The defense by his enemies! On the specific war crimes charge of ordering unrestricted submarine warfare, Dönitz was found "[not] guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships", because they were often armed and equipped with radios which they used to notify the Admiralty of attack[24][29] but the judges found, "Dönitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936 to which Germany acceded, and which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930... The order of Dönitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, violation of the Protocol... The orders, then, prove Dönitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol... the sentence of Dönitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare."[24][30] His sentence on unrestricted submarine warfare was not assessed, because of similar actions by the in particular, the British Admiralty on 8 May 1940 had ordered all vessels in the Skagerrak sunk on sight; and Admiral Chester Nimitz, wartime commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, stated the U.S. Navy had waged unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific from the day the U.S. entered the war. Thus although Dönitz was found guilty of waging unrestricted submarine warfare against unarmed neutral shipping by ordering all ships in designated areas in international waters to be sunk without warning, no additional prison time was added to his sentence for this crime.[24] Dönitz was imprisoned for 10 years in Spandau Prison in what was then West Berlin.[31]
"Even the most interested and committed readers of contemporary history have never heard of it: it is the most unknown book in the world. Needless to say, it has been out of print for years. And it is not only the most unknown, but also the most dangerous: its subject is the sentencing of Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz to ten years' imprisonment by the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.
Some four hundred voices on this most sensitive of cases have been collected by editors H. K. Thompson and Henry Strutz. It is primarily the military elite of the United States and the world who comment in this book, but one also learns why John F. Kennedy was among the most outspoken critics of the Nuremberg trials. And herein lies the real provocation of this volume: It is not resentful Germans who are belatedly inflating and glossing over the guilt. The highest officers from the ranks of the war opponents and the neutrals take the floor for Dönitz, the condemned enemy. Admiral Stark, who directed naval operations in the Atlantic during World War II and was thus Dönitz's direct opponent, expresses himself cautiously when he writes: "I am not sure there was any legal basis for war crimes trials of men who fought honorably for their country." Most of the others from the admiralty and generalship of America and Britain speak of a "distorted image" (travesty) of a trial under the rule of law and blame the "hysteria" of the early postwar period. Surprisingly many among the contributors praise the military genius of the Grand Admiral. Some, like William Langer, governor of North Dakota, wrote personal messages, "I have always felt, and still do, that you were treated unfairly in the heat of the moment." Poet T. S. Eliot recalls the war crimes at Katyn - the perpetrators were the Soviets, who helped sit in judgment on Dönitz. Lord Chatfield, British naval admiral and member of the War Cabinet, mentions the atomic bombs on Japan: "The Allies were anything but blameless."
Moving in their futility are Vice Admiral John F. Shafroth's congratulations on Dönitz's release in 1956: he hoped that he would now be accorded the affection and honors of the country he had served so loyally. A note to intellectuals: you are not the eternal, unconditional guardians of insight and humanity. Sometimes it can be generals."