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Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror
Robert Young Pelton first became aware of the phenomenon of hired guns in the War on Terror when he met a covert team of contractors on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border in the fall of 2003. Pelton soon embarked on a globe-spanning odyssey to penetrate and understand this shadowy world, ultimately delivering stunning insights into the way private soldiers are used.
Enter a blood-soaked world of South African mercenaries and tribal fighters backed by ruthless financiers. Drop into Baghdad’s Green Zone, strap on body armor, and take a daily high-speed ride with a doomed crew of security contractors who dodge car bombs and snipers just to get their charges to the airport. Share a drink in a chic hotel bar with wealthy owners of private armies who debate the best way to stay alive in war zones.
Licensed to Kill spans four continents and three years, taking us inside the CIA’s dirty wars; the brutal contractor murders in Fallujah and the Alamo-like sieges in Najaf and Al Kut; the Deep South contractor training camps where ex–Special Operations soldiers and even small town cops learn the ropes; the contractor conventions where macho attendees swap bullet-punctuated tales and discuss upcoming gigs; and the grim Central African prison where contractors turned failed mercenaries pay a steep price.
The United States has encouraged the use of the private sector in all facets of the War on Terror, placing contractors outside the bounds of functional legal constraints. With the shocking clarity that can come only from firsthand observation, Licensed to Kill painstakingly deconstructs the most controversial events and introduces the pivotal players. Most disturbingly, it shows that there are indeed thousands of contractors—with hundreds more being produced every month—who’ve been given a license to kill, their services available to the highest bidder.
Enter a blood-soaked world of South African mercenaries and tribal fighters backed by ruthless financiers. Drop into Baghdad’s Green Zone, strap on body armor, and take a daily high-speed ride with a doomed crew of security contractors who dodge car bombs and snipers just to get their charges to the airport. Share a drink in a chic hotel bar with wealthy owners of private armies who debate the best way to stay alive in war zones.
Licensed to Kill spans four continents and three years, taking us inside the CIA’s dirty wars; the brutal contractor murders in Fallujah and the Alamo-like sieges in Najaf and Al Kut; the Deep South contractor training camps where ex–Special Operations soldiers and even small town cops learn the ropes; the contractor conventions where macho attendees swap bullet-punctuated tales and discuss upcoming gigs; and the grim Central African prison where contractors turned failed mercenaries pay a steep price.
The United States has encouraged the use of the private sector in all facets of the War on Terror, placing contractors outside the bounds of functional legal constraints. With the shocking clarity that can come only from firsthand observation, Licensed to Kill painstakingly deconstructs the most controversial events and introduces the pivotal players. Most disturbingly, it shows that there are indeed thousands of contractors—with hundreds more being produced every month—who’ve been given a license to kill, their services available to the highest bidder.
376 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2006
74 people are currently reading
1142 people want to read
About the author
Robert Young Pelton
26 books62 followersRobert Young Pelton is an author, journalist, and documentary film director. He is known for his conflict reporting and interviews with military and political figures in war zones. He reported from the Battle of Qala-i-Jangi in Afghanistan, the Battle of Grozny (1999–2000) in Chechnya, the rebel siege to control Monrovia in Liberia, and the siege on Villa Somalia in Mogadishu. He spent time with the Taliban, the Northern Alliance (pre-9/11), the CIA during the hunt for Osama bin Laden and with both insurgents and Blackwater security contractors during the war in Iraq. He also hosted the Discovery Travel Channel series "Robert Young Pelton's The World's Most Dangerous Places" from 1998 to 2003.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 58 reviews
June 16, 2018
Read as research for WIP.
A look at the outsourcing of the war on terror from the perspective of the men on the ground. (I'm sure there are some women on the ground, but none are cover in this book.) The primary focus is on the line between private security contractors and mercenaries.
Contractors are hired to defend specific people and properties from attack. Mercenaries make up full-blown armies for hire, able to kick out rebels, overthrow governments, initiate coups, or provide other acts of orchestrated violence for private investors.
The author points out that in an environment with as little oversight as Iraq, where governments don't even know how many security companies are operating there, the line is very blurry and with the sheer amount of money to be made from U.S. government contracts, not likely to get much better.
A look at the outsourcing of the war on terror from the perspective of the men on the ground. (I'm sure there are some women on the ground, but none are cover in this book.) The primary focus is on the line between private security contractors and mercenaries.
Contractors are hired to defend specific people and properties from attack. Mercenaries make up full-blown armies for hire, able to kick out rebels, overthrow governments, initiate coups, or provide other acts of orchestrated violence for private investors.
The author points out that in an environment with as little oversight as Iraq, where governments don't even know how many security companies are operating there, the line is very blurry and with the sheer amount of money to be made from U.S. government contracts, not likely to get much better.
November 5, 2023
I'm not sure you can always take him on his word though, since he's got unusual connections:
Sounds like a guy hooked up with spooks after Soldier of Fortune Magazine
and to help 'edit' Eric Prince of Blackwater's autobiography just gives a strange smell to it all.
Interesting insights to take with a grain of salt when Blackwater is a pal of yours.
"I listened to all stories. Of all, Pelton’s were the most inconsistent and strange."
okay, maybe take him wth a pound of salt!
[i would hazard a guess he's chasing a Pulitzer Prize, and he's just a pawn of Blackwater, Eric Prince and Donald Rumsfeld, in the good ole days]
........
Maximilian Forte: The image created by Pelton gets foggier by the moment: journalist, author, outside the mainstream media, inside the mainstream media, outside government, catering to government, etc.
.........
here's some of the odder things in his wiki
His first break as a writer came in 1991, when he reported on the Camel Trophy, an annual competition by Land Rover across difficult terrain in Africa.
Pelton competed for the U.S. team and published his account in Soldier of Fortune.
Pelton has been present at conflicts such as the Battle of Qala-i-Jangi in Afghanistan, the Battle of Grozny (1999–2000) in Chechnya, the rebel siege to take Monrovia in Liberia, and the siege on Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, and has been with ground forces in about 40 other conflicts.
He spent time with the Taliban and the Northern Alliance pre-9/11, the CIA during the hunt for Osama bin Laden and also with both insurgents and Blackwater security contractors during the war in Iraq.
In 2006, Pelton teamed up with Eason Jordan, former head of international news for CNN, and several others to launch Iraq Slogger, a clearinghouse of news and information coming out of Iraq during the Iraq War.
The site was intended to aggregate articles by both foreign correspondents and Iraqi journalists, as well as nonprofessionals.
Pelton created the concept of "solo" or "solo journalist". someone who provides text, video, photos, and audio from remote regions without support.
In January 2009, Pelton resumed immersion-style coverage by going inside the U.S. Army's controversial Human Terrain System.
Around that time, he also spent a year as an advisor to NATO's Afghanistan commander.
In 2008, Pelton and Jordan founded AfPax Insider, a newsgathering and research service in Afghanistan and Pakistan modeled on Iraq Slogger. The venture provided free content on its website and was partially funded by the U.S. military.
Controversy arose when a Defense Department official who was operating an unauthorized spy ring allegedly diverted funds that were intended to pay the open-source project Pelton named AfPax.
According to Jordan, the venture never had a "full-fledged launch" into offering a premium subscription service to private clients, and due to insufficient funding....
In 2011, Pelton created Somalia Report. With assistance from around 140 locals and western editors, Pelton provided ground coverage of al-Shabaab, pirates, governments, contractors, intelligence groups, and regular people on a 24/7 information website.
.....
Licensed to Kill, Hired Guns in the War on Terror
Pelton has written about contemporary private military contractors (Licensed to Kill, Hired Guns in the War on Terror), as well as his experiences with US Special Forces in the opening weeks in the War on Terror.
Of Licensed to Kill, one reviewer summarized:
'He is a journalistic story-quilt of characters engaged as private security contractors and mercenaries in a variety of settings from Afghanistan to Equatorial Guinea... The pages turn... because Pelton's stories are intrinsically interesting.'
The book was reviewed by author and filmmaker Sebastian Junger
'An incredible look into the murky and virtually impenetrable world of private military contractors....Pelton may well have seen the future.'
