Gulf War I. The Pacific chapter focuses on the importance of the unconditional surrender policy. The Japanese generally wanted to preserve kokutao (unique political system headed by the emperor), so their one condition for surrender was to keep the Emperor. Violating most IR theory predictions, the US refused this condition, and pursued a massive bombing policy in order to force Japanese surrender. Rose shows that what the A-bombs really did was to empower the Emperor to step in to support the more peaceful faction in the Japanese government in favor of surrender. The reason the US stuck with this tough position was that they believed Japanese militarism needed to be rooted out of Japan and that they didn't want to take an action during war that would tie their hands during the peace. The US consistently has shown a belief that the behavior of aggressive states comes less from the pressures of the international system (realist view) and more from their internal character, leading the US towards broader objectives that involve changing the internal nature of states. On the German and Japanese questions, Rose contends, and I agree, that they were right.

In Korea, the nub issue that kept the war going for about 18 months was the repatriation of POW's who didn't want to go back to North Korea or China. At first, this seemed like a really noble call by Truman and Ike, who felt burned by the POW repatriation in WWII when the Soviets killed or jailed hundreds of thousands of returning prisoners. However, what was really going on was that pro-Kuomintang thugs in the camps were intimidating other prisoners to oppose repatriation, inflating the numbers far beyond what they wanted. In other words, the US took this noble stance based on very dubious assumptions, which ended up prolonging the war unnecessarily.

In GW One, Rose shows that the Bush administration really only had a solution to the Kuwait problem (get Saddam out) and not to the Iraq problem (what to do with this aggressive regime?). On the Iraq problem, Rose argues that if the US really wanted to overthrow Saddam, they should have kept the campaign going to the point where his regime collapsed, barring a straight up invasion. If the US wanted to convince him he was defeated in order to keep him down for a while, they should have hit key elements of his regime harder, such as the Republican Guard. Rose's valid criticism is that US policy was seriously unclear and seemed to change from moment to moment. The policy ended up being more of a hope that an Iraqi superman (probably a general) would come along and overthrow Saddam and set up a more pliable regime.. However, the loose ends of this conflict ended up dragging the US into a containment regime that occupied them throughout the 1990's. Rose isn't clear on how a better route out of this mess could have been found, but he does show the confusion and tensions within the policy. Interesting side note, unlike Wilson, FDR, and Truman, Bush's team interpreted Iraqi aggression more as a product of the international system in the region rather than the internal nature of the regime. They viewed Saddam as a bad dude, but they also keenly understood that he was a product of Iraqi politics and culture and that anyone who followed him was likely to be similar to him. They understood that we just weren't going to get a modern, democratic, pluralistic government out of this country any time soon and pursued a policy that fit this assumption. I think this assumption backed up the containment policy that emerged after GW One, and it should have been a broader part of the discussion about the aftermath of the 2003 invasion.

The biggest takeaway point from Rose is the Clausewitzean importance of adjusting the nature and levels of force to the political objective at hand. He suggests that the US was actually pretty good at this in many wars, and faltered in wars like Vietnam and Iraq. He asserts the importance of knowing the nature of the conflict you are in and the fine details of the points of dispute between the parties. He also makes some interesting points about the nature of lesson-learning. He concedes that policy-makers will do this, and they will often focus on the last war, but that they need to be exceedingly careful not to let the last war dictate the fighting of the current one. I think Powell was guilty of this, even if GW One worked out reasonably well. These are not stunningly original conclusions, but Rose backs them up with rich historical case studies. Final random thought: The title stinks. This book didn't really prove that we always fight the last battle at all. We didn't in Japan or Vietnam, right? Not really sure what Rose or the editors were thinking here.

[Lauren Albert · Rating 3 out of 5]

I didn't feel that the book said anything new. He analyzes the ending to each of our major wars and tries to see what went wrong and what went right and why. His main points are 1) think about the ending before beginning and 2) don't learn the wrong lessons from the past or the right lessons for the wrong situation. Before we make war, we should respond to what he calls the "Clausewitzian challenge" of making "force serve politics." As he writes, “World War I and the Iraq War, meanwhile, testify to how even decisive military victory can lead to problems if not harnessed to plans for a sustainable postwar political settlement.” (282) I thought the book was even handed politically which had been a concern for me when I saw it dubbed a "Council of Foreign Relations" book on the back cover.

