The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made

by Walter Isaacson, Evan Thomas

A captivating blend of personal biography and public drama, The Wise Men introduces the original best and brightest, leaders whose outsized personalities and actions brought order to postwar Averell Harriman, the freewheeling diplomat and Roosevelt's special envoy to Churchill and Stalin; Dean Acheson, the secretary of state who was more responsible for the Truman Doctrine than Truman and for the Marshall Plan than General Marshall; George Kennan, self-cast outsider and intellectual darling of the Washington elite; Robert Lovett, assistant secretary of war, undersecretary of state, and secretary of defense throughout the formative years of the Cold War; John McCloy, one of the nation's most influential private citizens; and Charles Bohlen, adroit diplomat and ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Genres: History, Biography, Nonfiction, Politics, American History, Business, Biography Memoir

864 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1986

About the author

Walter Isaacson, a professor of history at Tulane, has been CEO of the Aspen Institute, chair of CNN, and editor of Time. He is the author of 'Leonardo da Vinci; The Innovators; Steve Jobs; Einstein: His Life and Universe; Benjamin Franklin: An American Life; and Kissinger: A Biography, and the coauthor of The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made. Visit him at Isaacson.Tulane.edu and on Twitter at @WalterIsaacson

Reviews

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

I purchased this book at the Friends of the Library used book store at the Public Library in Laguna Beach, California. It is a formidable-looking book. I bought it mainly on the strength of one of its authors, Walter Isaacson. I have read some of his other biographies and found them very engagingly written. There is an inscription on the front flyleaf of my copy that reads, "To George & Julie Merry Xmas 1986 Hope this brings knowledge to your whole family Love Francie". The book had all the appearance of never having been read, so I suspect George, Julie, and their family were never enlightened as Francie hoped. It is unlikely that Francie, whoever she is, will ever read this review, but, Francie, if you do, rest assured that at least one person gained much from reading your gift.

I was born when Franklin D. Roosevelt was President, just a week shy of one year before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I don't remember anything about FDR and very little about his successor, Harry Truman. I do remember Eisenhower being elected in 1952 and I've been interested in our country's government ever since. I lived through most of the time period during which the subjects of this book were active in government. Before reading this book I had only heard of 2 of the 6, Averell Harriman and Dean Acheson.

So The Wise Men was for me kind of a trip down memory lane. It was fascinating to me to learn some of the insider information on the decisions that lead to such historic events as dropping the atomic bomb on Japan, the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, the Cuban missile crises, and the Vietnam War among lesser events. Walter Isaacson and his co-author, Evan Thomas, did an excellent job of portraying these events in an interesting and readable manner.

[Eric_W · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the story of what became known as the "American Establishment." "Establishment" was a term that originated in England to describe a circle of powerful men. Richard Rovere has proposed that the two parties in this country are really either populist or establishment, not conservative or liberal.

The American Establishment were "Atlanticists." Their similar schooling gave them an appreciation for Western European values and the perceived benefit of a traditional Europe. They were instrumental in shepherding the Marshall Plan through a hostile Congress. They felt a cosmopolitan duty to preserve the culture and civilization of the West.
This was to become a problem many years later as Asia became the focus of U.S. concern. Francophile Acheson was fundamental in recommending support for France in its futile attempt to preserve the colonial empire. Acheson's efforts resulted in an avalanche of U.S. funding, ultimately supplying France with far more than we spent on them during the entire Marshall Plan.

The establishment is profiled through the careers of Robert Lovett, John McCloy, Averell Harriman, Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, and Dean Acheson. They were all intelligent, educated at elite private schools, and most came from wealthy families. The six were not ideologues, preferring to adopt a pragmatic outlook, holding moderate views and they believed in consensus. Unfortunately, their sensible world view was translated by more simplistic minds in the fifties into being "soft on communism." They were not highly visible to the public (except when McCarthy made them targets), but preferred to persuade leaders privately and intellectually. They were fervent capitalists which made McCarthy's charges against them ludicrous. They believed in a strong link between free trade, free markets and free minds.

Isaacson and Thomas fill the book with marvelous anecdotes and they describe the unique characteristics of the six lucidly and with humor. For example, Dean Acheson resigned as Under Secretary of the Treasury under FDR in a dispute over whether the United States could legally buy gold at a price higher than that set by Congress. The authors explain differences among the six this way: "Acheson's friend Harriman would never have gone to the mat over a matter of principle with a President, he would likely have sidled away from the conflict to work on problems that he would be left to solve on his own. Lovett would probably have worked out some compromise, making any mountainous dispute seem suddenly like a small bump. So, too, would have John McCloy, the legal workhorse; like Bohlen, he would have been willing to go along. Kennan would no doubt have agonized about resignation only to become lost in philosophical brooding."

I had for many years vastly misunderstood George Kennan's role in the development of the cold war. The famous "X" article, which provided the foundation for containment, was misinterpreted to create the underpinning for Nitze's NSC-68 and development of the arms race. Kennan was really arguing for a non-military, less aggressive stance. Ironically, Nitze, icon of the modern American military was adamantly opposed to U.S. entry into Vietnam because he was aware of the limited resources of the United States. Prophetic indeed.

We may owe current European unity to the efforts of John McCloy who, as High Commissioner of Germany, and its virtual czar, was an exceptionally sincere and honest broker among the war-torn nations of Europe. His word was taken with equal faith in all the capitals and he laid the foundation for the economic miracle that was to take place. (There is a new biography of McCloy out recently - it's on my list.)

By the late seventies and early eighties the Establishment was out of favor. It was blamed for the cold war, Vietnam, and assorted other blunders; but its replacement, the self-centered, undisciplined, partisan, non-professional politicians-diplomats of the Reagan-Nixon era- has historians and revisionists yearning for the old order which had been, at least, consistent, selfless, and devoted to the national interest. "There was a foreign policy consensus back then, and its disintegration during Vietnam is one of the great disasters of our history," said Henry Kissinger. "You need an Establishment. Society needs it. You can't have all these assaults on national policy so that every time you change presidents you end up changing direction."
These men were responsible for building a coalition that resulted in 40+ years of Pax Americana. "They were public servants, not public figures, and did not have to read the newspapers to know where they stood....In their sense of duty and shared wisdom, they found the force to shape the world."