Terrorism expert Peter Bergen
'A rollicking read that takes the reader inside the murky world of military contractors—from the craggy passes of the Afghan-Pakistan border to the extreme danger of Baghdad's airport road, to the diamond fields of Africa. Licensed to Kill is not only a great travelogue, [but] it also has some important things to say about the brave new world of privatized violence.'
......
Civilian Warriors
In July 2013, Pelton stated in an interview with Spy Talk's Jeff Stein that Erik Prince had come to him to fix a ghostwritten autobiography that Prince had been unsuccessfully trying to publish since February 2008 with Regnery and again in 2010 with Simon & Schuster.
According to the interview, Pelton rewrote Prince's book, hired a fact-checker to remove numerous plagiarized passages from the previous writers, and dissuaded Prince from self-publishing, getting Prince a US$1 million advance from Adrian Zackheim at Penguin Publishing.
.....
Pelton has described and shown how he gets access and world exclusive interviews in his TV series The World's Most Dangerous Places for the Discovery Channel, investigating and reporting from the inside the drug business in Colombia and Peru, the mafia in Georgia and Turkey, and bounty hunting in Mexico.
......
His interviews feel flat to me, odd commentary from all the hotspots in the Middle East or Russia, and he always like to say 'oh there's all these 'people' and they're always manipulating stuff'
Well, every powerful nation has an agenda, especially in crappy parts of the world.
......
Zero Anthropology
Have I now been given reason to doubt the integrity of Robert Young Pelton, and to retract what I think was valuable about his article? Not necessarily.
Yet, there are some questions and allegations that are circulating about Pelton’s “real motives” in writing his article, and these pose additional challenges for analyzing the merits of his work in Afghanistan.
Moreover, Pelton himself has, I believe, tended to make matters worse by allegedly threatening at least one critical blogger with a lawsuit on the grounds of libel. (see here, and here).
I would prefer to see an open discussion and an airing of all possible facts, rather than trying to silence anyone. In extreme cases, yes, one has to proceed to court, but I am not sure that we have reached such extremes yet.
A speakers’ bureau, the Lavin Agency, describes Pelton in these terms:
"Robert Pelton’s continuous quest for knowledge and understanding has taken him to remote and exotic areas in more than eighty countries. Among his collection of unbelievable experiences are tales of survival in war-torn Central America, his role in organizing the world’s first television interview of Taliban leaders, and his capture by death squads in Algeria. In his presentations, Pelton never romanticizes war or conflict-he simply takes the opportunity to tell American audiences about the reality of life in other parts of the world, unfiltered by the agendas and political calculations of the mainstream media."
Pelton is also a partner of Eason Jordan, the former Chief News Executive for CNN, in a business venture called Praedict. (Jordan resigned from CNN over remarks he made at a Davos forum about U.S. soldiers targeting and killing journalists in Iraq.) Members of the advisory board include Ted Turner. Praedict, which runs “IraqSlogger,” describes its mission and services as follows:
"Praedict offers the next generation of media and insight. We are a group of well known professionals who have come together from media, marketing, and military backgrounds. Praedict’s CEO is Eason Jordan, and its president is Robert Young Pelton. We offer a synthesis of real-time news dissemination, customized content, and analysis distributed through web-based technology. The business is designed to meet the demanding requirements of news consumers, companies, governments, and NGOs operating in high-risk environments."
Is there a controversy?
One has to sort what are petty quibbles over descriptive details from larger issues of interpretation and perspective. Let’s turn to some of the larger allegations:
(1) Because Pelton has a business interest, his agenda slanted his writing about the Human Terrain System
(2) Pelton fabricates his material, probably because he has something against the Army or the U.S. mission in Afghanistan
(3) Pelton…Anti-Imperialist?
If Pelton wanted to write against imperialism, then he really fails, and would need to do a lot more work to be convincing on that front. I do not believe there is anything in Pelton’s background, his professional interests, his employment, etc., that remotely smacks of the anti-imperialist. I did not think so before, and I still do not. When Old Blue associates us, my liking Pelton because he says what I want to hear, his understanding is flawed on that very count: Pelton nowhere comes even remotely close to saying what I want to hear. What Pelton’s case does show is that anyone who writes in the mainstream media, and who deviates from either wilfull blindness or unquestioning praise of authority, will find himself set upon by a “pitchfork parade” that seeks to shame and silence — suppression of a free media, but in slow motion.
Old Blue is falling into a trap of his own making, and that is drinking from the well of Donald Rumsfeld.
"there are guys like Pelton out there who are chasing little specks of Pulitzer dust and they know exactly the tone and tenor of the stories they need to write in order to achieve their goal."
"These were questions that needed to be brought into the public discussion of the issue. I have laid what I have found on the table, and there it is. I have had input from Pelton as well as Fondacaro, McFate, other journalists who have done similar embeds, and sources who choose not to be named at this point. I listened to all stories. Of all, Pelton’s were the most inconsistent and strange."
.........
.........
Sounds like a guy hooked up with spooks after Soldier of Fortune Magazine
and to help 'edit' Eric Prince of Blackwater's autobiography just gives a strange smell to it all.
Interesting insights to take with a grain of salt when Blackwater is a pal of yours.
"I listened to all stories. Of all, Pelton’s were the most inconsistent and strange."
okay, maybe take him wth a pound of salt!
[i would hazard a guess he's chasing a Pulitzer Prize, and he's just a pawn of Blackwater, Eric Prince and Donald Rumsfeld, in the good ole days]
........
Maximilian Forte: The image created by Pelton gets foggier by the moment: journalist, author, outside the mainstream media, inside the mainstream media, outside government, catering to government, etc.
.........
here's some of the odder things in his wiki
His first break as a writer came in 1991, when he reported on the Camel Trophy, an annual competition by Land Rover across difficult terrain in Africa.
Pelton competed for the U.S. team and published his account in Soldier of Fortune.
Pelton has been present at conflicts such as the Battle of Qala-i-Jangi in Afghanistan, the Battle of Grozny (1999–2000) in Chechnya, the rebel siege to take Monrovia in Liberia, and the siege on Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, and has been with ground forces in about 40 other conflicts.
He spent time with the Taliban and the Northern Alliance pre-9/11, the CIA during the hunt for Osama bin Laden and also with both insurgents and Blackwater security contractors during the war in Iraq.
In 2006, Pelton teamed up with Eason Jordan, former head of international news for CNN, and several others to launch Iraq Slogger, a clearinghouse of news and information coming out of Iraq during the Iraq War.
The site was intended to aggregate articles by both foreign correspondents and Iraqi journalists, as well as nonprofessionals.
Pelton created the concept of "solo" or "solo journalist". someone who provides text, video, photos, and audio from remote regions without support.
In January 2009, Pelton resumed immersion-style coverage by going inside the U.S. Army's controversial Human Terrain System.
Around that time, he also spent a year as an advisor to NATO's Afghanistan commander.
In 2008, Pelton and Jordan founded AfPax Insider, a newsgathering and research service in Afghanistan and Pakistan modeled on Iraq Slogger. The venture provided free content on its website and was partially funded by the U.S. military.
Controversy arose when a Defense Department official who was operating an unauthorized spy ring allegedly diverted funds that were intended to pay the open-source project Pelton named AfPax.
According to Jordan, the venture never had a "full-fledged launch" into offering a premium subscription service to private clients, and due to insufficient funding....
In 2011, Pelton created Somalia Report. With assistance from around 140 locals and western editors, Pelton provided ground coverage of al-Shabaab, pirates, governments, contractors, intelligence groups, and regular people on a 24/7 information website.
.....
Licensed to Kill, Hired Guns in the War on Terror
Pelton has written about contemporary private military contractors (Licensed to Kill, Hired Guns in the War on Terror), as well as his experiences with US Special Forces in the opening weeks in the War on Terror.
Of Licensed to Kill, one reviewer summarized:
'He is a journalistic story-quilt of characters engaged as private security contractors and mercenaries in a variety of settings from Afghanistan to Equatorial Guinea... The pages turn... because Pelton's stories are intrinsically interesting.'