Quotes:

“A stable postwar political situation…should be considered Phase I, with the rest of the war being seen as a countdown to that blessed event. This easy fix would focus attention on the desired end result as the starting point for all war planning…” 285

“Define goals precisely and check prices before buying.” 285

“[P]olicymakers have tended to act as if following a script. Their thinking has been dominated by lessons drawn from the most recent war, whether or not those lessons were relevant or appropriate to the case at hand, and the deployment of resources has been driven more by availability than strategy.” 285

[Maria · Rating 4 out of 5]

Historians frequently comment that the tactics of the last war are used to fight the current one. The US military is no exception. Rose lists war by war the goals, tactics and lessons learn from each war starting with WWI and how that influenced the intentions and expectations of politicians and military leaders.

Why I started this book: Intriguing title, premise and it was on the US Army's War College Reading List.

Why I finished it: Fascinating to study the end of wars one after another. And I never made the connection to Woodrow Wilson's desire to be kinder to the defeated Germans and his own experience growing up in the South years after the Civil War. I really wish that this was mandatory reading for politicians as well as military service members.

[Dave Franklin · Rating 4 out of 5]

"No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve...," wrote Carl von Clausewitz. Gideon Rose, a Fellow at the Council for Foreign Relations, employs this precept in order to evaluate the wartime choices and conduct of American presidents and their advisers throughout the past century. Rose examines the final stages of major conflicts from World War I through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and proffers historically grounded critiques in response to this Clausewitzian challenge. The result is a study that is critical, fair, and pithy.

Rose outlines three basic arguments: ending a war successfully requires realistic and durable political arrangements, Americans often have been negligent in meeting the challenges which occur when wars are terminated, and the need for future policy makers to think more clearly and plan more carefully.

A variety of dynamics explain the prevalence of these failures. The military is trained to fight wars, and often eschews post-war planning. As James Conway, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq, stated quite bluntly, " You know, you always shoot the wolf closer to the sled." While this tendency is understandable from a military perspective, it is inexcusable in the broader context of policy formulation. In addition to the reluctance of military professionals to tackle post-war planning, other factors are at play. Rigid organizational silos, risk adverse bureaucratic inertia, and a generalized aversion demonstrated by policy makers to acknowledge the existence of trade-offs, are all deleterious. As a result, the wind up to war may generate political instability, produce human suffering, and contribute to further armed conflicts.

Rose's case studies elucidate the unintended consequences and complications that have ensued from the termination of virtually every American conflict from the Great War to the present. Frequently, there is a common denominator: Initial assumptions-often based on wishful thinking or domestic political experience-produce tragic outcomes.

To palliate these endgame outcomes, the author suggests that policy planners adhere to three salient guidelines: Plan ahead and work backward, define goals and check prices before buying, and monitor and adjust when necessary. Had these common sense steps been followed in the Iraq milieu, that conflict may not have culminated in "unchecked power leading to hubris, then folly, then nemesis," and the denouement of Afghanistan may not have so closely resembled Vietnam, circa 1975.

This is a valuable and important book. Rose's grounding in the world of time, space and events along with his utilization of a number of theoretical perspectives from political science, combine to create a vivid picture of failure, and an outline for a path forward.

[FP · Rating 3 out of 5]

The author focuses on the larger US wars from WW1 on. There's a great deal of research and history on each one, most of it revised what I learned, so that was interesting.

We already know wars typically end badly. That's true of practically all endeavors. We marvel at the exceptions - the Pantheon, for example, is still magnificent. But was anyone really surprised as Afghanistan descended into chaos?

This book would have more interesting if the author broadened the subject beyond war: The end of the Soviet Union, slavery, the Apollo Program...perhaps liberal democracies. There's a lot of potential material!

Alas, most books (and their reviews) tend to end badly, too.

[Jeff Lacy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Illuminating and well documented

Gideon Rose’s commentary on how the United States has concluded its wars in the twentieth century is well documented and illuminating. I have read a good amount of books on many of these wars, but none have devoted the attention to how the combatants ended them as Rose has. These detailed perspectives make for a compelling and interesting read.

[Brian W · Rating 4 out of 5]

We make decisions about the present war based on our experiences and lessons from the past. Articulates the difficulty in the civilian and military relationship throughout the significant battles of the 20th century. Does a great job of pointing out the mistakes and assumptions made by the U.S. and their associated results?

[Chelsea · Rating 2 out of 5]

Really needed more/better editing. If I had read the phrase "blood and treasure" one more time, I was going to throw something.

[Jerome · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very easy to read, and very good overview with the right level of detail. Relies heavily on Graham's model 1 analysis but provides enough historical detail to justify this analysis

[Jack · Rating 5 out of 5]

WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War...and now our Iraq adventures are supposedly done.