[Aaron · Rating 5 out of 5]

Part American WWII history, part Cold War history, part biography, part discussion of the "Establishment" in mid 20th century America combine to form a well-written account of several key players in U.S. foreign policy from the 1930s-70s. Isaacson and Thomas decide to focus on six men who they believe embody the views and actions of foreign affairs during and after WWII, and on into the Vietnam War era. This book is now thirty years old, and was written right when two of the six men had just died and two others were still living, so the passage of time that so often helps us to better evaluate and judge the actions and motivations of those in high political office is somewhat missing. But that does not dim the story nor many of the conclusions that the writers focus on. Even with it being written in 1986, almost all of the events that are covered occurred decades before.

Dean Acheson
Along with Averell Harriman, Acheson does seem to be the main character in this book. Perhaps because he was involved in so many important decisions, and held powerful positions both in the Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman administrations, this makes sense. The authors treat Acheson (and just about everyone) fairly, making sure to point out the reasons why they think he deserves so much attention as well as his personality flaws that seriously hampered his authority as Secretary of State. Acheson had a weakness for flattery and vanity, and often indulged in these vices, much to his friends' chagrin at times. Was he responsible for setting in motion the eventual tragedy of the Vietnam War just based on his almost sole focus on Europe and his belief that the Russians controlled all Communist countries? Or did he help architect a winning strategy in an increasingly scary world full of nuclear threats abroad and witch hunts at home?

Averell Harriman
Harriman manages to come off as both a dedicated public servant, logging a staggering amount of miles in airplanes on trips around the world - trips that never seemed to end, and a political opportunist who continually tried (and often succeeded) in injecting himself into important political matters and cozying up to world leaders. This mixture of sacrifice to the public good along with personal gain would play much more cynically in today's world: Harriman had numerous conflicts of interest due to his business dealings, yet paid no heed to such matters. He never achieved the one position that he really wanted (Secretary of State) but he managed to have a lasting impact on American foreign policy.

John McCloy
Like Harriman, McCloy had conflicts of interest as well but he much less disposed to seek out government positions. Instead, positions seemed to find him. While I generally agree with most of the analysis provided by the authors, I do differ strongly on one point concerning McCloy. Assistant Secretary of War during WWII, McCloy had a hand in implementing the horrible order to intern thousands of American citizens of Japanese descent. War hysteria and over-reactions led to this, and McCloy did nothing to stop it. Actually, he further muddied the waters as everyone in a high government position punted the responsibility for making this appalling decision somewhere else. The authors write, on page 197: "Much of the fear was understandable, at least in those jittery times." Forcibly targeting American citizens based solely on their race, and virtually imprisoning them for the duration of the war, was a black mark on everyone associated with the decision, and reflected poorly on the country, even if it was not looked at as so at that time.

Robert Lovett
Lovett and McCloy were so often lumped together that at times throughout the first half of the book, it was difficult to distinguish between the two. Like McCloy, Lovett typically did not seek out positions of power in the government. He preferred to make money on Wall Street and work behind the scenes when he could. But he became trusted adviser during the Truman years and also particularly to President Kennedy later on. Notably, he avoided Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War like the plague. Because of that, Lovett pretty much disappears in the last quarter of the book.

George Kennan
A tortured soul, Kennan for a time was considered the leading authority on all things Russia. He never seemed to be comfortable with himself: always being on the outside at dinner parties, and being on the fringes of government, yet seeming to relish this self-imposed isolation. Kennan is commonly referred to as the mind behind the containment doctrine, yet as he aged he came to view the Soviet Union differently, preferring to push for peace when possible. One interesting thing that the authors mention is Kennan's discovery of U.S. minister's notes from the early 1800s, describing the Russian people even back then as being paranoid. This helped to form Kennan's own image of the Soviet Union and how the U.S. could best coexist with it.

Chip Bohlen
Bohlen seems like he was thrown in as an extra. He is more of a supporting character here than a major player. For long stretches, he is not in the narrative at all. And even when he, it is usually as a counterbalance to Kennan. Throughout the first half of the book, Henry Stimson seems to be featured more than Bohlen; Paul Nitze in the second half. It would have been interesting for Isaacson and Thomas to have explored further the time that Bohlen was detained in Japan during WWII (and Kennan in Germany as well).

Overall an excellent review of the making of American foreign policy during the crucial period just after WWII and into the Vietnam era. Chock full of personal anecdotes thanks to the authors being able to interview most of their subjects themselves, and in cases where that was not possible (Acheson and Bohlen), many people who knew them intimately. This time of bipartisanship is now a bygone era in foreign policy.

Grade: A-

[Caroline · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating depiction of a world both ancient and modern, and that lies in sharp contrast to our current situation.

First of all, one notes that this was written by the elite, about the elite. The authors are both Harvard alumni, and most of the subjects went to Yale. They served in government partly out of personal satisfaction, partly as noblesse oblige. While the authors occasionally insert mild criticisms, this is almost a hagiography for six statesmen of the cold war. Nevertheless, the book obviously took years of intense scholarship. It offers a detailed picture of the development of American foreign policy over several decades. In a way, the shared aristocracy and educational background of authors and subjects enables the writers to enter the mindset of Acheson et al, and fine writing enables readers to go there with them.

Second, my own reflections as I read were immensely widened because I was reading Thucydides’ The Peloponnisian Wars simultaneously. Yes, once again I coincidentally found myself tackling parallel books.

Wise men: Russia and the United States, after long battles against a deadly mutual foe in WWI, try to expand the number and loyalty of their subject states. They are countries with fundamentally different mentalities and governments. The US has nuclear weapons and the USSR wants them. The US assesses the strength and paranoia of their recent ally, and decides it must get tough. Various statesmen offer opinions on how to deal with the Soviets, ranging from treaties and talk to arms buildups. Great speeches and influential articles come forth. Attempts at negotiation sometimes work, mostly fail. Bluffs, backdowns, alliances, a proxy war that nears disaster but ends in stalemate. A hero general takes a war into his own hands, disastrously. McCarthy forever poisons American politics with lies, hysteria and fear mongering. The US is lured into Vietnam, in part due to fear of appearing soft on Communism, and in a faraway country meets disaster. The six patricians look on as protestors and presidents they can’t abide change their world.