The book was reviewed by author and filmmaker Sebastian Junger
'An incredible look into the murky and virtually impenetrable world of private military contractors....Pelton may well have seen the future.'
Terrorism expert Peter Bergen
'A rollicking read that takes the reader inside the murky world of military contractors—from the craggy passes of the Afghan-Pakistan border to the extreme danger of Baghdad's airport road, to the diamond fields of Africa. Licensed to Kill is not only a great travelogue, [but] it also has some important things to say about the brave new world of privatized violence.'
......
Civilian Warriors
In July 2013, Pelton stated in an interview with Spy Talk's Jeff Stein that Erik Prince had come to him to fix a ghostwritten autobiography that Prince had been unsuccessfully trying to publish since February 2008 with Regnery and again in 2010 with Simon & Schuster.
According to the interview, Pelton rewrote Prince's book, hired a fact-checker to remove numerous plagiarized passages from the previous writers, and dissuaded Prince from self-publishing, getting Prince a US$1 million advance from Adrian Zackheim at Penguin Publishing.
.....
Pelton has described and shown how he gets access and world exclusive interviews in his TV series The World's Most Dangerous Places for the Discovery Channel, investigating and reporting from the inside the drug business in Colombia and Peru, the mafia in Georgia and Turkey, and bounty hunting in Mexico.
......
His interviews feel flat to me, odd commentary from all the hotspots in the Middle East or Russia, and he always like to say 'oh there's all these 'people' and they're always manipulating stuff'
Well, every powerful nation has an agenda, especially in crappy parts of the world.
......
Zero Anthropology
Have I now been given reason to doubt the integrity of Robert Young Pelton, and to retract what I think was valuable about his article? Not necessarily.
Yet, there are some questions and allegations that are circulating about Pelton’s “real motives” in writing his article, and these pose additional challenges for analyzing the merits of his work in Afghanistan.
Moreover, Pelton himself has, I believe, tended to make matters worse by allegedly threatening at least one critical blogger with a lawsuit on the grounds of libel. (see here, and here).
I would prefer to see an open discussion and an airing of all possible facts, rather than trying to silence anyone. In extreme cases, yes, one has to proceed to court, but I am not sure that we have reached such extremes yet.
A speakers’ bureau, the Lavin Agency, describes Pelton in these terms:
"Robert Pelton’s continuous quest for knowledge and understanding has taken him to remote and exotic areas in more than eighty countries. Among his collection of unbelievable experiences are tales of survival in war-torn Central America, his role in organizing the world’s first television interview of Taliban leaders, and his capture by death squads in Algeria. In his presentations, Pelton never romanticizes war or conflict-he simply takes the opportunity to tell American audiences about the reality of life in other parts of the world, unfiltered by the agendas and political calculations of the mainstream media."
Pelton is also a partner of Eason Jordan, the former Chief News Executive for CNN, in a business venture called Praedict. (Jordan resigned from CNN over remarks he made at a Davos forum about U.S. soldiers targeting and killing journalists in Iraq.) Members of the advisory board include Ted Turner. Praedict, which runs “IraqSlogger,” describes its mission and services as follows:
"Praedict offers the next generation of media and insight. We are a group of well known professionals who have come together from media, marketing, and military backgrounds. Praedict’s CEO is Eason Jordan, and its president is Robert Young Pelton. We offer a synthesis of real-time news dissemination, customized content, and analysis distributed through web-based technology. The business is designed to meet the demanding requirements of news consumers, companies, governments, and NGOs operating in high-risk environments."
Is there a controversy?
One has to sort what are petty quibbles over descriptive details from larger issues of interpretation and perspective. Let’s turn to some of the larger allegations:
(1) Because Pelton has a business interest, his agenda slanted his writing about the Human Terrain System
(2) Pelton fabricates his material, probably because he has something against the Army or the U.S. mission in Afghanistan
(3) Pelton…Anti-Imperialist?
If Pelton wanted to write against imperialism, then he really fails, and would need to do a lot more work to be convincing on that front. I do not believe there is anything in Pelton’s background, his professional interests, his employment, etc., that remotely smacks of the anti-imperialist. I did not think so before, and I still do not. When Old Blue associates us, my liking Pelton because he says what I want to hear, his understanding is flawed on that very count: Pelton nowhere comes even remotely close to saying what I want to hear. What Pelton’s case does show is that anyone who writes in the mainstream media, and who deviates from either wilfull blindness or unquestioning praise of authority, will find himself set upon by a “pitchfork parade” that seeks to shame and silence — suppression of a free media, but in slow motion.
Old Blue is falling into a trap of his own making, and that is drinking from the well of Donald Rumsfeld.
"there are guys like Pelton out there who are chasing little specks of Pulitzer dust and they know exactly the tone and tenor of the stories they need to write in order to achieve their goal."
"These were questions that needed to be brought into the public discussion of the issue. I have laid what I have found on the table, and there it is. I have had input from Pelton as well as Fondacaro, McFate, other journalists who have done similar embeds, and sources who choose not to be named at this point. I listened to all stories. Of all, Pelton’s were the most inconsistent and strange."
.........
.........
October 23, 2007
A. The journalist should not insert himself into every story. Who are you Scott Pelley?
B. Like my 4th grade teacher used to tell me: cite your sources. Nothing screams 'Bullshit' like an anonymous source.
C. The writing sucks.
In short, a poorly written/executed/documented book on a fascinating (IMO) and current subject that many are curious about.
B. Like my 4th grade teacher used to tell me: cite your sources. Nothing screams 'Bullshit' like an anonymous source.
C. The writing sucks.
In short, a poorly written/executed/documented book on a fascinating (IMO) and current subject that many are curious about.
December 28, 2011
I'm torn about this book. On the one hand, it's a fairly balanced study of the phenomenon of private military contractors with a lot of really interesting information in it. On the other hand, it's poorly organized, often back-tracking to cover ground that has already covered earlier in the book, and the prose is frequently confusing and stilted. The unimaginative title gives you a pretty good idea of Mr. Pelton's literary skills. At one point Pelton says about Erik Prince (owner of the Blackwater corporation):
"One of Erik's friends told me Erik's real ambition -- he wants Blackwater to be be the fifth column of the U.S. military."
Wait, what?! Erik Prince is secretly plotting to overthrow the U.S. government from within?!
Presumably Pelton means a fifth BRANCH of the military, not a fifth column ("fifth column" is an expression that is used to denote a traitorous element within a government -- something that a guy writing a book that actually deals explicitly with several coup attempts might be expected to know).
Later, Pelton uses the phrase "the gig was up." No, Mr. Pelton. The JIG was up.
Pelton clearly need a much more competent and actively involved editor. Too bad.
"One of Erik's friends told me Erik's real ambition -- he wants Blackwater to be be the fifth column of the U.S. military."
Wait, what?! Erik Prince is secretly plotting to overthrow the U.S. government from within?!
Presumably Pelton means a fifth BRANCH of the military, not a fifth column ("fifth column" is an expression that is used to denote a traitorous element within a government -- something that a guy writing a book that actually deals explicitly with several coup attempts might be expected to know).
Later, Pelton uses the phrase "the gig was up." No, Mr. Pelton. The JIG was up.
Pelton clearly need a much more competent and actively involved editor. Too bad.
January 27, 2008
A masterful and balanced study of a complicated topic. The author avoids demonizing the people who work in privatized military companies (PMCs), some of which do and some of which don't fit the definition of mercenaries, while making clear the dangers the industry itself poses to our national security, the people of the societies where they are working, and international order. He focuses primarily on Iraq but also examines quite a few other places and situations, present and past, including the parallels to the European mercantile companies like the British East India Company that had their own armies and functioned in some ways as proxies for their home governments (an arrangement that today might be called fascism, with its blending of corporate and government power and identities.)
One of the old masters of systems theory, Dr. W. Edwards Deming, made exhaustive studies of the problems of systems gone astray. He made and remade the point that, although in our culture the first reflex is often to look for a guilty party, a full 95% of the time - not a figure he pulled out of the air, but an actual statistical finding - everyone involved in the situation was making a good-faith effort to do the right thing, but the system in which they were working was flawed in ways that caused the bad outcomes he studied. The solution is to change the system, not blame the people; if we just ID and crucify some culprits and leave the system intact, the same things will almost certainly happen again with the next set of people.
