Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961

by Walter L. Hixson

During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Washington policymakers aspired to destabilize the Soviet and East European Communist Party regimes by implementing programs of psychological warfare and gradual cultural infiltration. In focusing on American propaganda and cultural infiltration of the Soviet empire in these years, Parting the Curtain emerges as a groundbreaking study of certain aspects of US Cold War diplomacy never before examined.

Genres: History, American History, Grad School

299 pages, Paperback

First published January 15, 1997

Reviews

[Rick Roseberry · Rating 5 out of 5]

In his revealing and fascinating tome, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945 – 1961, Walter L. Hixson examines official U.S. government efforts to use propaganda and culture to destabilize communist regimes in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet-dominated states in Eastern Europe. In his introduction, he explains, “Although these efforts usually remained on the periphery of Cold War strategy, I have found that they were more significant that generally recognized.” (ix) His focus in the book is on propaganda and culture as components of national security policy, and laments “cultural diplomacy has yet to receive the attention it deserves.” (x) He inserts a third layer of analysis to the traditional military and economic categorization of international relations – suggesting that international relations are intertwined with intercultural relations. Hixson’s central thesis is that “American mass culture has been one of the country’s greatest foreign policy assets,” and “The nation’s rise to world power was inextricably linked with the dissemination of images of affluence, consumerism, middle-class status, individual freedom, and technological progress.” (xi)

Hixson is a knowledgeable scholar on the subject of the cold war. He is a professor of history at the University of Akron and the author of several books and articles in scholarly journals, including The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy, several works on George F. Keenan, and several on the Vietnam War. In addition to his noteworthy credentials on the subject, he has masterfully used primary sources from the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the CIA, as well as numerous secondary sources to support his arguments.

Hixson notes the aversion of the American public and government to propaganda, or even the term, in the wake of the use and misuse of the device by the Bolsheviks during the revolution and the Nazis during World War II. President Harry S. Truman overruled them when he authorized the continuation of the Voice of America (VOA), though sharply curtailed by funding cuts, the USIA. The introduction of the Marshall Plan to revive Western Europe was a propaganda coup countered by the Soviets by their formation of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in 1947. The Soviets bombarded developing nations with Cominform propaganda and cultural exchanges, while the U.S. responded with the Fulbright educational exchange program, miniscule in comparison to the Soviet effort. The Soviets began to purge their society of western influence, so Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act to promote propaganda and cultural exchanges abroad. The “Campaign of Truth” was initiated by Truman in 1950 as the propaganda clash of the cold war began, spurring a “renaissance” in psychological warfare. (16) When Eisenhower became president, he rejected Truman’s containment policy against communism and embraced a “liberation” policy, intending to use propaganda and covert operations to achieve it. (22) The opening salvos of the cold war were fired on the radio, by VOA, the effectiveness of which the Soviets acknowledged by jamming the broadcasts. Jamming could not stop the “whisper propaganda,” however, Soviet citizens passing VOA depictions of western life from person to person. (52) Even with the expansion of propaganda outlets with the establishment of the ostensibly privately owned Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL), and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), use of propaganda declined in favor of cultural exchanges. American propaganda had erroneously convinced East Germans, Poles, and Hungarians that the U.S. would militarily support “liberation” during an uprising, which they discovered, to their chagrin, was not the case. Evolution, rather than liberation, became the watchword as the focus toward cultural exchanges began.

Hixson criticizes Eisenhower sharply for missing an opportunity for détente with his rejection of Stalin’s “Peace note” and his following the advice of John Foster Dulles to eschew negotiations with the Soviets. This, he claims, led to the nuclear and conventional arms race of the cold war. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” and “Open Skies” proposals were merely propaganda stunts, according to Hixson. Nevertheless, Eisenhower was genuinely enthused by the opportunity for East-West exchanges and cultural contact, which he believed could turn the tide of Soviet public opinion. Hixson’s reviews the 1958 cultural agreement that led to the American exhibit in Moscow in 1959. “While the Soviets hoped that the rival exhibition would spur their own economic development,” he explains, “Washington sought to exploit an unprecedented opportunity for propaganda and cultural infiltration of the USSR.” (165) The exhibition in Solkoniki Park was a huge success, especially in view of the Soviet response to try to sabotage its effectiveness. The ensuing temporary thaw in relations and the genuine effort on the part of Khrushchev and Eisenhower to improve relations between their countries came to a screeching halt when the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers’ U-2. Thus, “Eisenhower left office bitterly disappointed over having failed to achieve a breakthrough in the Cold War”. Hixson lays the blame on Eisenhower himself, charging “his own lack of leadership accounts in large measure for the inability to achieve a wider détente.” (224)

Hixson’s book is well written, thoroughly researched, and explores a part of American diplomacy that Hixson says “has yet to receive the attention it deserves.” (x) By supporting his thesis with solid research, he has rectified that shortcoming, as the reader inevitably concludes that American mass culture has indeed been one of the country’s greatest foreign policy assets.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hixson takes a look at a familiar point in American history - the early days of the Cold War, under Truman and Eisenhower's presidencies - and turns it slightly on its side, examining particularly the American propaganda efforts in winning hearts and minds in Europe. From radio broadcasts to national exhibitions, culminating in the famous "kitchen debate" between Khrushchev and Nixon.

While it's easy to get lost in the weeds of Voice of America vs. Radio Free Europe vs. Radio in the American Sector, Hixson does a good job focusing on the bureaucratic battles being waged in Washington. He identifies and criticizes America's choice to militarize the conflict with the Soviet Union from the outset, rather than seeking diplomatic solutions, and while that may seem an obvious point, Hixson's writing on the topic is clear and persuasive.

I'd have liked to see a bit more on why he thinks American propaganda efforts in the 1940s and 50s were so significant - he seems to draw a straight line between winning hearts and minds in the Eisenhower administration and the downfall of European communism thirty years later, but I'm not sure I followed his claims on that point.

[Andrew Sternisha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really solid book in which Hixson makes a strong case that culture and propaganda had a significant effect on the outcome of the Cold War. Hixson also illustrates that Eisenhower had a chance to deescalate the conflict in his second term, but often went against his own instincts and instead chose more aggressive actions that his advisors advocated, forcing Khrushchev to side with those in his circle who wanted to take a hardline stance toward the US. The material is dense and may be a challenge for those not steeped in diplomatic history, but the last two chapters where Hixson describes the Sokolniki exhibition and its aftermath are easy to read narratives. Highly recommended for those interested in the fall of the USSR and The Cold War more broadly.

[Claire Gutierrez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting book about Cold War propaganda and US-Russian relations.

[Kristin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good info, but a very dense and not exactly reader friendly text.