Greece: Athens and Sparta unite to defeat the Persians, then negotiate a peace treaty betwen themselves that lasts a few decades. Sparta, eying Athens growing empire and vast naval advantage, decides it can’t allow this to go on. It rallies its own allies and initiates twenty six years of war. Great speeches abound. Statesmen urge opposing policies and strategies. Allies and potential subject states are wooed, intimidated, defended. Allies switch sides at the drop of a helmet. Sparta builds up its naval capacity in part through its allies. The Athenian Alcibiades is a five or six times traitor as he repeatedly switches sides, makes side deals with the enemy, and generally finds no action to low. Athens is lured into a war of its allies in far-away Sicily. It depletes its treasury and almost its entire military force is destroyed. Back in its own seas, fighting for its life, it agrees to give up its democracy for an oligarchy and contemplates an alliance with the Persians.

Back to the Wise Men. Isaacson and Thomas are very skilled at following the threads of six lives and keeping their men’s personalities and actions distinct but related. These men were loyal friends, who all had some eperience in dealing with the Soviets early in their careers. Most served the State Department in some capacity there before World War II. This gave them varying, but well-founded, opinions on what the Soviet leadership might be up to in the subsequent decades.

Kennan is perhaps the most intriguing, as his early caution gave way to an earnest desire for peaceful co-existence later. Acheson is a key player throughout, although he was side-lined in the fifties after running afoul of McCarthy. Harriman is portrayed as the little boy with his hand in the air all the time eager to be called on to answer the question, serve as ambassador, negotiate with the Russians, be Secretary of State. He is portrayed as a skillful negotiator, but never got his chance as Secretary. Bohlen, Lovett, and McCloy I knew next to nothing about, but found they played essential roles in building air power, shaping and running the Marshall Plan, and generally advising on everything to president after president.

The patrician aspect of the authorial enterprise becomes problematic as we enter the sixties. There is no quarter given to LBJ. He is portrayed as a bellicose low-class grotesque. who single-mindely rejects the growing sentiment among not just the students in the streets but even these creators of the cold war that it is time to withdraw. No doubt there is a great deal of truth to this, but there is no credit given for Johnson’s other accomplishments or his complex character.

A small problem, in an engaging, well-written, and very educational book.

[Numidica · Rating 2 out of 5]

This was a DNF at about page 300. Despite my overall interest in the generation of leaders who helped win WW2 and then made such bad decisions in the Cold War, culminating in the disaster of Vietnam, I could not stick with this book. Frankly, it bored me. Maybe I was not in the right frame of mind for it, but I was not engaged, and it felt very much like a chore to read.

[Myles · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Wise Men, while an enlightening history of US foreign policy is a frustrating read.

It is the history of the creation of the US foreign policy establishment, its heyday, and its dissolution in the Reagan years. It is told through the biographies of six friends who formed the core of the establishment.

Each were remarkable men. Perhaps the most famous of them were Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the roving millionaire diplomat and once Governor of New York, Averell Harriman, son of the the 19th century railroad robber baron, E.H. Harriman.

Its biggest flaw is the absence of context for major events.

We enter the innermost conversations of US presidents, their military and diplomatic advisors.

The book’s high point is really the debate amongst war planners on what to do about the advancing Soviet armies in WWII. Despite wartime agreements Franklin Roosevelt never really pinned Stalin down on what he planned to do once Germany was defeated.

It’s one of the great turning points in history and was fun to read. What Stalin is doing, what Stalin might do, but there is no supporting research here about what the other side was actually thinking.

This book was first published in 1986 and we know so much more about the nascent Soviet Union than we did back then. This book really could stand some updating. For one thing we certainly know that Stalin was about self-preservation first.

American policy makers were scratching their heads over the intentions of the Communists, or were they Russians first and Communists second. Wait a minute, Stalin was Georgian, not Russian. Or perhaps more troubling, was the Soviet Union being being run by a criminal conspiracy that neither well-meaning Communists nor ordinary Russians approved of.

Any or all of these conclusions could have influenced American behaviour.

American policy makers certainly had some reason to believe the Soviet Union wouldn’t stop at Berlin. They had brutally butchered 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia in the Katyn Forest in April and May of 1940.

They were avowedly opponents of capitalism.

The extent of Stalin’s paranoia wasn’t fully known at the time, but the Western Allies gave him good reason to be paranoid if he wasn’t before:

1. They secretly developed first the A-Bomb then the Hydrogen bomb behind his back. (They didn’t realize a spy had given the Russians a heads up.)
2. No sooner had they defeated Germany than they were talking about re-arming Germany in the war’s aftermath.
3. They invented NATO to unite Western European nations against the Soviet Union and its satellites.
4. In the Truman years the Americans anointed themselves defenders of freedom around the world...even though knew they didn’t have the resources nor the commitment of Congress to make it happen.
5. The Marshall Plan helped rebuild Western Europe but left Eastern Europe a smoldering dump.
6. They were leaving thousands of troops in Western Europe even though the war was over.
7. They were actively recruiting German rocket experts, most notably Werner von Braun.
8. They were also recruiting German spies, incl. senior spies who had worked for the Nazis.

That was the Truman Doctrine. Self-appointed defenders of freedom.

Then they drew a line somewhere in the Pacific as their security perimeter. Unfortunately, that perimeter didn’t include South Korea and that blunder gave the Soviets and their North Korean clients reason to believe America would not come to South Korea’s defence. Thus the Korean War.

But the authors say nothing about what the Russians were thinking about Korea. Or about Laos. Or what Ho Chi Minh thought about the Chinese Communists north of the border.

And there was only fleeting discussion of CIA-hatched plots to keep countries out of the hands of the Soviets. Italy. Guatemala. Iran. Chile. Bay of Pigs. Funny how the decision to invade Cuba was left out of the book. It was on the Republican’s watch so what the hey. So much for the defenders of freedom.

The authors of this book would probably agree that the western allies time and time again overestimated the Soviet leadership. Stalin ruled his empire with fear. He emerged from the 1930’s having decimated the population of Ukraine with starvation and having slaughtered known and imagined political opponents.