Another relevant point was made by M. Scott Peck in his book People of the Lie, a study on evil. He recounted his experience while working at the Pentagon during the Vietnam war, and how the process of planning and executing that war and the attendant responsibility for its results was distributed among so many people that any one of them was likely to honestly feel that he/she wasn't the one making it happen, but was only doing his/her job as well as possible while the decisions and power rested elsewhere. That was one type of flawed system a la Deming.
Today as then, it might be more accurate to say that there are indeed some culprits, some people who are knowingly causing evil and suffering in the places where the PMCs operate; but most of those culprits are high up and far away.
This is a vital book for anyone concerned about the future of our country's international relations, the furthering of government reform in the Third World, and the blurring of the boundaries between government and corporate powers.
One of the old masters of systems theory, Dr. W. Edwards Deming, made exhaustive studies of the problems of systems gone astray. He made and remade the point that, although in our culture the first reflex is often to look for a guilty party, a full 95% of the time - not a figure he pulled out of the air, but an actual statistical finding - everyone involved in the situation was making a good-faith effort to do the right thing, but the system in which they were working was flawed in ways that caused the bad outcomes he studied. The solution is to change the system, not blame the people; if we just ID and crucify some culprits and leave the system intact, the same things will almost certainly happen again with the next set of people.
Another relevant point was made by M. Scott Peck in his book People of the Lie, a study on evil. He recounted his experience while working at the Pentagon during the Vietnam war, and how the process of planning and executing that war and the attendant responsibility for its results was distributed among so many people that any one of them was likely to honestly feel that he/she wasn't the one making it happen, but was only doing his/her job as well as possible while the decisions and power rested elsewhere. That was one type of flawed system a la Deming.
Today as then, it might be more accurate to say that there are indeed some culprits, some people who are knowingly causing evil and suffering in the places where the PMCs operate; but most of those culprits are high up and far away.
This is a vital book for anyone concerned about the future of our country's international relations, the furthering of government reform in the Third World, and the blurring of the boundaries between government and corporate powers.
June 10, 2010
Meh. The writing is a bit stilted, with pronouns used ambiguously. Often requiring re-reading a page before discovering that the "he" in question is not the "he" you thought. Apart from such flubs, the book could be divided into 3 parts.
The first is the alternating kiss-the-butt-of-Blackwater, then distance-yourself-to-appear-unbiased, shtick.
The second is ride-along-in-Iraq with Blackwater.
The third is discuss-African-mercenaries-and-one-highly-public-wannabe-Rambo-in-the-mideast.
The third is actually the most interesting, but entails little new information that couldn't already be gleaned from a number of better sources. The book's strength should have lain in the telling of life as a private security contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan. It didn't. What ended up happening is several chapters of name-dropping for credibility, followed by very general stories.
The book was not horrible, though. And for those interested in finding out about the massive numbers involved in farming out a government's job to big-business (in terms of money and lives lost), the book will open some eyes. Again, there's little new or groundbreaking here. What it does do is collect vignettes from a range of times and places into one book. While the author's focus was intended to be upon mercenaries (let's be honest here) in the "war on terror," the significant portions of the book don't deal with it. Rather, they are bits and pieces regarding mercenaries in the past 40 years. The only thing that's clear from the book, is that nothing is clear when governments hire mercenaries to do their work for them.
The first is the alternating kiss-the-butt-of-Blackwater, then distance-yourself-to-appear-unbiased, shtick.
The second is ride-along-in-Iraq with Blackwater.
The third is discuss-African-mercenaries-and-one-highly-public-wannabe-Rambo-in-the-mideast.
The third is actually the most interesting, but entails little new information that couldn't already be gleaned from a number of better sources. The book's strength should have lain in the telling of life as a private security contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan. It didn't. What ended up happening is several chapters of name-dropping for credibility, followed by very general stories.
The book was not horrible, though. And for those interested in finding out about the massive numbers involved in farming out a government's job to big-business (in terms of money and lives lost), the book will open some eyes. Again, there's little new or groundbreaking here. What it does do is collect vignettes from a range of times and places into one book. While the author's focus was intended to be upon mercenaries (let's be honest here) in the "war on terror," the significant portions of the book don't deal with it. Rather, they are bits and pieces regarding mercenaries in the past 40 years. The only thing that's clear from the book, is that nothing is clear when governments hire mercenaries to do their work for them.
September 29, 2025
Pelton has a gift for getting people who should really know better to open up, like Chechnyan terrorists, Afghan warlords, ex-Special Forces mercenaries, and 21st century violence entrepreneurs like Erik Prince. Pelton also has a gift for getting in and out of dangerous places alive, pioneering the practice of "solo" journalism where one person does the writing, images, sound, etc. In Licensed to Kill, Pelton traces a journey through the shadowy world of the private military contractor, asking who these people are, and what this means for the future of warfare.
First, a little background. Mercenaries are about as old as warfare. The Carthaginians depended on mercenaries for their armies. Italian city-states warred with bands of paid soldiers called condoterri, literally meaning "contractor". Privateers and private adventurers and officers seconded to local powers have a long history. The 21st century version comes from the spread of valuable corporate property into violent and loosely governed areas, and the push to privatize non-core governmental functions. Someone has to guard the oil rigs in disputed zones. Someone has to escort local politicians and supply convoys, and it isn't going to be the US army. But where is the line between security and warfare?
One of Pelton's key experiences is with the Mamba squad, a Blackwater unit that regularly transits the notorious Route Irish from Baghdad's Green Zone to the Baghdad International Airport and back. Route Irish at the time was undoubtedly the most dangerous road in the world, with regular snipers, IEDs, and car bombs. The Blackwater team had three Mamba MRAPs and a soft-skinned cargo truck. Rules of engagement follow a four step process: hand signals, warning shots, shots to disable a vehicle, and then lethal fire. Every step beyond the first involves firing a machine gun in a populated area, and there's no accountability or legal consequences for bullets fired. Contractors in Iraqi had formal legal immunity, and then de facto legal immunity. Of course, getting it wrong means a violent death for you and your entire squad.
The frontline of Blackwater and similar units are typically former military. ex-Delta Force and SAS are at the top of the internal contractor pecking order, with other special forces, regular army and Marines, and ex-cops at the bottom (but cops know how to drive, and SEALs are notoriously trigger happy meatheads). A westerner at the time could earn perhaps $600 a day, which at the typical 90-on 30-off cycle and three deployments a year comes to $162,000 annually. The flipside is the risk of death or serious injury, with compensation of $68,000 to your survivors if that happens. Pelton mentions, but does not spend much time with, the third-party nationals Gurkhas, Chileans, and South Africans who take many of the same risks for a fraction of the cost, or local "campaigns" who bear arms against insurgencies composed of their fellow countrymen, which is the single major oversight of the book.
Contractors have a certain macho style, but by and large they're depicted as ordinary dudes who want to make money and go home. By comparisons, the leadership, Erik Prince and Simon Mann and Tim Spicer, of the British Executive Outcomes/Sandlines, are legitimate freaks, with a vision of Western imperialism and corporate profit. Private Military Companies serve to do what the government needs done, but mushy and morally muddled liberal democracies are unwilling to do directly.
One open question is where exactly the money goes. Hundreds of millions to billions of dollars in poorly supervised contracts have gone to PMCs for services in Iraq and Afghanistan, at prices that the companies argue have saved the US taxpayer and immense amount, while also making the owners and investors immensely wealthy. Likely, the savings come from cutting corners. In the infamous Blackwater Bridge incident in Falluja, a convoy escorting commercial kitchen equipment was sent into town without a risk assessment, proper briefing, without armored vehicles, and with half the gunners promised. Four Blackwater contractors died trying to move an oven.
