Sectarianism in Iraq provides the first comprehensive analysis of the toxic issue of sectarian relations and sectarian identity in Iraq. Rather than reducing Arab Iraq to unchanging Sunnis and Shias, Fanar Haddad explores the social processes underlining the fluid dynamic of sectarian from coexistence to civil war. By exploring the often antagonistic mythologies and nationalist symbolisms of Iraqi Shias and Iraqi Sunnis, Haddad charts the constantly fluctuating relevance of sectarian identity through periods of calm and upheaval and focusses on two milestones that will continue to impact on sectarian relations in the uprisings of 1991 and the fall of the Baath in 2003.
A Singapore based analyst of Middle Eastern and Iraqi affairs. He previously lectured at the University of Exeter and has worked extensively on Iraq and the wider region, most recently as an analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
I came to realize how awful the arab media reported in Iraq. I knew this before reading this book but alas, the extent of how bad the reporting exceeded my expectations upon reading and reflecting on the facts analyzed by the author. The arab media foisted a narrative that was completely and unfortunately anti-shia and not understanding of the pre-2003 order and especially the events of 1990's. The narrative existed was that sectarianism itself was nascent and recent...and there were no prior experiences/myths/symbols (real or imagined) from the state or people of it before the 2003 war.
It would have been more correct to state that sectarian strife or sectarian civil war is recent but sectarianism in itself definitely was not. Afterall, the dominant narrative never pictures itself as sectarian leaning since it is dominant and secure. Only a shakeup of the status quo, which occurred after the war that things started to be viewed differently and that questions were raised.
For example, the sudden maybe "bitter" realization of the fact that iraqi sunnis are a numerical minority but had "cultural ownership" of the state and the political sway for a very long time. This sorta of power helps create and also sustain a facade of a deceitful narrative that was comforting albeit rather untrue or at the very least not eternal or sustainable in the longer run.
The authors categorization of attitudes of how sectarianism is expressed; aggressive-passive"unapologetic" and banal.
The chapters dealing with the 1990's events memories, the fact that sectarianism and nationalism are not exclusive to eachother.(the author went to great and convincing lengths to explain how wrong this line of thinking or viewing things were.)
My only complaint of the book is probably that I wanted to read more (it was an engrossing read!!)...especially concerning the civil-war(last chapter). It was quite short,given that all the preceding chapters were to lead to it.
I liked it very much. The author offers a careful and nuanced reconstruction of sectarianism as a political concept. Drawing on materials such as poetry, conference records, and online discourse collected in London, he deliberately seeks out middle- and lower-level voices in order to trace the evolution of sectarianism in Iraq. He shows how early social divisions were shaped more prominently by urban–rural and tribal differences; how, after the founding of the Iraqi state, Shiʿi narratives of the 1920 revolt were suppressed; and how, under the Baʿth regime, Arabness was emphasized while open discussion of sectarianism was discouraged—during which period everyday awareness of sectarian identity remained limited.
The analytical focus of the book lies in the 1991 Shiʿi uprising/rebellion in southern Iraq, an event that profoundly intensified sectarian tensions. As the Iraqi state gradually eroded under the impact of the Gulf War and international sanctions, religious, sectarian, and tribal identities all began to resurface and gain prominence. This trajectory was further accelerated after the U.S. invasion in 2003, when the politicization of sectarian identity deepened and ultimately culminated in the devastating civil war of 2006–2007.
Despite this, the author remains relatively optimistic. He emphasizes that even during the civil war, poetry continued to stress an overarching Iraqi identity, and that sectarian conflict was not a zero-sum struggle for mutual annihilation. Rather, it was a contest over state legitimacy and cultural authority. He further argues that state nationalism and sectarian nationalism are not inherently contradictory, but instead fluctuate in relation to the inclusiveness of the former.
The books central argument is that sectarian peace or tension depends on the surrounding socioeconomic and political conditions. Thus, there will be times of relative unity and then times of sectarian strife. Overall, the book was not very compelling. Haddad uses an inordinate amount of long, block quotes that he then never explains. He provides many poems that of subtle sectarian undertones but never fully demonstrates what these are. I had been hoping that this book would give me a nice overview of recent Iraqi history but it mostly takes for granted that the reader already knows this information. Haddad identified four ways in which sectarian identity was mobilized: “external influence, economic competition, competing myth-symbol complexes and contested cultural ownership of the nation” (10). External influence cropped up often when conspiracy theorists were fearing Iranian involvement. In the 1991 uprisings the state perpetuated the narrative that Iran had played a role in the Shi’a uprisings to deflect attention off the failure of the state. Contested cultural ownership of the nation seemed to be at the crux of the sectarian conflict. Neither side wanted to destroy or banish the other, rather each side wanted the state to assert their cultural identity.