In fact, Stalin’s team were lousy at feeding the population, at preparing for Nazi aggression, and building their foreign reserves. In their march westward they tore up Eastern European railways and industrial plants and left the Warsaw resistors to their fate as the German regiments tore them to pieces with Stalin’s divisions waiting for the dust to settle.

It was a terrible system and the disaster at Chernobyl sealed its fate.

The authors were happy to bury Lyndon Johnson under the debacle of Vietnam. Yes, it was self-inflicted. But the foreign-policy establishment really let him down. We’ll have to wait for Robert Caro’s next volume of The Years of Lyndon Johnson to get a better telling.

There is yet one more part of the story which seems little editorialized by the authors, and that is the distain for which the establishment bureaucrats hold the elected members of Congress.

Now given the hours some of them spent testifying in Congress in front of the red-baiting Sen. Joe McCarthy in the 1950’s, the distain and outright hatred for some of them is completely understandable. But on another level, it is reprehensible if you believe in the idea of self-government by the people.

It is nothing for the authors to praise or blame the Executive Branch for action on foreign policy. They assume it is perfectly ok for the President to make policies which have monumental impact on the budget of the Federal Government and the commitment of its soldiers.

In their minds it is no usurpation of authority for the Executive Branch to take these steps, and go cap in hand to Congress afterward for the spending authority. But as we see in this book, there is never any open discussion of ends and means on these issues.

The authors obscure the background of the Cuban Missile Crisis, an important part of which was the placing of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and they ignore much of the backchannel negotiations possibly because it wasn’t done by the heroes of the book.

The American electorate, somewhat intoxicated by the victory of WWII, followed somewhat blindly into the wars that followed. The authors blithely blame the isolationists for keeping America from taking its rightly place at the head of the community of nations.

Donald Trump is unilaterally ending that place of leadership to the horror of the modern day establishment. But his motivations for doing so are probably more destructive than anything tried before.

Books like this also make you wonder about the limits of sovereignty. Foreign policy is if nothing else, a means with which to project one sovereignty abroad. How helpful was that exercise if today we see the true limits of sovereignty? No obvious way to contain a pandemic. No obvious way to contain international crime. No obvious way to attack climate warming in a concerted global effort.

The allies fighting Nazism gave up a sterling chance to create global cooperation. Instead of competing to build nuclear arsenals NATO and the Soviet Union could have used that cooperation to build lasting institutions far more effective than the United Nations.

They tried it with nuclear test bans and non-proliferation treaties. They should have taken it much further.

All it required was giving up a modicum of sovereignty for the collective good. These “wise men” really could have done more. And they could have used a few wise women.

A new era began with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and, once again, a brief period when Americans were intoxicated with the smell of success. They won the Cold War.

And maybe the seeds the Wise Men had planted flowered after all.

But Putin? Really?

[Nicole · Rating 2 out of 5]

I can't believe it's finally over. I feel like I've been reading this book my whole life. It is so. Darn. LONG. And I like long books! Yeesh.

While interesting and thorough, I felt like I couldn't see the forest because there were just too many flippin' trees. There was just way, way too much detail. This is the second Walter Isaacson book I've read, and his writing philosophy seems to be, "If a point is worth making, it's worth belaboring." Not only was the mind-numbingly comprehensive recitation of detail tedious, it was exacerbated by a lack of overarching analysis and connective tissue. The tactical perspective was crystal clear, but the strategic viewpoint was fuzzy at best, and nonexistent at worst.

I really enjoyed the early parts of the book that focused on their roles in WWII and the immediate post war period. Then as it got into the Korean War, it started getting bogged down. And then the epilogue was really snobby and dismissive of public servants since those six men moved on.

Moral of the story - get the abridged version.

[Jana · Rating 4 out of 5]

True statesmen who served in both Democratic and Republican administrations. We need people like this in government today.

[Tom Brennan · Rating 2 out of 5]

Isaacson is a good writer. Or at least he is now. Thirty five years ago maybe not so much. The idea of this book is intriguing and Isaacson on the title sold it to me, but to put it simply it is just not well written. In attempting to tell the story of the beginning of the Cold War through the lens of these six men it becomes both too big and too small all at once. It is too big because you cannot write a biography of six men all at once. It is too small because in focusing on just the actions of these six men it leaves out numerous extraneous but tremendously important factors in the development of the Cold War. I love history, but I finished it only out of sheer character, and I cannot tell you any one particular thing I learned in consequence.

This is one of those zombie books - resurrected from a past generation - that should have been allowed to rest in peace.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a fascinating "collective biography" of six major, interrelated figures in the American establishment from the 1930s into the 1960s. Some might think of this as another "Best and Brightest," set earlier in time. But Halberstam's use of that term was ironic; here, the authors are not speaking ironically when they refer to the six as "the original brightest and best" (Page 19).

The beginning lays out what follows. Isaacson and Thomas observe that (Page 19): "Six friends. Their lives intertwined from childhood and schooldays, from their early days on Wall Street and in government. Now they were to be destined to be at the forefront of a remarkable transformation of American policy." They (Page 19) ". . .knew that America would have to assume the burden of a global role." And, say the authors, their (Page 19) ". . .outsized personalities and forceful actions brought order to the postwar chaos and left a legacy that dominates American policy to this day."

Those are some powerful statements. Does the book back these up? To a considerable extent, yes. But these six can hardly be said to have been the orchestrators. They were surely players, but to say that they were the architects of the American century (the title of the chapter in which these quotations are embedded) is too strong a statement.

Who were those among this sextet? George Kennan, Dean Acheson, Charles ("Chip") Bohlen, Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, and John McCloy. From their youth, they were trained to expect doing large things. For instance, Harriman took over his father's economic empire and grew it. Later in his life, he was elected as governor of New York (only to be defeated by Nelson Rockefeller after serving one term).

The story shows the interconnections among them. Harriman coached Acheson in rowing at Yale, for instance. As they matured, they sought careers in business. Later, all became interested in public service under the FDR Administration. The book chronicles their achievements (and some failures) in considerable detail from FDR's term on. The friction that flared among some from time to time is also discussed. They played major roles in the Truman Administration.