Politically, PMCs have been involved in coup attempts in the 3rd world, with Equatorial Guinea and Papua New Guinea having attempted regime changes spearheaded by a mercenary group. No local country wants heavily armed and unaccountable foreigners roaming around. The shadowy and deniable world of contractors creates space for outright scam artists, like Jack Idema, who set up a private prison in Afghanistan and started kidnapping and torturing random Afghans while claiming he was working for the CIA.
Pelton tells a thrilling story, and mostly lets the subjects speak in their own words. He got closer than typical journalistic ethics allow (he later edited and substantially rewrote Erik Prince's autobiography), but this neutrality favorable contrasts to say, P. W. Singer, who was writing about PMCs at the same time and pointedly not going to Iraq. From the distance of two decades, Pelton notes that the contractors remind him a lot of the Mujahideen of the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War, and he wonders what will happen when the violent men return home.
It's nightmarish, but the converse is that while Blackwater and other PMCs likely killed a lot Iraqis, they didn't run Abu Ghraib, they didn't level Fallujah, and direct government employees are handling plenty of 2025 era crimes against humanity. Somehow events turned out worse than Pelton's worst case scenario.
First, a little background. Mercenaries are about as old as warfare. The Carthaginians depended on mercenaries for their armies. Italian city-states warred with bands of paid soldiers called condoterri, literally meaning "contractor". Privateers and private adventurers and officers seconded to local powers have a long history. The 21st century version comes from the spread of valuable corporate property into violent and loosely governed areas, and the push to privatize non-core governmental functions. Someone has to guard the oil rigs in disputed zones. Someone has to escort local politicians and supply convoys, and it isn't going to be the US army. But where is the line between security and warfare?
One of Pelton's key experiences is with the Mamba squad, a Blackwater unit that regularly transits the notorious Route Irish from Baghdad's Green Zone to the Baghdad International Airport and back. Route Irish at the time was undoubtedly the most dangerous road in the world, with regular snipers, IEDs, and car bombs. The Blackwater team had three Mamba MRAPs and a soft-skinned cargo truck. Rules of engagement follow a four step process: hand signals, warning shots, shots to disable a vehicle, and then lethal fire. Every step beyond the first involves firing a machine gun in a populated area, and there's no accountability or legal consequences for bullets fired. Contractors in Iraqi had formal legal immunity, and then de facto legal immunity. Of course, getting it wrong means a violent death for you and your entire squad.
The frontline of Blackwater and similar units are typically former military. ex-Delta Force and SAS are at the top of the internal contractor pecking order, with other special forces, regular army and Marines, and ex-cops at the bottom (but cops know how to drive, and SEALs are notoriously trigger happy meatheads). A westerner at the time could earn perhaps $600 a day, which at the typical 90-on 30-off cycle and three deployments a year comes to $162,000 annually. The flipside is the risk of death or serious injury, with compensation of $68,000 to your survivors if that happens. Pelton mentions, but does not spend much time with, the third-party nationals Gurkhas, Chileans, and South Africans who take many of the same risks for a fraction of the cost, or local "campaigns" who bear arms against insurgencies composed of their fellow countrymen, which is the single major oversight of the book.
Contractors have a certain macho style, but by and large they're depicted as ordinary dudes who want to make money and go home. By comparisons, the leadership, Erik Prince and Simon Mann and Tim Spicer, of the British Executive Outcomes/Sandlines, are legitimate freaks, with a vision of Western imperialism and corporate profit. Private Military Companies serve to do what the government needs done, but mushy and morally muddled liberal democracies are unwilling to do directly.
One open question is where exactly the money goes. Hundreds of millions to billions of dollars in poorly supervised contracts have gone to PMCs for services in Iraq and Afghanistan, at prices that the companies argue have saved the US taxpayer and immense amount, while also making the owners and investors immensely wealthy. Likely, the savings come from cutting corners. In the infamous Blackwater Bridge incident in Falluja, a convoy escorting commercial kitchen equipment was sent into town without a risk assessment, proper briefing, without armored vehicles, and with half the gunners promised. Four Blackwater contractors died trying to move an oven.
Politically, PMCs have been involved in coup attempts in the 3rd world, with Equatorial Guinea and Papua New Guinea having attempted regime changes spearheaded by a mercenary group. No local country wants heavily armed and unaccountable foreigners roaming around. The shadowy and deniable world of contractors creates space for outright scam artists, like Jack Idema, who set up a private prison in Afghanistan and started kidnapping and torturing random Afghans while claiming he was working for the CIA.
Pelton tells a thrilling story, and mostly lets the subjects speak in their own words. He got closer than typical journalistic ethics allow (he later edited and substantially rewrote Erik Prince's autobiography), but this neutrality favorable contrasts to say, P. W. Singer, who was writing about PMCs at the same time and pointedly not going to Iraq. From the distance of two decades, Pelton notes that the contractors remind him a lot of the Mujahideen of the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War, and he wonders what will happen when the violent men return home.
It's nightmarish, but the converse is that while Blackwater and other PMCs likely killed a lot Iraqis, they didn't run Abu Ghraib, they didn't level Fallujah, and direct government employees are handling plenty of 2025 era crimes against humanity. Somehow events turned out worse than Pelton's worst case scenario.
July 18, 2015
Modern Mercenaries
13 September 2013
Based on what I have seen on Goodreads maybe I should have read Corporate Warriors instead of this book because people have described that book as 'the quintessential book on the private security industry' but the reason I ended up getting this book was because the title caught my attention when I was perusing Amazon and decided to place an order. In a nutshell it is an interesting book that explores the aspects of the private security industry that has arisen since the Iraq War but I found that Pelton seemed to spend a lot of time simply telling stories and would only then spend a small amount of time outlining the pros and cons of this relatively new industry. Not all of his stories were bad, though most of the time he seemed to just waffle.
Now, the idea of private security is nothing new because there have been firms providing security for as long as I have known, but in an advanced democracy these firms (at least here in Australia) tend to be kept on a very short leash. As a private security contractor in Australia you simply cannot be trigger happy. For instance, while a bouncer at a night club (and they generally work on a contractual basis, though the proper term for them is a crowd controller) can break up fights and eject people, they have to do it in a way that they cannot open themselves up for prosecution or civil penalties (such as a lawsuit).
What changed with the Iraq War was that these firms began to operate in overseas jurisdictions with limited oversight. At this stage the American Army was not actually outsourcing the combat aspects of the assignment, but rather they were outsourcing security for dignitaries such as the UN and the pro-consul Paul Bremer. However, in a place that was as chaotic as Iraq, the normal restraint that can be shown in a Western Democracy would probably end up getting you killed. The concern is that there is limited oversight over their actions and even if they do get involved in a fire fight that they start, they can easily vanish with no repercussions.
The US army had been outsourcing operations for quite a while, and an economic way that is understandable. It is better to outsource the minor details of the army such as catering, maintenance, and even laundry services because it means you do not need to keep full time staff on the payroll. You only pay what you use. This is the same with security details because it frees up the troops for combat orientated roles and also, theoretically, keeps costs down. While they still have mess halls, I have seen films of the bases in Iraq where there are Pizza Huts and Subways on base which, I must admit, does offer better variety than the simple mess hall.
There are problems with that though, as Pelton points out. For instance, the idea of cost plus (being the cost of providing the service plus profit) may at first seem cost effective, but these costs can quickly spiral out of control. There is one incidence where there were at least four layers of cost plus contracts (that is the initial contract which is sub-contracted to another company who then sub-contracts to another company and so forth). This also applies to other areas such as cantering because the company that won the contract (on a no bid basis) then goes and sub-contracts out to another. Further, because corporations operate purely on a profit motive, and because the average soldier does not get a choice as to the provider the soldier wishes to use, there is no incentive to provide a quality product. If the company doing the laundry service does a rubbish job then the soldier is stuck with that. I have actually heard that soldiers were not allowed to wash their own clothes but had to use the contractor who charged the American government an inordinate price for the service.
Many of us think of private security contractors as earning huge amounts of money and living a high lifestyle, however Pelton blows that myth to smithereens. The people making the money are those that sit at the top of the food chain, that is the executives. While the contractor may be earning $600.00 a day, this is not steady income and there is no guarantee that their contract will be renewed after the next stint. Then there is the threat of injury and/or death, separation from their families, and the fact that their skills are not really transferable. Once they are back home the best they can get is a minimum wage security job, and even then only if they are physically capable. It is highly unlikely that they would be offered insurance, so the only thing that their families have to rely on in case of death is a small amount given by the US government (about $65000.00).