[Tim Rose · Rating 5 out of 5]

Gideon Rose asks the question that military and political strategists should be asking before committing American lives and resources to war. It would seem to be the most natural question to ask, "How does this all end?" But, Rose explains how this question has been overlooked so often. As a result, America finds itself returning to armed conflict only to clean up the bad outcomes of previous conflicts namely in the case of World War I and the first Gulf War. Rose's thesis is very concise and straightforward and he uses a lot of valuable sources to back up his points. It's hard to argue with the logic of the fact that a war should be fought with a strategic end state in mind. But, what Rose accomplishes in this fascinating book is to show just how important the alignment of both military and political interests must be in working toward such an end goal. In this respect, he deliberately revives the thinking of Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz to explain how military operations must be tailored to the political outcome of war. As he explains, too often in American history, the political outcome takes a backseat to the focus on operations and tactics. Rose explains that war is more than just "beating up the bad guy", there is a "positive" nature to it that takes place once the bullets stop flying. Overall, I cannot recommend this book more highly especially with a new administration which inevitably means a new doctrine and a new strategic plan for America's role in the world.

[Melissa · Rating 4 out of 5]

An in depth analysis of American wars from WW1 to the Iraq War. This book is specifically focused on the multitude of factors that decided when and how each war ended. The book also demonstrates how the lessons we learn (or fail to learn) from previous wars affect the next war in everything from our willingness to initially engage to our exit strategy. Dense and chock full of fascinating historical information. A solid pick for anyone interested in military history and/or foreign policy.

[John Martindale · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thought Rose did a pretty good job at being balanced, he seemed unbiased, one could not tell if he learned to the political right or to the left. i liked that. I learned a few things here and there. It was interesting how presidents trying to avoid mistakes steered them into whole new blunders. I learned some things from the book, it was far more history then opinion, i expected the opposite. I do wish he focused more on when it seemed to work, like with Germany and Japan after WWII become strong nations again and yet in good relations with the united states.

[Joe Chernicoff · Rating 5 out of 5]

'How Wars End' is quite an interesting book, especially for one who has pretty much lived through most of the history Rose writes about. Of particular interest is Roosevelt and WWII, and Kissinger and Nixon discussions re: getting out of 'Nam. This latter bit explains, to a great degree, why or how this country didn't accomplish what it should have, and why our current actions in Iraq and Afghanistan are familiar.

Another excellent book for your reference library.

[Julian Haigh · Rating 4 out of 5]

Most books on war or diplomacy seem focused on why wars begin, but in this more practical approach Rose turns his eye to how they end. Placing WW1 to Afghanistan in this perspective and linking them together in brilliant historical analysis studying the different players' mindsets and emphasizing the central place of strategy in sustained winning, this book is an absolute must if you're contemplating a war in the near future :)

[Spencer · Rating 5 out of 5]

A bit dry, but insightful and thorough. My favorite take away is the partial refutal of the old maxim that if you fail learn history you are bound to repeat it. That may be true occassionally, but not enough to be statistically relevant so as to be referred to as universal wisdom. Instead, trying to solve modern day problems using solutions for past mistakes is often a recipe for disaster.

[Peter Nickeas · Rating 5 out of 5]

So if you wanted one book to summarize the ups and downs of the major American wars of the past century, this is it. The chapter on Iraq gives the most succinct explanation of the war's mismanagement that I have read to date. The chapter would work for someone with no interest in foreign policy who felt a need to suddenly learn about that war. Amazing, amazing read.

[Anthony Sanders · Rating 3 out of 5]

This wasn't a terribly exciting read; but it was very informative and very well researched. Just the endnotes are practically a book in and of itself. As a military guy it's always interesting to get a glimpse behind the scenes of what's happening at the strategic and national level.

[Chris Gorycki · Rating 5 out of 5]

An important read. It is a great deal of fun to have a Town School classmate write such an significant book. Thanks Gideon.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Policy maker preconceptions and ideas, and politics, can really prolong the agony of war. This is a good book about all of those things.

[T-Dub]

Doesn't look like I'll be finishing this one. When months go by without me picking it up, I think it's time to add it to the abandoned-books shelf.

[Dallas Powell, jr. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent analysis, but the author glosses over Afghanistan and doesn't mention even one of America's "small wars" since WWI. His thesis also fails to account for American intervention before WWI.

[Ratforce]

You may be interested in this political analysis of America’s actions in war. The author’s arguments span the United States’ involvement in wars from World War I to Iraq and Afghanistan.

[Joshua Pierson]

Rose surmises that the US fights the last battle based on the experiences of the past as opposed to understanding the geopolitics and situation within the country where the US is committed to action. Rose uses several wars as examples and demonstrates how policy that was designed to end one conflict was used in succeeding conflicts. WWI unconditional surrender policy was based on policy from the Civil War even though unconditional surrender created the environment that debased German currency and to WWII. These examples continue through the Gulf War and Iraq war where Phase IV planning was evident that it did not occur, creating insurmountable obstacles occurring within the theater of operations.