Later, when Lyndon Johnson tried to dissect what to do in Vietnam, he held a number of meetings, in which many of the "wise men" participated. Given Halberstam's discussion of the "best and brightest" who got the country into Vietnam and couldn't figure out how to succeed there, the "wise men" were opposed and raised their questions with Johnson.

Then, their final years and their fates. . . .

I think that there could be a somewhat more critical cast to the work, but it does a great job of portraying these eminent players in American politics. If there has been an "establishment," they were surely part of that in their time. I think that the authors may overestimate their impact, but they surely made a difference.

[Ted Hunt · Rating 4 out of 5]

I purchased this book when it was published in 1986, but never read it because I was unsure about reading a book about the Groton/Yale crowd who became the U.S. foreign policy establishment's "Wise Men." I was not interested in reading about the prep school/Ivy League world that these men emerged from, and, as expected. the book began with a thorough description of that world. However, if one gets through the first hundred pages, with its crew races and polo games, then the reader gets a superb view of how much this group of men helped to shape the foreign policy of the United States in the middle half of the 20th century. Familiar stories are retold, but through the lens of the story of these men, whose names are so familiar, yet whose full stories are not usually fully explored. The subject matter raises some interesting questions: was it wise to have at the center of American foreign policy so many men whose backgrounds were so similar to each other? Was the country better served by these very well educated and very affluent men than the people we get today in the upper echelons of power, whose motivations are often self-serving and political? Did these men help to create the Cold War or did they provide for us the strategy that won it (or both)? My only complaint about the book is that it tends to skip over the events (like the Bay of Pigs) where their imprint was not felt, even if those events had a profound impact on subsequent foreign policy decisions and crises. The bottom line is that, for these men, their particular political party affiliation and that of whoever was President at the time did not matter as much as serving their country. They truly possessed the quality of "civic virtue" that our Founders felt would be essential to the success of the republic, and which seems to be in short supply today.

[Joseph Sciuto · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The Wise Men: Six Friends and The World They Made," is an extraordinary, thought-provoking, and captivating look at the six men, most of whom were graduates of the famous Groton school and later graduates of Yale, Harvard, and Princeton who helped shape American foreign policy for way over fifty years. Often working in the private sector as bankers, Wall Street Insiders, and Railroad Tycoons they immediately responded to the call whenever their government and president sought their advice and council... Taking government jobs as Secretary of State, Ambassadors, Secretary of War, and National Security Advisor... Working for Presidents FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter, and Ronald Reagan. They differed in political philosophy, some leaning left while others leaned right; yet together they were the chief architectures of the Marshal Plan, convincing President Truman about the importance of rebuilding Western Europe after World War 2, despite Congressional and public reluctance to the idea, keeping lines of communication open with the Soviet Union, despite its aggressive takeover of Eastern Europe, building the alliance that came to be called NATO, and which was a major deterrant to Soviet aggression and fighting Communism wherever it spread leading us into two unpopular wars in Korea and Vietnam.

The six men, Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Robert Lovett, John McCloy and Charles Bohlen are hardly household names, even to individuals who think of themselves as knowledgable about American history, but their contributions to American greatness and America's status as a World Power is undeniable and as a nation we should be thankful for their unselfish duty to country... even if at times their philosophy and policies lead us down the wrong path.

A must read. Highly recommend.

[Vivek · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book works on two levels. On one, it is an excellent biography of six men dedicated to public service who were involved in American diplomacy during a critical time in the nation's history (WWII & the early Cold War). On another it explains how the powerful ideas (containment, anti-communism) guiding American foreign policy during the Cold War were formed and the force that these ideas took on beyond the control of their creators.

This is the best book I've read about the Cold War. Other books might focus on the theories and implementation of Cold War strategy (John Gaddis' excellent Strategies of Containment A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War for example), but by focusing on six men who were in the thick of it, this book gave me a better understanding of how and why these strategies were formed.

[Richard Marney · Rating 4 out of 5]

As a history of these extraordinary men and their times, the author once again distinguished himself. A rich reading experience!

More than this, I took away a sense of having traveled back into my youth, for both good and bad, where the Cold War cast its baleful shadow over our lives, but men of great erudition and commitment to public service strived to keep us safe.

[RANGER · Rating 4 out of 5]

Deep Dive into the Lives and Cold War Canon of the Secular Saints of the Establishment
"The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made" is a 4.5 star establishment history by two figures of the Washington DC establishment, Walter Isaacson, Academic, Rhodes Scholar, and CEO of the Aspen Institute; and Evan Thomas, Biographer, Journalist, and CIA Chronicler. Both attended Harvard.
"The Wise Men," published in 1986, is a combination biography and history. It is a biography of the lives of six men: Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Robert Lovett, John McCloy, and Charles Bohlen. It is a history of the impact these six men had WWII and on post-war history. It is focused on Cold War events from 1945-1972 and US-Soviet relations from the 1920s through to about 1980. The edition I read is a 2013 Simon and Schuster paperback.
It an extremely well-written, readable book despite clocking in at over 740 pages for the main text. There are substantial endnotes, index and bibliography.
If you are into Establishment studies and embrace conventional history, you will love the glowing, gushing tone, the insider information, the behind-the-scenes insights, and the way the book depicts the passing of the establishment baton from people like Elihu Root to Henry Stimson, to the Six Wise Men, to the likes of Cy Vance, Henry Kissinger, and William and McGeorge Bundy (among others).
If you are an outsider (like me), bit of a conspiracist, and distrust the Establishment's Frankenstein Deep State creations (the military industrial complex, rogue intelligence community, and the mainstream media complex), all your worst fears and suspicions will be thoroughly confirmed. You will note the overweening presence of Chase-Manhattan Bank, Wall Street, the Rockefellers, the CIA, and the consistent willingness of the Six Wise Men to engage in conflict-of-interest practices that would raise eyebrows and F-bombs today on popular podcasts and result in marathon Congressional investigations ultimately leading (as they mostly do) to nowhere.
The importance of this book lies in revealing the mind-set and social background of the men who set up the modern Foreign Policy Establishment and the on-going pursuit of a Global Order led by the Anglo-American Elites. And that makes "The Wise Men" a very important book indeed.
Being a long-term national security guy, policy wonk, and Big Government careerist with a passion for Cold War history (and conspiracy studies) I thoroughly enjoyed "The Wise Men." But I hesitate to give this book five stars. Some limitations:
- Despite efforts to come across as a "warts and all" popular history, the authors' own establishment bona fides lend them to coming across as hagiographical in tone. These are Establishment Saints and Establishment Canon we are talking about here. Everyone means well, is honest and wise, and best of all "selfless in service." Which comes across as ridiculous at times.
- The incessant name dropping and vast cast of establishment figures chronicled in this book can be confusing. Besides the Six there are dozens of others introduced to the reader.
- The biographies focus on the wealth, schools, social status, friendships, and personalities of the Six, with an emphasis on the shaping forces that put them in positions of influence. There are gaps. And one suspects from the tone that much that would reflect poorly on the Sainthood of the Six has been left out.
- You need to have a strong base of understanding of post-war history and government structure including events leading up to the Korean War and Vietnam War to appreciate the way all the dots are connected. Otherwise, much of the book's middle will be boring.
Despite my laundry list of reservations, this is a great book and has stood the test of time.
For people who really want to know how America came to be what is is today, who set the GPS of our national destiny, and the kinds of people who still operate behind the scenes to shape US foreign, financial, and social policy, "The Wise Men" is a worthy place to look for answers.
It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.