Naomi Klein mentioned in her book 'Disaster Capitalism' that the next bubble would the the private security bubble. I thought she was talking about Homeland Security but I suspect that she was talking about this industry. From what I gathered there are a lot of companies and once the war in Iraq is over (which I believe it technically is) there is going to be little to no work for these companies. I suspect that many of them have already folded, that is if they were not wound up beforehand and the executives made off with a tidy profit. However, many of these companies aren't listed on the stock exchange (Blackwater isn't) so I suspect most of the operators knew that this was only going to be a short term venture. By the way, Eric Prince, founder of Blackwater, as since left the company and the company has also changed its name twice so is no longer known as Blackwater.
The last chapter was particularly interesting because it was about the failed coup attempt in Equitorial Guinea that involved the son of Magaret Thatcher. I remembered that clearly because it involved the son of Margaret Thatcher. What I thought was odd was that Pelton was writing as if this coup was something new and something that had arisen from the Iraq War. In reality it is not. It was not so much like Executive Outcomes, a South African security firm that would be hired by African dictators to put down rebel forces, but rather a bunch of out of work special forces operatives that where brought together to get rid of a dictator and steal Equatorial Guinea's oil resources. Further, I don't actually think that it is all that ironic that they got caught in Zimbabwe. It is not that Mugabe would have particularly been concerned about some coup plotters, but what would have concerned him would have been the fact that the people pulling the strings behind the coup were all white. Okay, it all came about by accident, but for a guy that sought to evict all of the white farmers from Zimbabwe I highly doubt he would have turned a blind eye where a coup against an African government was being orchestrated by white power brokers.
13 September 2013
Based on what I have seen on Goodreads maybe I should have read Corporate Warriors instead of this book because people have described that book as 'the quintessential book on the private security industry' but the reason I ended up getting this book was because the title caught my attention when I was perusing Amazon and decided to place an order. In a nutshell it is an interesting book that explores the aspects of the private security industry that has arisen since the Iraq War but I found that Pelton seemed to spend a lot of time simply telling stories and would only then spend a small amount of time outlining the pros and cons of this relatively new industry. Not all of his stories were bad, though most of the time he seemed to just waffle.
Now, the idea of private security is nothing new because there have been firms providing security for as long as I have known, but in an advanced democracy these firms (at least here in Australia) tend to be kept on a very short leash. As a private security contractor in Australia you simply cannot be trigger happy. For instance, while a bouncer at a night club (and they generally work on a contractual basis, though the proper term for them is a crowd controller) can break up fights and eject people, they have to do it in a way that they cannot open themselves up for prosecution or civil penalties (such as a lawsuit).
What changed with the Iraq War was that these firms began to operate in overseas jurisdictions with limited oversight. At this stage the American Army was not actually outsourcing the combat aspects of the assignment, but rather they were outsourcing security for dignitaries such as the UN and the pro-consul Paul Bremer. However, in a place that was as chaotic as Iraq, the normal restraint that can be shown in a Western Democracy would probably end up getting you killed. The concern is that there is limited oversight over their actions and even if they do get involved in a fire fight that they start, they can easily vanish with no repercussions.
The US army had been outsourcing operations for quite a while, and an economic way that is understandable. It is better to outsource the minor details of the army such as catering, maintenance, and even laundry services because it means you do not need to keep full time staff on the payroll. You only pay what you use. This is the same with security details because it frees up the troops for combat orientated roles and also, theoretically, keeps costs down. While they still have mess halls, I have seen films of the bases in Iraq where there are Pizza Huts and Subways on base which, I must admit, does offer better variety than the simple mess hall.
There are problems with that though, as Pelton points out. For instance, the idea of cost plus (being the cost of providing the service plus profit) may at first seem cost effective, but these costs can quickly spiral out of control. There is one incidence where there were at least four layers of cost plus contracts (that is the initial contract which is sub-contracted to another company who then sub-contracts to another company and so forth). This also applies to other areas such as cantering because the company that won the contract (on a no bid basis) then goes and sub-contracts out to another. Further, because corporations operate purely on a profit motive, and because the average soldier does not get a choice as to the provider the soldier wishes to use, there is no incentive to provide a quality product. If the company doing the laundry service does a rubbish job then the soldier is stuck with that. I have actually heard that soldiers were not allowed to wash their own clothes but had to use the contractor who charged the American government an inordinate price for the service.
Many of us think of private security contractors as earning huge amounts of money and living a high lifestyle, however Pelton blows that myth to smithereens. The people making the money are those that sit at the top of the food chain, that is the executives. While the contractor may be earning $600.00 a day, this is not steady income and there is no guarantee that their contract will be renewed after the next stint. Then there is the threat of injury and/or death, separation from their families, and the fact that their skills are not really transferable. Once they are back home the best they can get is a minimum wage security job, and even then only if they are physically capable. It is highly unlikely that they would be offered insurance, so the only thing that their families have to rely on in case of death is a small amount given by the US government (about $65000.00).
Naomi Klein mentioned in her book 'Disaster Capitalism' that the next bubble would the the private security bubble. I thought she was talking about Homeland Security but I suspect that she was talking about this industry. From what I gathered there are a lot of companies and once the war in Iraq is over (which I believe it technically is) there is going to be little to no work for these companies. I suspect that many of them have already folded, that is if they were not wound up beforehand and the executives made off with a tidy profit. However, many of these companies aren't listed on the stock exchange (Blackwater isn't) so I suspect most of the operators knew that this was only going to be a short term venture. By the way, Eric Prince, founder of Blackwater, as since left the company and the company has also changed its name twice so is no longer known as Blackwater.
The last chapter was particularly interesting because it was about the failed coup attempt in Equitorial Guinea that involved the son of Magaret Thatcher. I remembered that clearly because it involved the son of Margaret Thatcher. What I thought was odd was that Pelton was writing as if this coup was something new and something that had arisen from the Iraq War. In reality it is not. It was not so much like Executive Outcomes, a South African security firm that would be hired by African dictators to put down rebel forces, but rather a bunch of out of work special forces operatives that where brought together to get rid of a dictator and steal Equatorial Guinea's oil resources. Further, I don't actually think that it is all that ironic that they got caught in Zimbabwe. It is not that Mugabe would have particularly been concerned about some coup plotters, but what would have concerned him would have been the fact that the people pulling the strings behind the coup were all white. Okay, it all came about by accident, but for a guy that sought to evict all of the white farmers from Zimbabwe I highly doubt he would have turned a blind eye where a coup against an African government was being orchestrated by white power brokers.
April 18, 2022
Although the author had the confidence of the hired guns he describes, his book maintains a critical view of them, and of the historical and economic circumstances that have fostered them. The bulk of the book is spent in and around Baghdad with Blackwater contractors. As well as memorable descriptions of their work, in particular the "Route Irish" airport road, the contractors come across as three-dimensional human beings rather than just shooters. Many have simply found a job they're good at, and whose risks are worth the pay, which is much better than what their skills would receive back home. The author spends most time with contractors from the USA, but many are "TCNs" (third country nationals), often from Latin America.
The contractor subculture is captured graphically, e.g. "the most important part of a contractor's outfit - the sunglasses". These are a kind of badge of career path and mindset, e.g. Maui Jims for ex-SEALs, Oakleys for ex-Delta, but Ray-Bans for amateurs.
The final part, titled "Of Rogues and Tycoons", covers some relatively well-known material on the 2004 attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea, but the most bizarre and disturbing chapter concerns Jonathan Idema, an ex-soldier and convicted criminal, who took advantage of the culture of outsourcing and deniability of American operations in Afghanistan to build himself media exposure as a supposed insider, and then to lead a group of gunmen who were able to detain and torture people at will, until he trod on too many powerful toes.
A more historically-minded analysis might’ve mentioned that the standing army system that we take for granted has existed since Napoleonic times, and tried to imagine what system will be suited to future decades.
The contractor subculture is captured graphically, e.g. "the most important part of a contractor's outfit - the sunglasses". These are a kind of badge of career path and mindset, e.g. Maui Jims for ex-SEALs, Oakleys for ex-Delta, but Ray-Bans for amateurs.
The final part, titled "Of Rogues and Tycoons", covers some relatively well-known material on the 2004 attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea, but the most bizarre and disturbing chapter concerns Jonathan Idema, an ex-soldier and convicted criminal, who took advantage of the culture of outsourcing and deniability of American operations in Afghanistan to build himself media exposure as a supposed insider, and then to lead a group of gunmen who were able to detain and torture people at will, until he trod on too many powerful toes.
A more historically-minded analysis might’ve mentioned that the standing army system that we take for granted has existed since Napoleonic times, and tried to imagine what system will be suited to future decades.
October 23, 2017
Robert Young Pelton writes excellent adventure books - except they aren't fiction!
What I appreciate about this is the full view. This book does not read like an issue of Soldier of Fortune. It's not a left-wing diatribe against the military industrial patriarchy. It tells the reader how we got here and the forces and people that brought us here. It spares a lot of judgment and describes why paramilitary forces are all the rage and will continue to be so. We learn how protection becomes mercenary - sometimes out of necessity in the heat of battle.
Licensed to Kill does not limit itself to just one company or just one war. The sections on how Executive Outcomes and Sandline came to exist are very interesting.
This is an era when governments are too hobbled by their own internal checks and balances. The work doesn't go away no matter how many lawyers barnacle the system up. And in the vacuum, voila.
What I appreciate about this is the full view. This book does not read like an issue of Soldier of Fortune. It's not a left-wing diatribe against the military industrial patriarchy. It tells the reader how we got here and the forces and people that brought us here. It spares a lot of judgment and describes why paramilitary forces are all the rage and will continue to be so. We learn how protection becomes mercenary - sometimes out of necessity in the heat of battle.
Licensed to Kill does not limit itself to just one company or just one war. The sections on how Executive Outcomes and Sandline came to exist are very interesting.
This is an era when governments are too hobbled by their own internal checks and balances. The work doesn't go away no matter how many lawyers barnacle the system up. And in the vacuum, voila.
May 30, 2017
Really enjoyed the book and the details inside about the author's experience. I wouldnt say he was critical but honest. I do think the word mercenary was tossed around a bit too much and not used by the State Dept standards. Another aspect is that any consideration into this subject would have to include the nature of Goverments and Armed forces, capabilites and altruistic actions.
May 9, 2019
About the only useful information in this book was the background on how Blackwater got started and the details of the failed coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea. The book was scattered (no chapter logically followed any other chapter) and full of anecdotes of uber masculine risks and debauchery. Plus it’s a bit outdated.
July 10, 2022
An exciting mix of grand schemes and broken guys with a few screws loose. The contractor culture has only grown since its publishing, and one has to wonder who are the employers now? Also significant implications for non-security government support contracts worldwide, not as exciting a topic but a major part of all modern military operations.
May 10, 2024
The book started off quite good and I was very much into it but towards the end it just kind of rambled on. Maybe I just like my history books to give me the tea piping hot this book didn’t scratch that itch for me . The last few chapters to be more specific just felt like I was reading the same chapter over and over . I’d say it’s a ok read.
April 13, 2018
Robert Young Pelton shines a light on the secretive and sometimes dark world of PMCs. Great stuuf.
September 20, 2022
Robert Young Pelton is a master at writing his books. This willl keep yours eyes peeled for the next few hours. Enjoy.
May 5, 2024
Surface level journalism
August 20, 2010
Pelton can be a bit hip-macho and light on background, but he does a very good job at getting on the ground in dangerous places and getting to talk to locals. I was much-less-than-impressed by his notorious article on Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan, but "Licensed to Kill" is Pelton in better form.
"Licensed to Kill" is street-level reportage about military contractors. It's not a polemic, though Pelton notes the things like heavy steroid use and disdain for locals, and tells the story of a couple of fakes and thugs--- including one con man who scammed money to create his own private prison in Kabul ---and raises key questions about the role of military contractors. He doesn't see Blackwater (now Xe) as a crypto-fascist Republican militia running amok in Baghdad and threatening the Constitution at home. He does see it as a business that grew to fill a niche as the military downsized after the Cold War, and one given too much slack by an administration convinced that private is always better. Pelton looks at payscales ($600/day for some operators with the right SF or CIA pasts) and asks if it makes sense to allow pay to tempt good soldiers away from the military...and make contractors trigger-happy so that they can collect on that. He understands that contractors fill specialised needs (training, bodyguards) but worries that private firms are accountable to a bottom line rather than societies.
Pelton spends time with contractors on the ground and finds himself riding through seriously bad parts of Baghdad and Afghanistan with them. He admires their courage and skill, but recognises that for many of these men--- fortyish, trained in skill sets that have no civilian application ---Blackwater is the alternative to being a deputy sheriff or a Wal-mart greeter, that an armoured car in an occupied city is the only place left for them.
Pelton insists that this isn't a book about politics. He's anti-Iraq War and no fan of Geo. W, but he's no fan of the Taliban or the Iraqi insurgents, either. What he cares about is finding out who the guys in Oakley sunglasses and 5.11 khakis are, and what their lives are like.
It's a book worth reading. And it does give you a sense of where war may be going in the new century.
"Licensed to Kill" is street-level reportage about military contractors. It's not a polemic, though Pelton notes the things like heavy steroid use and disdain for locals, and tells the story of a couple of fakes and thugs--- including one con man who scammed money to create his own private prison in Kabul ---and raises key questions about the role of military contractors. He doesn't see Blackwater (now Xe) as a crypto-fascist Republican militia running amok in Baghdad and threatening the Constitution at home. He does see it as a business that grew to fill a niche as the military downsized after the Cold War, and one given too much slack by an administration convinced that private is always better. Pelton looks at payscales ($600/day for some operators with the right SF or CIA pasts) and asks if it makes sense to allow pay to tempt good soldiers away from the military...and make contractors trigger-happy so that they can collect on that. He understands that contractors fill specialised needs (training, bodyguards) but worries that private firms are accountable to a bottom line rather than societies.
Pelton spends time with contractors on the ground and finds himself riding through seriously bad parts of Baghdad and Afghanistan with them. He admires their courage and skill, but recognises that for many of these men--- fortyish, trained in skill sets that have no civilian application ---Blackwater is the alternative to being a deputy sheriff or a Wal-mart greeter, that an armoured car in an occupied city is the only place left for them.
Pelton insists that this isn't a book about politics. He's anti-Iraq War and no fan of Geo. W, but he's no fan of the Taliban or the Iraqi insurgents, either. What he cares about is finding out who the guys in Oakley sunglasses and 5.11 khakis are, and what their lives are like.
It's a book worth reading. And it does give you a sense of where war may be going in the new century.
February 18, 2010
I can't stress enough how enjoyable of a read this was. Finished it today on the subway, and wanted to immediately start tearing out important pages for further research online and through various friends/fellow students. Pelton is one of the bravest and intimidatingly curious people alive today, and he writes in detail of the lives of contractors (and related professions) who have worked with PMCs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and many other places. His political analysis is on point, as he notes mistakes, moral amiguity and misunderstandings right along with notable accomplishments or good causes, be they carried out by the left, right, capitalists, dictators... you name it.
The ultimate message is probably what you'd expect would come from someone who makes a living travelling to the most dangerous places on the planet and writing about his death-defying experiences, who has made use of independent contractors in his own life several times, but who is very careful to draw the line between "contractor" and "mercenary." Triple Canopy, Blackwater, Dyncorp, Aegis, AFRICAP, LOGCAP, KBR, Simon Mann... even maniacs like "Jack" Idema are researched and evaluated in this thorough and completely fascinating study of modern-day hired guns, their history, and the possibilities regarding their future. These guys aren't going away... so it's best to start learning more about them as early as possible. And if you've ever wanted to read something by Robert Young Pelton, this is a great spot to start.