[Harold · Rating 1 out of 5]

I bought this because it is co-written by Walter Isaacson, who wrote the Jobs biography, and a wonderful book on Kissinger.

I got about half way through. It is the six biographies of men I vaguely remember as being aging luminaries when I was a child. Unfortunately the idea of a 6 person biography (instead of a diplomatic history of the period) doesn't work. None of them was important or interesting enough for me to want to read about their formative years (but I did). And as adults, I couldn't keep them straight. About half way through the book, I admitted defeat.

I picked up 6 Characters in Search of an Author instead. (Just kidding.)

[Washington Post · Rating 5 out of 5]

A study of the men who advised Harry Truman about how to rebuild Europe and contain communism in the years after World War II.

“Washington was filled with excitement that sunny Monday: Dwight Eisenhower, the returning hero, was greeted by the largest crowds in the city’s history as he paraded down Pennsylvania Avenue. Wedged into Truman’s afternoon schedule — between lunches and dinners and other ceremonies honoring Eisenhower — was the meeting on Japanese strategy.”

[noblethumos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas’s The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (1986) is a landmark study of mid-twentieth-century American statesmanship. Combining biography, political history, and intellectual portraiture, the book examines the lives and careers of six figures—Dean Acheson, Charles E. Bohlen, W. Averell Harriman, George F. Kennan, Robert A. Lovett, and John J. McCloy—who, as the authors argue, shaped the architecture of U.S. foreign policy in the age of the Cold War. Written with narrative verve and interpretive depth, The Wise Men is both an account of elite decision-making and an elegy for a style of leadership grounded in public service, strategic realism, and social cohesion.


Isaacson and Thomas’s central thesis is that these six men, bound by shared values, education, and social background, constituted an informal governing class whose collective influence extended far beyond their official positions. Educated at elite schools, forged in the crucible of the Great Depression and the Second World War, and united by a sense of duty inherited from the Anglo-American establishment, they translated their personal networks into institutional power. In doing so, they became the principal architects of containment, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the postwar liberal international order. The authors contend that their worldview—rooted in pragmatic idealism and restrained by moral seriousness—offered a model of leadership that has since disappeared from American political life.


The structure of the book is both biographical and thematic. Each chapter intertwines the personal histories of the six subjects with the major crises of U.S. diplomacy, from the negotiations at Yalta to the Korean War and the early years of Vietnam. The narrative alternates between private correspondence and public policy, allowing readers to see how the habitus of America’s eastern establishment—the clubs, law firms, and universities of New England—became the incubator of a foreign policy elite. The authors’ detailed use of archival materials, interviews, and contemporaneous documents gives the text both intimacy and authority.


One of the book’s major contributions lies in its portrayal of the ethos of the American governing class at mid-century. Isaacson and Thomas describe “the Wise Men” as products of a particular historical and cultural milieu—cosmopolitan yet paternalistic, self-confident yet cautious, liberal yet anti-radical. Their diplomacy was guided by a belief in balance: between idealism and realism, engagement and restraint, Europe and Asia. Drawing implicitly on the intellectual tradition of Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism, they viewed foreign policy as a moral enterprise conducted within the limits of power. The authors suggest that this ethical realism was the foundation of what later scholars, such as John Lewis Gaddis, would call the “strategy of containment.”


Yet the book is not a hagiography. Isaacson and Thomas are sensitive to the limitations and blind spots of their subjects. They note that the same insularity that fostered unity also bred arrogance; that their patrician confidence in their own judgment often led to exclusionary decision-making; and that their adherence to Cold War orthodoxy constrained dissenting perspectives. The authors trace how this elite consensus, initially a source of stability, ossified into complacency during the Vietnam era, when the “Wise Men” themselves became divided between hawks and skeptics. The tension between moral authority and technocratic power thus forms one of the book’s central themes.


From an academic standpoint, The Wise Men occupies an important place within the historiography of American foreign policy. It belongs to the tradition of elite studies and institutional history exemplified by works such as C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite (1956) and Richard Rovere’s The American Establishment (1961), but it departs from their structural determinism. Isaacson and Thomas focus less on class analysis than on character and culture. Their approach is prosopographical: by tracing the interconnections among individuals, they reveal how networks of education, friendship, and shared experience generated a coherent foreign policy elite. In this sense, the book bridges narrative biography and sociological insight, offering a textured account of how personal ethics and institutional roles intersect in the making of history.


Stylistically, the book reflects Isaacson’s later reputation as one of America’s foremost biographers. The prose is lucid, balanced, and occasionally elegiac, conveying both admiration for and distance from its subjects. The authors write with a journalist’s eye for detail and a historian’s sense of structure, producing a narrative that is both accessible and intellectually serious. While the tone occasionally borders on nostalgia for a lost era of elite governance, the analysis remains grounded in evidence and reflective of broader questions about leadership and legitimacy in modern democracy.