The ultimate message is probably what you'd expect would come from someone who makes a living travelling to the most dangerous places on the planet and writing about his death-defying experiences, who has made use of independent contractors in his own life several times, but who is very careful to draw the line between "contractor" and "mercenary." Triple Canopy, Blackwater, Dyncorp, Aegis, AFRICAP, LOGCAP, KBR, Simon Mann... even maniacs like "Jack" Idema are researched and evaluated in this thorough and completely fascinating study of modern-day hired guns, their history, and the possibilities regarding their future. These guys aren't going away... so it's best to start learning more about them as early as possible. And if you've ever wanted to read something by Robert Young Pelton, this is a great spot to start.
October 31, 2008
Excellent. Presents a street level, neutral view of a controversial industry.
It should be noted what this book is not, this is not an expose on the military/nat.security contractor industry like the recenetly Spies for Hire or Blackwater. Nor is it analysis of the development of the industry in the excellent Corporate Warriors.
In a style very similar to Sebanstien Junger, Pelton presents a journalistic view of the industry from the ground up. We get to know both the men who actually man the convoys to and from Baghdad International airport (the first chapter description of a run up Highway Irish is worth the price of the book alone). We also see the dangerous hangers-on who have proliferated in this business. We also see the new breed of CEO such as R. Prince of Blackwater and Tim Spicer of Executive Outcome-Sandline--(most recently) Aegis.
The book also offers one of the best descriptions of the recently attemped coup in Equitorial Guniea.
Again this book does not attempt to explain the rise of the industry nor does it attempt to analyze all of the dangers, it does present an excellent snap shot of the people involved.
It should be noted what this book is not, this is not an expose on the military/nat.security contractor industry like the recenetly Spies for Hire or Blackwater. Nor is it analysis of the development of the industry in the excellent Corporate Warriors.
In a style very similar to Sebanstien Junger, Pelton presents a journalistic view of the industry from the ground up. We get to know both the men who actually man the convoys to and from Baghdad International airport (the first chapter description of a run up Highway Irish is worth the price of the book alone). We also see the dangerous hangers-on who have proliferated in this business. We also see the new breed of CEO such as R. Prince of Blackwater and Tim Spicer of Executive Outcome-Sandline--(most recently) Aegis.
The book also offers one of the best descriptions of the recently attemped coup in Equitorial Guniea.
Again this book does not attempt to explain the rise of the industry nor does it attempt to analyze all of the dangers, it does present an excellent snap shot of the people involved.
April 4, 2013
This book follows the rise of military contractors and their role in the post Sept 11 world. Military contractors fill a variety of roles ranging from static defence, escort, providing personal security details to hunting down insurgents. While many of these roles are traditional military ones, contractors operate on a for-profit basis and under different, often looser rules with limited accountability. In general, the book is highly readable. It could benefit from some tightening in presentation; the author has a tendency to repeat himself without adding anything new for the reader to learn. This has the net effect of confusing the reader as to the chronology of events. This aside, the questions as to the accountability and responsibilities of private armies in an increasingly complex world demand discussion by public policy-makers and the larger public (who fund these contractors with their tax dollars).
June 4, 2012
A fine report of the world of private security firms such as Blackwater, that have blossomed as the American army sought to outsource various supporting tasks that were usually done by the army itself. Particularly during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan new companies jumped to the opportunity of multibillion dollar contracts to provide security to VIPs and installations. Not only do we get the meet the big bosses, such as Blackwater owner Erik Prince, but also many often colorful characters that do the actual dirty work for a much better pay than the regular troops.
I liked this book a lot because it really delivered as promised, an interesting discovery into the world of private armies, mercenaries and the boredom and horror that goes with a job in a warzone. Particularly the reconstructions of the killing of the four Blackwater contractors in Fallujah, but also of other skirmishes made this book an intense read.
I liked this book a lot because it really delivered as promised, an interesting discovery into the world of private armies, mercenaries and the boredom and horror that goes with a job in a warzone. Particularly the reconstructions of the killing of the four Blackwater contractors in Fallujah, but also of other skirmishes made this book an intense read.
April 28, 2009
Licensed to Kill caught my eye as I picked up a book at the local library for my #1 daughter who is researching a project in support of the Patriot Act. OK, so maybe it’s the 007 aspect to killing licenses that actually put the book in my hand, but I’ve long been intrigued by the patriots at Blackwater (Xe ) and (mistakenly) thought this book would be an introduction into the lives and sacrifices of America’s private professional warrior class. Truly this book is about conflict and not just the conflict of war zones. About the author, I kept asking myself, “Is he with us, or against us?” There is certainly no shortage of controversy about the author, as further research proves. After reading this book, all I really know is that I’ve got to get me some of those Oakley sunglasses.
http://oakley.com/
http://oakley.com/
October 27, 2011
an interesting book that gives you a look into the world of security contractors. the first hand accounts and the amount of personal involvement in the research makes it more exciting and helps engross the reader in the subject matter. it also adds a bit of weight to what robert young pelton is writing as he isn't just sitting around in a room safe behind a desk writing about other people's experiences.
a few gripes i have with the book is that the writing is uneven. the subject matters seems to jump too much and not have enough connecting material to bring it together into a cohesive book. pelton also starts to retread over the same ground as the book progresses, introducing characters or companies that we met in previous chapters as if we don't remember who they are. it seems like the book could have been broken up into 3 different books.
a few gripes i have with the book is that the writing is uneven. the subject matters seems to jump too much and not have enough connecting material to bring it together into a cohesive book. pelton also starts to retread over the same ground as the book progresses, introducing characters or companies that we met in previous chapters as if we don't remember who they are. it seems like the book could have been broken up into 3 different books.
July 1, 2008
i've always been fascinated by mercenaries, are they killing because of an intrinsic need or thrill or are they now out of the army, marines, navy and find that they are only qualified to work security at walmart. if you're asking these questions too, this book will answer them for you. it covers not only the current iraq war but various other wars/ sieges. its fairly easy and entertaining reading. it gives insights to the whole Blackwater thing, for better or for worse. its tough to read the future of a lot of the soldiers that come back from a war, what skills do they really have? how will they support families? it makes the idea of mercenaries much more gray.
April 17, 2008
Comparing this book to Singer's Corporate Warriors and Scahill's Blackwater, it reads much more like an action-adventure novel than an analytical assessment of PMCs (there is virtually no documentation or citation for information). Having said that, it was more engrossing than the aforementioned, but less thorough in its analysis. The author does provide great anecdotal stories about "what's really going on" (specifically in Afghanistan and Iraq) so it gives some great color to the subject. An interesting read overall-- it gives you the sense that war zones really are the wild west.
March 31, 2017
There is only two reasons to read this book. Reason one: You know nothing about contractors and are curious for a good start point. Reason Two: You are attempting to correlate events and information with details you already know.
Seeing as I was doing neither, could not appreciate this book. The writing is not very sophistacted, the stories although interesting are dry. There is nothing thrilling about this book. The one exception is the tiny space given to the story regarding the Battle of Najaf.
Seeing as I was doing neither, could not appreciate this book. The writing is not very sophistacted, the stories although interesting are dry. There is nothing thrilling about this book. The one exception is the tiny space given to the story regarding the Battle of Najaf.
October 7, 2008
This is an interesting book about private security contractors and their role in the war on terror. Prior to reading the book the only thing I could tell you about security contracors in Iraq was that they were there. I really had no concept of what they were doing or why they were in Iraq or ever thought about. I think everyone should read it and ask yourself if it is really a good idea for private corporation to have thier own "ready made" army.
January 3, 2016
This book is a little dated as far as whats going on now, but it would be one of the best books to read to understand in a broad way what was going on during the first few years of the war on terror. It follows the "deployments" of several mercenaries from several different companies in Iraq and covers personal things about them such as how they ended up in th business as well as discussing how the field has changed and is changing.
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August 30, 2012i just finished the book, and enjoyed it greatly. I thought it was a great book. The author describes and gave real good inside to the life of a soldier i think that these people in the book are incredible, and some times get over looked by the common people like us. this was a great book and gave me a deep respect for the soldiers that defend us today.
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