Critically, The Wise Men has been praised for its synthesis of personal and political history but also questioned for its implicit idealization of elite rule. Subsequent scholarship, particularly from revisionist and post-revisionist schools of Cold War history, has challenged the assumption that this patrician group’s worldview was either coherent or benevolent. Yet the enduring value of the book lies not in its normative judgments but in its reconstruction of a historical culture: a world in which diplomacy was guided by shared norms of responsibility, moderation, and service—traits that, the authors suggest, have eroded in the age of mass politics and bureaucratic specialization.


In retrospect, The Wise Men remains a definitive account of how a small, interconnected group of men helped to define the strategic and moral contours of American global power in the twentieth century. Its combination of narrative richness and interpretive depth ensures its place among the classic works on American statecraft. For scholars of diplomatic history, political sociology, and the history of elites, it offers an indispensable study of how culture, character, and conviction can shape the fate of nations.

GPT

[Cliff · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is, without a doubt, one of the best, easiest to read yet incredibly deep and detailed, history books I've ever read. Yet it's more than that. It's also book about diplomacy and how it's done, about relationships between friends, foes, rivals, and more. It's about how Washington works, or at least worked, and what it means for those who play the game.

The book undoubtedly admirers the six men involved, Dean Acheson, Charles E. Bohlen, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Robert Lovett, and John J. McCloy, but it doesn't shy away from their limitations, particularly later on once their day had passed. The author makes a strong case, perhaps too strong, that they were all wrong about Vietnam for various reasons. But by that time, their place in history as great men was already well earned. The role they played in the end of World War 2, the reconstruction of Europe, and the building of alliances and mollification of rivalries that would last till the end of the Cold War, was unparalleled.

Beyond that though, it shows, I thought, why the separation of powers works so well. Each man had limitations, severe in some ways. Yet they managed to balance each other out, even serving in different ways in different places and times. Kennan's pessimism could easily have been disastrous, but for Harriman's relative optimism. Acheson's haughtiness could have caused bigger problems if not for others being there to provide different perspectives and put different skill sets to the problem.

Anyhow, I doubt I can really say much about this book that hasn't already been said. It's worthy of its reputation and will probably be worth a re-read. I'm sure I'll thumb through it from time to time. It's a tome that has more wisdom than 10 more like it.

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book, providing a blend of biographical and historical narrative for key figures and actions shaping U.S. foreign policy during the mid-20th century. The authors, American journalists and historians Evan Thomas and Walter Isaacson, deliver an insightful look into the lives of six influential American statesmen—Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, John McCloy, Robert Lovett, and Charles Bohlen, as well as many of the other prominent decision makers of American diplomatic, military, and financial policy from the 1930s to the 1960s. The authors’ prose and meticulous research showcase the collective impact of a never-quite-defined “establishment” on major policies such as the Marshall Plan and the strategy of containment during the Cold War. The varied focus adds depth to the narrative, providing readers with both detailed individual portraits and a comprehensive understanding of the period’s global politics. Highly recommended for anyone interested in the history of America’s transitions before, during, and after World War II.

[Vidur Kapur · Rating 4 out of 5]

An immensely detailed account of half a century of US foreign policy from 1920 to 1970, illustrated through the lives of six policymakers and diplomats whose collective influence peaked around 1950. Around this time, they served as Truman’s de facto National Security Adviser (Averell Harriman), Secretary of State (Dean Acheson), Defense Secretary (Robert Lovett), High Commissioner for Germany (John McCloy), and State Department Counselor (George Kennan and Chip Bohlen). All of them held roles in the State Department, the US Embassy in Moscow, or the War Department during the Second World War.

All were either born into the WASP establishment or accepted into it at elite universities, though their personalities differed markedly. In brief: Harriman is portrayed as wealthier than he is intelligent, the man sent to negotiate with world leaders (whom he liked to collect like trophies); Acheson is the witty elitist snob sporting a moustache and a pinstripe suit; Lovett is shy but light-hearted; Bohlen is not too bright but very socially adept; McCloy is ‘Mr Worldwide’, the guy who’s one day the head of the World Bank and the next finds himself the proconsul of Germany; and Kennan is the intelligent, prophetic though contradictory and moody recluse.

Their postwar successes from 1945-1950 form perhaps the central plank of the book, which covers the Iran Crisis of 1946, intervention in the Greek Civil War and the Turkish Straits crisis, Kennan’s containment strategy (implemented in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan), the exclusion of French and Italian Communists from power in May 1947, Stalin’s humiliation during the Berlin Blockade and Airlift, and the creation of NATO and the European Coal and Steel Community.

Although the “wise men” mainly served under or advised the Democratic administrations of FDR, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson, not all of them were Democrats by birth or by nature. McCloy was a Republican. So was Lovett, though he nevertheless tended to vote Democratic because he thought they “had either better men or a better idea of what was going on”. Harriman came from a wealthy Republican-supporting family, but became a Democrat in response to the Wall Street Crash and the Republican Party’s isolationism and protectionism.

Nor did all of them agree all of the time on the specifics. As was also described in American Prometheus, Kennan went off to work at Robert Oppenheimer’s Institute for Advanced Study after he had disagreements with Truman, Acheson and Paul Nitze (the author of NSC-68, which called for a massive military buildup) about how militarised the US’s containment strategy was becoming and the development of the hydrogen bomb. The men also disagreed during the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises of 1961 and 1962 respectively, and over the Vietnam War, with Acheson in particular becoming more hawkish as he aged and Kennan and Harriman moving in the opposite direction.

Contrary to stereotype, then, Cold Warriors were not monolithic in their views by any means. Many of them in turn recognised that their Communist adversaries were not automatons but human beings with whom they could develop relationships and (occasionally) reach mutually beneficial agreements. Indeed, I was surprised by how close some of them became to the Soviet leaders (I didn’t expect to see a photograph of McCloy and Khrushchev swimming in Sochi) and how adored Harriman was in Russia over the decades as a result of his being the Ambassador to Moscow during the Second World War.

That isn’t to say that they didn’t succumb to groupthink. None of them felt able to share their doubts about MacArthur’s ultimately disastrous strategy during the Korean War, and in Vietnam most shared the assumption that US “credibility” was on the line even though they correctly feared that it would become a quagmire. This led to an “in for a penny, in for a pound” attitude, much like hawks in recent history urged the Trump and Obama administrations to escalate in Iran and Syria because US honour was at stake. British Prime Minister Tony Blair similarly thought that he had to join Bush in the Iraq War because it wouldn’t be “credible” to do otherwise. Only Kennan thought that the US should be realistic about what its core interests were.

The book is not uncritical of its subjects, though it seems restrained in places. Mistakes over Korea and Vietnam are highlighted, but aren’t treated as if they led to hundreds of thousands of people (including thousands of Americans) losing their lives. That the Wise Men had good intentions or internal doubts which they failed to voice is sufficient to exculpate them from serious charges in the authors’ eyes. In other words, they endorse what they report one of their subjects, Chip Bohlen, would tell his children when they protested that Vietnam was immoral: “Twas not a crime, but a mistake” (though the original French saying suggests that this makes matters worse!)

It’s true enough that outcomes would have been just as bad if not worse had the Republican hawks who were criticising the Truman and Johnson administrations for not going far enough been in charge. But the authors clearly believe that there is some merit to the designation of their subjects as Wise Men. Wisdom is usually meant to grow rather than shrink over time, so we might speculate that they pull their punches in order to preserve the book’s central premise, which is reliant on the subjects’ earlier successes. Had they refrained from passing judgment on the people they write about, that would have been another thing entirely, but characters like MacArthur, McCarthy and John Foster Dulles come in for plenty of criticism, and the Wise Men themselves are sometimes criticised fairly harshly for comparatively minor missteps or faux pas.

All in all, this is a great book for anyone interested in the day-by-day minutiae of Cold War policymaking, but the authors’ sympathies and biases are barely concealed.

[Kent · Rating 4 out of 5]

A portrait of The Establishment: the men--estrogen levels all but undetectable in this circle--responsible for defining the international role America was to play following the second world war. Very well written, and not an easy task, I imagine, intertwining the biographies of six men. It did take me a while to get a handle on the dramatis personae, though. At first, I was a bit dismayed that there was so little reference to the domestic situation of the times until I realized to what extent US foreign policy makers of the post-war era were impervious to local politics. The authors obviously admire their subjects yet offer up a largely dispassionate and impartial analysis. They do a fine job of examining the evolution of America's cold war foreign policy and vividly depict how the Establishment sowed the seeds of its own destruction. All in all, a work worthy of that old chestnut of back-cover blurbs: "a remarkable achievement."

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

Isaacson traces the careers and personalities of six men of the "political establishment." Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Robert Lovett, John McCloy, and Charles Bohlen served 4 administrations and advised 2 more. Their outlook, assumptions and experience shaped the American century, rebuilt Europe and mired the country in 2 land wars in Asia.

Why I started this book: The title caught my eye as I was browsing my library's Overdrive collection. After waiting on hold for months, it was my turn to power thru.

Why I finished it: At 33 hours and 27 minutes this was not for the faint of heart or the casual interest. And yet for all that, with 6 main leads there was lots of times when I wanted more depth about subjects that I knew about... and parts that I wanted to skip completely because who cares? Interesting to relearn the moments of decision and see it thru a prism of friendship and old boy networks.

[Book Dragon · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book provides a good overview of American foreign policy. These wise men who became part of the establishment dedicate themselves to public service and help navigate United States foreign policies through World War II, Soviet containment during the Cold War years, Arab Israeli conflict and the Vietnam war. After reading this book one may be more appreciative of the effort put forth by public service personnel to make any policy a “fait accompli”. A country’s political dogma needs to be flexible with changing times, but at the same time it should not be disdained all together with each change in the administration.

While I enjoyed reading about the different events that led to the policy at the time, the read was a bit cumbersome. I got a bit bogged down because there were a lot of moving parts given it’s a six person biography. I’d like to give this book a 3.5 stars if Good reads allowed it.

[Ellis Katz · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a great book! The authors give us a sympathetic, yet frank study of the six men who dominated American foreign policy making from the 1930s through the 1950s. Dean Acheson, Chip Bphlen, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Robert Lovett and John McCloy constituted a foreign policy elite that crossed institutional lines to shape our policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War Era. This is not to say that thy always agreed with each other. Indeed they they had some pretty nasty fights, but there is no denying their impact on America, and on the world. The book is very readable and provides so much information that I simply did not know. I am glad I read the book and recommend to all readers.

[Zach · Rating 5 out of 5]

Truly, a remarkable tour de force by Isaacson and Thomas about the six men that shaped the post-World War II world and the Pax Americana. If one wants to find out how the world got to where it was during the Cold War, read this book. For a Cold War enthusiast like myself and someone who wrote their master's thesis on NATO, this book really allowed me to see deeper into how these six men pushed America to become the indispensable nation that it is today. There are great thinkers in foreign policy now, but none that rival the likes of Acheson, McCloy, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, and Lovett anymore.

[Chris Bartholomew · Rating 4 out of 5]

An exceptionally good book about a group of men in positions of power and influence from the close of WWII up until the Nixon years. It mostly revolves around Dean Achenson, George Kennan, John McCloy, Averell Harriman and Charles Bolhlen. All were instrumental in reshaping both U.S. policy and the future of Europe after the war. They remained over sized figures through both the Korean and Vietnam wars. The authors did a great job covering a lot of ground.

[Steve Lacey · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Wise Men

Without fear of exaggeration, I call this tome a masterpiece of important historical writing. The era of the 1930s thru the 1980s was filled with momentous decisions with results likely to reverberate thru the ages and the wise men were at the fulcrum of history in the best tradition of American life. The chronicle is a must read for those who seek to plan for and impact the next century.

[Cathy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am fascinated by Isaacson's in-depth details of pre- and post- WWII government in the U.S. He takes six men who were highly instrumental in rebuilding post-war Europe and gives really good details of both their successes and failures as well as their personal background. You also get a glimpse into Turman's courage in some of his decisions.

[Kevin Sheives · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic, gripping portrayal of the key post Cold War foreign policy establishment. Love how Isaacson and Thomas weave friendship and policy together. Always nice to read a bio where Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower play secondary roles to underbelly of US foreign policy during those turbulent times.